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1.1 International migration 
On the 29th of September 2005, five African migrants died trying to cross from Morocco 
into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. Hundreds of migrants had been living outside the 
enclave for up to two years, and eventually tried to storm the fences separating Ceuta 
from Morocco. Some migrants were either trampled to death or died climbing over the 
barbed wire fence. Hospital staff in a nearby Moroccan city also reported that bodies 
had been brought there with wounds from rubber bullets, which are used by Spanish 
border guards. Spain, however, accused the Moroccan border guards of firing on the 
migrants (Nash, 2005; Carling, 2007a, pp.23-24; de Haas, 2008, p.1312). These were 
not isolated incidents: in total in 2005, 12,000 migrants attempted to enter Melilla alone 
(Bosch and Haddad, 2007, p.7). 
 On the 5th of October 2006, twenty African migrants drowned when their boat, 
bound for the Canary Islands, sank. In total, Spanish immigration officials estimated 
that 6,000 migrants died or went missing during 2006 attempting the sea crossing from 
the west coast of Africa to the Canary Islands. More than six times as many migrants 
attempted the crossing in 2006 compared to 2005. The boats used were flimsy, ram-
shackle structures and therefore often came into difficulty on the open seas. Most of the 
African migrants are unable to swim and therefore drown in a matter of seconds if their 
boat capsizes (BBC, 2006a; 2006b; Carling, 2007b, p.329). 
 The extensive media coverage of these events in 2005-2006 drew the attention of 
politicians and the public in Europe to international migration and its human costs. In 
particular, they highlighted two separate but related features of the migratory phenome-
non: firstly, the extent of illegal immigration to Europe; and secondly the role played by 
third countries1 (for instance their border guards) in policing Europe’s borders. 
 Developing countries’ labour forces are increasing rapidly due to high birth rates. 
As a result, there are more workers than jobs and therefore widespread unemployment 
and underemployment. At the same time, economic differences between nation states 
are widening: “The world’s gross domestic product (GDP) was $30 trillion in 2000, 
making the average per capita income $5,000 a year, but the range was from $100 per 
person in Ethiopia to $38,000 per person in Switzerland” (Martin et al., 2006, p.15). It is 
therefore not surprising that migrants will take huge risks to reach developed countries. 
Olesen (2002, p.141) estimates that emigration from a country will only begin to decline 
once a per capita income of $8,000 is reached. Links with existing communities of mi-
grants in Europe and conflict in the country of origin make it likely that future migration 
from Africa to Europe will increase rather than decrease (Carling, 2007a). 
  These various factors resulted in an exponential increase in the number of interna-
tional migrants during the second half of the twentieth century. In 1965 there were an 
estimated 75 million international migrants worldwide; by 2000, this number was esti-
mated at 150 million, although the real number is likely to be much higher due to the 
prevalence of illegal migration (Castles and Miller, 2003, p.4). Most national immigra-
tion policies of European countries, however, aim to prevent or limit permanent immi-
                                                          
1 ‘Third countries’ are understood in this thesis to be non-EU countries 
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gration, particularly of low-skilled migrants (Castles, 2006, p.744; Straubhaar, 2000, 
p.10). These developed welfare states would “go bankrupt overnight if literally every-
one could reap [the] benefits” and they therefore reject mass immigration (Joppke, 
1998, p.7). Immigration has also been an important element of public debate. Public 
opinion in developed countries is increasingly hostile to immigration, and many Euro-
pean countries have seen the emergence or growth of far-right political parties with an 
anti-immigration platform (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004, p.19). Europe and the European 
Union (EU) are popularly referred to as ‘Fortress Europe’ due to the tendency towards 
restrictive immigration policies. Most of these policies, however, fail (Boswell, 2003; 
Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004). European countries may be able to prevent migrants from 
entering legally ‘through the front door’, but migratory flows are redirected to the ‘side 
door’ (asylum and family reunification) or the ‘back door’ (illegal immigration) 
(Straubhaar, 2000, p.11). Nation states are limited in their ability to apply a restrictive 
immigration policy, for instance by an activist judiciary which applies constitutional 
norms to protect immigrants (Joppke, 1998; Guiraudon, 2000). However, electorates 
continue to be concerned with preventing illegal migration (Betts, 2011, p.35).  
 Immigration is thus clearly an important political issue in European countries, and 
yet European governments have, over the past few years, come to realise that they alone 
cannot control immigration. They have therefore sought to cooperate with the countries 
of origin of migrants in order to prevent illegal immigration (Boswell, 2003). The EU 
has also developed cooperation with third countries on migration issues (see section 
1.3). This ‘external migration policy’ of the EU is the subject of this thesis. Governing 
migration in this way brings together three sets of actors – the EU institutions, the EU 
member states, and the third countries – in a complex interaction. It is not always clear 
that these actors have the same interests (see section 1.4), so the question is how and 
why is EU external migration policy decided upon? The thesis develops a three-level 
game model to explain how and why decisions on EU external migration policy are 
made. 
1.2 International governance of migration 
As a result of the ‘gap’ between immigration policy objectives and outcomes (Cornelius 
and Tsuda, 2004), international migration has become a topic of global governance. 
Countries of destination (the developed countries) have objected to the introduction of a 
binding, UN-based system of multilateralism to regulate migration, but nevertheless 
want to influence the scope of international migration. Migration is therefore discussed 
in various international (non-binding) fora (Betts, 2011; Lavenex and Kunz, 2008), as 
illustrated in figure 1.1. These include the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), the Global 
Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), and the Berne Initiative (Lavenex, 
2011, p.7). International migration governance is also ‘embedded’ in numerous other 
areas of public international law, such as human rights law, humanitarian law, WTO 
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law, maritime law and labour law (Betts, 2011). Numerous international organisations 
deal with migration, such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Geiger and Pécoud, 2010). Migration 
is reflected in aspects of the work of several other international organisations, such as 
the International Labour Organisation, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UNHCR), the UN Population Fund, and the World Bank (Betts, 2011).  
 Migration is also increasingly the subject of trans-regional governance (ibid.). De-
veloped countries, concerned to prevent illegal migration, seek “to find ways to exert 
direct and indirect extra-territorial control over migration from and among ‘sending’ 
states in the developing world” (p.29). One way in which this has been achieved is by 
fostering the creation of regional consultative processes (RCPs) to “facilitate the devel-
opment of ‘good practice’ and to allow coordination of policies between states” (p.33). 
By 2001 IOM counted eleven (non-binding) RCPs dealing with migration (Castles and 
Miller, 2003, p.12). These include the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (part of 
the Southern African Development Community; SADC) and the Migration Dialogue for 
Western Africa (part of the Economic Community of West African States; ECOWAS) 
(Lavenex, 2011, p.16). These regions then become linked with European countries in a 
migration dialogue. One example is the EU-AU (European Union-African Union) Joint 
Declaration on Migration and Development (Betts, 2011, p.37). 
 At the national level of European countries, immigration has become an important 
issue of public and political debate. Before the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, 
immigration was seen by citizens of EU countries as one of the top issues facing their 
country, behind economic, health, and public safety issues (Eurobarometer, 2008a). 
Even after the onset of the crisis, immigration is still seen as a more important issue 
than pensions, terrorism and education (Eurobarometer, 2009). Economists point out 
that labour immigration has positive effects for a country, such as boosting productivity 
and growth, and contributing to innovation. However, ideas about the negative impacts 
of immigration are still marshalled in public debates (Boswell and Geddes, 2011, p.87). 
These ideas include the possibility that labour immigration leads to a downward pres-
sure on the salaries of indigenous workers, and that some sectors such as domestic work 
and construction will be particularly affected because these types of workers compete 
with immigrants for jobs (pp.86-87). Some political parties have seized on these ideas. 
Particularly since the 1990s, radical right-wing parties, propagating an anti-immigration 
message, have gained electoral success in Europe. Indeed, they have formed part of 
government coalitions in Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway (de 
Lange, 2008). It is thus hardly surprising that immigration, and particularly issues of 
border control, have become important topics for European governments.  
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Figure 1.1: Global migration governance structures 
 
European countries have therefore, alongside the regional processes outlined above, 
become involved in bilateral migration agreements with migrant-sending countries 
(Adepoju et al., 2010). Such partnerships generally “include agreements between gov-
ernments to better regulate migration” (Migration DRC, 2008). The “most high profile 
bilateral partnerships have been Italy-Libya, France-Mali, France-Senegal, Denmark-
Kenya, and the UK-Tanzania” (Betts, 2011, p.37). Agreements cover illegal migration 
and/or legal migration. Nigeria, for instance, has signed bilateral agreements with mul-
tiple European countries on illegal migration: the agreement with Ireland concerns the 
readmission of illegal migrants; the agreements with Spain and the United Kingdom 
(UK) aim to prevent trafficking of human beings; and the agreement with Italy con-
cerned capacity-building in the area of illegal migration, through the donation of 
equipment and goods by Italy to Nigeria (Adepoju et al., 2010, pp.49-50). Agreements 
on legal migration are often related to cooperation on illegal migration; Italy, for in-
stance, granted Nigeria a quota for legal migration in 2002, in recognition of Nigerian 
cooperation on preventing illegal migration (p.53). France has long linked migration to 
development policy (which the government calls ‘co-development’, involving existing 
networks of migrants); with Mali, for instance, a Consultation on Migration was estab-
lished in 2000, allowing for regular discussion on the integration of Malians in France 
and cooperative development projects in Malian regions affected by emigration (pp.63-
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64; Martin et al., 2006, p.136). This trend has not been limited to EU countries: in 2008, 
Switzerland created a legal basis for establishing migration partnerships with third 
countries. These partnerships, which can be either binding international treaties or non-
binding memoranda of understanding, are composed of projects or programmes on 
migration, covering topics such as voluntary return, reintegration of migrants, preven-
tion of smuggling and trafficking of human beings, visa facilitation, capacity-building in 
partner countries, migration and development, and exchanges in the fields of education 
and training (Rittener et al., 2011). 
 The result of these regional and bilateral agreements is a patchwork of connections 
between different countries. Italy and Libya, for instance, are connected on migration 
through the EU’s relationship with Libya, the EU-AU cooperation on migration, the 
5+5 dialogue (on migration in the Western Mediterranean), and the bilateral readmis-
sion agreement between Libya and Italy (Betts, 2011, p.30). These various migration 
agreements constitute an ‘externalisation’ of migration control, whereby control has 
shifted further away from the borders of European countries (this has also been termed 
‘remote control’) (Lavenex, 2009a, p.334). European countries experience difficulties 
expelling migrants from their territory, so for a restrictive immigration policy to be 
effective it is better to prevent ‘illegal’ migrants from arriving on the territory in the first 
place (Guiraudon, 2000). For this, European countries rely to an ever greater extent on 
third countries to carry out border controls (Samers, 2004; Wunderlich, 2010).  
1.3 EU external migration policy  
Ever since its inception, citizens of the European Economic Community (EEC) (as the 
EU was then called) have had the right of free movement throughout the territory of the 
community.2 This was one of the ‘four freedoms’ (free movement of goods, capital, 
services and people) upon which the internal market should be based. This freedom has 
developed over time, most significantly with the Schengen Treaty. In 1985, the gov-
ernments of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands agreed in this 
treaty to gradually abolish border controls between themselves. With the signing of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the Schengen Agreement was incorporated into EU law, 
and as of July 2013 the borderless Schengen area consists of 22 EU member states3 and 
4 non-EU countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). 
 The free movement of EU citizens has inevitably brought an EU dimension to mi-
gration policy. Writing in 1991, the Commission argued that “in a Community where 
there will no longer be passport checks at the internal borders, it is essential that this 
new freedom is not misused to bypass the legal/administrative system established to 
                                                          
2 This thesis is not concerned with this original ‘internal’ migration policy of the EU. While this has been 
relevant in bringing about an EU dimension to migration policy, this thesis understands ‘migration policy’ as 
addressing third country nationals (non-EU citizens). 
3 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
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control immigration” (Commission, 1991, p.4). In an EU with no internal border con-
trols, member states may face disadvantages from the disparities between their immigra-
tion policies. A member state with a restrictive immigration policy may find that mi-
grants enter the EU through a neighbouring member state, then cross an internal border 
with relative ease to take up illegal residence on the territory of the first member state 
(Straubhaar, 2000, p.13). There is therefore a rationale for a common EU migration 
policy. 
 The member states and the European institutions have been gradually constructing 
a common EU migration policy for some thirty years now (see e.g. Guiraudon, 2003; 
Lahav and Messina, 2005; Lavenex, 2009b; de Lobkowicz, 1994; Messina, 2007; Stet-
ter, 2000; Walters, 2010). Building on intergovernmental cooperation in fora such as the 
Trevi Group and the Ad Hoc Immigration Group during the 1970s and 1980s, the Maas-
tricht treaty designated migration and asylum as “matters of common interest” (article 
K.1). The Amsterdam Treaty formally delegated powers over asylum and migration to 
the EU level and the Lisbon Treaty extended the use of qualified majority voting and 
co-decision with the European Parliament. Since the European Council meeting in 
Tampere in 1999, the EU adopts 5-year programmes for justice and home affairs (JHA) 
policy: the Tampere programme for 1999-2004, the Hague Programme for 2005-2009, 
and the Stockholm Programme for 2010-2014. EU policy documents replicate the dis-
course of national immigration policies by focusing on the prevention of illegal migra-
tion and enhancing related measures such as border controls (see e.g. Bendel, 2007; 
Bouteillet-Paquet, 2003; Guiraudon, 2000; Haddad, 2008; Walters, 2010). Several doc-
uments refer to the ‘fight against illegal immigration’ (e.g. Commission, 2008a; 2006a; 
Council, 2003). 
 In recent years the ‘external dimension’ of EU migration policy has become in-
creasingly emphasised (see e.g. Bosch and Haddad, 2007; Haddad, 2008; Lavenex and 
Uçarer, 2004; Sterkx, 2008). External migration policy can be defined as a policy 
whereby third countries are drawn in to agreements, information exchanges, cooperation 
mechanisms or negotiations with the EU on migration issues. In this way, “third coun-
tries . . . take partial responsibility for managing migratory flows” (Rodier, 2006, p.6). 
The EU thereby “move[s] control of the borders beyond the borders themselves” (ibid.) 
by involving third countries in the control of immigration (see also Lavenex, 2006, 
p.330). In other words, migration policy is integrated into foreign policy (see e.g. Coun-
cil, 2002a, p.10). This is different from internal migration policy, which is decided with-
in the EU even if it impacts on third countries. So the requirements for obtaining a 
Schengen visa would be an instance of internal migration policy, because these re-
quirements are determined within the EU. A visa facilitation agreement would be an 
instance of external migration policy, because such an agreement is signed by both the 
EU and the third country concerned. The Lisbon treaty provided a legal basis for EU 
external migration policy in article 78(2)g which states that measures shall be adopted 
on “partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing in-
flows of people”. 
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This link between migration policy and foreign policy has long been made at the EU 
level – for instance, already in 1991 the Commission called for migration to be inte-
grated into EU external policy (Commission, 1991). However, it was with the Tampere 
programme that the external dimension of EU migration policy began to gain in impor-
tance. The Tampere programme (1999-2004) called for a common EU asylum and mi-
gration policy to be based on, among other elements, partnership with countries of ori-
gin (Council, 1999a). In a 2001 communication, the Commission acknowledged the 
importance of linking migration policy and foreign policy: 
bearing in mind that any action to counter irregular migratory flows should take 
place as close as possible to the irregular migrants concerned, the EU should pro-
mote actions in, and support actions of, countries of origin and transit . . . To that 
end, migration issues should be integrated in the existing partnerships, which are 
the general framework of our relations with third countries (Commission, 2001a, 
pp.3-8). 
In order for migration policies to be effective, the Commission emphasised that it is 
necessary to cooperate with third countries (Commission, 2006b, p.4). To support this 
policy discourse, an EU fund for migration-related action (budget line B7-667) was 
created in 2001 (Haddad, 2008, p.192). This was replaced by the Aeneas programme 
(2004-2006) and afterwards by the Thematic Programme for Cooperation with Third 
Countries in the areas of Migration and Asylum (since 2007). In the wake of events in 
Ceuta and Melilla, the European Council informal meeting at Hampton Court in Octo-
ber 2005 underscored again that responses to illegal migration must be based on coop-
eration with countries of origin (Bosch and Haddad, 2007, p.8). In December 2005, the 
Council (following a Commission communication) adopted the Global Approach to 
Migration (GAM). One of the pillars of the approach was to be dialogue with African 
countries (Council, 2005a), given the events that year in Ceuta and Melilla (Weinar, 
2011, p.5). By 2006, the Commission declared that “migration is at the heart of the 
political debate in Europe and is one of the strategic priorities in the external relations of 
the Union” (Commission, 2006b, p.3). 
 The tools of the EU’s external migration policy have been multi-faceted, including 
both legally binding and non-legally binding measures (see Poli, 2012). Arguably the 
first tools of external migration policy were the action plans produced by the High Level 
Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG). These action plans concerned the 
migration situation in selected third countries (Sterkx, 2008). Clauses on migration have 
been included in broader international agreements, such as Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements, Association Agreements, and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
(PCAs). The Actions Plans on JHA issues concluded with neighbouring countries under 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have also addressed migration. Cooperation 
with third countries has also been operational in nature, such as capacity-building mis-
sions to train third countries’ border guards, and information campaigns in third coun-
tries to warn migrants of the dangers of illegal migration (Boswell, 2003, pp.626-627; 
Sterkx, 2008, p.123).  
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Next to international cooperation on JHA more broadly, the EU has also concluded 
agreements specifically related to migration. The most important examples of such 
agreements are readmission agreements and visa facilitation agreements. Readmission 
agreements were the original cornerstone of EU external migration policy, and are still 
the only tool explicitly regulated by law (Hernández i Sagrera and Korneev, 2012, p.4). 
Article 79(3) TFEU gives the EU the competence to “conclude agreements with third 
countries for the readmission to their countries of origin or provenance of third-country 
nationals who do not or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or resi-
dence in the territory of one of the Member States”. In 2002 the Council recommended 
criteria to be taken into consideration when selecting third countries for readmission 
agreements: the migratory pressure from the country; countries with an association or 
cooperation agreement; neighbouring countries; the potential for added value resulting 
from a readmission agreement; and the geographical balance between countries and 
regions of origin and transit (Council, 2002b). Significantly, EU readmission agree-
ments go beyond the requirements of international law by obligating signatories also to 
take back third-country nationals or stateless persons if these transited through their 
territory on their way to the EU (Trauner and Kruse, 2008a; Coleman, 2009; Panizzon, 
2012).  
 Article 77(2(a)) TFEU gives the EU the competence to set “the common policy on 
visas and other short-stay residence permits”. Regulation 539/2001 sets out lists of those 
countries whose nationals do and do not require short-stay visas to enter the EU.4 In the 
Hague programme (2005-2009), the European Council invited “the Council and the 
Commission to examine . . . whether in the context of the EC readmission policy it 
would be opportune to facilitate, on a case by case basis, the issuance of short-stay visas 
to third-country nationals” (Council, 2004a, p.18). Visa facilitation agreements can cap 
the price of a visa, set a deadline within which member states must issue a visa to citi-
zens of the third country, and facilitate the issuance of multiple-entry visas to certain 
groups in society (e.g. members of parliament) (Trauner and Kruse, 2008a).  
 These two instruments have been linked: several policy documents by the Commis-
sion and Council make clear that third countries will only be offered a visa facilitation 
agreement once they have signed a readmission agreement (e.g. Council, 2005b, p.3). 
However, member states have been reluctant to “close a door on irregular immigration 
only to open a window on new potential irregular flows of visa overstayers, already the 
largest category of irregular migrants in the EU” (Roig and Huddleston, 2007, p.377). 
Therefore the link between readmission and visa facilitation agreements is not auto-
matic: 10 of 18 readmission agreements in place by February 2011 had been linked to a 
visa facilitation agreement (Commission, 2011c). 
 In the mid-2000s the policy discourse on migration policy and foreign policy was 
complemented by reference to development policy. In 2003 the Council declared that 
“an effective and coherent development policy is an essential part of an effective migra-
tion policy” (Council, 2003, p.4). A 2005 communication from the Commission high-
                                                          
4 Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 
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lighted the main policy areas which should be incorporated into migration policy in 
order to contribute to development: facilitating migrants’ financial transfers to their 
countries of origin; better links between countries of origin and their emigrant commu-
nities; encouraging migrants to return (temporarily) to their countries of origin to foster 
the transfer of skills to developing countries; and preventing the emigration from devel-
oping countries of skills/professions that are in short supply there (Commission, 2005a). 
Migration is one of the policy areas covered by the EU’s reports on policy coherence for 
development (e.g. Commission, 2009a). The thematic programme for cooperation with 
third countries in the areas of migration and asylum, which focuses on capacity-building 
in third countries, is funded through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
(Commission, 2011a). 
 Clearly much has changed in EU migration policy – from the beginnings of an 
internal migration policy for EU citizens, to the construction of a common migration 
and asylum policy, and most recently linking this policy area with foreign policy and 
development policy. 
1.4 Research question 
The previous section outlined the incremental development of an external migration 
policy at the EU level. The member states have gradually allowed the EU institutions to 
become involved in migration policy more generally, and together the member states (in 
the Council) and the Commission have agreed that it is important for the EU to cooper-
ate with third countries if its migration policy is to be effective. This introduces yet 
another set of actors to the governance of migration, namely the third countries with 
which such cooperation should take place. EU external migration policy thus incorpo-
rates several different actors. This section presents two puzzles regarding the role and 
interests of these actors in participating in such policies. These puzzles guide the over-
arching research question of this thesis (see sub-section 1.4.3). 
1.4.1 First puzzle: the member states and the EU institutions 
External migration policy sits at the crossroads of migration policy and foreign policy. 
These are two policy areas which are politically sensitive and important to a state’s 
sovereignty. This raises questions about the process of decision-making between the 
various EU institutions and the member states which leads to the adoption of measures 
in external migration policy. 
 Despite the incremental development of a common migration policy (as outlined 
above), there has been some tension within the EU (between the EU institutions and the 
member states) concerning the scope and content of such a policy. Although the Treaty 
of Rome provided for the free movement of EEC citizens, agreement on measures re-
lated to immigration from outside of the EU has been much more difficult (Geddes, 
2001). Particularly control over who enters a country’s territory “is often seen as one of 
the last bastions of national sovereignty” (Lavenex, 2011, p.2). Some legislation on 
 25 
legal migration has been passed at the EU level, concerning for example the admission 
of highly-skilled workers, students and researchers, and the rights of long-term resident 
third-country nationals in the EU including their right to family reunification. However, 
labour immigration has been a particularly contentious issue. In 2001 the Commission 
proposed a directive on the admission of third country nationals (of all skill levels) but 
this was withdrawn in 2006 due to opposition in the Council. In 2007 the Commission 
proposed a new directive on a single permit for third country nationals wishing to work 
and reside in the EU. The directive was finally agreed after two readings in December 
2011 (directive 2011/98/EU), although it is still “without prejudice to the Member 
States’ powers concerning the admission of third-country nationals to their labour mar-
kets” (article 1(b)). This reluctance of the member states to cede control to the EU level 
on labour migration has been codified in the treaties: article 79 (5) TFEU states that 
“this Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes of admis-
sion of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to 
seek work”. 
 Foreign policy is often said to be at the core of national identity and national sover-
eignty. EU member states have, over the years, come to conduct a significant proportion 
of their foreign policy objectives through the EU context (Manners and Whitman, 
2000a, p.243) and some scholars argue that a ‘coordination reflex’ has emerged 
amongst diplomats of EU member states, implying that working patterns have changed 
as a result of EU membership (Nuttall, 1992). As evidence, William Wallace (2005, 
p.454) notes that EU member states take a common line on more than 90% of votes 
taken in international organisations. However, foreign policy ultimately remains the 
preserve of national sovereignty (Featherstone, 2003, p.11). Member states have re-
mained reluctant “to submit their diplomacy to the strait-jacket of EU decision-making . 
. . Individual states have maintained distinct national foreign policies” (Tonra and Chris-
tiansen, 2004, p.1). In many cases the member states simply lack the political will to 
agree a common EU approach to an issue or a region, preferring instead to prioritise 
their national interests (Cameron, 2003, p.124; Wagner, 2003, p.589). Member states 
have privileged relationships with different third countries, depending on their own 
historical, geographical or linguistic situation. It is therefore not surprising that their 
foreign policy priorities differ. The most spectacular example of the EU’s foreign policy 
falling apart due to different national interests was the disagreement over the war in Iraq 
in 2003. 
 In external migration policy, migration policy concerns meet foreign policy con-
cerns. Given the sensitivities involved in these two policy areas, it might be expected 
that no progress can be made at the EU level on external migration policy. The combi-
nation of different migration policies and different foreign policy interests of the mem-
ber states will make agreement within the EU impossible. And yet some measures have 
been agreed. An external borders agency (Frontex) has been established to coordinate 
operational cooperation between the member states. The Commission concludes EU 
readmission and visa facilitation agreements with third countries, based on negotiating 
mandates issued by the member states in the Council. Several EU policy documents 
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highlight the complementarity between EU and member state actions in the area of 
migration (e.g. Council, 2005a, p.9). These are tentative steps towards a common exter-
nal migration policy, and EU policy documents continue to emphasise that actions will 
be taken according to the division of competences between the EU and its member 
states. In the Commission’s 2011 communication on the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM), for instance, mobility from partner countries is to be encour-
aged whilst “fully respecting Member States’ competence to manage their labour mar-
kets” (Commission, 2011b, p.12). 
 This raises questions about the governance of EU external migration policy: when 
is a common policy possible? Under which circumstances do member states accept 
measures to be taken at the EU level? When are the EU institutions able to play a role, 
and when are they side-lined? 
1.4.2 Second puzzle: cooperation between third countries and the EU 
Cooperation with third countries has been emphasised as a central aspect of EU migra-
tion policy. Cooperation with third countries has obvious benefits for EU member 
states: “it reduces the burden of control at their immediate borders and increases the 
chances of curtailing unwanted inflows before they reach the common territory” (Lave-
nex, 2006, p.337). Once a migrant reaches the territory of an EU member state there are 
legal and constitutional constraints in place which makes their removal difficult. From a 
migration control point of view, it is therefore preferable to prevent their entry in the 
first place (p.338), by cooperating with the countries of origin of these migrants. How-
ever, in many cases the interests of these third countries on migration issues are very 
different to those of the EU and its member states. Whereas the EU is primarily con-
cerned with the prevention of illegal migration, “sub-Saharan African countries are not 
necessarily interested in curbing the migration of their own citizens and are not inter-
ested in cooperation on readmission of non-nationals, fearing the impact it may have on 
their capacity to deal with migration flows” (Weinar, 2011, p.7l; cf. Coleman, 2009; 
Lavenex, 2006). Readmission is costly for the readmitting state: “repatriation nearly 
always constitutes the loss of vital foreign currency [in remittances] . . . the return of 
émigrés regularly puts further pressure on already-saturated labour markets . . . [and] 
reintegration can pose significant social challenges where deportees have engaged in 
criminal or ‘subversive’ political activity abroad or where migrants return with only a 
rudimentary knowledge of their ‘native’ language and culture” (Ellermann, 2008, 
p.171). Cooperating with the EU in preventing their citizens from moving affects the 
sovereignty of these third countries and is unpopular with the local populations 
(Wunderlich, 2010, p.251). Third countries are particularly opposed to the obligation 
contained in EU readmission agreements to readmit also stateless persons and other 
nationals that have transited through their territory. Opposition to this clause has caused 
negotiations on readmission agreements with Turkey and Morocco, in particular, to drag 
on (Panizzon, 2012, p.117). The Commission has recommended that this obligation 
should be removed in order to ease the process of negotiation with third countries 
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(Commission, 2011c), but the member states in the Council have insisted that this 
clause must be maintained (Council, 2011a; Council, 2004a; Coleman, 2009, p.166).5 
 The Commission recognises that it is, therefore, necessary to offer third countries 
an incentive to cooperate with the EU and to secure in particular the conclusion of re-
admission agreements (e.g. Commission, 2011c; 2002a; 2002b). The problem is that the 
incentives on offer in return for cooperation are not very significant – generally only 
some funding and the prospect of a “more favourable international reputation” (Eller-
mann, 2008, p.171). Signing a readmission agreement is no guarantee that a third coun-
try will be offered a visa facilitation agreement (Council, 2005b). Indeed, the “readmis-
sion-relevant ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific] states currently do not fully meet 
the criteria and/or standards that would allow linking readmission agreements with 
visas” (Klavert and van Seters, 2012, p.3). The EU also lacks the competence over im-
migration and labour migration policy to offer such incentives in return for signing a 
readmission agreement (Panizzon, 2012, p.119). Ellermann (2008, p.171; cf. Martin et 
al., 2006, p.123) argues that such incentives are anyway not adequate and that more 
concrete benefits, such as the prospect of EU membership, are required. EU member-
ship is, however, clearly not on offer to all third countries. 
 This raises questions about the external governance of migration policy: under 
which circumstances do third countries choose to cooperate with the EU on migration 
policy? Given that their interests are very different from the EU, what role are they able 
to play in the policy-making process? 
1.4.3 Research question 
The overarching research question of this research is:  
How does the interaction between EU institutions, member states and third coun-
tries shape the governance of the EU’s external migration policy?  
This research question is divided into four sub-questions: 
- What was the role of the EU institutions and the member states in the negotiation of 
the Mobility Partnerships? (puzzle 1) 
- What implications does this have for the form of the partnerships? (puzzle 1) 
- Why do some member states choose to participate in the Mobility Partnerships while 
others do not? (puzzle 1) 
- Why do third countries choose to join a Mobility Partnership? (puzzle 2) 
The study thus brings together the two puzzles of decision-making within the EU (be-
tween the EU institutions and the member states) and between the EU and third coun-
tries. Chapter 2 argues that, in order to understand how EU external migration policy is 
made, it is necessary to conceptualise the process of decision-making as a three-level 
game. The decision-making process is a three-level game because three groups of actors 
are involved: the member states; the EU institutions; and the third countries. However, 
simply indicating the existence of these three different levels of actors is not adequate 
                                                          
5 Despite the fact that varying use is made of this clause by member states: some member states only ever 
return migrants to their country of origin (Klavert and van Seters, 2012, p.2). 
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for understanding policy outcomes: it is necessary to understand how the three levels 
are connected and what the conditions are for agreements to be reached. Within this 
three-level game, the focus is on the two sets of interactions involving the EU: firstly 
between the member states and the EU institutions, and secondly between the EU and 
the third country. These two interactions are linked, as the outcome of the first interac-
tion becomes the subject of negotiation in the second interaction. This does not mean, 
however, that the interaction between EU member states and third countries is irrele-
vant. It will be shown that this interaction can affect third countries’ decisions on 
whether or not to cooperate with the EU on migration issues (chapter 6). However, 
given that the thesis attempts to account for the outcomes of EU external migration 
policy, the EU-member state and EU-third country interactions structure the empirical 
chapters. 
 The following section gives a brief overview of the research conducted on EU 
migration policy so far, in order to situate this research in the body of literature. It 
shows that scholars have tended to focus either on interactions between the EU institu-
tions and the member states, or on interactions between the EU and third countries. To 
date, these levels of analysis have not been combined. And yet, without understanding 
how the different interactions within the process of decision-making are linked, it will 
not be possible to understand fully how or why the EU cooperates with third countries 
on migration issues. 
1.5 Research on EU migration policy 
A growing body of scholarship deals with the governance of the EU’s migration policy. 
This scholarship can be divided according to the puzzles presented above: contributions 
concern either the ‘internal’ or ‘external’ dimension of decision-making. 
 Many of the contributions on the internal governance of EU migration policy out-
line the historical development of this policy area and the roles of the member states and 
EU institutions in the policy-making process (e.g. Geddes, 2003; Guiraudon, 2003; 
Luedtke, 2006; Menz, 2011; Papagianni, 2006; Walters, 2010). Generally, authors con-
clude that the Commission and European Parliament have gained increased competence 
over time (e.g. Papagianni, 2006; Uçarer, 2001). Despite this extension of competences 
of the EU institutions, “national representatives have maintained strong control over the 
policy process” (Schain, 2009, p.101). For this reason, several authors examine member 
states’ preferences on EU migration policy. Guiraudon (2000) argues that member 
states’ governments engage in ‘venue-shopping’: in other words, they choose the policy 
venue most suitable to achieve their policy objectives. The EU level is ‘used’ to achieve 
a more restrictive policy than that which would be possible at the national level (due to 
constitutional protections for migrants, enforced by domestic courts and advocated by 
pressure groups). Member states may also push for the inclusion in EU law of provi-
sions that allow them some room for manoeuvre, such as the setting of only minimum 
standards. Alternatively, member states may attempt to maintain control over migration 
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policy by exporting their vision of migration law to the EU level (Barbou des Places and 
Oger, 2005).  
 In terms of policy content, EU migration policy is often said to be ‘restrictive’, 
favouring controls on immigration and low minimum standards for migrants’ rights 
(e.g. Bendel, 2005; Huysmans, 2000; Schain, 2010; 2009). Readmission agreements, for 
example, have been interpreted as an attempt by the member states to transfer their 
responsibility for treating asylum requests to countries outside the EU, often with lower 
levels of protection than that granted by EU member states (Bouteillet-Paquet, 2003, 
p.360). Several authors argue that restrictive policies are a result of the constellation of 
decision-making in the EU: officials from interior ministries dominate the Council 
working groups, so that the Council has a rather restrictive focus. Both the Commission 
and European Parliament favour a more liberal policy, but the Council only approves 
policy proposals which are restrictive (Schain, 2009; Barbou des Places and Oger, 2005; 
Lavenex, 2006). In truth, the picture is somewhat more nuanced. Servent (2010) argues 
that the European Parliament, despite its image as pro-migrants’ rights, deliberately did 
not push through a liberal policy on the returns directive. The reason for this was the 
desire for the Parliament to prove itself as a responsible partner of the Council in the co-
decision legislative procedure. The Parliament is often assumed to have an integrationist 
stance on most policy issues, yet Lahav and Messina (2005) find that support amongst 
MEPs for the communitarisation of migration policy has actually decreased. The Com-
mission is also not uniformly liberal: Lavenex and Kunz (2008, p.443) argue that the 
then-Directorate General (DG) JLS (Justice, Freedom and Security) tended to align with 
the interior ministers in the Council. DGs Relex (External Relations) and Development, 
on the other hand, aim to prevent the use of development funding for migration pur-
poses (Boswell, 2003, p.626). Some scholars also dispute the commonly-held notion 
that EU migration policy is becoming ‘securitised’: Boswell (2007) shows that the 9/11 
terrorist attacks did not lead to a link being made between terrorism and immigration in 
policy discourses in Europe. 
 The literature on the external dimension of EU migration policy focuses on two 
main aspects: (i) the nature of external migration policy and the decision-making proc-
ess that produces such policies (though without considering member states’ domestic 
preferences), and (ii) case studies of particular (groups of) third countries or particular 
instruments of the EU’s external migration policy.  
 Chou (2006) defines two approaches to EU external migration policy: a ‘compre-
hensive’ approach and a ‘coercive’ approach.6 A comprehensive approach to migration 
“takes into consideration the needs of all three parties involved (EU member states, 
sending countries and the migrants) and attempts to reach a balanced distribution of 
risks and benefits among all three” (p.2). A coercive approach, on the other hand, “uses 
development aid or related incentives in exchange for third countries’ cooperation in 
achieving EU migration objectives, such as the tackling of irregular migration” (ibid.). 
Chou argues that the coercive approach is favoured by the EU, due to the role of the 
                                                          
6 In another contribution the distinction is between ‘repressive’ and ‘progressive’ measures (Chou, 2009a). 
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different actors in the decision-making process on migration policy. She highlights the 
following factors: migration policy remains a sensitive issue for the member states, so 
they play a significant role in the production of policy proposals by the Commission; 
unanimous voting in the Council results in security-driven policies favoured by the 
member states; and officials of national interior ministries dominate the decision-
making process through the JHA Council and the HLWG (pp.15-19; cf. Chou, 2009a; 
Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). However, she treats ‘the member states’ as a group, rather 
than separate entities that may have different preferences. Boswell (2008; cf. Sterkx, 
2008; Lavenex and Kunz, 2008) examines the Commission and shows that the different 
DGs in the Commission have had very different preferences on the external dimension 
of EU migration policy: DG (Directorate-General) JLS was quick to adopt the new 
policy agenda, whereas DGs Relex and Development were much more reticent. Louis 
Michel, the Commissioner for Development from 2004 to 2009, had a liberal view of 
migration and favoured mobility of all people. This is in stark contrast to the prefer-
ences of DG JLS and the member states in the Council (Boswell, 2008, p.505).  
 The EU’s external migration policy differs depending on the third countries con-
cerned. Uçarer and Lavenex (2002) define four circles of countries, ranging from those 
closest to the EU to those furthest away: Western European non-EU countries; candi-
date countries for EU membership; the Mediterranean and Balkan countries; and all 
other countries that have concluded agreements with the EU that incorporate migration. 
Some academic contributions consist of case studies of particular third countries and 
their migration relations with the EU. Kruse (2006) examines the impact of the EU’s 
readmission policy on Albania. Despite concerns of the Albanian government about the 
scope of the agreement, the long-term EU membership perspective was an important 
factor which eased the negotiations. Betts and Milner (2007) show that financial in-
ducement may not be sufficient to secure African countries’ cooperation on asylum 
issues. Coleman (2009) describes the process of readmission negotiations with Mo-
rocco, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Macao, Ukraine, Albania, Algeria, 
China, Turkey, the Western Balkans and Moldova. He identifies different strategies by 
the third countries to counter a readmission agreement which they are not keen to ac-
cept. Algeria, for instance, has managed to delay the opening of readmission negotia-
tions. Ukraine and Russia monitor each other’s negotiations with the EU in order to 
insist on the same compromises (pp.184-185). 
 This overview of the literature on EU migration policy clearly shows a cleavage: 
the literature on the internal and external dimension of decision-making is kept separate, 
rather than being analysed together. The internal governance literature examines the 
member states and the EU institutions, but does not include third countries’ interests 
and preferences. The external governance literature which considers the EU institutions 
tends to black-box the third countries, and that which considers the interests of third 
countries is not nuanced about member states’ interests. Generally, most contributions 
concern policy-making at the EU level, focusing on the EU institutions and their inter-
actions with either the member states or third countries. No contribution to date at-
tempts to ‘open the black box’ by examining both member states’ and third countries’ 
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preferences, and linking them through the EU level. And yet EU external migration 
policy is a story of three sets of actors: the EU institutions, the member states, and the 
third countries. The interests and role of all these actors must be considered for a com-
plete understanding of the policy-making process. An understanding of the interaction 
between the EU institutions and the member states might explain the policy content and 
why member states favour/do not favour such a policy, but it will not explain why third 
countries choose to cooperate with the EU or not. An understanding of the interaction 
between the EU and the third countries might explain why cooperation is successful or 
unsuccessful, but it obscures the fact that member states play a central role in shaping 
the policy that is the subject of this cooperation. 
 This is a young body of literature, due to the fact that the EU has only recently 
gained extensive competences in migration policy. Scholars have therefore taken the 
first steps towards mapping the governance of EU migration policy. They have identi-
fied the three levels of actors that are important. This research contributes to this body 
of literature by taking the next logical step: conceptualising how these different actors 
are linked in the decision-making procedure, in order to explain policy outcomes. Chap-
ter 2 argues that this process should be understood as a three-level game. The following 
section introduces the policy instrument which will form the object of the study. 
1.6 Case study: the Mobility Partnerships 
This thesis concerns a particular element of the EU’s external migration policy, namely 
the Mobility Partnerships in the time period 2006-2009. The partnerships are one of the 
tools of the GAM, adopted in 2005. This section begins by briefly outlining the nature 
of the other tools of the Global Approach, before explaining the concept of the Mobility 
Partnerships. 
 The tools of the Global Approach include migration missions, cooperation plat-
forms on migration and development, and migration profiles (Council, 2009b, p.61). 
Migration missions and cooperation platforms both aim to foster cooperation between 
the EU (Commission and member states) and the authorities of non-EU countries. Since 
2006, the EU has conducted approximately four migration missions per year to third 
countries (Weinar, 2011, p.10). By 2011, migration missions had been conducted in 10 
Sub-Saharan African countries7 and 5 Eastern European countries8 (Commission, 
2011d). The aim of migration missions is to “explore the potential of establishing or 
deepening dialogue and practical cooperation on migration and mobility with third 
countries” (Council, 2012a, p.3). A migration mission takes the form of an initial meet-
ing between EU and senior government representatives from the third countries con-
cerned. This is followed by a larger meeting with all government stakeholders, as well 
as a separate meeting with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Council, 2007a, 
p.6). Past migration missions have been co-chaired by the Commission and the Presi-
                                                          
7 Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania. 
8 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine. 
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dency of the Council, and have included representatives of interested member states, up 
to a maximum of 12 participants for practical reasons (Council, 2012a, p.6). Following 
a mission, a joint report is sent to the HLWG for discussion, and the local EU delega-
tion and Presidency of the Council organise a follow-up meeting and write a work plan, 
which is also sent to the HLWG (Council, 2008a, 3).  
 Migration missions may result in the establishment of a cooperation platform on 
migration and development (Council, 2007a, p.10); this has been the case in Ethiopia 
and South Africa (Commission, 2009b, p.3). The idea of the cooperation platform is “to 
strengthen cooperation on migration between actors in a country or region and to inter-
vene more effectively in the best interests of all” (Commission, 2011d). The cooperation 
platform therefore institutionalises the dialogue established by the migration mission, 
and in addition may be a regional initiative between the EU and more than one third 
country. Platforms may also involve international organisations (Council, 2008a, p.6). 
Cooperation platforms also supervise the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships – 
a cooperation platform for the Mobility Partnership with Moldova was set up in 2008 
(Commission, 2009c, p.7).  
 Migration profiles provide information on the migratory situation in a third country 
(Bosch and Haddad, 2007) and thus form the basis for the dialogue which may be estab-
lished by a migration mission or cooperation platform (Commission, 2011d). Migration 
profiles are more unilateral instruments as they are not explicitly based on dialogue with 
partner countries’ governments. Other tools have also been used in migration coopera-
tion with third countries. In Mali, for instance, the EU has established a Migration In-
formation and Management Centre which provides information to Malians wanting to 
emigrate or return from abroad. The experiences acquired with the centre in Mali should 
be used to develop Migration and Mobility Resource Centres in other countries (Com-
mission, 2011b, p.14). 
 The Mobility Partnerships were introduced in 2007 and aim to “identify novel 
approaches to improve the management of legal movements of people between the EU 
and third countries” (Commission, 2007a, p.2). They will “take into account the current 
state of the EU’s relations with the third country concerned as well as the general ap-
proach towards it in EU external relations” (ibid.). Mobility Partnerships therefore 
clearly belong to the external dimension of EU migration policy. They will be negoti-
ated “with third countries that have committed themselves to cooperating actively with 
the EU on management of migration flows, including by fighting against illegal migra-
tion, and that are interested in securing better access to EU territory for their citizens” 
(p.3). In other words, legal migration opportunities will be offered to third countries in 
return for their cooperation on preventing illegal migration. The communication high-
lights that Mobility Partnerships will be tailored to suit each partner country, and con-
tents will therefore depend on the specifics of the country concerned and the EU’s rela-
tions with that country. However, it does give some ideas as to the commitments which 
might be expected from partner countries, including a commitment to readmit both their 
own nationals and stateless persons; initiatives to discourage illegal migration; efforts to 
improve border control, including cooperation with EU member states; measures to 
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combat human trafficking; and commitments to improve domestic social and economic 
conditions (p.4). Commitments by the EU and its member states will also depend on the 
specific circumstances, but may fall into four categories: improved opportunities for 
legal migration for nationals of the third country, for instance by facilitating labour 
market access; financial or technical assistance to help third countries develop their 
capacity to manage migration; measures to address the risk of brain drain and promote 
circular migration; and improvement of the procedures for issuing visas to nationals of 
the third country, for instance extending opening hours in member states’ embassies 
(pp.5-8). 
 In terms of internal governance, the Commission communication acknowledges 
that Mobility Partnerships “will necessarily have a complex legal nature, as they will 
involve a series of components, some of which will fall in the Community’s remit, and 
others in the Member States’” (p.3). The communication refers to the participation of 
‘interested member states’, indicating that the Mobility Partnerships will not be compul-
sory for member states to join. Those member states that do want to participate will 
bring particular dimensions to each partnership “influenced by their own legal frame-
works (in particular on the admission of third country nationals) and by political con-
straints and priorities” (p.4). In other words, the precise content of the Mobility Partner-
ships will depend on what the participating member states are willing and able to offer. 
 The Mobility Partnerships are therefore a perfect test-case for understanding the 
puzzles of EU external migration policy. They clearly belong to the external dimension 
of EU migration policy, drawing third countries into a partnership arrangement. In De-
cember 2007 the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) invited the 
Commission “in close liaison with Member States and/or the Presidency, in order to 
ensure a close involvement of the Council, to open dialogue with Moldova and Cape 
Verde, with a view to launching pilot mobility partnerships” (Council, 2007b, p.5). In 
May 2008, Mobility Partnerships were agreed with Moldova and Cape Verde (although 
they were not signed until September 2008) (Council, 2008b; 2008c). In June 2008 the 
JHA Council further invited the Commission, “in close liaison with Member States and 
the Presidency, to take forward exploratory talks with Georgia and Senegal and to open 
dialogue with these countries, with a view to launching additional pilot Mobility Part-
nerships” (Council, 2008d, p.4). Although negotiations with Senegal were unsuccessful, 
a Mobility Partnership with Georgia was signed in November 2009 (Council, 2009a). 
Negotiations for Mobility Partnerships are currently underway with Ghana (Commis-
sion, 2010a). A partnership was signed with Armenia in 2011 (Council, 2011b). As of 
June 2012 negotiations were pending with Tunisia (Council, 2012b, p.13) and about to 
start with Azerbaijan (Commission, 2012a). Egypt, Jordan and Libya are also being 
considered for Mobility Partnerships (Commission, 2011e; Council, 2012c). A Mobility 
Partnership with Morocco was signed in June 2013 (Council, 2013). How and why do 
these third countries choose to participate in the Mobility Partnerships? What role do 
they play in the negotiations leading up to the signature of a partnership? 
 At the same time the voluntary nature of the partnerships also makes it possible to 
examine member states’ motivations for taking part. Table 1.1 shows which member 
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states take part in the three Mobility Partnerships signed by the end of 2009. It shows 
that only one member state (France) participated in all the partnerships, most member 
states participated in one or two partnerships, and four member states (Austria, Finland, 
Ireland and Malta) chose not to participate in any partnerships. Why is this the case? 
How did member states’ preferences on the Mobility Partnerships influence the role of 
the EU institutions such as the Commission? What did the policy-making process un-
derlying the Mobility Partnerships look like? 
 
Table 1.1: Member states’ participation in the Mobility Partnerships up to 2009. 
Member state MP Moldova (2008) MP Cape Verde (2008) MP Georgia (2009) 
Austria    
Belgium   X 
Bulgaria X  X 
Cyprus X   
Czech Republic X  X 
Denmark   X 
Estonia   X 
Finland    
France X X X 
Germany X  X 
Greece X  X 
Hungary X   
Ireland    
Italy X  X 
Latvia   X 
Lithuania X  X 
Luxembourg  X  
Malta    
Netherlands  X9 X 
Poland X  X 
Portugal X X  
Romania X  X 
Slovakia X   
Slovenia X   
Spain  X  
Sweden X  X 
UK   X 
 
                                                          
9 The Netherlands did not participate in the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde from the outset and there-
fore did not sign the declaration, but joined later in 2008. In June 2008 the Council highlighted that Mobility 
Partnerships are open to member states joining later (Council, 2008d, p.4). This table is correct as of July 
2013, but it is possible that member states will join partnerships at a later date.  
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The empirical and conceptual insights provided by this thesis are especially important 
and timely given that the Mobility Partnerships look set to become more frequently used 
in the future. The Commission’s 2008 communication on an Eastern Partnership (which 
aims to provide a specific eastern dimension to the ENP) states that Mobility Partner-
ships will be the main tool in so-called ‘Mobility and Security Pacts’ to be offered to the 
eastern neighbours (Commission, 2008b, p.6). The Stockholm programme calls for 
“continued and expanded use of the Mobility partnership instrument as the main strate-
gic, comprehensive and long-term cooperation framework for migration management 
with third countries” (Council, 2009b, p.61). In its 2009 evaluation of the Mobility 
Partnerships, the Commission concludes that the Mobility Partnerships “are promising, 
innovative and comprehensive tools” which “merit being further developed, improved 
and replicated” (Commission, 2009d, p.8). In 2011 the Commission stated that the con-
clusion of Mobility Partnerships with the Southern Mediterranean countries is “a crucial 
tool, beneficial for both sides to ensure better and more effectively managed migration 
and mobility” (Commission, 2011e, p.7). It therefore proposed to open dialogue with 
Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt with the aim, among others, of concluding Mobility Part-
nerships. As a result, a Mobility Partnership with Morocco was signed in June 2013 
(Council, 2013). The Commission’s 2011 communication on the GAMM stated that 
Mobility Partnerships should be the principal framework for cooperation with third 
countries (Commission, 2011b, p.10). 
1.7 Research on the Mobility Partnerships 
This research is the first piece of academic work to examine in detail both the internal 
and external governance of the Mobility Partnerships. As they are a relatively new pol-
icy instrument, little has so far been written about the partnerships and most contribu-
tions deal with only one aspect of the partnerships. This section identifies four different 
types of contributions, and positions the thesis in the existing body of work on Mobility 
Partnerships. 
 One group of contributions, particularly those published soon after the creation of 
the Mobility Partnerships, places the partnerships in the broader context of the EU’s 
other policies. Parkes (2009a; 2009b) compares the Mobility Partnerships to the provi-
sions of the ENP. In one article he concludes that, although the Mobility Partnerships do 
not actively clash with the mobility agenda of the ENP, they add little to it. The Mobil-
ity Partnerships are presented as a weaker tool than the instruments developed under the 
ENP to foster compliance: the Mobility Partnerships do not contain mechanisms to 
foster joint ownership; the incentives offered, particularly in terms of provisions of free 
movement, are limited; and they do not contain a sanctioning mechanism (Parkes, 
2009a, p.340). The other article is more decisive, concluding that “the mobility partner-
ship was forged as a response to a range of policy goals with little or no connection to 
the ENP” (Parkes, 2009b, p.2). Parkes (2009a) also discusses the difficult task that the 
Commission will face in coordinating the disparate activities of the Mobility Partner-
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ships – a task not made easier by the voluntary nature of the Mobility Partnerships for 
the member states, which has resulted in “fragmented schemes” (p.344). The article 
provides some insights into the functioning of the Mobility Partnerships, although as it 
deals with the ENP it concerns only the partner countries in Eastern Europe. The part-
nerships are a pragmatic tool, which is evidenced by the fact that criteria for the choice 
of partner countries are fluid – Georgia was selected rather for geopolitical reasons than 
migration reasons (p.331). The article also captures the ‘wrangling’ between member 
states, for instance on the selection of partner countries (see also chapter 4 of this the-
sis). 
 In a similar vein, Ward (2008) compares the Mobility Partnerships to the provisions 
for free movement in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and 
the Caribbean Forum (Cariforum) countries. She concludes that the Mobility Partner-
ships allow for mobility provisions more favourable to third countries than those of the 
EPA. The EPA is biased towards highly-skilled migrants, does not allow for direct entry 
into the labour market, and does not allow for periods of stay as long as those that are 
possible under the Mobility Partnership. However, the commitments required from third 
countries signing a Mobility Partnership are so onerous that the possibility of better 
provisions for mobility may not be a strong enough incentive. In a later contribution, 
Ward (2011) concludes that bilateral migration agreements between EU member states 
and developing countries have the greatest potential to facilitate mobility. It should be 
noted that the first article dates from 2008, when the implementation of the first two 
Mobility Partnerships (with Moldova and Cape Verde) was still at an early stage. As 
will be explained in chapter 4, in reality the Mobility Partnerships have not provided for 
new forms of mobility.  
 A second group of academic contributions deals with the provisions contained in 
the Mobility Partnerships. Lavenex and Stucky (2011) outline the structure and content 
of Mobility Partnerships, and argue that projects relating to migration control are more 
numerous than those relating to the promotion of mobility or development. Carrera and 
Hernández i Sagrera (2009) conclude that the Mobility Partnerships are ‘insecurity 
partnerships’ for third country nationals: third country nationals are treated as economic 
units rather than human rights holders due to the preference for circular migration; the 
nature of the Mobility Partnerships as ‘soft law’ makes it difficult to ensure that indi-
viduals’ rights will be upheld; and different treatment is established for individuals 
depending on their nationality (pp.2-3). The authors also argue that illegal migration and 
border control are emphasised in the Mobility Partnerships (see also chapter 4). In a 
later contribution (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2011), the authors assess the extent 
of circular migration provisions in the Mobility Partnerships with Moldova, Cape Verde 
and Georgia and conclude that they offer “few tangible examples of effective ‘circular 
migration’ initiatives” (p.101; see also chapter 4). 
 In 2009, the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs commissioned a briefing paper on the Commission communication on 
Mobility Partnerships and circular migration. However, the briefing paper which re-
sulted concerns Mobility Partnerships only in terms of circular migration. Circular mi-
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gration is defined as a “potentially effective tool for fostering economic development in 
sending countries” (Wiesbrock and Schneider, 2009, p.1). The paper goes on to give 
examples of circular migration in national settings (the Netherlands and Sweden). 
Whilst it is true that a scheme for circular migration could form part of a Mobility Part-
nership, the partnerships are broader in nature as they include also cooperation on illegal 
migration. 
 A third group of contributions examines how and why the Mobility Partnerships 
were concluded, both from the point of view of member states and the third countries. 
Ward (2011) considers the motivations for member states to join Mobility Partnerships 
and outlines three possible rationales: firstly, member states are actually resisting dele-
gation of competence over migration issues to the EU level by joining Mobility Partner-
ships but maintaining bilateral cooperation at the same time; secondly, Mobility Part-
nerships replicate the approach taken at national level; or thirdly, “in a few cases par-
ticipation in the MPs should be interpreted within the context of domestic political con-
siderations” (p.151). There are two problems with these conclusions: firstly, they are 
based on secondary (literature) research; and secondly, as will be argued in this thesis, 
the domestic political context is the basis for understanding member states’ preferences 
in all cases. Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera (2009) show that member states have 
made a conscious choice that the Mobility Partnerships should be an instrument of soft 
law, as a result excluding the European Court of Justice (ECJ) from this policy. Member 
states’ participation in a Mobility Partnership is determined by their interest in and rela-
tionship with the third country concerned (p.31). Lavenex and Stucky (2011) mention 
the problem of division of competences in the Mobility Partnerships, namely that “those 
issues that would interest partner countries most . . . are in the competence of the Mem-
ber States, and the Commission has no leverage” (p.117). This is an important aspect of 
the Mobility Partnerships because it affects the interest of third countries in joining such 
a partnership (see chapter 6). 
 EU member states played a decisive role in the selection of third countries for Mo-
bility Partnerships, by indicating which countries they prioritised for cooperation (Lav-
enex and Stucky, 2011). Some third countries were proactive in requesting a Mobility 
Partnership: Moldova and Georgia submitted non-papers expressing their interest in 
taking part in Mobility Partnerships (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2011; cf. chapter 
6 on the role of Senegal and Cape Verde in becoming candidate countries). However, 
there is evidence that IOM played a significant role in the production of these non-
papers (Lavenex and Stucky, 2011; Potaux, 2011). Once selected, negotiations were 
brokered by the Commission, and the “scope for third countries to express their con-
cerns [was] limited” (Lavenex and Stucky, 2011, p.132). 
 Chou (2009b) examines the origins and outlooks of the Mobility Partnerships with 
Cape Verde and Senegal. She argues that a ‘repressive’ approach dominates in EU ex-
ternal migration policy; in other words, measures are implemented that “primarily bene-
fit the Union at the expense of migrants, countries of origin or transit and other private 
actors” (p.8). This is due to the dominance of interior officials in the EU’s migration 
policy. The HLWG, for instance, is institutionally under the General Affairs and Exter-
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nal Relations Council of the EU, and yet is made up of officials from member states’ 
interior or migration ministries (p.18). With regards to the Mobility Partnerships she 
concludes that “the Commission recommendation to conclude a readmission agreement 
with Cape Verde and the negotiation stalemate with Senegal do suggest that the repres-
sive dimension is again instrumentalised in the first instance” (p.10). 
 Chou and Gibert examine the negotiations on a Mobility Partnership with Senegal 
in particular. They argue that the proposed Mobility Partnership would duplicate the 
Cotonou Agreement which already contains an article (Article 13) on readmission. It is 
therefore puzzling that the EU would push Senegal to sign a separate readmission 
agreement (Chou and Gibert, 2010). However, they neglect that article 13 of the Coto-
nou agreement does not include provisions for the direct readmission of third country 
nationals. Indeed, it states that, at the request of a party to the agreement, negotiations 
on a readmission agreement may be initiated: “These agreements shall also cover, if 
deemed necessary by any of the Parties, arrangements for the readmission of third coun-
try nationals and stateless persons” (Cotonou Agreement, article 13(5)ii). It is therefore 
not surprising that the EU pushes for the conclusion of precisely such a readmission 
agreement. A later contribution by Chou and Gibert (2013) reaches conclusions about 
why the negotiations on a Mobility Partnership failed: both the Senegalese and French 
governments were at best ambivalent about the negotiations; the Senegalese government 
was not convinced of the added value of an agreement due to the legal and financial 
uncertainties surrounding the Mobility Partnership; the EU’s ‘our-size-fits-all’ approach 
to relations with third countries failed spectacularly in this case; and there was a lack of 
political leadership on both the Senegalese and EU sides (Chou and Gibert, 2012). This 
thesis agrees with some of these findings, and challenges others. Chapter 6 shows that 
the prospect of a readmission agreement was a main reason for the Senegalese reluc-
tance to sign a Mobility Partnership; this is something that is not emphasised enough in 
the article by Chou and Gibert. Chou and Gibert assign explanatory power to the am-
bivalent position of the French government, based on an interview in the French em-
bassy in Dakar; chapter 5 of this thesis shows, however, that decisions on the Mobility 
Partnerships were taken for the French government by the ministry of immigration in 
Paris. Officials in the ministry of foreign affairs (and thus also the embassies) were 
bypassed. 
 Finally, some scholars misunderstand the nature of the Mobility Partnerships com-
pletely. Cassarino (2009) refers to the Mobility Partnerships as “a new generation of 
temporary labour-migration schemes”, whereas this thesis will show that labour migra-
tion is not a major component of the Mobility Partnerships agreed to date (see chapter 
4). Cassarino does, however, also point out that Mobility Partnerships “belong to an 
existing political framework based on a form of quid pro quo” (ibid.) – chapter 6 dis-
cusses this quid pro quo in the cases of Senegal and Cape Verde. Barnes and Cherino 
(2011) equally misunderstand the extent of circular migration included in the Mobility 
Partnerships. Such misunderstandings can perhaps be explained by the fact that the 
Commission communication introducing the concept of Mobility Partnerships also deals 
with circular migration (Commission, 2007a). 
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This research contributes to the existing body of academic work on the Mobility Part-
nerships in two main ways. Firstly, at an empirical level, this is the first study to con-
duct systematic, in-depth research into the Mobility Partnerships. Many contributions 
were published very early (2008 or 2009) when the Mobility Partnerships were still a 
very new policy tool. In addition, they tend to rely largely on document analysis. The 
problem with relying on document analysis is that there are not many documents about 
the Mobility Partnerships officially available, and the various Council conclusions pro-
vide only a superficial insight into the negotiation of the partnerships. The Commis-
sion’s 2007 communication was essentially only charting out a possible route for the 
partnerships. The texts of the concluded partnerships are available online (because they 
take the form of Council documents), but the scoreboards (internal Commission docu-
ments, giving information about all the projects being implemented in the framework of 
the Mobility Partnership) are not published.  
 Interviews are therefore an important source of information on the Mobility Part-
nerships (see chapter 3). Some researchers have conducted interviews on the Mobility 
Partnerships in the EU institutions in Brussels (e.g. Lavenex and Stucky, 2011; Carrera 
and Hernández i Sagrera, 2011; 2009; Chou and Gibert, 2012; 2010). Fewer have con-
ducted interviews in third countries, and there has certainly been no extensive research 
done in third countries. Chou and Gibert (2012) reach conclusions about the failure of 
the Mobility Partnership with Senegal, but these conclusions are based mostly on inter-
views with officials in the Council Secretariat and Commission, and member states’ 
embassy staff in Dakar (17 of the 20 interviews cited). Only three interviews were con-
ducted in the Senegalese government, covering only two ministries (the ministry of 
youth and the ministry of foreign affairs). Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera (2011) and 
Lavenex and Stucky (2011) rely on only two interviews each in the Moldovan and 
Georgian missions to the EU. There is no in-depth research on Mobility Partnerships 
based on interviews conducted in the EU member states, the exception being two inter-
views by Lavenex and Stucky (2011). 
 Much of the in-depth research that has been conducted so far focuses on the Mobil-
ity Partnerships with Moldova and Georgia (e.g. Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 
2011; Lavenex and Stucky, 2011; Parkes 2009a; 2009b), probably due to the fact that in 
the east three partnerships have now been concluded, whereas concluding partnerships 
with African countries has proven more difficult (see chapter 6). Contributions which 
deal with third countries’ role and preferences on the Mobility Partnerships tend not to 
be detailed on member states’ preferences (e.g. Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2011; 
Lavenex and Stucky, 2011; Chou and Gibert, 2012). In empirical terms, this research 
benefits from some temporal distance from the events being studied, as well as exten-
sive interviews not only in Brussels but also in third countries and EU member states 
(including the first interviews conducted on the issue with officials in Cape Verde, 
France, Austria and the Netherlands). It therefore brings together and substantiates the 
insights from the various contributions so far published on what the Mobility Partner-
ships look like and how they are concluded. 
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Secondly, at a conceptual level, this is the first study to bring together different levels of 
analysis (see also chapter 2). Some researchers have studied the internal governance of 
the Mobility Partnerships (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2009), capturing the inter-
actions of the Commission and the member states. Some have studied the external gov-
ernance of the Mobility Partnerships (Chou and Gibert, 2012), capturing the interactions 
between the EU and the third countries concerned. The contributions by Carrera and 
Hernández i Sagrera (2011) and Lavenex and Stucky (2011) to a certain extent deal with 
both interactions, in that they consider the set-up and functioning of the Mobility Part-
nerships at the EU level, as well as the selection and negotiation of the partnerships with 
the third countries (albeit not in much detail). However, no single contribution to date 
combines the EU and third country levels with an analysis of member states’ prefer-
ences. In other words, scholars have begun to tackle the question of why and how third 
countries cooperate with the EU on Mobility Partnerships, but have not addressed in an 
in-depth or systematic manner the role that member states play in this policy instrument. 
This oversight is problematic because the member states’ preferences are central to 
understanding the shape that the Mobility Partnerships take (see chapter 4). This thesis 
argues that in order to understand this policy instrument completely it is necessary to 
bring these three levels of analysis together. Chapter 2 proposes to conceptualise the 
decision-making procedure on EU external migration policy as a three-level game, in 
which the interaction between the EU institutions and the member states is linked to the 
interaction between the EU and the third country. Only by understanding how these 
interactions are linked can a full explanation of the decision-making procedure be given. 
1.8 Outline of study 
Chapter 2 outlines the sub-questions and the theoretical framework guiding the analysis. 
It argues in particular that the process of decision-making on EU external migration 
policy should be understood as a three-level game. Chapter 3 sets out the case study 
methodology used to conduct the research and justifies the case selection (France, the 
Netherlands and Austria at the member state level; Senegal and Cape Verde at the third 
country level). Chapter 4, the first empirical chapter, concerns the EU governance of the 
Mobility Partnerships. It examines the role of the EU institutions and the member states, 
and the implications this pattern of governance has had for the form of the partnerships. 
Having established that the member states played a central role in the decision-making 
process on the Mobility Partnerships, chapter 5 asks why different member states had 
different preferences on this policy instrument. It sets out the case studies of the three 
EU member states. Chapter 6 concerns the third countries and explains why Senegal and 
Cape Verde had different preferences regarding a Mobility Partnership. The conclusion 
reflects on the utility of the three-level model and suggests some routes for future re-
search. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical framework 
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2.1 Introduction 
This research is concerned with understanding the decision-making process on EU ex-
ternal migration policy, in other words those policy instruments which draw third coun-
tries into a cooperation on migration issues. Chapter 1 demonstrated that there are three 
sets of actors involved in EU external migration policy: the member states; the EU insti-
tutions; and the third countries. Decision-making on EU external migration policy there-
fore takes place at different levels: at the member state-level; at the EU level between 
the EU institutions and the member states (in the Council); and at the international level 
between the EU and third countries. These different levels are constantly engaging with 
each other: the Commission finances migration projects in third countries; member 
states have bilateral migration agreements with third countries; member states meet at 
the EU level in bodies such as the HLWG to determine the EU’s approach to external 
migration policy. This thesis is a first attempt to bring together these different levels 
into a comprehensive model in order to understand how the EU’s external migration 
policy is made. 
 Chapter 1 showed that there has to date been a cleavage in the academic literature, 
which tends to focus on one of two strands: relations between the member states and the 
EU (‘internal’ governance); or relations between the EU and third countries (‘external’ 
governance). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) make an explicit distinction be-
tween internal governance (how EU rules are created) and external governance (how 
these rules are then transferred to and adopted by third countries). Scholars working on 
the internal governance of the EU do not take into account the role of third countries in 
these policies, despite the fact that EU policies in areas such as JHA, environment and 
energy increasingly have an external dimension (Lavenex, 2004; Lavenex and Wich-
mann, 2009). The literature on ‘new’ modes of governance highlights the role of non-
state actors in EU governance (Héritier, 2003), but neglects the fact that third countries 
play a role in external policies. Equally, scholars working on the EU’s external govern-
ance do not account for member states’ preferences. Several contributions argue that the 
internal mode of EU policy-making is reflected in external governance (Lavenex and 
Wichmann, 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009), but they fail to incorporate 
member states’ preferences into their explanations. The conditionality model of EU 
influence on third countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004) emphasises the 
decision-making process in and preferences of third countries, but this alone does not 
explain policy outcomes. Indeed, the model simplifies policy-making by referring only 
to ‘EU’ conditionality and ‘EU’ rules, without analysing the process within the EU 
(between the member states and the EU institutions) that leads to the adoption of these 
rules.  
 Such approaches overlook the fact that internal and external governance – how EU 
rules are created and how they are adopted by third countries – are linked. These differ-
ent aspects of the decision-making process therefore cannot be modelled independently 
of each other (Putnam, 1988, p.434; Patterson, 1997, p.142). Putnam (1988) has charac-
terised international negotiations as a two-level game, in which national executives try 
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to find an agreement that can be accepted at both the international and the domestic 
levels. Hubel (2004) has built on Putnam’s two-level game model: he argues that the 
EU’s external policies should be understood as the outcome of a three-level game: the 
domestic policies of member states; the decision-making process between the EU insti-
tutions and the member states; and the negotiation between the EU and third countries 
(see table 2.1). This research adopts such a three-level approach to EU external migra-
tion policy. The three levels are linked through two interactions: one interaction be-
tween the EU institutions and the member states; and a second interaction between the 
EU and the third countries. At levels I and III, a ‘national’ preference on EU external 
migration policy emerges through discussions and negotiations between the actors in-
volved. In the interactions, the member states or the third countries negotiate with the 
EU over the substance and form of EU external migration policy, based on the national 
preference. 
 The thesis makes both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the fledgling 
literature on three-level games in the EU: theoretically, it aims to clearly conceptualise 
how the three levels are linked and what the conditions are for agreement to be reached; 
empirically, it extends the application of the three-level game to a new policy field, as 
contributions to date have dealt mainly with (agricultural) trade policy. 
 
Table 2.1: The three levels of EU external policy.10 
Level I International level 
Level II EU level 
Level III Member state level 
 
This chapter first outlines the nature of the three-level game (section 2.2). It outlines the 
actors present at each level, and explains under which conditions agreements can be 
reached. Section 2.3 concerns the EU level (level II), and outlines the nature of govern-
ance of EU external migration policy. Section 2.4 concerns the member state level (lev-
el III), and explains why member states choose to participate in EU external migration 
policy. Section 2.5 concerns the international level (level I) of the game and examines 
why third countries choose to cooperate with the EU on migration issues. Based on 
these sections, section 2.6 outlines expectations about the cost of no agreement and the 
ratification procedure for both interactions within the game. The chapter concludes by 
reiterating the expectations about preferences and consequences at each of the three 
levels. 
                                                          
10 The thesis follows Putnam’s (1998) system for numbering the levels. Putnam refers to the international 
level as level I, and therefore to the domestic level as level II. This thesis also refers to the international level 
as level I. It adds the EU level as level II, and the member state level as level III. 
 44 
2.2 Conceptualising EU external migration policy as a three-level game 
Robert Putnam (1988) developed the notion of two-level games to explain the ‘entan-
glement’ of domestic and international politics and the outcome of international nego-
tiations (see also Moravcsik, 1993a).11 In a two-level game, the domestic and interna-
tional levels are linked by national political leaders, who are present at both levels: at 
the domestic level, these political leaders construct an agreement between different 
domestic groups on the national preference in the international negotiations; at the in-
ternational level, national political leaders must negotiate an agreement that is accept-
able to their domestic groups (Putnam, 1988). Statesmen involved in international nego-
tiations therefore “simultaneously [calculate] the domestic and international implica-
tions of their actions . . . Diplomatic tactics and strategies are constrained simultane-
ously by what other states will accept and what domestic constituencies will ratify” 
(Moravcsik, 1993a, p.4). Traditional theories of international relations, which focus 
either on systemic (international-level) or domestic explanations for states’ foreign 
policies, are not adequate to explain interstate relations. Systemic theories make restric-
tive assumptions about domestic politics as nothing more than a ‘black box’. Empirical 
reality does not support such assumptions – indeed, most authors working within this 
tradition do acknowledge the importance of domestic factors for explaining interstate 
relations, but employ such domestic explanations in a rather ad-hoc way to explain only 
those aspects which cannot be explained satisfactorily by systemic theory (pp.6-15; see 
also Smith, 1986). Similarly, a domestic view alone cannot account for the outcome of 
interstate bargaining. The two-level game approach combines the international and 
domestic view, without privileging either: statesmen “seek to manipulate domestic and 
international politics simultaneously . . . Diplomacy is a process of strategic interaction 
in which actors simultaneously try to take account of and, if possible, influence the 
expected reactions of other actors, both at home and abroad” (Moravcsik, 1993a, p.15; 
emphasis added). The two-level game does not simply posit the significance of two 
levels of decision-making, rather it emphasises the interaction between the two levels 
(p.17). The two levels are intertwined because “expectations and unfolding develop-
ments in one arena affect negotiations in the other arena” (p.23). 
2.2.1 Criticism of the two-level game approach 
This thesis attempts to overcome some of the criticisms directed at two-level game 
approaches. Firstly, the two-level game model has been criticised for focussing on na-
tional political leaders because this “precludes investigation of the origins of [chief 
                                                          
11 The distinction between traditional game theory and two-level games should be clarified. Game theory is, 
broadly speaking, concerned with modelling the interactions between decision-makers. The two-level game 
approach is concerned with the interaction between two levels of negotiations: the domestic and the interna-
tional. Individual decision-makers link these two levels because they take part in both negotiations and seek to 
reach agreement that can be accepted at both levels. The two-level game approach has not been formalised in 
the same way as game theory: “both Putnam and Moravcsik explicitly state that the original article used game 
theory only as a metaphor and did not derive propositions through conventional choice theoretic analysis” 
(Knopf, 1993, p.604). 
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executives’] preferences so that we see only through the ‘eyes of the executive’” (Ja-
cobsen, 1996, pp.98-99). This research overcomes this criticism by examining how and 
why EU member states and third countries reached a certain domestic preference on the 
issue of Mobility Partnerships. Chapters 5 and 6 account also for the role of other do-
mestic actors, and how various preferences came together to form one national prefer-
ence. 
 Secondly, Putnam’s (1988) original article might be criticised for drawing mainly 
on examples of economic cooperation (Moravcsik, 1993a, p.17). Several of the three-
level game models developed to date (e.g. Larsén, 2007; Patterson, 1997, Collinson, 
1999; Young, 2003) also focus on EU external economic cooperation. This thesis makes 
an empirical contribution to the literature on two- and three-level games by employing a 
three-level game approach in a rather different policy field, namely migration. 
 The two-level game approach has also been criticised for being a metaphor rather 
than a full-fledged theory (Trumbore, 1998). Moravcsik (1993a, p.23) argues that, in 
order to move the from the two-level game as a metaphor towards the two-level game as 
a model of state behaviour, Putnam’s framework must be more restrictively defined. 
Drawing on Waltz’s three levels of analysis in international relations, Moravcsik out-
lines three elements that must be specified when the two-level game model is applied: 
the domestic politics of the issue; the international negotiating environment; and the 
statesman’s preferences. This chapter will specify these elements for the three-level 
game. The domestic politics of international migration cooperation is considered for 
both the member states and the third countries. The politics of external migration policy 
is also highlighted at the EU level, by examining the roles of the different EU institu-
tions in making external migration policy. There are two ‘international negotiating envi-
ronments’ in a three-level game: between the member states and the EU, and between 
the EU and the third countries. This chapter outlines expectations about the nature of the 
international negotiating environment in both of these cases. Finally, the preferences of 
member states’ and third countries’ governments and of the EU institutions are central 
to this chapter, which outlines explanations for member states and third countries’ deci-
sion-making procedures on EU external migration policy. 
2.2.2 Three-level games 
Several authors (mainly from the US) have applied or refined Putnam’s model of two-
level games in the field of international relations (e.g. Trumbore and Boyer, 2000; Car-
ment and James, 1996; Mo, 1995; Knopf, 1993; Schoppa, 1993). The model has also 
been applied to the EU – to parliamentary oversight of the EU (Pahre, 1997), to negotia-
tions on EMU (Hosli, 2000), and to the open method of coordination (Büchs, 2008), to 
name a few examples. Moravcsik’s (1993b) liberal intergovernmentalism is a two-level 
model, combining an assumption of rational state action, a liberal theory of domestic 
preference formation (highlighting the importance of economic factors), and an inter-
governmental theory of EU negotiations. National executives are the privileged actors. 
Governments “are assumed to act purposively in the international arena . . . on the basis 
of goals that are defined domestically” (p.481). 
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Putnam (1988, p.449) already acknowledged in his original article that some institu-
tional arrangements consist of more than two levels, citing the (then) European Com-
munity as an example:  
Consider negotiations between the United States and the European Community 
over agricultural trade . . . Modifications of the Common Agricultural Policy re-
quire unanimous ratification by [the member states in the Council of Ministers]. In 
turn, each of those governments must, in effect, win ratification for its decision 
within its own national arena.  
Some contributions in the field of EU studies have therefore adapted the two-level mod-
el and conceptualised negotiations between the EU and third countries as a three-level 
game because “the EU constitutes an international organisation in itself and as such it 
serves both as the international arena in the negotiations between the EU member states 
and as the domestic arena in the negotiations between the EU and the third party” 
(Larsén, 2007, p.859).12  
 Hubel (2004) is an example of an author utilising a three-level model to explain EU 
policy-making. He discusses EU policy towards Russia and Turkey, and argues that it is 
a three-level game composed of the following levels: the domestic policies of member 
states; the decision-making process between the EU institutions and the member states; 
and the negotiation between the EU and third countries. He seems to imply that the 
member states are the privileged actors, as he discusses their preferences when discuss-
ing each of the three levels, but he does not precisely conceptualise how the different 
levels of the game are linked or what the conditions are for an agreement to be reached. 
Wood adopts Hubel’s model, but limits his analysis to a simple statement that “Tur-
key’s bid to join the EU entwines at least three levels of politics” (2004, p.19) without 
conceptualising how the levels are linked. Moyer (1993) examines the role of the Euro-
pean Community (EC) in the GATT Uruguay round, and argues that the three-level 
game in EC decision-making explains the reluctance of the EC to make changes to the 
Common Agricultural Policy. The three levels identified by Moyer are the EC decision-
making process (level II), the national decision-making processes of the member states 
(level III), and the EC GATT negotiating team (level I). Moyer refers to constraints 
imposed on one level by another level as an explanation for the outcome of the GATT 
negotiations, but does not clearly outline expectations about how these constraints arise 
and how they influence decision-making. Falkner (2002) identifies different actors than 
Moyer: in her conceptualisation, the three levels are the member state level; the negotia-
tions between member states; and the ‘game’ between member states and the EU insti-
tutions. However, she does not provide an accurate model of how the levels are linked 
                                                          
12 Knopf (1993) also identifies security negotiations as involving three levels because “there are sometimes 
divisions within a military bloc that is itself just one party to the negotiations . . . In such cases, it may be 
necessary to treat the governments of alliance partners or the outside bloc as a third layer in the analysis” 
(pp.610-611; emphasis added). However, he does not specify that the alliance itself may be an actor. The EU 
is generally acknowledged to be unique amongst international organisations, given the strength of its suprana-
tional institutions. This might therefore be the only international organisation which can justifiably be re-
garded as an actor in international negotiations. 
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or the conditions for agreement to be reached. Leal-Arcas (2004) also examines the EC 
in the WTO, and identifies the roles and powers of the three levels of actors involved in 
decision-making: the national (member state level); the supranational (Brussels level); 
and the international level (within the WTO in Geneva). However, this contribution also 
does not outline a specific model of the three-level game. Panke (2013) has an empirical 
and theoretical focus on the conditions under which the EU can develop a common 
position in the UN, and the conditions under which the EU is successful in UN negotia-
tions. She hypothesises that member states’ win-sets will be large if their foreign minis-
tries have few capacities and if the issue at stake is not salient domestically – this is a 
rather different conceptualisation than that adopted in this thesis (see sub-section 2.2.4). 
Her second set of hypotheses link the existence/non-existence of a common EU ap-
proach to the choice of negotiation strategies at level I; again, a rather different concep-
tualisation than that adopted in this thesis, which sees negotiation strategies as stem-
ming from the size of win-sets (see sub-section 2.2.5). 
 The central conceptual difference between a two-level game and a three-level game 
is the interactions involved. In a two-level game, there is one interaction: between the 
domestic level and the international level (Putnam, 1988). A three-level game of EU 
decision-making is more complex, with linkages and “reverberation among negotiation 
levels” (Patterson, 1997, p.151). The three levels are linked in three different ways. 
Firstly, there are two interactions: (1) between the EU institutions and the member 
states and (2) between the EU and the third countries. These interactions are linked 
because the policy that is decided upon in the first interaction becomes the subject of 
negotiation in the second interaction. Secondly, EU member states and third countries 
may be linked independently of the EU level (represented by the dashed line in figure 
2.1). The existence of such a link can affect third countries’ decisions on whether or not 
to cooperate with the EU on migration issues (see chapter 6). Finally, member states are 
‘present’ in the EU-third country interaction by virtue of their central role in determin-
ing the content of the policy being negotiated (see sub-section 2.2.5). 
 
Third countries
(level I)
EU
(level II)
Member states
(level III)
EU-third country interaction
EU-member state interaction
(Bilateral relations)
 
Figure 2.1: Links between the three levels in the game. 
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2.2.3 Conceptualising the three levels 
Most applications conceptualising EU international negotiations as a three-level game 
deal with external trade policy (Larsén, 2007; Patterson, 1997; Collinson, 1999; Young, 
2003). Larsén (2007) examines the negotiations leading to the Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement with South Africa in 1999. She conceptualises the negotiations 
as a three-level game with the Commission as the privileged actor that is present at all 
three levels (domestic, EU and international). It is essential, she argues, to understand 
the dynamics of decision-making within the Commission in order to understand the 
outcome of external trade policies. The ‘domestic’ level is therefore the intra-
Commission negotiations between different DGs in order to establish a common Com-
mission position. The EU level is the negotiations between the Commission and the 
member states in the Council. The international level is the negotiations between the 
third country and the Commission. Larsén acknowledges that “by moving the domestic 
focus from the Member States to the internal game played inside the Commission, the 
dynamics within the Member States are neglected” (p.861). This is an important ac-
knowledgement, because the member states are still the constituents of the Commission: 
the member states (in the Council) authorise the Commission to open trade negotiations 
with third countries, and appoint a committee to supervise the Commission in its nego-
tiations with third countries. Although the Commission negotiates on behalf of the EU, 
the Council must still approve the conclusion of trade agreements. Nevertheless, an 
argument could be made that a focus on the Commission (at the expense of the member 
states) is justified in a policy field like trade, where the EU has significant competences. 
However, it is not appropriate for external migration policy, given the central role of the 
member states (see chapter 4). 
 This thesis therefore proposes a different conceptualisation of the three-level game 
in EU external migration policy. This conceptualisation is in line with that proposed by 
Patterson (1997), Collinson (1999) and Young (2003). These authors have developed 
the clearest conceptualisation of the three-level model to date. At the international level 
(level I), the EU and third countries negotiate on migration issues. In order to under-
stand the outcome of these international negotiations, it is essential to understand third 
countries’ domestic preferences on cooperating with the EU. The EU level (level II) is 
the decision-making process within the EU, between the EU institutions and the mem-
ber states in the Council, on external migration policy. The member state level (level 
III) refers to the domestic preference formation of the member states on EU external 
migration policy. It is important to understand member states’ domestic preferences in 
order to understand the outcome of decision-making within the EU. The model devel-
oped in this research goes further than the models by Collinson and Young by consider-
ing the size of the win-set for each level of the game. Neither of these authors formulate 
clear hypotheses about the size of the win-sets, although Young (2003, p.56) rightly 
notes that “one might expect the [EU’s] win-set to be smaller than those of other gov-
ernments. This is due to the [EU’s] win-set being the product of pre-negotiation among 
(currently) 15 governments”. Section 2.2.4 discusses the determinants of the size of 
win-sets in a three-level game. 
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The three-level game developed here also goes further than previous conceptualisations 
by theoretically accounting for the preference formation of member states and third 
countries. Patterson (1997), in her discussion of negotiations within GATT in general, 
ends up focusing only rather superficially on the preferences and strategies of the 
United States. This is understandable given the number of countries represented in 
GATT. Within the EU, she focuses on the preferences of France, Germany and the UK, 
which is again understandable given the impossibilities of focusing on all member 
states. Panke (2013), who identifies level I as ‘the UN’, ends up focusing on the role of 
the EU member states – again understandable, given the number of other countries and 
groups represented in the UN and the impossibility of accounting for all of their prefer-
ences. This research systematically accounts for the preferences of a small number of 
countries by selecting case studies for in-depth process-tracing (see chapter 3). 
2.2.4 Conceptualising the two interactions: determining the size of win-sets 
Putnam outlines the importance of the notion of ‘win-sets’ for understanding the out-
come of negotiations. A win-set “for a given Level II constituency [is] the set of all 
possible Level I agreements that would ‘win’ – that is, gain the necessary majority 
among the constituents – when simply voted up or down” (Putnam, 1988, p.437). So in 
order to reach a successful outcome, international negotiations must produce an agree-
ment that can also be ratified at the domestic level. Putnam outlines three main determi-
nants of the win-set: the cost of no agreement; the domestic ratification procedure; and 
the strategies of negotiators. Patterson (1997) is the only author whose work on the 
three-level game model sketches conditions for agreement to be reached based on these 
determinants outlined by Putnam. However, she does not clearly separate the determi-
nants for the different actors. This is a significant oversight: the EU institutions will, for 
instance, have a different view of the cost of no agreement than the member states. Each 
actor therefore has a win-set – the range of possible agreements that are acceptable – 
and where the win-sets of different actors overlap agreement is possible. This thesis 
focuses on the first two of the determinants – the cost of no agreement and the domestic 
ratification procedure – and takes into account that they differ for the different actors in 
the three-level game. 
 Firstly, win-sets are large if the cost of no agreement is high. This is because “rati-
fication pits the proposed agreement, not against an array of other (possibly attractive) 
alternatives, but only against ‘no-agreement’” (Putnam, 1988, p.442). This resembles 
the BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) in negotiation theory: “both 
parties [to a negotiation] have an alternative to a negotiated settlement: no settlement. 
They can always choose an alternative ending: no agreement” (Carrell and Heavrin, 
2008, p.29). If a party would be worse off with the status quo than the proposed agree-
ment, it is preferable to continue negotiations. If, however, a party is better off or no 
worse off under the status quo, it is preferable to walk away from the negotiations. The 
cost to a particular constituency of no agreement can be altered, for example by offering 
a package deal, but in general those constituencies that face low costs of no agreement 
will be sceptical of an international agreement.  
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Secondly, win-sets are large if the domestic ratification procedure is ‘easy’. Domestic 
ratification is easy if, for example, there is strong discipline within the governing party, 
only a simple majority is required in the national parliament for ratification, or no do-
mestic group has a veto right over the issue being negotiated (Putnam, 1988, pp.448-
449). Ratification is ordinarily understood as parliamentary approval of government 
agreements. However, this thesis broadens the concept of ratification. This is necessary 
for empirical reasons: the Mobility Partnerships, which form the object of this study, are 
non-legally binding political declarations, adopted by governments (see chapter 4). It 
can therefore be expected that the role of parliaments will be less significant than for the 
legally binding international treaties envisaged by Putnam. It is thus more appropriate to 
conceive of the ratification procedure as the autonomy of the central decision-maker(s) 
to take a decision: if central decision-makers can act relatively autonomously then the 
win-set is large because an agreement must not be approved by many other domestic 
institutions (Patterson, 1997, p.144; Collinson, 1999, p.216). Functionally, this is simi-
lar to the classical understanding of ratification, which also concerns the room for ma-
noeuvre of negotiators. This room for manoeuvre depends on various factors, one of 
which is whether the agreement must be ratified by parliament; however, negotiators 
can be constrained even when there is no parliamentary ratification required, for exam-
ple if the decision to go ahead with the agreement must be approved by several other 
government officials within the own ministry or from different ministries. It might be 
more appropriate to term this the domestic ‘consent’ for or ‘approval’ of an agreement; 
however, in order to maintain the link to Putnam’s two-level game, this thesis will con-
tinue to refer to ‘ratification’. 
 The expectations regarding the size of the win-set for each actor are set out in table 
2.2. When the cost of no agreement is low and the ratification procedure is difficult, the 
win-set is small – the actor concerned can only accept a limited number of possible 
agreements. When the cost of no agreement is high and the ratification procedure is 
easy, the win-set is large – the actor concerned is willing and able to accept a larger 
number of possible agreements. For the remaining two configurations (low cost of no 
agreement and easy ratification procedure; high cost of no agreement and difficult rati-
fication procedure) the win-set is somewhere between ‘large’ and ‘small’ – it is ‘me-
dium’. To say something meaningful in terms of the size of these two win-sets, it is 
useful to distinguish between the two determinants. If one is a more important determi-
nant, then it is possible to categorise the win-sets as ‘large/medium’ and ‘me-
dium/small’. Putnam does not specifically make such a distinction, but seems to priori-
tise the cost of no agreement by devoting more space to it. This research goes along 
with this assumption that the cost of no agreement is the more important determinant 
because it seems logical: a difficult ratification procedure can be overcome if it is con-
sidered urgently necessary to have an agreement. However, an easy ratification proce-
dure cannot necessarily overcome a low cost of no agreement. This distinction between 
the two determinants is shown in table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Determinants of size of win-sets. 
  Ratification procedure 
  Easy Difficult 
High Large Large/medium Cost of  
no agreement Low Medium/small Small 
2.2.5 The role of strategy and the Commission as ‘chief negotiator’ 
Putnam states that “the size of the win-set depends also on the strategies of the Level I 
negotiators” (1988, p.450). The two-level game model assigns a privileged position to 
‘statesmen’, ‘national political leaders’ or ‘chief negotiators’ – in other words, the na-
tional government representatives who are conducting international negotiations. These 
negotiators “appear at both game boards” (p.434), and the strategies that they adopt can 
therefore affect the shape of the final agreement. In a three-level game, the privileged 
actor would seem to be the one that is present at both interactions – between levels I and 
II, and between levels II and III. In terms of the EU, this would appear to be the Com-
mission, which is present in the EU-member state interaction, and also plays the interna-
tional game on behalf of the EU. 
 Strategies for two-level action fall into four categories: statesmen and domestic 
actors may reshape the domestic win-set; reshape the foreign win-set; form transna-
tional alliances; or attempt to undermine a foreign leader. Moravcsik (1993a) outlines 
examples of strategies used by negotiators: 
- Statesmen can gain influence by pushing an international agreement towards their 
personally preferred position, so long as they remain within the domestic win-set (so 
that the agreement will be ratified) 
- Statesmen can make threats during the bargaining procedure, although the threat will 
only be effective if there is a real prospect of it being carried out 
- Statesmen can attempt to reshape the domestic win-set by changing the rules for 
ratification, offering side-payments to alter the domestic balance of coalitions or 
manipulating information about the agreement 
- Statesmen can employ international actions to change expected outcomes at the 
domestic level, for example by setting the international agenda or joining an interna-
tional regime 
Much has been written about negotiation theory and negotiation strategies in general. 
Pruitt (2002), for instance, distinguishes between three main strategies: contending, 
problem solving, and yielding. Contending involves holding firm, making threats and 
arguing vigorously for one’s position; problem solving involves seeking a solution that 
satisfies all parties to the negotiation; yielding implies conceding one’s own interest in 
order to reach an agreement. Carrell and Heavrin (2008, pp.202-206) distinguish be-
tween negotiation strategies that are seen to be appropriate, and those that involve 
“lapses in truth-telling” and are therefore seen as inappropriate. Examples of inappro-
priate negotiation strategies might include deceiving the other party about the issue 
being negotiated, misrepresenting one’s position, bluffing, and providing false informa-
tion. 
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Scholars examining negotiations in the EU have also developed typologies of negotia-
tion strategies. Dür and Mateo (2010), for instance, distinguish between ‘hard bargain-
ing’ and ‘soft bargaining’ negotiation styles. Strategies characteristic of hard bargaining 
are public statements of a firm position, criticising the other side, creating a defensive 
coalition, or making threats. Negotiators employing a soft bargaining style might signal 
flexibility, stress the common interest bringing the sides together, praise the other side, 
seek partners for compromise, or make several proposals so that the other side can indi-
cate their preference. 
 Despite the importance assigned by Putnam to strategies of negotiators, they are not 
hypothesised in this thesis to determine the size of the win-set. Putnam is himself rather 
ambiguous on this point: he does not make a concise argument about a certain type of 
strategy causing the win-set to be large or small, and indeed includes arguments about 
the effect of the size of the win-set on the choice of strategy by the negotiator. It is 
therefore not clear whether negotiation strategies result from, or determine, the size of 
the win-set. Patterson (1997, p.144) seems to imply that negotiation strategies result 
from the size of the win-set: she argues that “the smaller the win-set, the greater the 
chance that a country will get exactly what it wants”. This is intuitively plausible: nego-
tiation strategies are determined according to the negotiation situation, and that situation 
might change during the course of the negotiations (Carrell and Heavrin, 2008, p.11).  
 The issue of negotiation strategies adopted by the chief negotiator is all the more 
interesting because there is reason to doubt that the Commission actually has such a 
privileged position in EU external relations. This thesis argues that, although the Com-
mission plays the international game on behalf of the EU, the member states are ‘pre-
sent’ in the EU-third country interaction in two ways: firstly, member states play the 
central role in determining the type of foreign policy adopted at the EU level. Figure 2.1 
showed that it is this policy, the outcome of the EU-member state interaction, which 
feeds into the EU-third country interaction. By extension of their central role at the EU 
level, the member states are therefore also ‘present’ in the EU-third country interaction 
– they have played a central role in determining the policy that is being negotiated. 
Some of the literature on the EU’s external migration policy hints at this connection. 
Several authors argue that EU migration policy is restrictive in nature, due to the domi-
nance of member states’ interior ministers in negotiations at the EU level (e.g. Chou, 
2009a; Schain, 2009; Weinar, 2011). Schain (2009) shows that between 1999 and 2002 
the Commission was only able to gain support from the member states for its proposals 
if they were restrictive in nature. Third countries are often shown to be dissatisfied with 
this restrictive approach by the EU (e.g. Chou and Gibert, 2010; Council, 2000, p.7) and 
may choose not to cooperate with such a policy. The Commission is constrained and 
does not have the mandate to offer the third country more than that which has been 
agreed at the EU level (where the member states dominate). This is hardly surprising in 
a policy area which sits at the crossroads of migration policy and foreign policy, two 
sensitive issues for member states’ sovereignty (see chapter 1). 
 Secondly, member states are present at the international level through their existing 
bilateral agreements concluded independently of any EU external migration policy 
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towards a country/region (represented by the dashed line in figure 2.1). The existence of 
such bilateral migration agreements can undermine the Commission’s negotiating posi-
tion, because member states may offer more attractive alternative agreements for third 
countries. When discussing the EU’s GAM in relation to Africa, Weinar (2011, p.5) 
argues that “the EU has had a difficult time competing with established bilateral rela-
tions in the region, as the agenda of the political dialogue is still led by the same few 
Member States”. Panizzon (2008) argues that the competition between France and Spain 
for migration cooperation with Senegal has increased the Senegalese government’s 
confidence and therefore hindered negotiations between the EU and Senegal on migra-
tion issues (see also chapter 6).13 
 Negotiation strategies are thus certainly important: strategies employed by negotia-
tors may mould the agreement reached, and several different strategies might be used in 
the course of a single round of negotiations. Negotiation strategies are not hypothesised 
to be a determinant of the size of the win-set, but are rather expected to be an outcome 
of the size of the win-set. They are thus included in the analysis, and the conclusion will 
return to the issue and reflect on the strategies employed by the different actors. 
2.2.6 Chapter outline 
As the policy which is being examined originates at the EU level, this is an appropriate 
place to begin the analysis (cf. Moyer, 1993, p.99). Section 2.3 therefore concerns the 
EU level (level II of the three-level game) and the roles of the EU institutions and mem-
ber states in EU external migration policy. Section 2.4 concerns the member states (lev-
el III) and outlines two competing explanations for member states’ preferences on EU 
external migration policy. Section 2.5 concerns the international level (level I) and out-
lines two competing explanations for third countries’ decisions to cooperate with the 
EU on migration issues. Putnam does not privilege a particular theoretical framework, 
but rather claims that “the two-level conceptual framework could in principle be mar-
ried to . . . diverse [theoretical] perspectives” on domestic politics (1988, p.442). Sec-
tions 2.4 and 2.5 outline competing rationalist and constructivist explanations for the 
preferences of both the member states and the third countries. Rationalism and construc-
tivism are two contrasting ‘images’ of decision-making (Lewis, 2003). These two theo-
retical images differ on why decision-makers arrive at certain preferences: according to 
a rationalist account, decision-makers consider the material benefits and costs of a cer-
tain decision, and seek the best overall outcome; according to ‘conventional’ construc-
tivism, decision-makers’ interests are constructed by social facts such as norms and 
culture (Jupille et al., 2003). The distinction is thus between preferences based on mate-
rial interests and preferences based on ideas (Panke, 2004). These two theoretical ap-
proaches are compared in terms of their suitability to account for both member states’ 
                                                          
13 The effect of the existence of bilateral relations on member states’ preferences is difficult to predict. If 
participation in an instrument of EU external migration policy would allow member states to achieve objec-
tives that cannot be realised at the bilateral level, participation can be expected to be high. If, on the other 
hand, member states favour their bilateral relationship, participation will be low, further weakening EU exter-
nal migration policy and thus the role of the Commission. 
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and third countries’ decisions on participation in the Mobility Partnerships. The aim is 
to compare the empirical fit between theory and evidence for each of the theoretical 
approaches (Jupille et al., 2003, p.21). The application of these approaches is necessar-
ily slightly different at these two different levels of the three-level game (see sections 
2.4 and 2.5). 
 It is necessary to understand the preferences of the actors at each of the three levels, 
in order to account for the outcomes of the two interactions in the three-level game. 
Section 2.6 therefore concludes by outlining some expectations about the size of the 
win-sets for both the EU-member state interaction and the EU-third country interaction. 
2.3 Level II: theorising the EU 
The first two sub-questions of this Ph.D. project concerns the decision-making process 
at the EU level: what was the role of the EU institutions and the member states in the 
negotiation of the Mobility Partnerships? And what implications does this have for the 
form of the partnerships? The interest is in the different actors present at the EU level 
and the role that they are able to play in the governance of migration policy. This will 
affect the type of policy adopted. The focus is on the member states and the Commis-
sion because (as will become clear in chapter 4) these are the central actors in the Mo-
bility Partnerships. 
2.3.1 The governance approach 
In the past, scholarly debates on the European integration project centred on the process 
and nature of integration. Intergovernmentalists claimed that the member states control 
the pace and future direction of integration, while neofunctionalists claimed that initial 
integration in a few sectors will lead to pressure to integrate in other, related sectors, 
with this process being promoted by the supranational Commission. During the 1990s, 
however, it became increasingly clear that intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism 
cannot provide a subtle enough account of the realities of decision-making in the EU 
(Kassim and Menon, 2003, p.126). Scholars agreed that a dynamic and complex politi-
cal system is emerging at the EU level (Rosamond, 2000, p.105), in which no single 
actor or level is entirely in control of the pace of integration. Indeed, “the EU has be-
come a polity where authority is dispersed between levels of governance and amongst 
actors” (p.110; cf. Marks et al., 1996). It is not even clear that a single governance pat-
tern holds across all policy areas – rather, “the Union’s capacity and legitimacy for 
institution-building has varied across institutional spheres such as competition policy, 
monetary affairs, external and internal security, and culture, and the ongoing develop-
ment from (primarily) market-building to polity-building creates a need to attend to the 
different dynamics of various institutional spheres and policy sectors” (Olsen, 2007, 
p.78; cf. Moravcsik, 1998, p.54). 
 We have therefore witnessed a governance turn in EU studies (Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger, 2006). Governance is a term that was first used in the field of international 
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relations to “conceptualize the emergence of political order at the international level in 
the absence of a global public regime let alone a world government” (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.795). Governance is defined in various ways by the scholars 
applying the governance approach. Peters and Pierre (2009, p.91), for instance, point 
out that “at its most fundamental level governance implies the capacity of a society to 
develop some means of making and implementing collective choices”. Smith (2004, 
p.743) defines governance as “the authority to make, implement, and enforce rules in a 
specified policy domain”. 
 The governance approach in European Studies lacks a central paradigm and is 
rather made up of various scattered (sometimes contrasting) strands: studies of Europe-
anisation; a focus on new modes of governance and regulatory policy-making; and the 
concept of multi-level governance. Scholars applying the governance approach have a 
common interest in EU institutions, decision-making procedures and rules (Bulmer, 
1994, p.355). These scholars seek to understand the EU as a political system and how 
this system functions in a day-to-day context, rather than focusing on the process of 
integration as such, as the debate between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism 
did. Whereas classical integration theory takes the shape of the Euro-polity as the de-
pendent variable (the outcome to be explained), the governance approach instead takes 
it as the independent variable, and seeks to understand how the shape of the polity im-
pacts on the policies adopted (Jachtenfuchs, 2001). As Lavenex and Kunz (2008, p.443) 
argue, “the distribution of power among the actors involved in framing processes, and 
the institutional procedures guiding their access and interaction in the relevant policy 
arena are crucial in examining the emergence and the effects of particular policy 
frames”.  
 Governance approaches do not purport to explain every aspect of the EU polity, but 
rather particular elements or specific policy areas (Rosamond, 2000, p.126; Bulmer, 
1994, p.356). As integration has proceeded unevenly across policy areas, scholars ask 
why a particular mode of governance has emerged in a given policy area (Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz, 1997). The edited volume by Wallace, Pollack and Young (2010), for 
instance, deals with policy-making by policy area, including competition policy, the 
common agricultural policy, environmental policy, and energy policy. The member 
states and the EU institutions have different interests, roles and powers across these 
various policy areas, and this affects the type of policies adopted. Helen Wallace has 
identified five variants of the EU policy process: the community method; the EU regula-
tory mode; the EU distributional mode; policy coordination; and intensive transgovern-
mentalism. Foreign policy is an example of a policy area that touches sensitive issues of 
state sovereignty. In such policy areas, a policy mode of ‘intensive transgovernmental-
ism’ prevails: the European Council and Council of Ministers play a central role in 
setting policy direction; the Commission is marginalised; the European Parliament is 
excluded from policy-making; and the ECJ has limited or no jurisdiction. EU foreign 
policy has therefore not been based on legislation, but instruments such as joint actions 
and joint declarations. At the other end of the spectrum, a ‘Community method’ of pol-
icy-making has applied to a policy area such as agriculture. Here there is a strong pol-
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icy-making role for the Commission and the European Parliament, and the ECJ has the 
power to enforce the legal authority of EU legislation (Wallace, 2005a). Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz (1997) propose a continuum of modes of governance, ranging from in-
tergovernmental politics at one end to supranational politics at the other (see figure 2.2). 
The modes of governance differ according to three dimensions: the influence of the EU 
institutions; the formalisation and clarity of EU rules; and the role of transnational ac-
tors. Each of these three dimensions gains in importance as a policy area moves from 
intergovernmental politics to supranational politics.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Governance in the European Union (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). 
 
JHA is the traditional example of a policy area governed by intensive transgovernmen-
talism (see Lavenex, 2009b). Member states have cooperated outside of the EU frame-
work (e.g. in the Schengen agreement), thereby limiting the role of the Commission and 
excluding the European Parliament and ECJ. The use of the intensive transgovernmen-
talism mode of policy-making in JHA is hardly surprising, given that this is a policy 
area that “touch[es] core aspects of state sovereignty” (Lavenex, 2001, p.19). However, 
both the typology by Wallace and that by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz may be mislead-
ing in that they seek to assign an entire policy area to one mode of governance. Instead, 
modes of governance can differ within a policy area, so some elements of a policy are 
more intergovernmental while others are more supranational. Indeed, as far as migration 
policy is concerned, there is evidence of “a patchwork of supranational and national 
immigration policies located at different levels of governance and in different institu-
tional areas, which allow for the full Europeanization of some aspects of migration 
policy while leaving others to the discretion of the member states” (ibid.). Even within 
legal migration policy, family reunification is regulated at the EU level, whereas labour 
migration is still very much a national competence.  
 The governance approach is thus interested in understanding the “overall function-
ing of the institutions” within the EU political system (Bulmer, 1994, p.356) and in 
particular the roles that different actors are able to play. Several contributions focus on 
the role of the member states. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (2003, p.7) argue that “in 
the entire system, member states are still very important”. Despite the emergence of a 
system of multi-level governance in which policy-making power is shared across sev-
eral governance levels (Marks et al., 1996), member states remain important actors in 
EU decision-making. They are “powerful actors who cannot always impose their pre-
ferred outcomes on other players in the EC political system . . . [they are] repositories of 
immense resources, both material (e.g. financial) and non-material (e.g. legitimacy)” 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997, pp.312-314; cf. Marks et al., 1996). On the other 
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hand, the EU institutions are ‘competence-maximisers’ that seek to increase the compe-
tences of the EU level on any given issue area in order to increase their own compe-
tences in the policy-making process (Pollack, 2003, p.35). 
 It is possible to criticise the governance approach as a description (rather than ex-
planation) of the patterns of decision-making at the EU level. Indeed, multi-level gov-
ernance has been criticised for being “an attempt to depict complexity as the principal 
feature of the EU’s policy system” (Rosamond, 2000, p.111; emphasis in original), 
rather than being a coherent theory of the EU. Such a description of the patterns of deci-
sion-making at the EU level is already more productive than the traditional theoretical 
debate between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. However, a description of 
the complexity of EU governance is less interesting than an explanation for this com-
plexity. Why has a certain pattern of governance emerged in a particular policy area? 
This thesis will follow such an approach by first mapping the governance of the Mobil-
ity Partnerships, and then explaining this governance in terms of the role of the member 
states and the EU institutions. 
2.3.2 The governance of EU external migration policy 
The previous sub-section reviewed the literature on the governance of the EU, which is 
concerned with understanding how the EU’s political system functions. One of the most 
important findings of this literature is that governance patterns vary between different 
policy areas. This raises the question for this research: how is the EU’s external migra-
tion policy determined? Lavenex (2001) identifies intensive transgovernmentalism as 
the dominant policy mode in EU JHA policy (albeit with elements of the community 
method appearing). But is this true for external migration policy as well? This sub-
section outlines the roles played in EU external migration policy by the member states, 
the Commission, the ECJ, and the European Parliament. 
 The member states, in the Council and the European Council, have certainly been 
central in the development of the EU’s external migration policy. In terms of the exter-
nal dimension of JHA more broadly, the European Council has been a “strategic guide” 
for the development of this policy (Poli, 2012, p.26). Already in 1992, the European 
Council adopted a declaration on governing external aspects of migration policy, which 
stated that “co-ordination of action in the fields of foreign policy, economic co-
operation and immigration and asylum policy . . . could contribute substantially to ad-
dressing the question of migratory movements” (Council, 1992, p.47). Since 1999, the 
European Council adopts multi-annual programmes on JHA, all of which have empha-
sised the importance of the external dimension (Council, 2009b; 2004b; 1999a). The 
Tampere conclusions are seen as a milestone in the development of EU external migra-
tion policy. In these conclusions, the European Council recommended that the instru-
ments of the EU’s external policy should be used to achieve goals in JHA (Council, 
1999a). The Stockholm programme reaffirms the “need for EU migration policy to be 
an integral part of EU external policy” (Council, 2009b, p.60). The European Council’s 
role in this respect was codified by the Lisbon Treaty, which states that it shall “define 
the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of free-
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dom, security and justice” (article 68 TFEU). The EU’s external migration policy has 
been the subject of many Council meetings and resulting policy documents. In 2005, for 
instance, the Council adopted a strategy for the external dimension of JHA policy, 
which introduced the notion of “partnership with third countries to tackle common 
problems and meet shared policy objectives” (Council, 2005c, p.5). 
 There have been countless policy documents published by the Commission on the 
external dimension of JHA. Through these many communications, reports and recom-
mendations, the Commission tries to act as an agenda-setter (cf. Schain, 2009, p.100). 
Already in 1991, the Commission called for migration to be integrated into EU external 
policy (Commission, 1991). It repeated this call in 1994, arguing that migration should 
be integrated into all of the EU’s external policies, including trade, development, human 
rights, and security policy (Commission, 1994). During the 1990s, however, the Com-
mission, particularly DGs Relex and Development, was sidelined in EU external migra-
tion policy due to its reluctance to use development funding to prevent immigration to 
the EU. This changed in the early 2000s when these DGs came to the realisation that it 
would be better to take the initiative on external migration policy in order to be able to 
set the agenda. This led to a series of communications being published by the Commis-
sion (Boswell, 2003). 
 The Commission and the Council work closely together on EU external migration 
policy: they are the institutions responsible for implementing the strategic guidelines set 
by the European Council (Poli, 2012, p.32). DG JLS of the Commission was responsi-
ble for drafting the 2005 strategy on the external dimension of JHA (Pawlak, 2009, 
p.33). Once it was adopted by the Council, the Commission drafted a report on the im-
plementation of the strategy, and this report was then also adopted by the Council 
(Wolff et al., 2009, p.14). Commission officials participate in Council meetings and 
working bodies dealing with external migration policy. The Commission negotiates visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements with third countries on behalf of the EU, but 
must act on a mandate issued by the Council. 
 Despite this close cooperation between the Commission and the Council, migration 
is, like foreign policy, an issue of ‘high’ politics (Messina 2007, p.138; Caviedes 2004, 
p.289; Lahav and Messina, 2005, p.854). The notion of borders and territory are inher-
ent in the idea of national sovereignty (namely that the state has supreme power within 
its borders), and border control has long been a core part of state activity (Andreas, 
2003, p.78). As Börzel (2005, p.225) points out: “Defence and war pertain to the core of 
state sovereignty. So do law and order, which are merely the domestic flipside of the 
legitimate monopoly of force of the modern state”. Member states’ interior ministries, 
which can be seen as ‘policemen of sovereignty’, have therefore sought to dominate EU 
external migration policy (Lavenex, 2006; Lavenex and Kunz, 2008; Chou, 2009a). 
Whereas ‘internal’ migration policy is now largely communitarised at the EU level, the 
EU institutions have less power and influence over external migration policy (Lavenex, 
2006, p.346). As Sterkx (2008, p.135) concludes: “Member States are in a position of 
power, and their influence on the implementation of the external aspects of asylum and 
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migration policy is substantial”. Geddes (2005) agrees, arguing that EU external migra-
tion policy has domestic roots. 
 This has led to some tension between the Commission and the member states (in 
the Council). Poli argues that “some Member States do not take the EU’s prerogatives 
in the [area of freedom, security and justice] into serious consideration” (2012, p.36). 
There is sometimes little coordination at the EU level on such issues, and no regard for 
the Commission’s role. Member states continue their bilateral cooperation with third 
countries on JHA issues (see Wolff, 2009). The Commission has, for instance, threat-
ened to open an infringement action against Germany for concluding a bilateral read-
mission agreement with China after the Commission received a mandate to negotiate 
with China on behalf of the EU (Poli, 2012, p.34). Some member states concluded bi-
lateral memoranda of understanding with the USA on visa waivers, despite the Com-
mission’s ongoing negotiations with the USA on a general agreement for EU citizens 
(p.35). The member states (acting in the Council) are also quick to check the Commis-
sion when they feel its proposed measures are too far-reaching. In 2010, the Council 
issued a rebuke to the Commission in response to its action plan on the implementation 
of the Stockholm programme. The Council pointed out that “some of the actions pro-
posed by the Commission are not in line with the Stockholm Programme” and urged the 
Commission to comply with the Stockholm programme (Council, 2010a, p.2). Particu-
larly interior ministries’ representatives in the HLWG and external relations and devel-
opment officials in the Commission have failed to see eye-to-eye on whether and how 
the EU’s development cooperation budget should be used to control migration flows 
(Boswell, 2003, p.631).14 Where the European Council meeting in Seville in 2002 
threatened to carry out “a systematic assessment of relations with third countries which 
do not cooperate in combating illegal immigration” (Council, 2002a, p.11), the Com-
mission in the same year focused on providing positive incentives for third countries to 
cooperate on migration management (e.g. Commission, 2002b, p.25). The role that the 
Commission plays also depends on the exact nature of the policy: it “plays the role of 
policy entrepreneur more in some areas (external dimension of borders, visa, asylum) 
than others (external dimension of legal migration)” (Weinar, 2011, p.7). 
 The role of the European Parliament in EU external migration policy has been 
limited. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the Parliament was only entitled 
to express its opinion on readmission agreements (Poli, 2012, p.37). The use of Council 
and European Council conclusions to set external migration policy limits the possibility 
for the Parliament to influence the policy-making process. Nevertheless, the Parliament 
has “shown a constant interest in influencing the course of action in this field, by adopt-
ing regular Resolutions and Recommendations, emphasizing the lack of democratic 
accountability of the JHA external dimension” (Wolff et al., 2009, p.14; cf. Coleman, 
2009, p.168). In 2002, for instance, the Parliament adopted a resolution in which it 
stressed “the shortcomings in the EU’s external strategy in the JHA area, in which noth-
                                                          
14 Lavenex and Kunz (2008, p.443) point out that DG JLS (now DG Home Affairs) has tended to align with 
the Council, in opposition to DGs Relex and Development (see also Boswell, 2008, on the differences be-
tween the DGs). 
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ing is done to involve Parliament” (European Parliament, 2002). It has also criticised 
the substance of EU external migration policy on human rights grounds and raised con-
cerns that third countries are not enough involved in dialogue with the EU (Sterkx, 
2008, p.121). Generally, the Parliament (like the Commission) has argued for a more 
liberal migration policy (Servent, 2010; Acosta, 2009), bringing it into conflict with 
member states’ preferences for a more restrictive policy. 
 The role of the ECJ in external migration policy is limited, due to the prevalence of 
‘soft law’ in this area. The Court has no jurisdiction over matters such as European 
Council conclusions or instances of operational cooperation with third countries. Most 
tools of external migration policy (such as capacity-building missions) are not men-
tioned in the treaties. Given the sensitivity of both migration policy and foreign policy 
for the member states, this is not surprising: in such policy areas, they will tend to fa-
vour modes of governance not based on binding legislation, in order to preserve their 
sovereignty (Héritier, 2003; Citi and Rhodes, 2007). These modes of governance side-
line the Court. This has been the case also in internal migration policy: the member 
states have sought to limit the role of the Court, because the Court has tended to try to 
advance integration by interpreting the provisions on the free movement of workers 
expansively (Papagianni, 2006, p.258; Guiraudon, 2000, p.262). 
 Overall, it is clear that external migration policy remains rather intergovernmental. 
Few of the instruments used in cooperation with third countries are mentioned in the 
treaties, and there is no binding legislation in this area. The Commission and the Coun-
cil work closely together, although the member states (in the Council and the European 
Council) remain the central actors. The Commission is merely “a broker of deals in the 
name of its Member States, and a manager of financial aid. The objectives of the deals 
are laid down by the Member States” (Weinar, 2011, p.3). The European Parliament and 
ECJ are for the most part not included in the policy-making process. Chapter 4 shows 
that this picture of the governance of EU external migration policy was reflected in the 
negotiations on the Mobility Partnerships. 
2.4 Level III: the domestic politics of the member states 
The previous section examined the institutional dynamics of EU external migration 
policy. It showed that the member states (in the European Council and the Council) play 
a central role in the decision-making procedure. EU external migration policy is for the 
most part not based on binding legislation. Member states therefore have the choice of 
whether or not to contribute to operational cooperation with third countries. Chapter 1 
showed that different constellations of member states have participated in the various 
Mobility Partnerships. The question therefore raised for this research is: when and why 
do member states choose to conduct external migration policy at the EU level? Specifi-
cally, the third sub-question addressed is: why do some member states chose to partici-
pate in the Mobility Partnerships while others do not?  
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This thesis highlights the importance of the member states’ domestic preferences for 
understanding EU governance (see Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006). These domestic 
preferences determine a member state’s choice for or against cooperation at the EU 
level (Dowding and King, 1995). Moravcsik (1993b, p.481; cf. Moravcsik and Nico-
laïdis, 1998, p.68) emphasises that “an understanding of domestic politics is a precondi-
tion for, not a supplement to, the analysis of the strategic interaction among states” at 
the EU level. The domestic politics approach (Bulmer, 1983) holds that “too much lit-
erature has concentrated on . . . the formal institutional framework of the [EU] without 
examining the domestic sources of national negotiating positions” (p.353). “The mem-
ber states” are not a unitary actor (Kassim and Menon, 2003, p.133). Indeed, one of the 
problems of early intergovernmentalist theory (Hoffmann, 1966) was precisely this 
tendency to treat governments as unitary actors and member states as ‘black boxes’, 
which would all react in broadly the same way to the ‘threat’ of European integration 
(Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005, p.3). In reality, member states’ preferences vary across 
policies and time, and governments do not consist of only one decision-maker; rather, 
policies are the outcome of bargaining between various players in the national govern-
ment (Allison, 1971; Allison and Halperin, 1972; Kassim, 2001). Scholars have ob-
served empirically that member states’ preferences on migration differ and they are 
sometimes at odds over how to deal with an issue. In 2006, for instance  
Spain, Italy and Malta complained about the limited support for border patrolling 
from . . . northern countries. Some northern European governments (such as France, 
Austria and the Netherlands) responded by blaming Spain and Italy for their recent 
mass regularisations, which they believe pull in even more irregular migrants (de 
Haas, 2008, p.1314).  
In 2004, Italy proposed an EU immigration quota system as an incentive for third coun-
tries to sign readmission agreements, but this was rejected by the European Council and 
particularly opposed by France and Germany (Coleman, 2009, p.199). The southern 
member states (Spain, Italy and Malta) and the northern member states (Germany and 
the Scandinavian countries) also have different positions on the role of Frontex and the 
amount of funding which the agency should receive (Wolff et al., 2009, p.20). Member 
states favour readmission agreements with different third countries depending on the 
countries of origin of the immigration flows that they face (Sterkx, 2008, p.126). Within 
member states, several different ministries tend to be involved in setting migration pol-
icy (European Migration Network, 2010a), and this can affect the type of policy pre-
ferred at the national level: for example, interior ministries tend to be more ‘inward-
looking’ than foreign ministries (van Selm, 2005).15 While interior ministries may fa-
vour the signature of readmission agreements with third countries, foreign ministries 
may view such agreements suspiciously because they spoil diplomatic relations (Paw-
lak, 2009, p.37). Different ministries may also be responsible for representing member 
                                                          
15 This resembles the different approaches within the Commission between DG JLS on the one hand and DGs 
Relex and Development on the other (see above, and Boswell, 2003). 
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states in Council working groups, which may affect EU policy outcomes (Chou, 2009a; 
Lavenex and Kunz, 2008, p.453; Papagianni, 2006, p.222; Schain, 2009, p.103). 
 The previous section argued that member states have maintained their dominant 
position in external migration policy due to the sensitive nature of this issue, which lies 
between migration policy and foreign policy. This section goes one step further by de-
veloping explanations to understand why member have states have different preferences 
on the same policy instrument. 
2.4.1 Explaining member states’ preferences on EU external migration policy  
Given that external migration policy sits at the crossroads of migration policy and for-
eign policy, this thesis combines the literature on EU migration policy with the litera-
ture on EU foreign policy to explain member states’ preferences on participation in the 
Mobility Partnerships. This sub-section outlines two competing explanations. The first 
is a rationalist explanation, according to which a cost-benefit calculation of the conse-
quences of participating in EU external migration policy determines member states’ 
preferences. The second is a constructivist explanation, according to which member 
states’ preferences on EU external migration policy result from a certain national iden-
tity and role conception. These two explanations will be compared in chapter 5 to de-
termine which provides the most convincing account of why member states chose to 
join/not join the Mobility Partnerships. 
 Firstly, according to a rationalist explanation, member states will choose whether to 
conduct external migration policy at the EU level based on a cost-benefit calculation of 
the consequences of doing so. In general terms, rationalism explains policy-makers’ 
actions and decisions in terms of the outcomes expected (Fearon and Wendt, 2002). 
Writing on foreign policy, Manners and Whitman (2000b, p.10) argue that conducting 
policy through the EU can be either a constriction on member states’ foreign policy 
choice or an opportunity for foreign policy action. Member states assess whether the EU 
level amounts to a constriction or opportunity and decide accordingly whether to par-
ticipate in EU-level action or not. Cooperation at the EU level is selected when it 
strengthens the state, rather than weakening it (cf. Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). This 
explanation relies on a ‘logic of consequences’: “actors choose among alternatives by 
evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives . . . [The 
choice for a certain policy] is ‘explained’ by providing an interpretation of the outcomes 
expected from it” (March and Olsen, 1998, pp.949-950).16 The benefits expected from 
participating in EU policy do not necessarily have to be material: actors may adhere to 
norms for reasons such as gaining an enhanced international standing. A cost-benefit 
explanation is characterised by the fact that the underlying logic of the state’s prefer-
ences is still means-ends in nature (Thielemann, 2003, p.255). An example of this dis-
tinction is provided by Checkel (1997, p.478): in the 1990s, the United States adopted 
                                                          
16 Rationalist approaches are criticised for tending to ‘black-box’ the interactions which lead to a certain 
policy being chosen (Checkel, 2001, p.556). Regardless of whether the rationalist approach will be shown to 
explain member states’ choices on the Mobility Partnerships or not, this thesis seeks precisely to open up this 
black box and examine the interaction between member states’ different administrative departments. 
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the global norm of outlawing child sweatshops not due to a logic of appropriateness, but 
rather as a rationalist decision to try to head off criticism by NGOs. 
 There are various potential benefits to member states of conducting external migra-
tion policy through the EU. Guiraudon (2001; 2000) developed the ‘venue-shopping’ 
argument, according to which national governments choose to conduct migration policy 
at the EU level in order to achieve policy objectives which cannot be realised at the 
domestic level. The venue-shopping argument assumes that governmental actors and 
other political actors have different preferences on an issue, which constrains the gov-
ernment in its ability to act. For example, national courts or parliaments may resist the 
government’s migration policy agenda.17 There are several examples of member states’ 
governments applying a venue-shopping approach to circumvent opposition to their 
migration policy objectives from domestic political actors. In the early 1990s, for in-
stance, EU migration policy allowed the German government to justify a restrictive 
policy change requiring a constitutional amendment which was opposed at the domestic 
level (Koslowski, 1998, p.175; Henson and Malhan, 1995). France has made extensive 
use of this tactic. The French government used discussions at the EU level on detention 
of asylum-seekers to modify the national law on detention without entering into a na-
tional discussion about the topic (Barbou des Places and Oger, 2005, p.362). Guiraudon 
assumes that member states’ governments seek a more restrictive migration policy than 
other domestic actors, but the opposite situation could easily be imagined: a govern-
ment, which is balancing the wishes of the public against the labour requirements of the 
national economy and the reality of a declining and ageing population, may actually 
favour a more liberal migration policy than publics and parliaments. Indeed, since 2000, 
many European governments have “argued that selective labour migration could help 
boost productivity and growth, by filling labour and skills shortages” (Boswell and 
Geddes, 2011, p.79). 
 According to Guiraudon’s argument, the EU is used by the national government as 
an ‘excuse’ for having to adopt a policy that it secretly favours; in other words, there is 
no consensus at the national level on migration policy objectives. A different take on the 
venue-shopping argument would be that there is consensus on migration policy objec-
tives amongst domestic political actors and the government, but that these objectives 
cannot be effectively achieved at the national level. Choosing policy action in a differ-
ent venue (namely the EU level) is thus a way of addressing national concerns (Börzel, 
2002, p.196; Moravcsik, 1993b, p.485). Joppke (1998) has argued that the migratory 
phenomenon may present challenges which cannot be addressed adequately by individ-
ual countries. The sheer volume of immigration, coupled with ethnic diversity and re-
sulting social change, means that EU member states are becoming less able to ‘control’ 
migration through national policies alone. They are therefore more likely to conduct 
policy at the EU level in order to achieve their national policy goals. For example, in the 
early 1990s the German government pushed for the supranationalisation of migration 
                                                          
17 National executives have a privileged position in the venue-shopping explanation because they represent 
their country in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. They use this privileged position to 
pursue their preferred policy. The venue-shopping explanation thus relies on the logic of a two-level game. 
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policy in the hope that responsibility for migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
could be shared with other EU member states (Herz, 2006, p.228). 
 Another possible benefit of EU external migration policy is that it offers member 
states more ‘clout’ internationally, through a politics of scale (Ginsberg, 2001). National 
“preferences, ideals and policy models” can be pursued at the EU level (Wong, 2007, 
p.332), for instance if EU external migration policy is targeting a third country with 
which the member state has important (diplomatic) relations. This strengthens national 
foreign policy objectives because it allows “member states to pursue and even expand 
foreign policy objectives . . . beyond those attainable with domestic capabilities” (Keu-
keuleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, p.144). Member states acting together at the EU level 
may, for instance, have more incentives to offer a third country in return for its coopera-
tion on issues such as readmission. This is particularly the case for smaller member 
states, which may not be able to negotiate a readmission agreement with some of the 
larger developing countries (Klavert and van Seters, 2012, p.4).18 
 On the other hand, participation in EU external migration policy will be costly if 
there is a substantial ‘misfit’ with national policy objectives. The literature on Europe-
anisation develops the notion of ‘goodness of fit’ (Börzel, 2002, Börzel and Risse, 
2000; Falkner and Laffan, 2005), which is applied to explain the implementation of 
binding EU legislation: member states will face more difficulties with implementation 
when there is a substantial misfit between EU legislation and existing national legisla-
tion. Although this research is not dealing with an instance of binding legislation, a 
misfit between national policy and a proposed EU external migration policy instrument 
would imply societal, financial or administrative costs to the member state of participat-
ing. Such costs must be weighed against potential benefits of the EU-level cooperation, 
in order for a member state’s government to decide whether or not to participate. A 
member state might also consider cooperation at the EU level too costly if it encroaches 
on a special bilateral relationship or a ‘special issue’ that is considered particularly sen-
sitive at the domestic level (Manners and Whitman, 2000b, p.11). 
 Where rationalism focuses on costs, benefits and expected outcomes, constructiv-
ism focuses on ideas, identities, norms and values as the basis for decisions. According 
to a constructivist explanation, member states’ preferences on EU external migration 
policy are shaped by their own national identities and role conceptions (Aggestam, 
2004; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, pp.137-138; Holsti, 1987). Broadly speak-
ing, constructivists hold that “what actors do in international relations… [is] defined by 
social norms and ideas rather than by objective or material conditions” (Barkin, 2003, 
p.326). Policy preferences are therefore not related to a calculation about means and 
ends, but rather relate to “identity politics” (Jørgensen, 2004, p.23) and a norm-based 
rationale (Thielemann, 2003, p.254). Jørgensen (2004, p.23), writing about foreign 
policy, argues that it is determined by questions such as “Is [state X] a great power? 
                                                          
18 Panizzon (2012, p.104) argues the opposite: that third countries tend to prefer bilateral readmission agree-
ments with individual EU member states, because such agreements are more likely to contain offers of labour 
market access, and the readmission obligation covers only one state, rather than all (or rather most of) the EU 
member states as with an EU readmission agreement.  
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Ought [state X] to be represented in the [UN] Security Council? Is [state X] a civilian 
power?” Alons (2007, p.215) refers to this as the “ideological” dimension of national 
interest. National identity concerns ideas about the ‘we’ of the national political com-
munity: the norms and values that the state stands for and seeks to promote in its inter-
national relations, and the way in which “foreign policy-makers view past history, the 
present and the future political choices they face” (Aggestam, 2004, p.83). A role con-
ception 
includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, com-
mitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their 
state should perform on a continuing basis . . . It is their image of the appropriate 
orientations or functions of their state (Holsti, 1987, p.12). 
Such an explanation of policy preferences therefore relies on a ‘logic of appropriate-
ness’: “action involves invoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that 
identity or role to a specific situation” (March and Olsen, 1998, p.951). Such an ap-
proach is inherently able to account for the different preferences of the member states, 
because member states have different national identities and role conceptions (see Rey-
nolds, 2004). These identities or role conceptions are anchored in the domestic context: 
a government’s domestic popularity may well depend on the policy adopted, so a do-
mestic-generated role conception is likely to be favoured as the ‘road-map’ for action 
(Aggestam, 2004, p.88).19 For this reason, the thesis does not focus on the emergence of 
shared norms or role conceptions at the EU level (see Checkel, 2001); rather, it is as-
sumed that existing domestic norms and role conceptions are the foundation for the 
decision to participate/not participate in EU policy proposals: if the EU policy is con-
sidered appropriate in terms of domestic norms, then the member state will decide to 
participate. Aggestam aims to explore the extent to which national identities are becom-
ing shaped by the exchange with other member states in the framework of the EU; how-
ever, she concludes that France, Germany and the UK “conceptualise foreign policy 
objectives first and foremost in a national mind-set” (p.97). Applying such an explana-
tion to the specific case being studied (the Mobility Partnerships), member states will 
choose to participate if the concept of migration cooperation with third countries inher-
ent in the Mobility Partnerships matches their national identities and role conceptions. 
 Table 2.3 summarises how these two explanations account for member states’ deci-
sions to participate in EU external migration policy measures. Chapter 5 assesses which 
of these explanations is more convincingly able to account for member states’ prefer-
ences on the Mobility Partnerships. 
 
                                                          
19 It is important to note that states do not just have one conception of their nationality identity (Holsti, 1987, 
p.28); rather the course of action that policy-makers see as being appropriate may depend on the issue at stake. 
An EU member state might, for instance, have a very different idea of its role in the EU’s external migration 
policy than its role in the Common Security and Defence Policy. 
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Table 2.3: Explaining member states’ decisions to participate in EU external migration policy. 
 Explanation for participation 
Cost-benefit Expected benefits of participation outweigh expected costs 
National identity EU external migration policy matches national identity/role conception 
 
2.4.2 Mapping member states’ participation in EU external migration policy 
The EU member states are affected by different migratory flows, both in terms of mag-
nitude and origin, and have different histories of external migration policy (see chapter 
5). It can therefore be expected that they will make different choices concerning their 
participation in EU external migration policy. This thesis concerns their choices on one 
policy instrument, namely the Mobility Partnerships. However, this sub-section illus-
trates that member states’ preferences have differed on other aspects of EU external 
migration policy as well. It is clearly beyond the scope of this sub-section to outline 
fully the participation of all 27 member states in all aspects of EU external migration 
policy, and it therefore focuses on migration missions, the Thematic Programme for 
Cooperation with Third Countries in the Areas of Migration and Asylum, and Frontex 
operations. 
 Migration missions had been conducted to fifteen countries by 2011.20 Different 
constellations of member states have taken part in these missions. Using the migration 
missions in Eastern Europe as an example, table 2.4 shows member states’ participation. 
Poland and Sweden have participated in all three of these migration missions, whilst 
some member states have participated in none. 
 
                                                          
20 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, 
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Ukraine. 
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Table 2.4: Member states’ participation in migration missions in Eastern Europe (Council, 2011c, p.2; Delega-
tion of the European Union to Belarus, 2009; Public Radio of Armenia, 2008). 
Member state Armenia (2008) Belarus (2009) Azerbaijan (2011) 
Austria    
Belgium    
Bulgaria    
Cyprus    
Czech Republic X  X 
Denmark    
Estonia  X  
Finland  X  
France X   
Germany X X  
Greece    
Hungary   X 
Ireland    
Italy    
Latvia  X  
Lithuania  X  
Luxembourg    
Malta    
Netherlands   X 
Poland X X X 
Portugal X X  
Romania X   
Slovakia  X  
Slovenia   X 
Spain  X  
Sweden X X X 
UK    
 
Member states have made varying use of the EU’s Thematic Programme for Coopera-
tion with Third Countries in the Areas of Migration and Asylum. Table 2.5 shows 
which governments have received funding from the programme to carry out projects in 
third countries. The Czech, Italian and Spanish governments have been the most suc-
cessful in acquiring funds from the thematic programme. 
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Table 2.5: Member states awarded funding from the Thematic programme to carry out projects in third coun-
tries (Commission, 2011f; 2010d; 2008c). 
Member state Call 2007-2008 Call 2009-2010 Call 2011-2012 
Austria    
Belgium    
Bulgaria    
Cyprus    
Czech Republic X  X 
Denmark    
Estonia    
Finland    
France X   
Germany    
Greece    
Hungary    
Ireland    
Italy X  X 
Latvia    
Lithuania    
Luxembourg    
Malta    
Netherlands    
Poland    
Portugal X   
Romania    
Slovakia    
Slovenia    
Spain X X  
Sweden X   
UK X   
 
Finally, member states have participated to varying extents and in different ways in 
Frontex operations. All member states, with the exception of the UK and Ireland, par-
ticipated in the Rapid Border Intervention Teams deployed to the Greek-Turkish border 
in 2010 (Frontex, 2011). France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain 
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contributed to Operation Hera which aimed to patrol the waters near Senegal and Mau-
ritania and detect migrants being transported by sea to Europe (Frontex, 2012). 
2.5 Level I: explaining third countries’ preferences 
International migration is by its very nature a matter of foreign policy. Indeed, “to view 
migration management as a domestic issue alone neglects important foreign policy 
considerations” (Geddes, 2004, p.8). The EU therefore increasingly attempts to “influ-
ence migration from, and the migration policies of, non-EU states” (Geddes, 2008, 
p.170). There are a number of tools used for this purpose, such as readmission agree-
ments, migration dialogues (such as the EU-African Rabat process), and the funding of 
projects (such as the creation of a migration information centre in Mali, to warn poten-
tial migrants about the dangers of migrating illegally and to promote legal migration) 
(see chapter 1; Bosch and Haddad, 2007; Pastore, 2007). In order to understand the 
outcome of the interaction between the EU and third countries, this thesis asks under 
which circumstances third countries choose to cooperate with the EU on migration 
issues, in this case the Mobility Partnerships. The final sub-question to be addressed in 
this research is therefore: why do third countries choose to join a Mobility Partnership?  
2.5.1 EU external governance 
There is a growing body of literature on the external governance of the EU. External 
governance refers to the EU “exporting forms of political organization” to third coun-
tries (Bulmer, 2007, p.47). The difference between internal and external governance is 
that “while the former concerns primarily the creation of rules as well as their imple-
mentation in national political systems, the external dimension is exclusively about the 
transfer of given EU rules and their adoption by non-member states” (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.661; emphasis in original). External governance, however, is 
more than simply the transfer of rules by the EU to third countries; it implies the par-
ticipation of third countries in the process of policy-making. This thesis defines external 
governance as a policy-making process whereby “third countries participate in the defi-
nition of relevant EU policies” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.796).21  
 The concept of external governance has been developed by scholars writing about 
the enlargement process. In order to differentiate between external governance in coun-
tries that are candidates for EU membership and countries that are not candidates, Lave-
nex (2004, p.683) defines external governance as “the extension of the legal boundary 
of authority [of the EU] beyond institutional integration”. In other words, non-member 
states become drawn into the pursuit of the EU’s internal policy goals, without the pros-
pect of eventual accession to the Union. 
 There are two main strategies that the EU employs in its relations with third coun-
tries. Conditionality (or ‘external incentives’) is the best-known model of EU influence 
on third countries (Schimmelfennig, 2009). Conditionality is a rationalist model “based 
                                                          
21 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig actually coin the term ‘extended governance’ for this definition. 
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on the direct, sanctioning impact of the EU on the target government” (p.8). There are 
two types of conditionality: positive and negative. Positive conditionality “involves 
promising . . . benefit(s) to a state if it fulfils the conditions; negative conditionality 
involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state in question 
violates the conditions” (Smith, 1998, p.256). There is then a cost-benefit calculation by 
the third country, which will choose to cooperate “if the benefits of EU rewards exceed 
the domestic adoption costs” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.664). Various 
factors determining this cost-benefit balance have been proposed by different authors. In 
his piece on conditionality and aid donors (more broadly than only the EU), Killick 
(1997) argues that there is a minimum level of coherence required between donor and 
recipient objectives, and that the threat of punishment must be credible. Schimmelfen-
nig and Sedelmeier argue that the success of the conditionality model depends on: the 
clarity of the EU’s requirements; the credibility that both the reward and sanction will 
actually be administered by the EU; and the cost to the third country of adopting the 
requirements (ibid.). Adoption costs “may take the form of opportunity costs of forgo-
ing alternative rewards offered by adopting rules other than EU rules . . . [or] they may 
produce welfare or power costs for private and public actors” (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004, p.664). It is in this context that existing bilateral relations between 
the third country and EU member states is important: EU member states may be offer-
ing cooperation that is less costly or more beneficial than that proposed by the EU. This 
can affect the third country’s decision on whether or not to cooperate with the EU – in 
effect, the member states are ‘undermining’ EU policy.  
 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009, pp.804-805) emphasise the importance of 
domestic structures: external governance is effective when EU rules resonate well with 
domestic rules, traditions and practices; when the number of veto players incurring 
significant costs from the adoption of EU rules is low; and when state capacity in the 
third country is high. In terms of state capacity, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009, 
p.805) highlight the compatibility of domestic institutions in the third country with the 
EU system. This is highly relevant in an enlargement context: if a third country seeks to 
join the EU, they will have to apply the entire EU acquis and officials will need to be 
integrated into the EU’s decision-making bodies. However, in a case of external gov-
ernance, where membership of the EU is not at stake, state capacity should be measured 
differently. Even in the enlargement process, when the EU made accession conditional 
on ‘administrative capacity’, it was unclear what was meant by this (Dimitrova, 2002). 
Several definitions of administrative capacity have been suggested: staffing levels; 
internal organisation and coordination structures; sectoral capacity; and the ability to 
implement policies (Laffan, 1997; Dimitrova, 2002). As the thesis deals with decision-
making (rather than implementation), administrative capacity will be understood as 
being dependent on staffing levels and the existence of sectoral coordination structures.  
 Some of the factors identified in the literature as part of the cost-benefit calculation 
by third countries are not relevant for the instance of EU external migration policy ex-
amined in this thesis. For instance, there is no clear sanction that is threatened if a third 
country refuses to sign a Mobility Partnership. This is in contrast to the conditionality 
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imposed on countries wanting to become members of the EU, which may find their 
accession funding through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance withheld if they 
do not comply with the accession criteria (under Council Regulation EC 1085/2006). 
Some EU member states have in the past favoured withholding development aid to 
countries that do not cooperate on migration objectives, but this was rejected by the 
Council as a whole (Chou, 2006). This thesis therefore argues that the cost-benefit cal-
culation made by third countries will depend on three factors: (i) the resonance of the 
EU policy with national policy objectives; (ii) the administrative capacity of the target 
state; and (iii) the domestic costs of adopting the EU policy.  
 Under such a conditionality approach, third countries are not involved in the defini-
tion of the policy. Hettne and Söderbaum (2005) define this as ‘soft imperialism’: it is 
“an asymmetric relationship and the imposition of norms in order to promote the EU’s 
self-interest rather than a genuine (interregional) dialogue as a foundation for sustain-
able global governance” (p.549). Chou (2006, p.2) defines the EU approach as ‘coer-
cive’ because it “uses development aid or related incentives in exchange for third coun-
tries’ cooperation in achieving EU migration objectives, such as the tackling of irregular 
migration”. Lavenex and Wichmann (2009) argue that, in a policy area such as internal 
security, the relationship between the EU and third countries is highly asymmetric, as 
the EU has much stronger interest in cooperation. Betts (2011, p.24) agrees that there is 
a fundamental power asymmetry in migration relations: “receiving states have discre-
tion to open or close their borders and are thus implicit ‘rule-makers’, while sending 
states have to generally accept the decisions of receiving states and are thus implicit 
‘rule-takers’”. 
 The conditionality model has been developed in relation to the enlargement process 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Lavenex (2012) identifies distinctive features 
of external governance and conditionality in the context of enlargement: there is a su-
pranational acquis which must be adopted by the third countries; monitoring mecha-
nisms exist to check compliance by third countries; and the reward on offer for compli-
ance – eventual membership in the EU – is significant. Indeed, “the lack of membership 
prospects or other attractive incentives poses serious limits to external governance” 
(Lavenex, 2004, p.694). Trauner (2009) nevertheless argues that conditionality can be 
applied in a non-enlargement context, by focusing on ‘policy conditionality’. Policy 
conditionality refers to “material rewards that do not relate to EU accession” (p.776). 
The example that Trauner gives is the promise of visa liberalisation for third countries 
in return for signing a readmission agreement and making reforms in the sector of JHA 
(p.775). He applies this additional element of conditionality to Macedonia, whose 
membership perspective is less certain than for countries like Croatia. However, policy 
conditionality can also be considered in cases where no membership perspective exists 
at all. Visa liberalisation, for instance, could be a powerful incentive for African coun-
tries to cooperate with the EU on migration. Even visa facilitation could lead to conces-
sions by African countries on the issue of readmission (Klavert and van Seters, 2012, 
p.4). 
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The other explanation for third countries’ decision to cooperate with the EU is a ‘social 
learning’ approach in which third countries are persuaded of the legitimacy and appro-
priateness of EU policies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).22 This explanation 
implies voluntarism on the part of the third country which “adopts EU rules depend[ing] 
on the degree to which it regards EU rules . . . as appropriate” (p.667). This in turn de-
pends on a group of factors: member states being subject to the rules as well; delibera-
tion with the EU on rule transfer; EU rules being shared by other international organisa-
tions; and the target state identifying with the EU community (p.668). 
 A central aspect of the social learning model is that governments of third countries 
“do not so much engage in cost/benefit calculations as puzzle, debate and argue with 
international interlocutors over the scope and direction of change” in a ‘policy dialogue’ 
(Checkel, 2000, p.15). Epstein (2005) highlights the differences between the condition-
ality and social learning models with reference to reforms implemented in Poland in 
preparation for EU accession. Central bank independence was adopted in advance of 
EU requirements, as a result of extensive interactions between Polish and EU officials 
which led to acceptance of EU rules through a process of social learning; in the case of 
agricultural reform, on the other hand, the Polish government complied with EU re-
quirements because accession was conditional on reform being implemented, but the 
norms associated with the reform were not internalised and remained domestically con-
troversial. In one case, therefore, reform came to be seen as the ‘right’ thing to do based 
on a process of dialogue with EU officials (social learning explanation), in the other 
case, reform was adopted because the costs of the reform were outweighed by the bene-
fit of EU membership (conditionality explanation). 
 A process of dialogue and persuasion is therefore central to the social learning 
model. Risse (1999) argues that “the goal of [such] discursive interaction . . . is to 
achieve voluntary argumentative consensus and truth seeking, not to push through one’s 
own view of the world or moral values” (p.534). Participants in this search for argumen-
tative consensus are assumed to be equal: “relationships of power, force and coercion 
are assumed absent . . . This implies respect for two principles: universal respect as the 
recognition of all interested parties as participants in the argumentative discourse and 
the recognition of equal rights to all participants concerning making an argument or 
challenging a validity claim” (p.535). Lavenex and Wichmann (2009) refer to “partici-
patory governance”. In relation to EU external migration policy, Chou (2006, p.2) refers 
to a ‘comprehensive’ approach by the EU which “takes into consideration the needs of 
all three parties involved (EU member states, sending countries and the migrants)”. This 
is in line with the EU’s emphasis on ‘ownership’ of policies by partner countries (e.g. 
Commission, 2010b).  
                                                          
22 Schimmelfennig and Sedelemeier (2004) also list the ‘lesson-drawing’ model of EU influence. However, 
this model does not depend on any contact or negotiation between the EU and the third country. Instead, third 
countries “adopt EU rules without incentives or persuasion” (p.668). Policy-makers in the third country search 
for a solution to a domestic problem by reviewing policies of other countries, and adopt the rules that they 
deem suitable for this purpose. This model is not appropriate for analysing the Mobility Partnerships (which 
are a negotiated agreement between the EU and a third country) and will therefore not be considered. 
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Table 2.6 outlines the two competing explanations for third countries’ decisions to co-
operate with the EU on migration issues. Chapter 6 assesses which of these explanations 
is more convincingly able to account for third countries’ preferences on cooperating 
with the EU in a Mobility Partnership. 
 
Table 2.6: Explaining third countries’ decision to cooperate with the EU. 
 Explanation for participation 
Policy conditionality Expected benefits of cooperation outweigh expected costs 
Social learning Third country is persuaded of the legitimacy and appropriateness of EU poli-
cies in a process of dialogue with the EU 
 
2.5.2 Mapping the external governance of EU migration policy 
There has been much criticism in the academic literature of the EU’s approach towards 
third countries in the area of migration. Chou (2009b, p.19), for instance, argues that 
“for the migration ministers the idea of ‘cooperation with third countries’ [is] less cen-
tred on how both partners could obtain shared advantage and more concentrated on 
formulating a common EU approach in the first instance, and then subsequently enforc-
ing it on third country ‘partners’”. This sub-section sets out the approach adopted by the 
EU and gives examples of third countries’ responses. It outlines the nature of the exter-
nal governance of EU migration policy and is therefore not concerned with judging the 
normative aspect of the EU approach. Just as with the member states (see section 2.4.2), 
third countries have made different decisions on whether or not to cooperate with the 
EU on migration issues. As this thesis deals only with one policy instrument, namely 
the Mobility Partnerships, this sub-section aims to illustrate third countries’ varying 
preferences on some other aspects of EU external migration policy. 
 The Commission has on several occasions emphasised the need to cooperate with 
third countries in order to achieve migration policy objectives (e.g. Commission, 
2002b), and this was again acknowledged with the introduction of the Global Approach 
(Council, 2005a). Some authors have argued that this has enabled third countries to play 
a role in EU migration policy, with African countries increasingly involved in processes 
of dialogue (Collyer, 2009). Dialogue is a key component of a ‘social learning’ explana-
tion, because it is a forum through which the EU can persuade third countries of the 
appropriateness of its policies. The Commission emphasises the importance of “devel-
oping dialogue and cooperation on migration related issues” with African countries 
(Commission, 2009e, p.27). In November 2006, an EU-Africa ministerial conference on 
migration and development (involving all EU and African heads of state/government) 
was held in Tripoli. At the regional level, EU and West African heads of 
state/government are involved in the Rabat process on migration and development. 
Meetings were held in Rabat in 2006, Paris in 2008, and Dakar in 2011 (Commission, 
2011g). The pillar on dialogue and cooperation with Africa in the Global Approach 
recommends regular meetings between senior officials of the EU and partner countries 
in order to “make migration a shared priority for political dialogue between the EU and 
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the African Union” (Council, 2005a, p.11). At the bilateral level, the EU sends migra-
tion missions to third countries to foster dialogue on migration issues. To date, migra-
tion missions have been sent to the following sub-Saharan African countries: Camer-
oon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa 
and Tanzania (Commission, 2011g). 
 Such an approach of dialogue with third countries is not, however, uniformly ap-
plied. In many cases, ‘dialogue with countries of origin of migrants’ means “dialogue 
on the implementation of the EU’s plans, not on the drafting of those plans” (van Selm, 
2002, p.154). When the HLWG produced action plans for several third countries, for 
example, it did so without consulting officials of these countries. This led to an angry 
reaction by the Moroccan government, which refused to discuss the plan with EU offi-
cials (Boswell, 2003, p.631; Pastore, 2002, p.113; Council, 2000, p.7). Rather than 
attempting to persuade third countries of the legitimacy of its migration policy, the EU 
focus is more often on making certain benefits conditional on third countries’ coopera-
tion. The Commission has argued that this is necessary because the interests of the EU 
and third countries on migration issues may differ substantially (Commission, 2002b). 
Whereas the EU is primarily concerned with the prevention of illegal migration, “sub-
Saharan African countries are not necessarily interested in curbing the migration of their 
own citizens and are not interested in cooperation on readmission of non-nationals, 
fearing the impact it may have on their capacity to deal with migration flows” (Weinar, 
2011, p.7). It is particularly readmission agreements that are costly for the readmitting 
state: “repatriation nearly always constitutes the loss of vital foreign currency [in remit-
tances] . . . the return of émigrés regularly puts further pressure on already-saturated 
labour markets . . . [and] reintegration can pose significant social challenges where 
deportees have engaged in criminal or ‘subversive’ political activity abroad or where 
migrants return with only a rudimentary knowledge of their ‘native’ language and cul-
ture” (Ellermann, 2008, p.171; cf. Roig and Huddleston, 2007).  
 Nevertheless, readmission agreements remain central to EU migration policy 
(Council, 2011a). The Commission has therefore long recognised the need to offer third 
countries an incentive for their cooperation (Commission, 2002b), in the form of a visa 
facilitation agreement, financial assistance, or legal migration opportunities (Commis-
sion, 2011c). There is a difference between the rhetoric of the Commission and Euro-
pean Parliament on the one hand, and some member states in the Council on the other, 
on the approach towards third countries. At the Seville European Council meeting in 
2002, Spain and the UK proposed to limit the provision of development aid to third 
countries that do not cooperate with the EU on migration issues (Chou, 2006, p.4). Al-
though this was rejected by other member states, it was agreed that measures may be 
adopted (under the Common Foreign and Security Policy or other policies) against 
countries that do not cooperate on migration (Council, 2002a). In contrast, the Commis-
sion has stated that “introducing aid conditionality . . . is not an effective way of ad-
dressing the problem, and that the global approach is the best conduct to follow” 
(Commission, 2009f, p.123). The European Parliament has also emphasised that techni-
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cal and financial aid should not be made conditional on a third country’s performance 
on the issue of readmission (European Parliament, 2006a, p.11). 
 The greatest reward the EU can offer for third countries’ cooperation is the pros-
pect of entry into the EU. However, enlargement is clearly not on the cards for all coun-
tries in the world, and such a reward cannot be offered to countries in Africa (Eller-
mann, 2008). The EU can therefore only offer rewards that fall short of enlargement. 
For instance, visa liberalisation dialogue have been offered to selected third countries 
including Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (Lavenex, 2012, p.128), Ukraine (Council, 
2010b), Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Council, 2010c), Georgia (Commission, 
2012b), Kosovo (Commission, 2012c) and Moldova (Council, 2012d). Under visa liber-
alisation dialogues, progress on document security, border management, and asylum 
policy is eventually rewarded with visa-free travel to the EU.  
 Faced with such an approach by the EU, third countries make different decisions on 
whether and how to cooperate. Van Criekinge (2010) shows that Senegal chooses to 
cooperate on migration issues only where the government expects to benefit. It has 
adopted a strategy of non-compliance and resistance towards the EU where benefits are 
not expected in return for cooperation. Morocco has responded to EU pressure by posi-
tioning itself as “Europe’s leading partner in the ‘fight against illegal migration’”. This 
strategy has the benefit of strengthening the Moroccan position in negotiations with the 
EU and diverting attention away from the fact that Morocco is the most important 
source country of migrants in the EU (de Haas, 2008, p.1316).  
2.6 Explaining the size of the win-sets in the three-level game 
So far, this chapter has dealt with the three different levels of analysis rather separately. 
Section 2.3 outlined the still rather intergovernmental nature of EU external migration 
policy, which is due to the fact that this policy area sits at the crossroads of two policies 
that are significant for member states: migration policy and foreign policy. Section 2.4 
developed two explanations for member states’ preferences on EU external migration 
policy: a rationalist, cost-benefit explanation, and a constructivist explanation based on 
national identity and role conception. Section 2.5 developed two explanations for third 
countries’ preferences on migration cooperation with the EU: the rationalist policy con-
ditionality model and the constructivist social learning model.  
 This section briefly outlines the implications of these theoretical expectations for 
the size of the win-sets in the three-level game. As noted above, there are two main 
interactions in EU external migration policy: one between the EU institutions and the 
member states; and one between the EU and third countries. These interactions are 
distinct, but linked. In each interaction, the possibility for agreement depends on the size 
of the win-set for each actor. The size of the win-set is determined by the cost of no 
agreement and the ratification procedure. If these win-sets overlap, for instance if both 
actors have a large win-set, agreement is possible. If there is no overlap, for instance if 
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both actors have a small win-set, there is no common ground between the actors and 
agreement is not possible. 
2.6.1 EU-member state interaction: size of the win-set 
For the EU-member state interaction, the cost of no agreement differs for the EU as 
compared to the member states. This thesis assumes the EU institutions to be ‘compe-
tence-maximisers’ that seek to increase their competences in the policy-making process. 
Sub-section 2.3.2 showed that the Commission has cooperated closely with the member 
states, but that there has also been some tension as this is a policy area which member 
states consider a national prerogative. Sub-section 2.5.2 showed that the Commission 
has been vocal on the need to cooperate with third countries on migration issues and 
offer them incentives for their cooperation. It can therefore be assumed that the cost of 
no agreement for the Commission is high – if there is no agreement, the Commission 
role is by default reduced to nothing. The Commission cannot conduct an EU external 
migration policy on its own. Indeed, the member states (acting through the Council) can 
withdraw permission for the Commission to conduct the EU’s external migration policy 
if they are dissatisfied with the Commission’s actions. They threatened to do just this in 
2004 due to a lack of progress on readmission negotiations (Coleman, 2009, p.146; 
Casarino, 2012, p.203). For the member states, on the other hand, the cost of no agree-
ment depends on one of two factors: whether the benefits of an agreement outweigh its 
costs; or whether the policy matches with national identity. In cases where there are 
significant benefits from EU cooperation or where EU cooperation matches with con-
ceptions of national identity, the cost of no agreement is high.  
 The ratification procedure used at the EU level depends on the type of policy being 
agreed on. The European Parliament is primarily involved with legislation. Most aspects 
of external migration policy are therefore outside of its competence, with the exception 
of readmission agreements. This makes the ratification procedure easier by eliminating 
a veto-player. The decision rule in the Council depends on whether the policy being 
agreed on is specifically mentioned in the treaties. In case of operational cooperation 
with third countries that falls outside the treaties, member states must agree unani-
mously on any new measure. Such a decision rule inevitably makes the ratification 
procedure more difficult, by introducing 27 veto-players. Equally, at the domestic level 
of the member states, the ratification procedure depends on the national context and the 
type of policy. Some governments may (be obliged to) consult their parliaments or 
specific interest groups on all matters of EU policy. This would make the ratification 
procedure at EU level more difficult, by introducing a new veto-player for each member 
state using such a decision-making procedure. In other member states, civil servants in 
the ministry responsible for migration or EU policy may have relative autonomy in 
deciding to participate/not participate in the Mobility Partnerships. Overall then, it is 
difficult to outline precise expectations on the nature of the ratification procedure. It 
should be noted that the ratification procedure is considered also for negative cases 
(where the member state decided not participate in the Mobility Partnerships). Ratifica-
tion, as conceptualised in this thesis, is the autonomy of the central decision-maker(s) to 
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take a decision; that decision could also be negative, in other words the decision not to 
participate in the Mobility Partnerships. 
 The size of the win-sets can be represented graphically (Putnam, 1988). In figures 
2.3 and 2.4, the continuum represents the space of all potential agreements. The size of 
the space between EU and EU1 represents the win-set for the EU, and this depends on 
the cost of no agreement for the EU and the ratification procedure in the EU; the size of 
the space between MS and MS1 represents the win-set for a member state, and this de-
pends on the cost of no agreement for the member state and the ratification procedure in 
the member state. Where these spaces overlap, between EU1 and MS1, lays the possibil-
ity for agreement – this is the space containing the agreements that are acceptable to 
both parties, indicating that there is some common ground (Collinson, 1999, p.216). 
Figure 2.3 depicts a situation where both the EU and the member states have a large 
win-set, for instance if the cost of no agreement is high and the ratification procedure is 
easy in both cases. In such a situation, both the EU and the member states desire and 
can commit to an agreement. Figure 2.4 depicts an example of a situation in which no 
agreement is possible: the cost of no agreement for the EU is high, but the ratification 
procedure in the EU is difficult. At the same time the cost of no agreement for the 
member states is small and the ratification procedures in the member states is difficult. 
Only one party is therefore striving for an agreement, and institutional rules are unfa-
vourable to ratification: reaching agreement will not be possible. 
 
EU ------------------[----------------------------------------------------------]---------------- MS 
                            MS1                                                                      EU1 
Figure 2.3: Agreement possible. 
 
EU -------------------------------------------]---------------------------[---------------------- MS 
                                                            EU1                              MS1 
Figure 2.4: No agreement possible. 
2.6.2 EU-third country interaction: size of the win-set 
For the EU-third country interaction, the cost of no agreement again depends on the 
actor concerned. Sub-section 2.5.2 showed that there is recognition within the EU that 
cooperation with third countries on migration issues is necessary. For the EU, the cost 
of no agreement is therefore assumed to be high in all cases: without agreements with 
third countries, there is no EU external migration policy. For the third country, the cost 
of no agreement depends on one of two factors (see sub-section 2.5.1): whether the 
policy is expected to bring more benefits than costs; or whether the policy is considered 
appropriate. In case cooperation with the EU is expected to be beneficial or appropriate, 
the cost of no agreement will be high. But if the value or nature of the EU agreement is 
not certain, or there are preferable alternatives, the cost of no agreement for the third 
country is low. This is where the link between the member states and the third countries 
becomes important (see figure 2.1): if these bilateral relations offer a preferable alterna-
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tive to the one presented by the Commission, the win-set of the third country is small, 
making agreement with the EU impossible. In other words, bilateral migration agree-
ments undermine the Commission’s bargaining position. 
 The ratification procedure in the third country will depend on the national context 
(just as for the member states). If veto-players (such as the national parliament or other 
domestic groups) are involved in the decision-making procedure, the ratification proce-
dure is difficult. The smaller the number of actors that must approve the cooperation 
with the EU, the easier is the ratification procedure. Just as for the member states, the 
ratification procedure is also considered for negative cases (cases where the third coun-
try decided not to sign a Mobility Partnership). In these cases, ratification refers to the 
process by which the decision not to sign was taken: where was the decision made? Did 
the decision need to be reached jointly with other institutions? Did the decision need 
approval from higher levels in the bureaucracy? Was the decision to participate/not 
participate confirmed by the parliament? The nature of the ratification procedure in the 
EU depends on the extent to which the Commission is constrained by the member states 
in the Council. Sub-section 2.3.2 showed that the Commission has cooperated closely 
with the member states in making EU external migration policy, but that the member 
states have exercised control over the Commission’s actions. If this control of the 
Commission by the member states is tight, the ratification procedure is difficult because 
the Commission cannot act autonomously but must consider the preferences of the 27 
member states. Examples of tight control might include a requirement for the Commis-
sion to report frequently to the Council; to include member states’ experts in the negoti-
ating team for migration agreements with third countries; or to gain member states’ 
approval before finally concluding a migration agreement.  
 Figures 2.5 and 2.6 depict two possible situations for the EU-third country interac-
tion. The continuum represents the space of all possible agreements. In figure 2.5, 
agreement is possible: the cost of no agreement for the EU is high, and the ratification 
procedure in the EU is easy. The cost of no agreement for the third country is also high, 
although the ratification procedure is difficult. Nevertheless, the two win-sets overlap, 
so agreement is possible. Figure 2.6 depicts an example of a situation in which no 
agreement is possible. The cost of no agreement for the EU remains high, but the ratifi-
cation procedure is difficult. The cost of no agreement for the third country is low and 
the ratification procedure is difficult. Only one of the actors actually desires to reach 
agreement, and institutional rules are unfavourable to ratification. The win-sets do not 
overlap and there can be no agreement. 
 
EU -------------------------------------------[--------------------------]----------------------- TC 
                                                             TC1                            EU1 
Figure 2.5: Agreement possible. 
 
EU ------------------------------------------]------------------------------------[-------------- TC 
                                                            EU1                                          TC1 
Figure 2.6: No agreement possible. 
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Sub-section 2.2.2 argued that the two interactions in a three-level game are linked, be-
cause the policy that is decided upon in one interaction becomes the subject of negotia-
tion in the second interaction. The member states and the EU institutions negotiate in 
the first interaction to determine the format and content of EU external migration policy, 
and this policy then becomes the subject of the negotiations between the EU and the 
third country. This is show in figure 2.7: the room for manoeuvre that the Commission 
has in the interaction with third country depends on what has been agreed in the first 
interaction with the member states. 
 
EU ------------------[--------------------]--------------------------------------------------- MS
MS1 EU1
EU [---------------------]--------------------------------------------------- TC
EU1  
Figure 2.7: The link between the two interactions in a three-level game. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined four sub-questions to be addressed in this research project: 
- What was the role of the EU institutions and the member states in the negotiation of 
the Mobility Partnerships? (chapter 4) 
- What implications does this have for the form of the partnerships? (chapter 4) 
- Why do some member states chose to participate in the Mobility Partnerships while 
others do not? (chapter 5) 
- Why do third countries choose to join a Mobility Partnership? (chapter 6) 
Decision-making on EU external migration policy should be conceptualised as a three-
level game. The interactions between these three levels determine policy outcomes. The 
chapter outlined competing rationalist and constructivist explanations for member 
states’ and third countries’ preferences on EU external migration policy (see table 2.7). 
Finally, section 2.6 outlined some expectations about the conditions for win-sets to be 
large (which makes agreement possible). Figure 2.8 shows the complete model: the 
links between the three levels, the theoretical explanations for member states’ and third 
countries’ preferences, and the determinants of the size of the win-set for each actor.  
 
Table 2.7: Rationalist and constructivist explanations for member states’ and third countries’ preferences 
 Member states Third countries 
Rationalist Cost-benefit Policy conditionality 
Constructivist National identity Social learning 
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The empirical chapters follow the structure established in this chapter. Chapter 4 deals 
with the EU level (level II of the three-level game) and answers the first two sub-
questions. It explains the nature of EU-level governance in the particular case being 
examined in this thesis: the Mobility Partnerships. This chapter will show the central 
role played by member states on this policy instrument. This is a necessary part of em-
pirical research: showing first ‘what is happening’, before explaining ‘why it is happen-
ing’ (Goldthorpe, 2001, p.11). In this case, the dynamics between the EU institutions 
and the member states must be established, before explaining why member states have 
certain preferences on EU external migration policy. These preferences (the third sub-
question) are dealt with in chapter 5. It deals firstly with the member state level (level 
III of the three-level game) by explaining why member states chose to participate in the 
Mobility Partnerships. It also deals with the interaction between the EU institutions and 
the member states by discussing the size of the win-sets for both sets of actors, in order 
to account for the policy outcome. Chapter 6 answers the final sub-question and there-
fore deals with the international level (level I of the three level game) by explaining 
why third countries chose to agree/not agree a Mobility Partnership. It also deals with 
the negotiations between the EU and the third country by discussing the size of the win-
sets for both sets of actors. This accounts for the outcome of the negotiations. Chapter 6 
shows the significance of the member states, which are informally present at all three 
levels of the game, even though formally it is the Commission that plays the game at the 
international level.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
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3.1 Choosing for case studies 
This research applies a case study methodology in order to answer the research ques-
tions presented in chapters 1 and 2. Case studies have frequently been criticised, par-
ticularly by those favouring a large-N research strategy. The main criticisms of case 
studies are that case studies provide specific, rather than general, knowledge; case stud-
ies are not generalisable; case studies are only suitable for hypothesis-generating and 
not hypothesis-testing; case studies are not rigorous and therefore have an inherent 
verification bias; case studies are prone to selection bias because cases are selected 
when values on certain variables are already known; and that single case studies have no 
value for social scientific research because there is no variance on the values of the 
variables. 
 Such critiques overlook or downplay the inherent strengths of case studies, or mis-
represent case study methodology. Case studies are, in a sense, intuitive (George and 
Bennett, 2005, p.5). They represent the very way in which humans learn: through con-
crete, context-dependent knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.73). Context is everything, and 
it is the “detailed consideration of contextual factors” (George and Bennett, 2005, p.19) 
that is a hallmark of case study research. This lends such research high conceptual va-
lidity – something that is difficult for large-N research to achieve. As Collier et al. 
(2004, p.237) point out, “the size of the N is hardly the only source of inferential lever-
age”. A case study researcher is intimately familiar with his or her cases, and case study 
research therefore provides a wealth of details. Indeed, a large-N researcher necessarily 
has some distance from his or her cases, but this distance “can lead to ritual academic 
blind alleys, where form becomes more important than content” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.72). 
Case studies allow researchers to go beyond a simple statement that ‘cause X and out-
come Y are linked’: case study research uncovers the causal mechanisms that explain 
how X and Y are linked (Gerring, 2007, p.45). Generalisation is not and should not be 
the only ideal of scientific research. Science and research are about accumulating 
knowledge: “formal generalisation is only one of many ways by which people create 
and accumulate knowledge. That knowledge cannot be formally generalised does not 
mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a 
given field or society” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.76). And yet case studies, even a single case 
study, can generate generalisable knowledge if the case is selected in a theoretically 
meaningful way: if, for instance, a most likely case does not display the theoretically 
predicted outcome, this has serious implications for the theory being examined. In order 
to select theoretically meaningful cases, case study researchers need to know the value 
of some variables before they embark on their research. This is not problematic, as 
quantitative researchers would hold. Rather it is a function of the familiarity of the re-
searcher with the cases and should be embraced because it allows for more fruitful re-
search to be conducted.  
 Ultimately both quantitative and case study methodologies have their merits and 
pitfalls. There is therefore “no virtue, and potentially great harm, in pursuing one ap-
proach to the exclusion of the other” (Gerring, 2007, p.63). However, these very differ-
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ent methods should be judged on their own terms, not those of the other method. They 
are, in a sense, two different cultures (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). George and Bennett 
(2005, p.6) argue that “scholars’ understanding of case studies is often distorted by 
critiques based on the assumptions of statistical methods”. Such critiques universally 
neglect the fact that the logic of causation underpinning statistical methods and case 
studies is very different: statistical methods are probabilistic and correlational; they aim 
to uncover the average effect of a number of independent variables on an outcome (‘ef-
fects-of-causes’). Case studies are interested in establishing the causes for a certain 
outcome (‘causes-of-effects’); such causes are necessary and/or sufficient, and explana-
tions are multivariate because causes act in conjunction to produce an effect (Mahoney 
and Goetz, 2006). As a result of these differences, “the case study has its own rigor, 
different to be sure, but no less strict than the rigor of quantitative methods” (Flyvbjerg, 
2001, p.82). There is a clear trade-off between large-N and small-N research in terms of 
breadth versus depth: large-N research can incorporate many cases, but not in much 
depth. Small-N research provides rich empirical detail, but is limited in that this exact-
ing level of detail cannot be established for more than a handful of cases (George and 
Bennett, 2005, p.31; Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.87). 
 The inherent strengths of case study methodology were the main reason for case 
studies to be selected for this research. However, case studies were also the only feasi-
ble and appropriate method for this particular research project. The theoretical explana-
tions outlined in chapter 2 cannot be distilled into quantifiable variables. How would 
one quantify whether a third country took a decision on the Mobility Partnerships based 
on a cost-benefit analysis or because it was persuaded by the EU of the appropriateness 
of this policy? In order to understand why a certain decision was reached, it is necessary 
to trace the process, conducting interviews in order to understand policy-makers’ inter-
ests and motivations. This is a very intensive research process and cannot be done for 
more than a few cases. For this reason, a case study methodology was selected. George 
and Bennett (2005, p.90) recommend that case study researchers are as transparent as 
possible regarding their methods, so that the results of their research are more convinc-
ing.23 This chapter therefore outlines which cases were selected and why, and how the 
cases were analysed. 
3.2 Research design 
The main research question of the Ph.D. project is: How does the interaction between 
EU institutions, member states and third countries shape the governance of the EU’s 
external migration policy? The research focuses on explaining the cause(s) – the inter-
action between EU institutions, member states and third countries – leading to a par-
ticular outcome – the governance of the EU’s external migration policy. The general 
                                                          
23 Collier et al. (2004, p.239) point out that this applies also to quantitative researchers: given the practice of 
running several regression analyses in order to reach statistically significant results, quantitative researchers 
should be open about the number of tests run and the explanatory variables used. 
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outcome is the Mobility Partnerships. At the EU level (level II), the outcome is an EU 
policy instrument: the Mobility Partnerships. At the member state and third country 
levels (levels III and I), the outcome is the decision to participate/not participate in the 
Mobility Partnerships. The cause for these outcomes is to be found in the process of 
decision-making at each level leading to the signature/no signature of these partner-
ships. It should be noted that ‘governance’ is a broad term and could subsume the entire 
policy-making process. This thesis is only interested in the negotiation of the Mobility 
Partnerships, which subsumes three stages of the policy-making process: agenda-setting 
(recognition that there is a problem that needs to be solved), policy formulation (the 
proposal of a solution), and decision-making (the choice of one solution over another) 
(Versluis et al., 2010; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). The implementation and evaluation 
of the Mobility Partnerships are not dealt with in this research. 
 The aim of the research was thus to uncover the reasons why policy-makers made 
their decisions on Mobility Partnerships; nothing was known about this in advance of 
the study. In other words, the outcome of each case (Y) was known, but the cause (X) 
was not. The cases at both the member state and third country levels differ on the out-
come displayed. At both levels, two different Xs are posited which can account for these 
outcomes; the research then establishes the causal process (the precise sequence of 
events) leading to the outcome to determine which X was the starting point. The Xs 
relate to the theoretical explanations developed for each level (see chapter 2). So for the 
member states, X1 is a cost-benefit analysis (cost-benefit explanation), and X2 is a con-
cept of national identity/role conception (national identity explanation). For the third 
countries, X1 is a cost-benefit analysis (policy conditionality explanation), and X2 is a 
process of persuasion (social learning explanation). Each theoretical explanation posits 
its X as a necessary and sufficient condition: if X, then Y.24 
 A major strength of case studies is the combination of inquiries into causal effects 
as well as causal mechanisms: “causal inference via the analysis of causal effects falls 
short of offering a causal explanation of why an outcome occurs, that is, it remains un-
clear as to what the causal process and mechanism are that underlie the effect and tie the 
cause to the outcome” (Rohlfing, 2012, p.3). The aim of this research, as depicted in the 
research design in figure 3.1, is thus to uncover both causes and causal processes (the 
sequence of events linking causes to outcomes). It should be noted that the Xs in this 
research design are not causes in the sense of empirical events that triggered a series of 
other events leading to the outcome; rather the interest is in an anticipated process 
(pp.154-158). An explanation of outcomes in terms of an anticipated process “focuses 
on the considerations that actors make before coming to a decision and/or committing a 
specific action . . . It follows that the empirically relevant process is the decision-making 
                                                          
24 See Mahoney et al. (2009) on necessary and sufficient causes. Necessary and sufficient conditions are 
related to set-relational causation, as distinct from correlational causation. This distinction is neatly captured 
by the following example: there is a difference between arguing that high GDP per capita is a cause of low 
illiteracy (set-relational causation) and arguing that the higher GDP per capita is, the lower the illiteracy rate is 
(correlational causation) (Rohlfing, 2012, p.32). The choice for a set-relational approach in this research is 
made based on the set-relational views of the rationalist/constructivist theories being applied to member 
states’ and third countries’ decision-making processes. 
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process that brings about the outcome” (ibid.). The decision/action in this case (the Y) 
is the decision to participate/not participate in a Mobility Partnership. The process-
tracing therefore collected pieces of evidence showing that the governments concerned 
weighed the two alternative courses of action, and determines which logic (rationalist or 
constructivist) informed these deliberations. Rationalism and constructivism can there-
fore be seen as the causal mechanisms at work in each of the case studies. 
 
             X1 or X2                                                                                          Y 
(cause to be identified)          (causal process to be identified)          (absent or present) 
Figure 3.1: Research design. 
3.3 Case selection 
Various, overlapping, typologies of case studies have been developed over the years 
(see Eckstein, 1975; Gerring, 2007; Levy, 2008; Lijphart, 1971). George and Bennett 
(2005, p.75) summarise the various proposed typologies as follows: atheoreti-
cal/configurative idiographic case studies are descriptive and not directly contributing to 
theory; disciplined-configurative case studies explain a particular event in terms of 
established theory; heuristic case studies aim at theory-building by studying ‘deviant’ or 
‘outlier’ cases; theory-testing case studies assess the validity of a single or competing 
theories; plausibility probes are preliminary tests of new theories/hypotheses. Within 
these various typologies fits well-known ‘case study language’. Most likely cases raise 
questions about theory: if a theory cannot account for a case when it really ought to be 
able to, then the validity of that theory is called into question. Least likely cases raise 
the status of a theory: if a theory can account for a case ‘against all the odds’, then the 
theory is strengthened. Typical cases are used in theory-generating or theory-building 
studies: if the aim is to develop a theory that says something general about a larger 
phenomenon, then the cases used to make the point should be somehow typical of that 
larger phenomenon. Crucial cases are studied for the purpose of theory modification: 
they expose serious flaws in established theory, and in-depth analysis can suggest new 
hypotheses or alterations to the theory, to be taken into account in future research. 
 Clearly having such a multitude of different terms to describe similar kinds of case 
studies is not helpful. There is a real danger of case study researchers simply talking 
past each other, rather than engaging in useful methodological debate. Indeed, Rohlfing 
(2012, p.11) argues that, regardless of the type of case study being conducted, the re-
search process is much the same: first concepts are formulated, hypotheses are then 
formulated or modified (if the research aims to test a hypothesis), cases are selected, the 
empirical analysis is conducted, and conclusions are drawn regarding the hypothesis 
being proposed/tested/refined. 
 At the most basic level, types of cases and case selection is about the role of theory. 
The cases in this research project are neither atheoretical nor theory-testing. The empiri-
cal chapters specifically aim to discern whether rationalist or constructivist explanations 
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can better account for member states’ and third countries’ preferences on the Mobility 
Partnerships. Theory therefore plays and important role. However, theory-testing is not 
at the centre of the research: the aim is not to discover flaws in rationalist or constructiv-
ist theory. Enough other scholars are already working on this. George and Bennett 
(2005, p.117) warn that, “if a phenomenon has not previously received wide study, a 
theory can only make a rather weak claim to being the ‘best’ explanation”. To date, 
literature on EU external migration policy tends to under-theorise particularly member 
states’ decisions to participate in such policy measures. The policy conditionality and 
social learning models are well-developed in the area of EU external governance in 
general, but less so for external migration policy in particular. The Mobility Partner-
ships specifically have not yet been the subject of in-depth comparative research on all 
three levels of actors. The results reached about which explanation can best account for 
member states’ and third countries’ decisions must therefore be treated with some cau-
tion. 
 Instead, the three-level game model is at the heart of this thesis. The thesis repre-
sents the first attempt to thoroughly conceptualise the three levels of EU external pol-
icy-making, the links between these levels, and the conditions for agreement to be 
reached. It applies this model to a recent policy instrument, the Mobility Partnerships. 
The research is in this sense rather exploratory, aiming to modify existing accounts of 
the three-level game model which have not been fully conceptualised. For such cases, 
Rohlfing (2012, pp.66-71) recommends selecting either typical or diverse cases. Typical 
cases “provide evidence for causal propositions of a broad reach” because they are rep-
resentative of the phenomenon under study (Gerring, 2007, p.49). Diverse cases are 
selected based on the assumption that the results from two cases that display extreme 
values on either the cause or the outcome can be generalised to all the cases lying be-
tween these two points (Rohlfing, 2012, p.70). Broadly speaking, the phenomenon un-
der study here is EU external migration policy, and member states’ and third countries’ 
decisions to participate in such policy measures: the overarching research question per-
tains to the governance of EU external migration policy, and how this is shaped by the 
interaction of the EU institutions, the member states and the third countries. The Mobil-
ity Partnerships are conceived as an instance of EU external migration policy. Within 
this population, there are many possible cases: every decision by a member state or a 
third country to participate/not participate in a Mobility Partnership is a case. As the 
explanations posited in chapter 2 for these decisions differ slightly, case selection needs 
to occur at two levels: at the member state level, and at the third country level. 
 There is general agreement among scholars that selecting cases randomly (which is 
the approach used for most statistical analysis) is not appropriate for the study of a small 
number of cases (Levy, 2008, p.8). Indeed, intentional selection of cases is the only way 
for researchers to select case studies (Rohlfing, 2012, p.96). However, King, Keohane 
and Verba (1994, p.128), while acknowledging this fact, nevertheless argue that aban-
doning randomness opens the door to bias – in particular, they warn against selection on 
the dependent variable. Case study researchers, they argue tend to select cases which 
display the outcome that they are interested in; however from a correlational point of 
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view, “nothing whatsoever can be learned about the causes of the dependent variable 
without taking into account other instances when the dependent variable takes on other 
values” (p.129). Levy (2008, p.8) argues that case studies operating at the within-case 
level espouse a very different inferential logic to that of King, Keohane and Verba, 
which means that selecting cases which display the same outcome on the dependent 
variable is not problematic.25 Nevertheless, this Ph.D. includes ‘negative cases’, where 
either a member state or a partner country chose not to participate in a Mobility Partner-
ship.  
 The following sub-section treats the two instances of case selection (at member 
state level and third country level) separately. However, before examining the case 
selection, one qualification should be made regarding the time-frame on which the case 
selection is based. The case selection was finalised in autumn 2009. Given that the Mo-
bility Partnerships are a new policy instrument, it is rather like trying to pin down a 
moving target: the instrument is constantly changing and evolving, and new partner-
ships, involving different constellations of member states and different third countries, 
are being negotiated and signed throughout the duration of this Ph.D. project (2008-
2013). By July 2013, Mobility Partnerships had been signed with Armenia (Council, 
2011b) and Morocco (Council, 2013), while negotiations with Ghana appeared to have 
stalled. It could in the future be that the case selection is no longer valid: perhaps a 
Mobility Partnership will be signed but the French government will decide not to take 
part. Perhaps the Austrian government will reverse its policy and decide to take part 
after all. Or perhaps the negotiations with Senegal will be resumed and a Mobility Part-
nership will be signed. However, for the purposes of this research, a time frame for the 
case selection had to be established. This section therefore refers only to those Mobility 
Partnerships negotiated by the end of 2009. The empirical chapters refer to names of 
Commission DGs and member states’ ministries as they were at the time that the deci-
sion on Mobility Partnerships was made, although it will be noted that in several cases 
DGs and ministries have since changed name and/or function. 
3.3.1 Case selection – member states 
One sub-question presented in the theoretical chapter was: Why do some member states 
chose to participate in the Mobility Partnerships while others do not? By the end of 
2009, Mobility Partnerships had been signed with Moldova, Cape Verde and Georgia. 
Participation ranges from 5 member states participating in the partnership with Cape 
Verde, to 16 member states participating in the partnership with Georgia. Table 3.1 
shows which member states participate in each of the Mobility Partnerships. 
 
                                                          
25 Indeed, Collier and Mahoney (1996, p.73) argue that no-variance designs can play an invaluable role in 
investigating new phenomena. 
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Table 3.1: Member states’ participation in the Mobility Partnerships up to 2009 (Council 2008b; 2008c; 
2009a). 
Cape Verde (2008) Moldova (2008) Georgia (2009) 
France 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands26 
Portugal 
Spain 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Romania 
Sweden 
UK 
 
Clearly, given the fact that the EU now counts 27 member states, it is not possible to 
conduct an in-depth case-study analysis of all member states’ reasons for joining/not 
joining the Mobility Partnerships, and therefore a selection has to be made. The member 
states which will be studied are diverse cases. Diverse cases have maximum variance on 
the outcome – they are at either extreme of the values possible for Y (Rohlfing, 2012, 
p.71). Given that the outcome is either present or absent (a member state either partici-
pates or does not participate in Mobility Partnerships) it may seem counter-intuitive to 
argue that the selected cases have extreme values on Y. However, two of the cases are 
indeed extreme: one member state is selected which has participated in all the Mobility 
Partnerships to date – the extreme end of ‘participation’. The choice of cases on this 
criterion is limited: France is the only member state that has chosen to participate in all 
the Mobility Partnerships to date. One member state is selected that has not participated 
in any Mobility Partnerships. Four member states (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Malta) 
do not participate in any Mobility Partnerships. This thesis will focus on Austria as an 
extreme case: the Austrian government was so opposed to the idea of the Mobility Part-
nerships that it directed a letter to the Commission stating that the intent of the partner-
ships is to undermine the competences of the member states in the area of labour migra-
tion (Interview 21). Given such fierce opposition, the case of Austria is located at the 
extreme end of ‘no participation’. A major advantage of studying diverse cases is that 
the results can be generalised to all other cases that lie between these cases in terms of 
their value on Y: “the causal inferences are extended to all other cases because they are 
                                                          
26 The Netherlands did not participate in the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde from the outset and there-
fore did not sign the declaration, but joined later in 2008. This table is correct as of July 2013, although it does 
not include the Mobility Partnerships with Armenia or Morocco. However, as highlighted in the Council 
conclusions in June 2008, Mobility Partnerships are open to member states joining later (as the Netherlands 
did with Cape Verde). It is possible that this will also happen with the agreements with Moldova and Georgia. 
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embraced by the diverse cases” (Rohlfing, 2012, p.201). Nevertheless, to complement 
the diverse cases of France and Austria, one ‘ambivalent’ member state is selected – in 
other words, a member state that has participated in some but not all of the three part-
nerships, so that the value on Y lies somewhere between the values for France and Aus-
tria. Although several countries have signed up to only one or two agreements, the 
Netherlands (which has only signed the agreements with Cape Verde and Georgia) is 
selected due to the fact that it did not favour the Mobility Partnerships from the outset. 
Rather, it joined the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde later in the process, some 
months after the agreement had been signed. The process leading up to the Dutch deci-
sion to sign the Mobility Partnerships is therefore assumed to be clearly documented, as 
it entailed a specific change in policy preference. For an overview of the case selection 
for the member states, see table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Case selection (member states).27 
 Participation Ambivalent No participation 
Member state France Netherlands Austria 
 
The three cases are similar in many respects. All three are ‘old’ EU member states, in 
other words part of the EU15 before the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. They are all 
members of the Schengen area, and none has an opt-out from the EU’s area of freedom, 
security and justice, meaning that all EU legislation adopted in the area of migration 
applies to them and must be implemented. In both France and the Netherlands, far-right 
parties took less than 10% of the popular vote in the last election before 2007.28 In the 
2006 parliamentary elections in Austria, the two right-wing populist parties, the Aus-
trian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), together 
took 14% of the popular vote.29 However, in none of the cases was a far-right party part 
of the government at the time of the decision being taken on the Mobility Partnership. 
In Austria, the government consisted of a ‘grand coalition’ between the SPÖ (Social 
Democratic Party of Austria) and the ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party), with the minister 
of interior provided by the ÖVP. In France, the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) 
formed the government. In the Netherlands, the government consisted of a coalition 
between the Christian Democrats, the labour party, and the Christian Union. In 2007, 
the ministers for foreign affairs, justice, and social affairs all came from the Christian 
Democrats. In other words, the ministries responsible for making the decision on Mobil-
ity Partnerships in each member state (see chapter 5) were all controlled by centre-right 
political parties. Types of immigration are also similar across the cases. European Mi-
                                                          
27 Although the Mobility Partnerships with Armenia and Morocco fall outside the time frame for the case 
selection for this thesis, it is interesting to note that France and the Netherlands both take part in these new 
partnerships, while Austria again has chosen not to participate (Council, 2011; Council, 2013). The assump-
tions about ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ cases among the member states therefore still hold. 
28 2007 is the reference point for this section because the member states’ decisions on participating in Mobility 
Partnerships were made during 2007. 
29 Data from http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/ (retrieved 9 March 2012). 
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gration Network data shows that, for all three countries, the single most important rea-
son for first residence permits to be granted in 2007 was family reunification.30 There 
were differences between the cases in terms of the second- and third-most important 
reasons: France granted significantly more residence permits for study purposes than for 
employment; the Netherlands granted significantly more residence permits for employ-
ment than for study purposes; whilst Austria granted an equal number of residence per-
mits for both study and employment. 
 There are, however, also some differences between the cases, which must be ac-
knowledged. Firstly, the immigrant population (as a percentage of the total population) 
is higher in Austria than in France and the Netherlands. In Austria, non-EU citizens 
accounted for 6.5% of the total population in 2007. In France, they accounted for 3.7% 
and in the Netherlands 2.7%. The percentage for Austria is thus higher than the EU27 
average (4.2%), whilst for both France and the Netherlands it is lower. Figure 3.2 shows 
that Austria had the third-highest number of non-EU nationals as a proportion of the 
total population in the EU in 2007. This might suggest that foreign nationals in Austria 
choose not to/are not eligible to naturalise, whereas France and the Netherlands have 
higher naturalisation rates. 
 Although all three member states received significant numbers of guest workers in 
the past, these migrants came from different countries of origin. These different migra-
tion histories mean that the immigrant populations in each case represent different coun-
tries of origin (see table 3.3). Immigration to Austria has been shaped by the permanent 
settlement of temporary workers recruited from Turkey and the Former Yugoslavia 
during the 1960s and 1970s (Jandl and Kraler, 2003). France has a long history of im-
migration, with migrants from the colonies in North Africa (particularly Algeria) arriv-
ing already at the end of the 19th century (Currle et al., 2004). Between the 1940s and 
1970s, France recruited migrants to meet the labour needs involved in reconstructing the 
country. These migrants were mainly recruited from the Mahgreb (Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia) and the Iberian Peninsula, but also to a lesser extent from Turkey and sub-
Saharan Africa (European Migration Network, 2009d, p.7). Starting in the 1960s, the 
Netherlands recruited unskilled workers from Turkey and Morocco, and since 1970 the 
Netherlands has seen substantial immigration from the Dutch overseas territories (Wal, 
2007; Geddes, 2003). In each of these cases, immigration in the form of family reunifi-
cation continued even after the guest worker schemes had ended. 
                                                          
30 European Migration Network data for 2007 (http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/Downloads/prepareShowFiles. 
do;jsessionid=0F1A2232A40FB70511DD49DB3A2EF52B?entryTitle=00b.%20Tables%20of%20Asylum%2
0and%20Migration%20Statistics%202007%20and%20earlier retrieved 8 March 2012) 
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Table 3.3: Top 5 countries of origin of non-EU nationals present in 2007 (source: European Migration Net-
work 2009a; 2009b; 2009c). 
Austria France Netherlands 
Serbia and Montenegro Algeria Turkey 
Turkey Morocco Morocco 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Turkey China 
Croatia Tunisia United States 
Russia China Indonesia 
 
Current rates of immigration are also slightly different between the three cases selected. 
Figure 3.3 shows the rate of immigration to the EU member states in 2007 per 1,000 of 
the total population. As with the immigrant population, the rate of immigration to Aus-
tria is higher than for France and the Netherlands. The rate of immigration to Austria 
(4.768) is slightly higher than the EU-27 average (4.087), whilst for both France and the 
Netherlands it is lower. France is the ‘old’ member state with the lowest rate of immi-
gration in 2007. 
 Finally, Eurobarometer data shows a different salience of immigration as a public 
issue in the three countries, at least at the time that the decision on participation on the 
Mobility Partnerships was being made. The issue of immigration was more salient in 
Austria than in both France and the Netherlands. 26% of Austrian respondents rated 
immigration as one of the most important issues facing their country, making it one of 
the three ‘main problems’ identified by Austrians. In contrast, 14% of both French and 
Dutch respondents rated immigration one of the most important issues facing their 
country, just below the EU-27 average of 15%. In neither country was immigration one 
of the main problems identified by respondents (Eurobarometer, 2008b, p.25). This 
implies a higher politicisation of migration in Austria than in France and the Nether-
lands. 
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Chapter 5 explains member states’ preferences on the Mobility Partnerships in terms of 
domestic politics: participation in the Mobility Partnerships is favoured if the partner-
ships match the national identity/role conception, or if the member state expects greater 
benefits than costs from participation. The differences between the cases are therefore 
not problematic; indeed, an appreciation of these differences is necessary to understand 
the “domestic sources of national negotiating positions” at the EU level (Bulmer, 1983, 
p.353). It is not fruitful to assume that member states are similar in important respects, 
partly because this does not stand up to empirical scrutiny (Gerring, 2003, p.21), and 
partly because it is the differences between member states that explain their different 
preferences on EU policies. Process-tracing (see section 3.4) can make up for the limita-
tions of having cases that are not perfectly similar in all respects but one, because proc-
ess-tracing establishes the causal mechanisms leading to an outcome. It can therefore 
establish whether different causal mechanisms in different cases have led to the same 
outcome (George and Bennett, 2005, pp.214-215). For the purposes of this research, 
both France and the Netherlands ultimately decided to join the Mobility Partnerships. 
Process-tracing can uncover whether the same causal mechanisms led to this decision in 
the two countries. 
3.3.2 Case selection – third countries 
Another sub-question presented in the theoretical chapter was: Why do third countries 
choose to join a Mobility Partnership? So far, Mobility Partnerships have been signed 
with countries in the south and in the east, reflecting the balance of the GAM (Commis-
sion, 2009d, p.3). These regions are considered important in terms of migration – in 
2006, the Commission recognised that countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
Northern Africa lack the infrastructure to effectively deal with migration, leading to 
illegal immigration to the EU (Commission, 2006b, p.4). In the same year, migrants 
from non-EU European countries and Africa together accounted for approximately 50% 
of all immigration to the EU (Eurostat, 2008). West Africa in particular was designated 
in 2007 as a priority region for migration missions, due to the volume of illegal mi-
grants travelling through this region (Council, 2007a, p.11). Table 3.4 shows the differ-
ent partner countries for Mobility Partnerships. 
 
Table 3.4: Partner countries for Mobility Partnerships.31 
Signed Mobility Partnership Negotiations underway Negotiations stalled Negotiations still to open 
Moldova 
Cape Verde 
Georgia 
Armenia 
Morocco 
Ghana Senegal Tunisia 
Egypt 
 
By the end of 2009 (the time-frame for the case selection), Mobility Partnerships had 
been signed with Moldova, Cape Verde and Georgia, and negotiations with Senegal had 
                                                          
31 This table is correct as at July 2013. 
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stalled. In Eastern Europe, two out of two proposed Mobility Partnerships had been 
signed. In order to compare a ‘positive’ case and a ‘negative’ case, whilst selecting 
broadly comparable cases, this thesis therefore studies the Mobility Partnerships with 
African countries. The cases are Cape Verde (the ‘positive’ case) and Senegal (the ‘neg-
ative’ case). These can be seen as typical cases. Typical cases are selected on two main 
criteria: “one should choose one case having the outcome present and one case having 
the outcome absent . . . [and] the difference of the selected cases’ score on the outcome 
should be large” (Rohlfing, 2012, p.68). As with the member states, the choice of third 
country cases is limited: the thesis covers all the negotiations on Mobility Partnerships 
initiated with African countries by the end of 2009. Given the focus of the Global Ap-
proach, it is reasonable to assume that Mobility Partnerships will be agreed with more 
African countries in the future. Indeed, in June 2013 a Mobility Partnership was signed 
with Morocco. Negotiations are pending with Tunisia, and are being considered with 
Libya, Egypt and Jordan (see chapter 1). Negotiations on a Mobility Partnership were 
initiated with another West African country, Ghana, although these have since stalled; 
however, these negotiations were initiated after the case selection for this research was 
made. 
 
Table 3.5: Case selection (third countries). 
 Mobility Partnership No Mobility Partnership 
Third country Cape Verde Senegal 
 
Africa has a different relationship with the EU than do Eastern European countries. This 
thesis acknowledges that there are therefore likely to be different dynamics and factors 
at play in Eastern European countries’ decision-making processes on the Mobility Part-
nerships. The aim is not to make statements that are generalisable to the EU’s partner 
countries to the east or south-east. The population that is of interest in this research is 
therefore migration relations between the EU and African countries; being an African 
country is a scope condition for the third countries being investigated (Rohlfing, 2012). 
One significant difference between Eastern European and African countries is that Afri-
can countries do not have the prospect of membership of the EU. The only African 
country ever to apply for membership was Morocco in 1987, and this request was re-
jected on the basis that Morocco is not a European country (Haddadi, 2002, p.151). 
Nevertheless, the Commission has emphasised the importance of the relationship be-
tween the EU and Africa, for example in terms of trade and development but also the 
political, economic and cultural links existing between certain member states and Afri-
can countries (Commission, 2005b, p.2). It is therefore vital for the EU to have a “com-
prehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African conti-
nent” (ibid.), clearly indicating the importance of this region in the EU’s external rela-
tions. This communication was followed by the Council’s adoption of the EU Strategy 
for Africa, which recognises that “Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous 
and democratic Africa” (Council, 2005d, p.8) and listed several measures to be 
achieved, including in the area of migration: addressing the root causes of migration; 
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fostering links with development; and combating illegal migration (ibid.). Van Reisen 
(2007) argues that, due to Europe’s colonial past, relations with Africa have played an 
important role in the EU ever since its inception – indeed, the Treaty of Rome estab-
lished the principle of ‘association’ for overseas territories of member states and created 
the European Development Fund to share the burden of assistance to the colonies.  
 Relations between the EU and African countries, including both Senegal and Cape 
Verde, are regulated by the Cotonou agreement. Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement 
deals with migration – in particular, article 13(5) stipulates an obligation to readmit own 
nationals. Under the agreement, five-year country strategy papers are drawn up, and 
migration is an important component of the 2008-2013 country strategy papers of both 
Cape Verde and Senegal. The country strategy paper for Cape Verde includes specific 
objectives on migration under the general objective of support for national security. The 
objectives focus on improved border control and management of migratory flows (Cape 
Verde-European Community, 2008, p.39). The country strategy paper for Senegal re-
calls that Senegal has traditionally been a country of destination for migrants, but it has 
increasingly become a country of departure. However, migration is not a priority area 
for cooperation between the EU and Senegal. The national indicative programme fo-
cuses on regional integration, sanitation, and budgetary support. Only 8% of the funds 
available are allocated to non-priority areas (migration, civil society and culture) (Sene-
gal-European Community, 2008). The migration profiles for both countries highlight 
the importance of remittances. Although the value of remittances to Cape Verde as a 
percentage of GDP has declined over the past decades, they are still estimated to make 
up between 10% and 20% of GDP (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008; Carling, 
2008, p.23; World Bank, 2011). Remittances are also an important part of Senegal’s 
economy: IOM estimates that remittances made up 12% of Senegalese GDP in 2007 
(IOM, 2009a), whilst the World Bank puts the figure at 9% of GNI (gross national in-
come) for 2010 (World Bank, 2011). In 2002, remittances to Senegal were estimated to 
be worth one and a half times the value of official development aid (IOM, 2009a). 
 There are, however, also important differences between Cape Verde and Senegal. 
Firstly, there is less emigration from Cape Verde than from Senegal. The net migration 
rate for Cape Verde of -0.66 per thousand in 2011 is considerably lower than in Sene-
gal, where the rate is -1.9 (CIA World Factbook, 2011a; 2011b; IOM, 2009a). The 
2008-2013 country strategy paper for Senegal indicates that a high level of unemploy-
ment contributes to illegal emigration (Senegal-European Community, 2008). Migration 
from Senegal and including Senegalese migrants became headline news in the mid-
2000s. In 2006, tens of thousands of migrants attempted to reach the Canary Islands, of 
which 50% were estimated to be Senegalese. Over 1,000 migrants were confirmed 
drowned and thousands more were missing (Gerdes, 2007, p.6). Following pressure 
from Spain, Frontex missions were deployed in Senegalese waters starting in September 
2006, in order to prevent further illegal migration from Senegal (van Criekinge, 2008, 
p.21). In comparison, the ‘migration pressure’ from Cape Verde is low. The migration 
profile shows that only 183,000 Cape Verdeans are estimated to live in the EU (Cape 
Verde-European Community, 2008). This is relatively insignificant compared to the 
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numbers of migrants coming from some other African countries. In 2006, for instance, 
an estimated 481,000 Algerians were living in France alone (European Migration Net-
work, 2009b). By comparison, official figures show that approximately 200,000 Sene-
galese citizens live in Europe; unofficial figures, however, are much higher, estimating 
the real number to be more than two million (Senegal-European Community, 2008, 
p.19). Generally, Cape Verdeans perceive migration as only temporary – most migrants 
have the intention to return (Carling and Åkesson, 2009; Carling, 2002). The migration 
profile in the country strategy paper also indicates that Cape Verde is increasingly be-
coming a country of destination or transit, particularly for ECOWAS citizens (Cape 
Verde-European Community, 2008). 
 A second difference between Cape Verde and Senegal is their different economic 
and governance status. Within the Cotonou Agreement, Cape Verde represents a special 
case. The country was removed from the list of least-developed countries by the UN, 
after having satisfied two of the three conditions: GDP and level of human develop-
ment. For the third condition (degree of economic vulnerability) Cape Verde remains in 
a weak position (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.18). Nevertheless, Cape 
Verde has achieved a “high level of governance” (Commission, 2007b, p.3). In com-
parison, the migration profile included in the 2008-2013 country strategy paper is criti-
cal of Senegal’s governance of migration, stating that there is a lack of coordination 
between different actors and no clear leadership by the Senegalese authorities (Senegal-
European Community, 2008, p.45). This is echoed by the 2009 migration profile by 
IOM: “Despite the size of regular and irregular migration flows, Senegal has neither a 
formal migration policy nor a structure dedicated to the migration issue for determining 
and implementing the national migration policy. Migration management is entrusted to 
various ministries” (IOM, 2009a, p.28; cf. Dia, 2009). The economic differences be-
tween Cape Verde and Senegal are clear from their GDP per capita for 2010: the GDP 
per capita for Cape Verde ($3,800) is twice that of Senegal ($1,900) (CIA World 
Factbook, 2011a; 2011b). 
 Finally, within the Cotonou Agreement, Cape Verde has achieved a special status. 
In 2007, the Commission issued a communication on the future of relations between the 
EU and Cape Verde, in which it proposed a ‘Special Partnership’ (Commission, 2007b). 
One month later, the Council endorsed this proposal (Council, 2007c). The Special 
Partnership is “intended to strengthen dialogue and policy convergence between the two 
parties, so enhancing the traditional donor-beneficiary relationship with a framework of 
mutual interests” (Commission, 2007b, p.2). This does not signal the end of Cape 
Verde’s inclusion in the Cotonou Agreement – rather, the Special Partnership is to be 
compatible with the Cotonou Agreement (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, 
p.21). It provides for a regular dialogue between the parties, centred around six pillars: 
good governance; security/stability; regional integration; technology and standards 
convergence; knowledge-based society; and poverty alleviation and development 
(Commission, 2007b). The 2008-2013 national indicative programme indicates that 
€11.5 million of Cape Verde’s allocation (€51 million) will be spent on the develop-
ment of the Special Partnership (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.32). Cape 
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Verde is not the only African country in the Cotonou agreement to have a special status: 
other examples include the Strategic Partnership agreed between South Africa and the 
EU in 2007 (Council, 2007d) and the association agreements signed with Egypt, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia.32 
 The comparison of Senegal and Cape Verde is therefore not a perfect one as there 
are important differences between the two countries. However, this is the best compari-
son possible, given that the case selection is limited to those African countries that have 
so far negotiated a Mobility Partnership. As with the member states, it is not fruitful to 
assume that third countries are similar in all respects that are relevant to explaining their 
preferences; indeed, it is the differences in their domestic contexts that explain their 
different preferences. In the case of Senegal and Cape Verde, their different migration 
situations might, for example, cause them to have very different national migration 
policy objectives, which in turn will affect their decision to cooperate/not cooperate 
with the EU in a Mobility Partnership. Although Senegal and Cape Verde are not de-
mographically, culturally, politically or historically identical to the other African coun-
tries (or to each other), they are both part of the Cotonou agreement and the overall 
structure of their relationship with the EU is therefore representative of the relationship 
between the EU and Africa. 
 
Five cases are thus selected for this research: France, Austria and the Netherlands at the 
member-state level, and Senegal and Cape Verde at the third-country level. Rohlfing 
(2012, pp.24-26) argues that, since a case is usually defined as a bounded empirical 
phenomenon that is an instance of a population of similar empirical phenomena, the 
boundaries that delineate the case must be set out. Cases are bound in three main ways: 
spatially, substantially, and temporally. Spatially, each case in this study is a country. 
The focus is on policy-makers in the government, but the spatial limitation is the state. 
Substantively, the cases are instances of decision-making on the Mobility Partnerships. 
Decision-making is understood as being separate from policy implementation and eval-
uation: the interest is in how the decision to participate/not participate in a Mobility 
Partnership was made, not on how this decision, once taken, was put into practice. 
Temporally, the end point for the case selection has already been defined as autumn 
2009. This end point captures member states that changed their policy from non-
participation to participation, such as the Netherlands. By the end of 2009, the Mobility 
Partnership with Cape Verde was signed and the negotiations with Senegal were clearly 
stalled. The starting point for each case will be 2006, because this is the time when the 
Commission first began to mention the idea of Mobility Partnerships. This allows the 
case studies to capture member states’ and third countries’ position during the whole of 
the evolution of the policy instrument. 
                                                          
32 Respectively OJ L 304, 30 September 2004, pp.39-208 ; OJ L 70, 18 March 2000, pp.2-204; OJ L 97, 30 
March 1998, pp.2-183. 
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3.4 Process-tracing and causal process observations 
A within-case analysis in this thesis determines how the Mobility Partnerships were 
negotiated, and the role and preferences of the various actors (EU institutions, member 
states and third counties). Several authors have argued that case studies suffer from a 
‘small N many variables problem’ (e.g. King, Keohane and Verba, 1994) – in other 
words, designs with only one or two cases are empirically underdetermined and cross-
case comparisons therefore cannot be made. Case study researchers respond that, be-
cause there are many observable implications of a theory, there are no studies where N 
= 1.33 George and Bennett (2005, p.151) nevertheless acknowledge that the control 
required for case study researchers to carry out a comparative analysis of a small num-
ber of cases is difficult to achieve, and therefore suggest alternative methods: within-
case analyses; counterfactual analyses; and a before-after research design. As they point 
out, these approaches focus “not on the analysis of variables across cases, but on the 
causal path in a single case” (p.179). As this Ph.D. project attempts to establish the 
causal process linking causes to outcomes, the process-tracing method is used. Tarrow 
(1995, p.472; cited in George and Bennett, 2005, p.177) has pointed out that the goal of 
process-tracing is not to examine individual causal steps with a view to integrating them 
“into a larger number of data points but to connect the phases of the policy process and 
enable the investigator to identify the reasons for the emergence of a particular decision 
through the dynamic of events”. Checkel (2005, p.14) argues that process-tracing can 
move social sciences away from correlational views of causation towards “theories that 
capture and explain the world as it really works”. 
 George and Bennett (2005, p.206) define process-tracing as a method that “at-
tempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mecha-
nism – between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable”. 
Rohlfing (2012, p.158) defines process-tracing as “a method for the collection of casual 
process observations in order to be able to reconstruct the process that leads to the out-
come of interest”. This definition specifies that process-tracing aims to collect a specific 
type of data: causal process observations. Collier et al. (2004) draw a distinction be-
tween data-set observations (which are observations in the sense of rows in a data set) 
and causal process observations which are insights that support the claim about causal 
effect. Causal process observations may not be directly comparable to each other within 
a case or across cases; rather, evaluating causal process observations is “similar to as-
sembling a jigsaw puzzle; every piece is more or less different from every other piece, 
but when put together, they deliver a full picture of the phenomenon of interest” (Rohlf-
ing, 2012, p.30). Process-tracing is based on causal process observations and is there-
                                                          
33 King, Keohane and Verba (1994, p.212) actually do acknowledge that, as case study researchers work at the 
level of processes, there are no studies with N = 1 because a case study always contains many observations. 
Collier et al. (2004, p.264) argue that “it is precisely the emphasis on standard quantitative tests that leads 
[King, Keohane and Verba] to make what we view as a major mistake: subordinating causal-process observa-
tions to a conventional quantitative framework”. King, Keohane and Verba take as their point of departure an 
experimental model, which is incompatible with the observational data of qualitative research, acquired 
“through the unfolding of political and social processes” (p.230). 
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fore “a style of causal inference focused on mechanisms and processes, rather than on 
covariation among variables” (Collier et al., 2004, p.260). However, “it is not as though 
observations . . . can be connected to each other however one pleases. Only certain 
connections can legitimately be drawn” (Trachtenberg, 2006, p.29). Process-tracing is 
closely related to theory: when tracing a process, “the researcher looks for a series of 
theoretically predicted intermediate steps” (Checkel, 2005, p.5). Theoretical explana-
tions cannot be directly ‘observed’. As Checkel (2001, p.557) points out, the issue of 
operationalisation is a difficult one: “How would I know persuasion when I saw it?” In 
order to evaluate the explanatory power of different theoretical approaches, the re-
searcher should ask him- or herself ‘what would I expect to observe if this theoretical 
explanation holds?’ This step-wise procedure “essentially produces a series of mini-
checks, constantly pushing the researcher to think hard about the connection (or lack 
thereof) between theoretically expected patterns and what the data say” (Checkel, 2005, 
p.5). The process-tracing method used in this research is therefore not simply a detailed, 
atheoretical narrative – it is an analytic explanation based on theoretical expectations 
(on this distinction see George and Bennett, 2005, pp.201-211).  
 The theoretical chapter considered the preferences and roles of the actors involved 
in the decision-making process on Mobility Partnerships at three levels: the EU level 
(level II of the three-level game), the member state level (level III) and the third coun-
tries (level I). Different explanations can account for the preferences of each of these 
actors. At Level II, the EU institutions (particularly the European Commission) are 
assumed to always have an interest in creating EU policies because the existence of 
such policies creates a role for these institutions. If there is no EU policy, there will by 
default be no role for the EU institutions to play. However, the EU institutions are only 
able to play a role in the decision-making process in so far as the member states allow 
them to have an influence in a policy area which is crucial to national sovereignty con-
cerns. Chapter 4 traces the process of decision-making within the EU to determine 
which actor played the decisive role in the creation of the Mobility Partnerships. Causal 
process observations which would be associated with a central role of an actor might be: 
- Proposing the concept of Mobility Partnerships 
- Issuing policy proposals 
- Securing a legally binding status for Mobility Partnerships 
- Deciding on partner countries 
- Proposing projects for a Mobility Partnership 
- Conducting negotiations with third countries 
 One common criticism of case studies is that they have a verification bias: case 
study researchers are said to impose their favoured hypothesis or explanation on their 
cases. Case study researchers can counter such criticism by considering alternative 
theoretical explanations: “The plausibility of an explanation is enhanced to the extent 
that alternative explanations are considered and found to be less consistent with the 
data” (George and Bennett, 2005, p.91; cf. Gerring, 2003, p.18 who refers to this as 
‘comparison of causal arguments’). At both levels I and III, rationalist and constructivist 
logics are juxtaposed in order to determine which is better able to account for policy-
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makers’ decisions. At level III, two competing explanations could account for member 
states’ decisions to participate in the Mobility Partnerships: participation is due either to 
a fit with a national role conception (national identity explanation) or to a calculation 
that the benefits of participation outweigh the costs (cost-benefit explanation). Table 3.6 
shows the causal process observations that would confirm the explanatory power of 
each of these explanations (see e.g. Lewis, 2008). 
 
Table 3.6: Causal process observations at level III. 
Explanation National identity Cost-benefit 
Causal process  
observations 
- policy-makers link Mobility Partner-
ships to a notion of ‘appropriate’ or 
‘inappropriate’ policy measures 
- participation in Mobility Partnerships 
is considered as the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
thing for the government to do 
- Mobility Partnerships match or 
contradict ideas about the role the 
state ‘ought to’ play in the EU or in-
ternational affairs 
- government choice to participate or 
not to participate in Mobility Partner-
ship is linked to an expected outcome 
- policy-makers explicitly consider 
both the costs and benefits of partici-
pation 
 
At level I, third countries’ decisions to cooperate with the EU in a Mobility Partnership 
are due either to a third country being persuaded of the appropriateness of a Mobility 
Partnership (social learning explanation), or to a decision by the government that the 
benefits of a Mobility Partnership outweigh the costs (policy conditionality explana-
tion). Table 3.7 shows the causal process observations that would confirm the explana-
tory power of these explanations. 
 
Table 3.7: Causal process observations at level I. 
Explanation Social learning Policy conditionality 
Causal process 
observations 
- there is interaction and dialogue 
between the EU and the third country 
on the Mobility Partnerships 
- the EU attempts to persuade the third 
country that a Mobility Partnership is 
an appropriate policy instrument  
- policy-makers in the third country see 
Mobility Partnerships as an ‘appro-
priate’ or ‘inappropriate’ way to deal 
with migration issues 
- policy-makers explicitly consider the
balance of costs and benefits of a 
Mobility Partnership 
- policy-makers consider the resonance 
of the Mobility Partnerships with na-
tional policy objectives 
3.5 Sources 
The sources used to support the causal process observations are primary sources, secon-
dary sources, and, crucially, interviews. This section discusses the use of primary and 
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secondary sources. The following section is dedicated to reflection on the main source 
of data in this research, namely interviews. 
3.5.1 Primary sources 
The primary sources used for this project are mainly policy documents at the member 
state and partner country level, as well as those issued by the EU institutions. Primary 
sources are particularly useful for gaining an insight into the policy-making process. As 
George and Bennett (2005, p.98) point out, “when academic scholars attempt to recon-
struct how and why important decision were made, they tend to assume an orderly and 
more rational policymaking process than is justified”. Primary sources can therefore 
provide a more complete picture of the policy process. However, there are also several 
disadvantages of primary sources which should be acknowledged. Thies (2002, p.356) 
argues that “of all the primary sources that might be pertinent to your research question, 
you are automatically dealing with a smaller group” – in other words, there is already 
some inherent bias in the research. In order to overcome this problem, it is important to 
evaluate the sources used (ibid.) – George and Bennett (2005, p.100; emphasis in origi-
nal) suggest that researchers should consider “who is speaking to whom, for what pur-
pose and under what circumstances”. This is particularly relevant for this project as it is 
presumed that the different actors involved (EU institutions, member states, and third 
countries) have different preferences on the Mobility Partnerships. A variety of types of 
primary sources should be consulted in order to maximise coverage of the event in ques-
tion (Thies, 2002, p.357). Primary sources should not be chosen in a selective way to 
depict the event in question in a way consistent with the favoured theory or hypothesis 
(p.355). For the purpose of transparency of the research, all primary sources consulted 
are clearly referenced in the empirical chapters. 
3.5.2 Secondary sources 
The idea of Mobility Partnerships is relatively recent, and so there are few secondary 
sources dealing with this policy instrument (see also chapter 1). Instead, secondary 
sources can act as a cue-giver, for example leading to new policy documents which are 
important in the policy process. The problems of secondary sources should therefore be 
acknowledged, though they are not likely to cause a serious problem for the research. 
Lustick (1996; cited in Thies, 2002) warns against the selective use of historians’ work 
to support the argument being made – to overcome this problem, Thies (2002, p.360) 
argues that research should always use more than one account of the event in question. 
Another problem with secondary sources is ‘presentism’ – “descriptions or analyses of 
the past based on the vantage point of the present” (ibid.). Here it is an advantage to be 
examining a relatively young policy instrument, so that secondary sources are tempo-
rally close to the events they describe. The secondary sources being used may also be 
biased and base analyses on only some primary sources (p.359). Chou and Gibert 
(2010), for instance, cite only one interview within the Senegalese administration. As 
with primary sources, it is necessary to evaluate each source and to consult several dif-
ferent secondary sources. Trachtenberg (2006, p.64) highlights issues which make a 
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secondary source dubious as evidence, such as the absence of references to primary 
sources and contradictions in the argument being made. 
3.6 Interviews as a data source 
There are not many primary or secondary sources dealing specifically with the Mobility 
Partnerships and the decision-making processes that are the focus of this study. At the 
EU level, the main Commission documents on the Mobility Partnerships are the com-
munication proposing their establishment (Commission, 2007a) and the 2009 evaluation 
(Commission, 2009d). These do not explicitly explain how Mobility Partnerships came 
to take the form that they do, or why member states and third countries have made dif-
ferent decisions on participating. Various Council conclusions authorise the Commis-
sion to take forward negotiations on Mobility Partnerships, but do not reveal or explain 
the different preferences of the member states on this policy instrument. No government 
of the member states or third countries selected as case studies has produced any official 
document explaining their decision on participation in a Mobility Partnership. Given 
that Mobility Partnerships are a new policy instrument, the number of secondary 
sources related to the decision-making process is also fairly limited (see chapter 1). 
 Aberbach and Rockman argue that, in research, “interviews are not always neces-
sary. Written records, for example, may be more than adequate” (2002, p.673). In the 
case of the Mobility Partnerships, official written records are far from adequate because 
they do not report on the process of decision-making, only on the decision that has been 
taken. In order to trace back the roles and preferences of the different actors involved in 
making these decisions, interviews were a necessary source of information. The inter-
views conducted were elite interviews, in the sense that interviewees were in decision-
making roles and were therefore experts on the topic of the research (Leech, 2002a, 
p.663), in this case the decision-making procedure on the Mobility Partnerships. When 
conducting research based on interviews, a “sustained time period ‘in country’ is key to 
making connections and being able to set up interviews” (Goldstein, 2002, p.671). Ta-
ble 3.8 gives an overview of the periods of fieldwork for this research project and table 
3.9 outlines the number of interviews conducted. A complete, anonymised list of inter-
viewess is provided in Annex I. George and Bennett (2005, p.94) recommend that case 
study researchers are open and honest in reflecting on the methodological challenges 
encountered during the process of data collection. This section therefore reflects on the 
methodological and practical issues associated with the interviews conducted. 
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Table 3.8: Overview of fieldwork. 
Time Location Organisation 
September-October 2009 The Hague, 
 Netherlands 
Ministries of foreign affairs, justice, and social affairs; 
IOM 
February 2009- 
September 2010 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
Commission (DG Home Affairs, DG Development, 
DG Relex); member states’ Permanent Representa-
tions; ICMPD; IOM 
June 2010 Vienna, Austria Ministries of interior, foreign affairs, social affairs; 
IOM 
January 2011 Paris,  
France 
Ministries of immigration, foreign affairs, European 
coordination office; IOM 
January-February 2011 Dakar, Senegal Ministries; member states’ embassies; development 
agencies; IOM; Commission delegation 
May-June 2011 Praia, 
Cape Verde 
ministries; member states’ embassies; development 
agencies; IOM; Commission delegation 
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Table 3.9: Number of interviews conducted 
Location Organisation Number of interviews 
Brussels European Commission (DG JLS) 
European Commission (DG Development) 
European Commission (DG Home Affairs) 
European Parliament (DG Internal Policies) 
Permanent Representation of Portugal 
Permanent Representation of the Netherlands 
Permanent Representation of France 
Permanent Representation of Austria 
Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom 
IOM 
5 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
The Hague Ministry of Housing 
Ministry of Justice 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
IOM 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 
Vienna Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of Labour 
1 
1 
2 
Paris Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Interior 
SGAE 
IOM 
1 
2 
1 
1 
Dakar Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of Senegalese Abroad 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Public Service and Employment 
Dutch embassy 
French embassy 
Spanish embassy 
OFII 
EU delegation 
2 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Praia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Communities 
Office of the Prime Minister 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Institute of Communities 
National Institute for Employment and Vocational Training 
Portuguese embassy 
Luxembourg embassy 
EU delegation 
EU common visa centre 
CAMPO 
IOM 
7 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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3.6.1 Criticism of interviews 
Interviews may provide insights into the ‘informal’ part of the policy process, particu-
larly any aspects of decision-making which are undocumented. However, interviews are 
criticised as a data source, particularly in terms of reliability: are the results achieved 
from different interviews consistent? (Berry, 2002) This thesis is, however, interested 
precisely in the differences between interviewees. Chapter 2 argued against ‘black-
boxing’ entities, such as ‘the EU’, ‘the French government’, ‘the Commission’, ‘the 
Senegalese government’. Within each entity, different policy-makers played different 
roles and may have different preferences on the Mobility Partnerships. Differences 
between interviewees are an empirical fact and are highlighted in the empirical chapters. 
Of course it is important to recognise that interviewees tell, at best, a version of ‘the 
truth’:  
Interviewers must keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject to be objec-
tive and tell us the truth. We have a purpose in requesting an interview but ignore 
the reality that subjects have a purpose in the interview too: they have something 
they want to say . . . They’re talking about their work and, as such, justifying what 
they do. That’s no small matter (ibid., p.680).  
Berry suggests three strategies for countering this tendency of interviewees to exagger-
ate certain details and leave others out. All these strategies were used in the interviews 
conducted for this research. Firstly, it is important to use multiple sources. The aim of 
the fieldwork for this Ph.D. was to interview at least two policy-makers in each depart-
ment working on the Mobility Partnerships (although in some cases only one person in 
any given department had been involved in the Mobility Partnerships). Secondly, the 
interviewer can ask the subject to critique his or her own case. For instance, Commis-
sion documents on the external dimension of migration policy were used to take mem-
ber states’ policy-makers away from their own point of view to the more general politics 
of the Mobility Partnerships. Finally, an interviewer should ask about other participants 
in the policy-making process. This was the very aim of this research, and interviewees 
were always asked about the role of other departments in their own administration, and 
the other actors in the three-level game.  
3.6.2 Interviewees 
Once the choice had been made to conduct interviews, consideration had to be given to 
which interviews to select and how to find these people. Goldstein (2002) argues that 
sampling is not only a concern for quantitative researchers; researchers conducting elite 
interviews should also be concerned to identify a target population and draw a sample 
that is representative. This is not always straightforward. The limited number of public 
documents available on Mobility Partnerships was the main reason for choosing to 
conduct interviews, and yet it also made it difficult to identify the policy-makers that 
had been involved in the decision-making process. Interviewees were therefore sampled 
using a ‘snowball’ method (Weiss, 1994, p.25; Goldstein, 2002, p.671), based on two 
initial interviews in DG JLS of the European Commission. These two initial interviews 
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made use of existing points of access (Goldstein, 2002, p.671), demonstrating that con-
ducting interviews relies, unfortunately, on a bit of luck (Woliver, 2002, p.678). Yanow 
(2000, p.38) suggests asking at the end of each interview ‘with whom else should I be 
speaking?’ This approach was adopted during this research as well, and was very fruit-
ful – interviewees in the Commission, for example, pointed to officials in member 
states’ permanent representations in Brussels, and these in turn pointed to the relevant 
policy-makers in their capitals. Snowball sampling can overcome the problem that elite 
systems are not stable over time (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, p.675) – policy-makers 
move to different positions within the bureaucracy. This was the case also for this re-
search. For instance, in the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, all policy-makers are ro-
tated after a maximum of four years in one position. However, when using snowball 
sampling this is not problematic, because people remember who they worked with on a 
particular policy issue, even if that person has since moved to another function. 
 The aim was for the sampling frame to be equivalent to the target population 
(Goldstein, 2002, p.670). The Mobility Partnerships are one policy tool, and therefore 
presumably a limited number of policy-makers had been involved. It should therefore 
be possible to identify and interview them all. Ultimately, two obstacles prevented this: 
firstly, not all those approached in any given research project wish to be interviewed. 
They may be too busy (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, p.673), or may simply not want 
to take part in the research. This happened in only one instance in this case: an official 
in DG Development did not feel qualified to answer questions on the Mobility Partner-
ships. In such a case, one can be “politely persistent”, and follow up an email with a 
phone call to attempt to arrange the interview (ibid.). If this fails, however, the best that 
the researcher can do is take into consideration how different those interviewed are from 
those who refused to be interviewed (Golstein, 2002, p.670). The official who refused to 
be interviewed was working in DG Development on the Mobility Partnerships from a 
thematic point of view, rather than his two colleagues who were working from a geo-
graphical point of view. As Goldstein (p.672) points out, “unlike those doing survey 
research of the mass public, researchers using elite interviews actually know quite a bit 
about those who remain uninterviewed”. In this case, something is known about the 
views of DG Development in general about migration issues (Boswell, 2008; 2003). 
 The second obstacle to interviewing the entire target population is a practical one: 
namely the limits (time and money) on field research. This was a particular problem in 
this research for the case studies of France, Austria, Senegal and Cape Verde. Visiting 
these countries again for follow-up interviews would be difficult to arrange within the 
time-span of the project. One French official was unavailable during the field research 
in Paris, so a follow-up interview was conducted by email. One Austrian official was 
unavailable during the field research in Vienna, so a follow-up interview was conducted 
by telephone. Despite intense efforts (also by the student assistant in Praia), an official 
of the Cape Verdean ministry of interior could not be contacted during the field research 
there. 
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3.6.3 Preparing the interviews 
All interviewees were approached first and foremost by email.34 The email outlined 
briefly the nature of the research, stated who had provided the interviewee’s contact 
details, made the request for input, and suggested a possible date for the interview. The 
email mentioned Maastricht University and made use of the official university email 
signature (cf. Goldstein, 2002, p.671 on using official stationary). Sending an email in 
this way allowed interviewees to read the information in their own time, rather than 
being caught off-guard and at a busy moment with a phone call. If there was no re-
sponse, the email was followed up 2-3 weeks later with another email, and after that 
with a phone call. 
 Approaching interviewees must be done carefully: they must not be misled as to the 
nature of the research, but it is also not possible to give precise details of research ques-
tions and hypotheses because this may affect the answers they give (Woliver, 2002). 
Fortunately the policy instrument which formed the case study for this research – the 
Mobility Partnerships – is specific enough that simply mentioning this as the topic of 
the interview in the email sent was sufficient. No interviewee requested details on the 
exact aims of the research. 
 Leech (2002b, p.666) stresses that it is important to put interviewees at their ease. It 
can, for instance, make interviewees nervous if a researcher wants to ‘interview them’. 
‘Talking with them’ is much less threatening. The emails sent to interviewees in this 
research requested “a meeting” to gain “input” for the Ph.D. research. It is also impor-
tant to consider the ethical issue of confidentiality (Kvale, 2007, pp.27-28). Interview-
ees were told at the beginning of the interview that their responses were confidential, in 
the sense that arguments or quotations would not be linked to their name, and that the 
information gathered would only be used for academic purposes. Gaining good rapport 
with interviewees is essential to snowball sampling – interviewees will only open doors 
to other potential interviewees if they feel comfortable with the researcher (Goldstein, 
2002, p.671). 
 Another aspect of putting interviewees at ease which played a role was an issue of 
language. Interviewees in France, Senegal and Cape Verde were approach in their na-
tive languages (interviewees in the EU institutions, Austria and the Netherlands were all 
competent in, and happy to conduct the interview in English). This necessitated the 
hiring of student assistants in France, Senegal and Cape Verde to assist with translation 
of emails to interviewees and interpretation during the interviews.35 
3.6.4 Conducting the interviews 
Researchers must choose between three main types of interviews: ethnographic style, 
unstructured interviews; structured interviews with close-ended questions; and semi-
                                                          
34 An exception is the fieldwork in Senegal. Senegalese ministries insisted that requests for interviews be 
submitted by regular mail, after which the secretary of the person concerned would get in touch. However, the 
text of the letter was the same as that usually sent by email. 
35 Coincidentally, two of these student assistants were migrants themselves: the student assistant in Senegal 
was from Benin, and the student assistant in Cape Verde was from Guinea-Bissau. 
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structured interviews. Both unstructured and structured interviews were inappropriate 
for this research project. Unstructured interviews are useful for gaining insights into the 
interviewee’s world, but not for exploring hypotheses. Structured interviews are useful 
if a researcher already has a lot of knowledge about a topic, but close-ended questions 
can backfire if the researcher asks the wrong questions or omits a response option. 
Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions are the middle ground: they can 
“provide detail, depth, and an insider’s perspective, while at the same time allowing 
hypothesis testing” (Leech, 2002b, p.665). Semi-structured interviews are appropriate 
when interviewing elites, because these people do not appreciate “being put in a 
straightjacket of close-ended questions” Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, p.674). Instead, 
“open-ended questions have the virtue of allowing the subjects to tell the interviewer 
what’s relevant and what’s important rather than being restricted by the researcher’s 
preconceived notions about what is important” (Berry, 2002, p.681). 
 How the researcher presents him- or herself during the interview is important. 
Leech (2002b, p.665) recommends presenting oneself as knowledgeable on the general 
political context and decision-making procedures, whilst having no idea about what 
happened in the particular instance that is the subject of the research. This is the ap-
proach adopted in this research: I presented myself as knowledgeable on EU decision-
making procedures and external migration policy in general, but with little idea about 
how the Mobility Partnerships were decided upon. Leech (2002b, p.665) warns against 
“playing dumb” with interviewees, because they will feel that they are wasting their 
time; however, cultural factors should be taken into account. Senegalese interviewees 
(who were, almost without exception, middle-aged men) seemed to enjoy lecturing to 
the ‘young white woman’, and allowing them to do this made them more open later to 
more sensitive questions. 
 It is advisable to begin the interview with a ‘grand tour’ question, which requires 
the interviewee to give an outline of something they know well, in order to get them 
talking (Leech, 2002b, p.667). As “people find talking about themselves about as fasci-
nating as any subject they know” (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, p.675), this helps to 
put interviewees at ease. Interviewees for this research project were always asked first 
to outline their own involvement in the Mobility Partnerships. From then on, the next 
questions depended on the answer to this first question and on the placement of the 
interviewee (in the European Commission, in a member state’s ministry, or in a third 
country’s ministry). As Leech (2002b, p.668) points out, the first grand tour question 
may actually render some planned later questions redundant, because the interviewee 
already answers them. 
 Woliver (2002, p.678) recommends ending the interview by asking a question like 
“‘Is there anything you would like to tell me about which I haven’t thought to ask you?’ 
. . . Interviewers cannot anticipate everything and you need to give the respondents 
openings to tell you about an event, connection, or insight that you didn’t think to ask 
them about”. This approach was also adopted in this research to ensure that vital infor-
mation was not missed. 
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Interviews were tape-recorded. Aberbach and Rockman (2002, p.675) argue that this 
helps to “facilitate the use of a conversational style and to minimise information loss”. 
Tape-recording ensures accuracy and provides a record in case the interviewee later 
disputes the way in which the results of the interview are reported. Indeed, deciding 
which question to ask next whilst also listening to the current answer and taking notes, 
is a difficult task (Berry, 2002, p.682). The only interviewees who refused to be tape-
recorded were the officials in the Senegalese ministry of foreign affairs, one official in 
the Cape Verdean ministry of foreign affairs, and one official in DG JLS of the Com-
mission. The wishes of these interviewees were respected. 
3.6.5 Analysing the interviews 
Having been tape-recorded, all interviews were transcribed according to a denaturalised 
approach: grammar was corrected and interview noise removed (Oliver et al., 2005). As 
the research did not aim to apply quantitative techniques to analyse the data collected, 
no systematic coding procedure was used (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Aberbach et 
al., 1975); rather, interviews were analysed through a close reading, matching inter-
viewees’ responses with the causal process observations expected according to the 
competing theoretical explanations (see sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.1). 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the case study methodology applied in this research project. 
Case selection occurred at two levels: the member state level, and the third country 
level. The member states selected are France, Austria and the Netherlands; these are 
diverse cases in terms of their score on the outcome (participation in the Mobility Part-
nerships). The third countries selected are Senegal and Cape Verde; these are typical 
cases. The following chapter deals with the EU level (level II of the three-level game). 
It examines the role of the EU institutions and the member states in the negotiation of 
the Mobility Partnerships, and the impact this had on the form of the partnerships. 
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Chapter 4 
The EU level 
Third countries
(level I)
EU
(level II)
Member states
(level III)
EU-third country interaction
EU-member state interaction
(Bilateral relations)
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the EU level (level II of the three-level game). It maps the gov-
ernance at the EU level of the particular case of external migration policy being exam-
ined in this research: the Mobility Partnerships. It answers the first two sub-questions of 
the project as presented in chapter 2: what was the role of the EU institutions and the 
member states in the negotiation of the Mobility Partnerships? And what implications 
does this have for the form of the partnerships? This chapter thus specifies the politics 
of EU external migration policy and the nature of negotiations between the EU institu-
tions and member states on policy content. 
 The member states therefore form (one of) the subjects for both chapters 4 and 5. 
This chapter concerns decision-making at the EU level, of which the member states are 
an inevitable part. The chapter shows that member states sought to maintain control 
over the policy-making process at the EU level on the Mobility Partnerships: their na-
tional external migration policies indirectly influenced the Commission proposal on 
Mobility Partnerships; the member states in the Council mandated the Commission to 
negotiate Mobility Partnerships; member states determined the legal form and specific 
content of the Mobility Partnerships; and member states controlled the selection of third 
countries with which partnerships should be negotiated. This chapter thus deals with the 
general role of the member states in the policy-making process. It does not answer the 
question of why individual member states chose to participate in the Mobility Partner-
ships; it is chapter 5 which opens up the ‘black box’ and examines the cases selected for 
this study (France, Austria and the Netherlands). This chapter refers to the general con-
cerns expressed by member states over the Mobility Partnership instrument; chapter 5 
examines the specific domestic considerations for the cases selected in order to explain 
why these member states decided to participate or not. 
 This chapter begins with a brief section concerning policy-making in the EU, be-
fore accounting for the role of the various EU institutions in the decision-making proc-
ess on the Mobility Partnerships. Decision-making on the Mobility Partnerships actually 
encompassed two separate, but overlapping, elements: first the Commission communi-
cation was published setting out the purpose and principles of this policy instrument 
(this is dealt with in section 4.4); then once this general outline of the Mobility Partner-
ships had been agreed, specific individual Mobility Partnerships were signed with third 
countries (section 4.5).36 Figure 4.1 summarises the decision-making process in the 
form of a timeline of the Mobility Partnerships. 
                                                          
36 As outlined in chapter 3, the time-frame for the case-selection was 2006-2009. The Mobility Partnerships 
with Armenia and Morocco fall outside of this time frame, having been signed in 2011 and 2013 respectively. 
This thesis will therefore refer mainly to the partnerships with Moldova, Cape Verde and Georgia, and the 
failed negotiations with Senegal. 
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4.2 Policy-making in the EU 
In the classic ‘community method’ of policy-making, EU policies are proposed by the 
Commission and decided on by the Council, with some degree of involvement of the 
European Parliament. The resulting legislation is subject to the jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (Nugent, 2010, p.294). This thesis, however, is dealing with a 
policy instrument that does not envisage the adoption of EU legislation. Several schol-
ars point out that there is no single version of the EU policy-making process; rather, the 
role of the various institutions depends on the policy area concerned (Nugent, 2010; 
Wallace, 2005a). Both JHA and foreign policy-making are better described by ‘inten-
sive transgovernmentalism’, where the member states (in the European Council and the 
Council) dominate the process, with only a limited role for the Commission and Euro-
pean Parliament (Wallace, 2005a, p.87; see also chapter 2). Indeed, international agree-
ments such as the Mobility Partnerships exemplify a three-level game, where both the 
member states and the third countries also make a decision on whether or not to partici-
pate. Even when EU legislation is being proposed, the story is not as simple as ‘the 
Commission initiates’. The Commission may be at the centre of policy formulation, but 
due to the consensus oriented nature of the EU system it must still ensure support for its 
policy proposals if agreement is eventually to be reached with the Council and the Eu-
ropean Parliament (Versluis et al., 2010, pp. 133-134). It is also misleading to speak of 
‘the’ Commission, ‘the’ Council or ‘the’ European Parliament as unitary actors. Within 
the Commission, it is officials in the DGs that undertake practical policy work; in the 
Council, important ‘pre-cooking’ of policy decisions is done by working groups consist-
ing of national experts or representatives from the member states’ Permanent Represen-
tations; and in the European Parliament the parliamentary committee and rapporteur 
responsible for a particular policy proposal play an important role in formulating the 
final parliament position (pp.33-38). Within each institution, different bodies may have 
different interests or compete for influence. In the drafting of the EU’s Strategy for the 
External Dimension of JHA, for instance, DG JLS of the Commission marginalised 
other DGs (Pawlak, 2009, p.33). This chapter takes account of this nuanced picture by 
referring to the specific bodies involved at all stages of the policy-making process on 
the Mobility Partnerships. 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured according to the stages of the policy-
making process (Versluis et al., 2010). It starts by outlining the agenda-setting behind 
the Mobility Partnerships: how did the idea of a partnership on migration issues with 
third countries become an issue deserving serious consideration within the EU? This 
section also highlights the type of policy tools being employed by the EU before the 
Mobility Partnerships were developed. The chapter then goes on to look at the process 
of policy formulation: how did the policy proposal for Mobility Partnerships emerge? 
What were the main features of the Commission’s communication? Finally, the chapter 
looks at the process of decision-making on the Mobility Partnerships: how was the pol-
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icy proposal decided upon? What form do the signed Mobility Partnerships take?37 Each 
section outlines the role of the various EU institutions (Commission, member states in 
the Council, European Parliament and other EU institutions) in the Mobility Partner-
ships. 
4.3 Agenda-setting: the policy background to the Mobility Partnerships 
Two trends are evident in EU policy documents since 2000: firstly, an awareness of 
increased and continuing international migration flows; and secondly, a resulting need 
for the EU to cooperate with third countries on migration issues.38 These trends have 
been emphasised both by the Commission and by the member states in the Council. 
 In its communication on a community immigration policy in 2000, the Commission 
noted that “large numbers of third country nationals have entered the Union in recent 
years and these migratory pressures are continuing with an accompanying increase in 
illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking” (Commission, 2000, p.3). This in-
creased immigration to the EU can be explained by the imbalances between wealthy 
European countries with ageing populations on the one hand, and poorer third countries 
with young and fast growing populations on the other (Commission, 2006b, p.3). There 
are also specific push factors at play in developing countries, such as “failing econo-
mies, impoverishment of the population, human rights violations, environment degrada-
tion . . . civil war, wars for control of natural resources, political persecutions, political 
instability, corruption and dictatorships” (European Parliament, 2006b, p.3). The in-
creased immigration to the EU is characterised by “a rise in the absolute number of 
migrants, including in the number of women, the multiplication of the types of migra-
tion, the increase in trafficking in human beings, the growth of diasporas, the integration 
challenges for the migrants and the host countries . . . the diversification of destinations 
and origins, and the multiplication of migration routes” (Commission, 2006b, p.4). 
Particularly the human cost of illegal migration has often been emphasised, for example 
in 2005 when several migrants lost their lives trying to enter the Spanish enclaves of 
Ceuta and Melilla (see chapter 1). This led to an informal meeting of EU heads of state 
and government at Hampton Court in October 2005, where it was agreed that more 
needs to be done to prevent illegal migration (Bosch and Haddad, 2007, p.7). In re-
sponse to the meeting at Hampton Court, the Commission issued a communication 
stating the EU’s commitment to respond to the challenges of illegal migration in order 
to avoid the “human tragedy that is a frequent consequence” (Commission, 2005c, p.3).  
                                                          
37 In reality, it is very difficult to draw a clear distinction between the different stages of the policy-making 
process (Versluis et al., 2010, p.133). They are separated here for heuristic reasons, but there is clearly overlap 
in particular between agenda-setting and the first stages of policy formulation. The policy-making process 
contains two further stages: implementation and evaluation. These are, however, not relevant to the research 
questions of this thesis and are therefore not considered. 
38 These trends have continued to be emphasised in policy documents up to the present (e.g. Commission, 
2011h; Council, 2009b), but this section concerns the policy context leading up to the launch of the concept of 
Mobility Partnerships, and therefore examines only policy documents up to 2007. 
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The need to cooperate with third countries is considered essential if the EU is to regu-
late immigration (e.g. Commission, 2000, p.22). Third countries should be involved in 
“helping to manage the migration flows, stem illegal immigration and set up effective 
information campaigns on the conditions in the recipient countries of the EU including 
the criteria for obtaining asylum” (European Parliament, 2006b, p.3). Several policy 
documents emphasise that this cooperation should be differentiated according to the 
type of country of origin, making a distinction between applicant countries for EU 
membership, countries that are party to a regional programme funded by the EU, and 
other third countries (Commission, 2002b, p.46). In a 2001 communication, the Com-
mission made suggestions as to how migration should be integrated into the EU’s exter-
nal relations: taking account of migration when planning development cooperation; 
enhancing the positive impacts of migration, such as remittances from migrants abroad, 
whilst reducing the negative impacts, such as brain drain; encouraging migrants resident 
in the EU to maintain links with their countries of origin; discouraging illegal migration, 
amongst others by ensuring that a framework for legal migration exists; supporting third 
countries’ efforts to manage migration; and supporting the reintegration of returning 
migrants in their country of origin (Commission, 2001b, pp.10-11). Cooperation is par-
ticularly important on illegal migration (Commission, 2006a, p.3; Council, 2002a, p.10), 
specifically on issues of return and readmission: “third countries must readmit their own 
nationals unlawfully present in a Member State, and, under the same conditions, nation-
als of other countries who can be shown to have passed through their territories before 
arriving in the EU” (Commission, 2002a, p.9; cf. Council, 2002a, p.11).  
 As an indication of the importance of cooperation with third countries on migration 
issues, specific budget headings have been created to finance such actions. Cooperation 
with third countries was financed from 2001 to 2003 from the budget heading B7-667. 
This heading was created in the general budget of the EU as a preparatory action, in 
order to assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of funding in this area. The budget 
heading belonged to JHA, and so DG JLS of the Commission controlled the selection of 
projects to be implemented (Coleman, 2009, pp.122-123). Budget heading B7-667 was 
replaced in 2004 by the AENEAS programme to assist third countries to manage migra-
tory flows, and AENEAS was replaced in 2007 by the thematic programme for coopera-
tion with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (Commission, 2006b). DG 
JLS also controlled the AENEAS programme (Coleman, 2009, p.125), however the 
thematic programme is part of the EU’s DCI, and is thus controlled by DG Develop-
ment. 
 Cooperation with third countries on migration issues has been central to the EU’s 
multi-annual programmes on JHA. The Tampere programme called for a common EU 
asylum and migration policy to be based on four elements: a common European asylum 
system; fair treatment of third country nationals; management of migration flows; and 
partnership with countries of origin (Council, 1999a). The Hague programme acknowl-
edged that “asylum and migration are by their very nature international issues. EU pol-
icy should aim at assisting third countries . . . in their efforts to improve their capacity 
for migration management” (Council, 2004b, p.20). The external dimension of asylum 
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and migration is therefore one of the specific orientations of the programme, including 
partnership with countries and regions of origin and an effective return and readmission 
policy. 
 Against this background, the Council, under the UK presidency, adopted the Global 
Approach to Migration in December 2005 (Council, 2005a). The GAM builds on the 
Commission’s follow-up to the Hampton Court meeting (Commission, 2005c), but also 
on the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA (Council, 2005c). The Strategy em-
phasised again that issues such as terrorism, organised crime, corruption, drug smug-
gling and migration cannot be dealt with by the EU alone. It is therefore necessary to 
work in partnership with third countries, based on certain principles: incentivising co-
operation on JHA for third countries; adopting a differentiated approach to third coun-
tries; ensuring coherence between the EU’s internal and external policies; ensuring 
coordination between EU and member state actions; and monitoring and evaluating 
actions properly (p.5). The GAM incorporates cooperation with third countries across 
three dimensions: legal migration, illegal migration, and migration and development 
(Council, 2008f, p.4). 
 How has this perceived need to cooperate with third countries on migration issues 
been implemented in practice? The GAM sets out certain actions to be taken with regard 
to African and Mediterranean countries: increasing operational cooperation between 
member states, for instance through the work of Frontex or by establishing regional 
networks of Immigration Liaison Officers; implementing a dialogue on migration with 
Africa through various fora including the EU-Africa ministerial troika discussions, the 
EU-Africa ministerial conference, ECOWAS, the Cotonou Agreement, and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and working with neighbouring 
countries, for instance on a Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network, and particularly 
with Morocco, Algeria and Libya (Council, 2005a). In 2007 the GAM was extended to 
countries to the east and south-east of the EU, particularly the Western Balkans, Turkey, 
countries in the ENP, and Russia (Council, 2007e). At this occasion, the Council also 
suggested further possible actions to be taken under the Global Approach, including: 
establishing common visa application centres; organising joint return flights through 
Frontex; establishing migration cooperation platforms with third countries; strengthen-
ing cooperation on migration through Ministerial Conferences; promoting networks of 
companies and academic institutions in third countries and EU member states; provid-
ing information to migrants about the costs of sending remittances; carrying out infor-
mation campaigns to raise awareness of the danger of trafficking in human beings; and 
supporting third countries to effectively implement EU readmission agreements (ibid.). 
 The Commission’s 2002 communication on integrating migration in the EU’s ex-
ternal relations includes an overview of the projects related to migration programmed 
for third countries in the period 2000-2006 (both from the community budget and from 
the European Development Fund). It shows that projects were programmed under the 
following headings: refugees and displaced populations (21 projects); migration man-
agement (24 projects); voluntary return (23 projects); fighting illegal immigration (8 
projects); border management (19 projects); JHA (5 projects); and development (2 pro-
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jects) (Commission, 2002b). Examples of types of projects include: information cam-
paigns; capacity-building of the civil service of the third country concerned (e.g. to 
implement a migration and asylum policy); technical assistance (e.g. with border control 
systems); material assistance (e.g. with constructing a migrant reception centre); action 
plans on migration; and support to diaspora in developing projects in their country of 
origin (ibid.). 
 The two main tools in the cooperation with third countries on migration issues have 
been readmission and visa facilitation agreements (see also chapter 1). These agree-
ments have been combined in the EU’s external relations: in order to encourage coun-
tries to accept the onerous conditions attached to readmission agreements, visa facilita-
tion agreements are used as a ‘carrot’. As a former official of DG JLS phrased it: “it’s 
no use trying to sell to a third country the idea of a readmission agreement if you don’t 
have anything to offer” (Interview 20). Readmission agreements are in principle recip-
rocal, obligating EU member states to also take back their own or third-country nation-
als illegally present on the territory of the other signatory state. However, this reciproc-
ity is unlikely to be utilised, as “the countries with which [the EU concludes readmis-
sion agreements] would not in theory have any problem with expulsions to the Commu-
nity” (Council, 2002c, p.2). Starting in 2004 the member states in the Council therefore 
began to accept the linking of readmission agreements to visa facilitation agreements 
(Coleman, 2009), although the Council has stressed that the signature of a readmission 
agreement will not automatically lead to the opening of negotiations on a visa facilita-
tion agreement (Council, 2005b). As of February 2011, there were 18 countries with 
which negotiations on readmission agreements were foreseen, ongoing, or concluded.39 
10 of these 18 proposed or concluded readmission agreements have been linked to visa 
facilitation agreements (Commission, 2011i).40 
 In addition to a thematic focus on the external dimension of migration policy at the 
EU level, migration appears as a topic in several geographic policy instruments. The 
most important for these in terms of the Mobility Partnerships are the ENP, the PCAs, 
and the Cotonou Agreement. 
 Firstly, a 2007 communication by the Commission emphasised that the promotion 
of mobility should be an important element of the ENP. Increased mobility “will go 
hand in hand with the commitment of our partners to increase security and justice and 
fight illegal migration” (Commission, 2007c, p.5). ENP Action Plans cover cooperation 
on migration issues under the titles on cooperation in JHA. Measures that could be tak-
en include “support for the creation and training of corps of professional, non-military 
border guards and measures to make travel documents more secure” (Commission, 
2004a, p.17). Second, cooperation on prevention of illegal migration is a topic in the 
                                                          
39 Readmission agreements were in force with Hong Kong, Macao, Sri Lanka, Albania, Russia, Ukraine, 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova and Pakistan. A readmission agreement 
had been signed with Georgia. Negotiations with Morocco, Turkey, Cape Verde, China and Algeria were 
ongoing. 
40 This is the case for Albania, Russia, Ukraine, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, 
Moldova, Georgia, and Cape Verde. 
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PCAs with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Commis-
sion, 2010c). Generally, however, this cooperation is operationalised in the texts only as 
a commitment by the PCA country to readmit its own nationals if they are illegally 
present in the EU, to provide its nationals with the necessary identity documents for 
readmission, and to conclude bilateral agreements with member states on readmission 
(including the readmission of third-country nationals). Third, article 13 of the Cotonou 
Agreement deals with migration issues. Article 13(4) concerns the relationship between 
migration and development and emphasises that development strategies should take 
account of migratory flows. Article 13(5) is a readmission clause establishing that each 
party shall readmit their nationals if they are illegally present on the territory of the 
other. At the request of any party, negotiations shall be opened on bilateral readmission 
agreements to extend this cooperation to third country nationals and stateless persons. 
 By 2007, the agenda for Mobility Partnerships had been set. Cooperation with third 
countries on migration issues had been highlighted by both Council and Commission 
documents as essential to the EU’s migration policy. The main concept of the Mobility 
Partnerships – increased legal migration opportunities in exchange for cooperation on 
illegal migration – had been established through the linking of readmission and visa 
facilitation agreements. Although there is no discernible difference between the Com-
mission and the member states in the Council on the need to cooperate with third coun-
tries, the form of the cooperation has been contested: the Commission acknowledges the 
need to compensate third countries for their cooperation, whilst member states have 
been reluctant to grant automatic visa facilitation to third countries in return for read-
mission agreements. A geographic focus had also taken shape, with ENP countries, 
PCA countries, and ACP countries being specifically targeted for cooperation on migra-
tion. The stage was set for the formulation of the new Mobility Partnership instrument. 
4.4 Policy formulation: the Commission communication on Mobility Partnerships 
This section traces the process leading up to the publication of the Commission com-
munication on Mobility Partnerships in May 2007. It shows that, despite the communi-
cation being a Commission document, the Commission “does not invent policy propos-
als in a vacuum” (Wallace, 2005b, p.29). In the case of the Mobility Partnerships, the 
Commission’s communication was guided by member states’ preferences and their 
existing national policy solutions to migration issues. 
4.4.1 The role of the Commission 
The notion of Mobility Partnerships first appeared in 2006, in a speech by then-
Commissioner Franco Frattini, and in a communication by the Commission evaluating 
the GAM. At the very outset, the concept of Mobility Partnerships was framed in two 
ways: as part of the migration and development agenda, whereby migration policy and 
development policy should be better linked and more coherent; and as one of the meas-
ures need to develop the legal migration aspect of the GAM. 
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Franco Frattini, at that time the Commissioner for JLS, first mentioned the notion of 
Mobility Partnerships in a speech to the EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration 
and Development in Tripoli on 22 November 2006 (Frattini, 2006). In his speech Frat-
tini outlined the EU’s priorities in migration policy with Africa. These include a focus 
on issues such as the rights of children, asylum and return and readmission; the estab-
lishment of migration profiles to analyse the measures needed within migration and 
development; the establishment of cooperation platforms to bring together African 
states and EU member states to manage migration more effectively; and the establish-
ment of Migration Support Teams consisting of experts from EU member states to pro-
vide assistance to African states. In addition, Frattini stated that “once certain conditions 
have been met, such as cooperation on illegal migration and effective mechanisms for 
the readmission of illegal migrants, Mobility Packages could be agreed upon between 
the EU and interested African states, which would make for easier movement of people 
and give them better access to the EU labour market” (ibid.; emphasis added). He is 
thus echoing the concern in previous EU policy documents (both by the Council and the 
Commission) that cooperation with third countries on illegal migration is necessary (e.g. 
Commission, 2006a; 2002a; Council, 2002a). 
 A few days after the speech by Frattini, the Commission published an evaluation of 
the GAM (Commission, 2006c). The evaluation listed the achievements so far and sug-
gested recommendations for the further development of the Global Approach, which the 
Commission argued should focus on five priorities: strengthening dialogue and coopera-
tion with African countries, including promoting the migration and development agen-
da; legal migration; integration and intercultural dialogue; fighting illegal migration and 
trafficking in human beings; and asylum and refugee protection. In terms of legal migra-
tion, the Commission highlighted that “the further development of a common European 
policy on labour immigration is an important component of the Global Approach” (p.6). 
One of the five objectives to be achieved in the area of legal migration was the conclu-
sion of ‘mobility packages’ with third countries. The wording of the communication is 
very similar to that used by Frattini in his speech: “Once certain conditions have been 
met, such as cooperation on illegal migration and effective mechanisms for readmission, 
the objective could be to agree Mobility Packages with a number of interested third 
countries which would enable their citizens to have better access to the EU” (p.7; em-
phasis added). 
 In May 2007, the Commission published its communication on Mobility Partner-
ships and circular migration (Commission, 2007a). This had been discussed and adopted 
at the meeting of the Commissioners on 16 May 2007 (Commission, 2007d). Whenever 
an initiative is prepared within the Commission, “the department responsible for prepar-
ing an initiative shall ensure . . . that there is effective coordination between all the de-
partments with a legitimate interest in the initiative”.41 The communication on Mobility 
Partnerships was drafted by DG JLS,42 although both DG Relex and DG Development 
                                                          
41 Commission decision of 15 November 2005 amending its rules of procedure (2005/960/EC, Euratom) 
42 DG JLS (Justice, Freedom and Security) was created in October 1999. Prior to this, the Commission had 
had only a small task-force dedicated to justice and home affairs matters (Lavenex, 2009b, p.259). In July 
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were consulted, already in advance of the usual inter-service consultation (Interview 
20).43 These three DGs have the institutional competence for the issues covered in the 
Mobility Partnership communication: migration, development, and relations with third 
countries. It has often been argued that, on migration issues, DGs Relex and Develop-
ment have rather different preferences than DG JLS. They have, for instance, disagreed 
on how funding should be spent: Boswell (2003, p.626) argues that DGs Relex and 
Development are keen to prevent development funding from being used for migration 
purposes. DG Relex tried (but failed) to insert a human rights clause into EU readmis-
sion agreements (Coleman, 2009, p.149). It is not surprising that the DGs have different 
preferences on migration issues given their different missions statements and mandates. 
DG Development is committed to “defending the interests of the most disadvantaged 
developing countries and the poorest sections of the population in economically more 
advanced developing countries” (Commission, 1999, p.1). DG Relex has a broad mis-
sion statement (cf. Moyer, 1993), namely to contribute “to the formulation of an effec-
tive and coherent external relations policy for the European Union” (Commission, n.d., 
p.3). In contrast, the objectives of DG JLS are more inward-looking, namely to ensure 
that the EU is an area of freedom, security and justice (Commission, 2008d). Neverthe-
less, cooperation between the DGs is necessarily frequent. DG Development, for in-
stance, is responsible for the thematic programme for cooperation with third countries in 
the areas of migration and asylum, because this is financed from the DCI. The thematic 
programme, however, is clearly relevant to the work of DG JLS. DG Relex is also 
somewhat constrained by its broad mandate (cf. Moyer, 1993) – it is not possible for it 
to specialise in all thematic areas. DG JLS, on the other hand, can specialise in a spe-
cific aspect of external relations, namely migration cooperation with third countries. DG 
JLS has benefited from an increased budget over the past few years. In 2006, the budget 
of the Commission for the area of freedom, security and justice was just under €580 
million;44 by 2010, this had increased to over €1 billion.45 An increased budget implies 
that a DG will be able to expand its policy role due to having more resources available 
to it. 
                                                                                                                                              
2010, DG JLS was split to create DG Home Affairs and DG Justice. Since 2010, therefore, migration issues 
have been dealt with by DG Home Affairs. The Mobility Partnerships are currently the remit of unit 2 of DG 
Home Affairs, which is responsible specifically for International Affairs (Commission, 2011j) and reports 
directly to the director general of the DG (Interview 30). This thesis refers to DG JLS throughout because this 
was the way that the Commission was organised during the time-frame concerned (up to 2009). 
43 With the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010, DG Relex ceased to exist 
because much of its mandate was transferred to the EEAS. Today, the Commissioner for International Coop-
eration, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response heads DG ECHO (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection). 
DG Development and DG Aidco were merged in 2011 to form DG Devco, headed by the Commissioner for 
Development. This thesis refers to DGs Relex and Development as they existed during the time-frame con-
cerned (up to 2009). 
44 Final adoption of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2007, OJ L 77 volume 50. 
Retrieved 8 February 2012 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:077:SOM:EN:HTML 
45 Definitive adoption of the European Union’s general budget for the financial year 2010. OJ L 64 volume 53. 
Retrieved 8 February 2012 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:064:SOM:EN:HTML 
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The 2007 communication refers to the ‘mobility packages’ mentioned in the 2006 
evaluation of the Global Approach, but states that these packages “should in the Com-
mission’s view be called ‘mobility partnerships’” (Commission, 2007, p.3). Officials in 
DG JLS state that this change was made for linguistic purposes: there was a feeling that 
‘mobility packages’ would not translate well from English to other languages (Interview 
20). Mobility Partnerships was therefore preferred as the term for this new policy in-
strument. Lavenex and Stucky (2011, p.126) claim that the shift to using the term ‘part-
nership’ was made to imply an element of shared responsibility and ownership of this 
new policy instrument with third countries. Mobility ‘packages’, on the other hand, 
would have implied a policy tool with a “bargaining character”. 
 The aim of the communication on Mobility Partnerships is to “identify novel ap-
proaches to improve the management of legal movements of people between the EU 
and third countries” (Commission, 2007, p.2). Just as both Frattini’s speech and the 
2006 evaluation of the Global Approach, the communication indicates that Mobility 
Partnerships will be negotiated “with third countries that have committed themselves to 
cooperating actively with the EU on management of migration flows, including by 
fighting against illegal migration, and that are interested in securing better access to EU 
territory for their citizens” (p.3). In other words, legal migration opportunities will be 
offered to countries in return for their cooperation in preventing illegal migration. The 
communication does, however, identify obstacles to such facilitated movement: firstly, 
any measures relating to legal migration must be based on the labour needs of the mem-
ber states; secondly, the principle of Community preference for EU citizens must be 
respected; finally, other EU agreements already in place should also be taken into ac-
count, for example the Association Agreement with Turkey, under which EU member 
states give priority to Turkish workers. 
 The communication highlights that Mobility Partnerships will be tailored to suit 
each partner country. There is therefore no ‘standard’ format for a partnership; rather 
contents of a partnership will depend on: the state of the EU’s relations with that coun-
try; the specifics of that country (the migration situation in the country and the legal 
framework in place); and the level of the country’s commitment in terms of action 
against illegal migration and the facilitation of return migration. Nevertheless, the 
communication lists possible commitments which might be expected from third coun-
tries, and possible commitments which could be made by the EU and its member states. 
These are summarised in table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Possible commitments to be made in a Mobility Partnership (Commission, 2007a). 
Commitments by third countries 
A commitment to readmit their own nationals 
A commitment to readmit stateless persons who enter the EU from their territory 
Initiatives to discourage illegal migration 
Efforts to improve border control, supported by member states and/or Frontex 
Cooperating and exchanging information with member states to improve border management 
Measures to combat human trafficking  
Commitments to improve the domestic economic and social conditions (to reduce incentives for emigration) 
Commitments by the EU/member states 
Improved opportunities for legal migration for  
nationals of the third country 
For employment 
For studies/training 
Assistance to help third countries develop their  
capacity to manage migration 
Providing information on the labour market needs of 
member states and the conditions for migrating to the 
EU 
Facilitating mobility of students, young professionals, 
researchers and volunteers 
Providing pre-departure linguistic/technical training for 
those with a job offer in a member state 
Matching of job offers in EU member states with job-
seekers in the third country 
Facilitating the economic and social reintegration of 
migrants returning to the third country 
Facilitating the transfer of migrants’ remittances 
Measures to address the risk of brain drain and  
promote circular migration 
Exclude migration from sectors which are under strain 
in the third country 
Incentives for migrants to return to the third country 
Mechanisms to foster circular migration 
Mechanisms to allow migrants to divide their life 
between the host country and the country of origin 
Support from the EU for the third country to create 
attractive job opportunities locally 
Improvement of the procedures for issuing visas  
to nationals of the third country 
Longer opening hours at member states’ embassies 
Consular cooperation between member states 
Flexibility in issuing visas (for instance to bona fide 
persons needing to travel to the EU frequently) 
Establishment of a common visa application centre 
Conclusion of a visa facilitation agreement 
 
4.4.2 The influence of the member states 
Despite the fact that the Commission was responsible for the policy proposal on Mobil-
ity Partnerships, the proposal was nevertheless influenced by the member states (Inter-
view 2). That Commission proposals are influenced by member states is not surprising: 
Commission officials are aware that member states’ agreement on its proposals will 
eventually be required. It must take into account the different positions of the member 
states if its proposals are to be effective (Edwards, 2006, p.10). The Commission there-
fore “pools ideas and proposals but is not always the original author of them” (Die-
drichs and Wessels, 2006, p.223). In the case of the Mobility Partnerships, the influence 
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by member states was not direct, in the sense that member states were not actively push-
ing for a certain formulation of the policy proposal. Rather, the Commission was aware 
of member states’ existing national policy solutions to migration issues and therefore 
knew which type of policy instrument would be acceptable to member states. 
 In a 2006 communication the Commission referred to member states’ bilateral 
approach to concluding readmission agreements: “Member States are increasingly offer-
ing also other forms of support and assistance to third countries to facilitate the conclu-
sion of such agreements, and the possibilities of applying this wider approach at EU 
level should be explored” (Commission, 2006c, p.9). The concept of offering incentives 
for the conclusion of readmission agreements is therefore not one unique to the EU 
level, but was already being utilised by the member states. 
 The origins of the Mobility Partnerships can be traced to a Franco-German pro-
posal for a ‘new European migration policy’, presented by the then interior ministers 
Wolfgang Schäuble and Nicolas Sarkozy to a meeting of the G646 interior ministers on 
26 October 2006 (Angenendt, 2007; Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2009). This pro-
posal was supported by the other members of the G6 (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
Bundesvorstand, 2008, p.8). The initiative set out the idea of using circular migration 
schemes to reduce illegal migration to the EU (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2009, 
p.11): “Wir wünschen keine ungesteuerte Zuwanderung in unsere Arbeitsmärkte und 
unsere Sozialsysteme. Im Hinblick auf mögliche Maßnahmen zur Förderung der zirku-
lären Migration sollten Quoten der Arbeitsmigration für bestimmte Berufe festgelegt 
werden” (Schäuble and Sarkozy, 2006, p.3). Quotas for labour immigration are to be 
reported by the member states to the Commission, so that the Commission can use these 
as leverage in negotiations on readmission agreements (p.4). The initiative calls for 
partnership with countries of origin of migrants and for the signature of bilateral part-
nerships between member states and third countries: “Die Summe aller Partnerschaften 
ergibt eine europäische Partnerschaft mit einer Vielzahl von Herkunftsländern” (ibid.). 
Circular migration had appeared in previous Commission communications in the con-
text of fostering the development of third countries (Commission, 2005a, pp.7-8), but 
the link between offering legal migration opportunities and preventing illegal migration 
was first made at the EU level in the concept of the Mobility Partnerships. However, the 
Franco-German proposal demonstrates that member states’ interior ministers were al-
ready discussing such a linkage before the Commission proposal on Mobility Partner-
ships. 
 In addition to the Franco-German proposal, which concerned specifically the form 
that European migration cooperation with third countries should take, existing national 
policy practices also influenced the creation of the Mobility Partnerships (Interview 10; 
16). Particularly the French bilateral migration agreements (the accord de gestion 
concertée des flux migratoires) had been discussed previously at the EU level in brain-
storming sessions organised by the French government and attended by other member 
states’ officials (Interview 16). These agreements link cooperation on legal migration, 
                                                          
46 Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and Poland. 
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illegal migration, and migration and development (Assemblée Nationale, 2009; see also 
chapter 5). Significantly, they facilitate access to certain sectors of the French labour 
market for migrants from the third country concerned (European Migration Network, 
2009d, p.16). The concept is thus similar to the idea contained in the Mobility Partner-
ships of facilitating movement to the EU for citizens of countries that are prepared to 
cooperate on preventing illegal migration. The first French bilateral agreement, with 
Senegal, was signed in September 2006 (French Ministry of Interior and OFII, n.d.) – in 
other words, before the publication of the Commission communication on Mobility 
Partnerships. 
 Spanish bilateral migration agreements are also cited as a source of inspiration for 
the Mobility Partnerships (Interview 10). The Spanish agreements are of two types: 
agreements on migratory flows concern only the management of immigration to Spain 
of workers required on the Spanish labour market, whereas Framework Agreements 
include cooperation both on readmission and labour migration (European Migration 
Network, 2009e, p.65), just as the Mobility Partnerships do. The Spanish government 
considers that “legal immigration may represent a very important indirect aspect of the 
fight against illegal immigration” (ibid.). The labour migration dimension of these 
agreements may involve notification of job offers in Spain, agreements on rights and 
social and working conditions, or provision for temporary migration (European Migra-
tion Network, 2010b, pp.41-42). By the end of 2007, an agreement had been signed 
with, among others, Cape Verde, and the Spanish and Senegalese governments had 
signed a declaration stating their intent to conclude an agreement. 
 The communication on Mobility Partnerships mentions at several points that they 
will be signed by “interested Member States” (Commission, 2007a, p.3) and that com-
mitments will be made by “Member States participating” (p.5). The implication is that 
participation in a Mobility Partnership will be voluntary. The Stockholm programme 
emphasises that the development of the Mobility Partnership instrument should respect 
their voluntary nature (Council, 2009b, p.61). Making the Mobility Partnerships volun-
tary for member states to join was a strategy adopted by the Commission in order to 
prevent member states from blocking this policy tool altogether (Interview 17). Indeed, 
some member states were initially hesitant about the concept of Mobility Partnerships, 
particularly because elements of legal migration policy are included (Interview 17; see 
also sub-section 4.5.2). The UK government was one of those stressing that the partner-
ships should not be overly focussed on legal migration, as this is only one aspect of the 
GAM (Interview 18). Indeed, the UK is one of the fiercest opponents of EU competence 
in the area of legal migration (Poli, 2012, p.57). The Commission’s 2009 evaluation of 
the Mobility Partnerships is positive about the voluntary framework, stating that this 
should in principle ensure that the partnerships “will be supported by motivated signato-
ries” (Commission, 2009d, p.4). Caviedes (2004, p.290) argues that the Commission has 
been very calculating when introducing new measures in migration policy: it is “aware 
of the parameters that states will insist upon in drafting immigration policy [and has 
therefore] eschewed attempting to assume direct legislative authority for fear of their 
veto power”. It is not possible to introduce new measures without some degree of sup-
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port from member states, and it is therefore not fruitful for the Commission to suggest a 
policy instrument that member states will object to. In the past, the Commission has 
emphasised that EU policy measures can only be effective if backed up by political 
determination of the member states (Commission, 2004b, p.5). In 2002, the Commis-
sion identified a lack of political and diplomatic support by member states as a reason 
for slow progress on the negotiation of readmission agreements (Commission, 2002a, 
p.24). It is therefore important to have this political support of the member states for 
new policy instruments. Indeed, member state officials point out that, if the Commission 
had attempted to impose the Mobility Partnership instrument on member states, “it 
would never have succeeded” (Interview 32). Instead, the Commission took a flexible 
approach and yielded to member states’ preferences.  
 The member states’ preferences and national policy solutions, as well as an under-
standing of what type of policy instrument would be acceptable to them, therefore 
played an implicit role in the policy formulation of the Mobility Partnerships. The 
Commission was very well aware of what the member states could accept, and what 
they would reject. This influence of the member states on the policy formulation stage is 
acknowledged by the Commission. The communication on Mobility Partnerships em-
phasises the mandate of the member states in the Council and European Council. First-
ly, the communication is a response to a request by the European Council in December 
2006 which asked the Commission “to present detailed proposals on how to better or-
ganise and inform about the various forms of legal movement between the EU and third 
countries by June 2007” (Council, 2006, p.9). Secondly, the communication emphasises 
that “negotiation of any mobility partnership would need to be based on clear political 
guidelines from the Council, on the basis of a recommendation from the Commission” 
(Commission, 2007a, p.3). 
4.5 Decision-making: deciding on the Mobility Partnerships 
Once the general concept of the Mobility Partnership instrument had been formulated in 
the Commission communication, the exact shape of the instrument needed to be decided 
and partnerships needed to be signed. This section examines the process within the EU, 
after the publication of the Commission communication, which led to the first Mobility 
Partnerships being signed (summarised in figure 4.2). It focuses on the role of the 
Commission and the member states, and accounts for the exclusion of the European 
Parliament and other EU institutions from the policy-making process. 
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Following the publication of the communication on Mobility Partnerships, the first 
partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde were signed in 2008. A partnership was 
signed with Georgia in 2009. These partnerships all take the same form: they consist 
first of a preamble concerning the intention of the EU, the participating member states, 
and the third country concerned to cooperate on migration issues in general; this is fol-
lowed by a political declaration outlining more specific objectives in a number of cate-
gories; finally there is an annex of specific projects that are proposed (see Council, 
2008a; 2008b; 2009a).47 
 The preambles of the Mobility Partnerships have the same structure. They begin by 
listing the participants in the partnership: the third country, the participating member 
states, and the European Community/Union. They then outline the existing frameworks 
for cooperation between the EU and the third country concerned, which varies for each 
of the countries (see table 4.2). All Mobility Partnerships then note the “benefits and 
opportunities that a well managed migration can bring to migrants and to the Signatories 
alike” (ibid.) and confirm the commitment of the signatories to facilitate the movement 
of persons from the third country to the EU, whilst working to prevent illegal migration. 
The preambles recall the context for the Mobility Partnership, namely the GAM and the 
Commission’s communication on Mobility Partnerships, and, for Cape Verde, the EU-
Africa Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment. All preambles, except the 
Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde, reaffirm the commitment of the signatories to 
conclude and implement visa facilitation and readmission agreements. The preambles 
recognise the existing bilateral migration agreements in place between the third country 
and EU member states. Finally, the preambles outline briefly the main purposes and 
objectives of the Mobility Partnership, which are identical for all partnerships: facilitat-
ing and better managing legal migration; cooperating on migration and development; 
preventing illegal migration; and promoting an effective readmission and return policy. 
 
                                                          
47 The format of the Mobility Partnerships with Armenia and Morocco, signed in 2011 and 2013, is the same 
as these first partnerships (Council, 2011b; Council, 2013). 
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Table 4.2: Existing frameworks for cooperation between the EU and the third country concerned. 
Country Frameworks 
Moldova European Neighbourhood Policy 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
Cape Verde Cotonou Agreement 
Special Partnership 
Georgia European Neighbourhood Policy 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
Prague Eastern Partnership Summit 
Armenia European Neighbourhood Policy 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
Prague Eastern Partnership Summit 
Morocco Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement 
European Neighbourhood Policy 
Regional processes e.g. Rabat Process 
 
The political declarations of the Mobility Partnerships are divided into cooperation in 
four categories: mobility, legal migration and integration; migration and development; 
border management, identity and travel documents, fight against illegal migration and 
trafficking in human beings; and, in the partnership with Georgia, asylum and interna-
tional protection. Table 4.3 shows the objectives covered in each category of coopera-
tion. The final section of the declaration concerns implementation of the Mobility Part-
nership, which will happen through the initiatives listed in the annex. EU agencies, such 
as Frontex and the European Training Foundation, may also be involved. The signato-
ries intend to meet at least twice a year, and will conduct an evaluation of the Mobility 
Partnership if considered appropriate. Finally, each declaration ends with a statement 
that the provisions contained in it “are not designed to create legal rights or obligations 
under international law” (ibid.). 
 The annexes to each Mobility Partnership list the projects which are intended to be 
carried out, and are specific to the partnership concerned. The project proposals state 
which party has proposed the project and the overall objective to be achieved. Projects 
are proposed by the participating member states, the Commission or an EU agency, or 
the third country concerned. An example of a project proposed by a member state is the 
proposal by Romania to offer scholarships to Moldovan students (Council, 2008a, p.14). 
An example of a project proposed by the Commission is the proposal to sign a visa 
facilitation agreement with Cape Verde (Council, 2008b, p.10). An example of a project 
proposed by a third country is the proposal by Moldova to strengthen the information 
centres for Moldovan migrants in its embassies (Council, 2008a, p.13). Tables contain-
ing all the projects proposed under the first Mobility Partnerships can be found in An-
nex II.48 
 
                                                          
48 This annex includes the projects proposed in the Mobility Partnership with Armenia. 
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Table 4.3: Objectives of the Mobility Partnerships. 
Legal migration - promote a better framework for legal mobility 
- inform potential migrants on ways of legal migration to the EU 
- strengthen the capacity of the third country to manage migration 
- ensure the social protection of legal migrants 
- deepen dialogue on visa issues 
- implement pre-departure training for migrants 
Migration and  
development 
- support voluntary return, reintegration, and circular migration 
- prevent brain drain and brain waste 
- strengthen links with diaspora 
- improve data collection on migration 
Illegal migration - fight illegal migration and strengthen border management 
- facilitate operational cooperation on border management 
- promote operational cooperation between third country and Frontex 
- improve security of travel and identity documents 
- develop dialogue on readmission 
- carry out information campaigns on the risks of illegal migration 
- only use regularisation of illegal migrants on a case-by-case basis 
Asylum - build capacity of the third country to implement asylum policy 
- facilitate the reception of asylum seekers in third country 
 
4.5.1 The role of the Commission 
In the process leading to the signature of the Mobility Partnerships, DG JLS of the 
Commission played a central, coordinating role (Lavenex and Stucky, 2011, p.128; 
Interview 13; 14). This DG conducted negotiations with third countries and was respon-
sible for ensuring “the overall coordination and consistency of the combined EC offer 
based on the individual proposals and political priorities expressed by each participating 
member state” (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2009, p.28).  
 As a first step, DG JLS suggested potential partner countries for Mobility Partner-
ships by preparing fiches on the migration situation in some third countries (Interview 
21; 30). When proposing potential partner countries, officials in DG JLS took into con-
sideration several criteria: in order to begin testing the concept of Mobility Partnerships, 
countries should be selected with which cooperation is generally smooth so that nego-
tiations could be quickly concluded; the third countries concerned should have a func-
tioning administration so that the implementation of a Mobility Partnership would be 
possible; and there should be immigration to the EU from the third countries concerned 
(Interview 1; 13; 21). Both Moldova and Cape Verde were suggested by the Commis-
sion to the member states because they were seen as small countries with which negotia-
tions could be quickly and successfully concluded (Interview 21). The Moldovan gov-
ernment also proactively indicated its interest in becoming a partner country for a Mo-
bility Partnership by submitting three non-papers (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 
2009, pp.22-23).49 An early version of these non-papers highlighted circular migration 
                                                          
49 For an explanation of how Cape Verde and Senegal were selected by the EU for a Mobility Partnership, see 
chapter 6; for more on how Georgia was selected, see sub-section 4.5.2. 
 133 
as a possible topic for cooperation (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2011, p.103). DG 
JLS was responsible for conducting exploratory talks with the third countries con-
cerned, in order to judge the interest of the authorities in taking part in a Mobility Part-
nership (Interview 13; 17). Officials in DG JLS relied on officials in DG Relex and DG 
Development for information on the third countries concerned (Interview 21) – DG 
Development being responsible for countries falling under the Cotonou Agreement, and 
DG Relex being responsible for relations with all other third countries (Interview 12). 
 Once a third country had been selected, DG JLS gauged the interest of the member 
states in participating in the Mobility Partnership. Interested member states were invited 
to meetings to discuss their input to the partnership, and thereby allow DG JLS to coor-
dinate the various proposals being made (Interview 1). Indeed, “until the date of formal 
adoption of the MPs, the Commission ‘campaigned’ for the involvement of as many 
Member States as possible in the partnerships” (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2011, 
p.103). To do this, the Commission adopted an approach of ‘soft bargaining’, by mak-
ing several proposals for member states to choose from. DG JLS officials would, for 
instance, offer member states’ officials examples of different types of projects that 
would be suitable for a Mobility Partnership, in order to encourage their participation 
(Interview 21). 
 DG JLS was responsible for the discussions with officials of the third country that 
ultimately led to each Mobility Partnership being signed: “no direct meetings between 
Member States and partner countries have taken place; it is the Commission – acting 
like a ‘broker’ or ‘mediator’ – which holds discussions with each of the parties to de-
termine how far the different interests could be matched” (Lavenex and Stucky, 2011, 
p.131). At first sight, this seems to put DG JLS in a central role as the main negotiator. 
The member state holding the presidency of the Council was, however, included in 
meetings with the third countries (Commission, 2009d, p.4), and the member states 
maintained control of the Mobility Partnership instrument in other ways (see sub-
section 4.5.2). This significantly limited the room for manoeuvre that DG JLS had in the 
negotiations (see also chapter 6). Discussions were led by the head of the DG JLS direc-
torate on immigration, asylum and borders (Interview 13). Based on member states’ 
proposals, officials in DG JLS drafted the joint declarations and annexes which ulti-
mately form the Mobility Partnerships (Lavenex and Stucky, 2011, p.132). 
 Besides its role in the conclusion of specific Mobility Partnerships, the Commis-
sion has continued to shape this policy tool past the policy formulation stage by promot-
ing it as “an overall framework for migration management with third countries” (Com-
mission, 2008e, p.4). In 2008, the Commission suggested that Mobility Partnerships 
could be the key element in ‘Mobility and Security Pacts’ to be offered to countries 
under the Eastern Partnership dimension of the ENP (Commission, 2008b, p.6). The 
2009 evaluation by the Commission states that the “mobility partnerships constitute the 
most innovative and sophisticated tool to date of the Global Approach to Migration and 
contribute significantly to its operationalisation” (Commission, 2009d, p.4). They there-
fore “merit being further developed, improved and replicated” (p.8). In 2011 the Com-
mission argued that the Mobility Partnership tool “should be upgraded and promoted as 
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the principal framework for cooperation in the area of migration and mobility between 
the EU and its partners” (Commission, 2011b, p.10). 
4.5.2 The role of the member states 
Despite the Commission’s apparently central role in coordinating and promoting the 
Mobility Partnership instrument, it is the member states (in the Council) that have ulti-
mately controlled the shape and progress of this instrument. Any steps taken on negoti-
ating new Mobility Partnerships have always been mandated by the Council; member 
states’ reluctance to commit to legally binding agreements determined the legal form of 
the Mobility Partnerships; member states determine the specific content of each Mobil-
ity Partnership through the projects they propose; and member states have controlled the 
selection of third countries with which partnerships should be negotiated. The High 
Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) has been the main Council 
body following the Mobility Partnerships and the main forum for political and strategic 
discussions on the partnerships (Interview 2; 30). This sub-section outlines the role of 
the member states in general in the decision-making process on the Mobility Partner-
ships; chapter 5 will ‘open up the black box’ and deal with the preferences of Austria, 
France and the Netherlands in particular. 
 Shortly after its publication, the Commission communication on Mobility Partner-
ships was the subject of discussion in the Council structures. At the highest level, Coun-
cil conclusions on the communication were discussed in both the JHA and GAERC 
Councils, having been broadly agreed to in Coreper and the HLWG (Council, 2007e). 
These Council conclusions welcome the Commission communication “as a basis for 
further discussions” on how to incorporate legal migration into the EU’s external poli-
cies (p.5). Mobility Partnerships could include measures to enhance the links between 
migration and development; capacity-building measures in migration management; 
measures to promote the reintegration of returning migrants; visa facilitation; protection 
of human rights in the fight against illegal immigration; and protection of refugees (p.6). 
Finally, the Council authorises the Commission to take this policy instrument forward: 
 The Council believes that the concept of mobility partnerships between the Euro-
pean Union, Member States and third countries could be tested by way of a limited 
number of pilot partnerships. The Council therefore invites the Commission to con-
sult Member States on the further development of this concept . . . with a view to 
exploratory talks with interested third countries on pilot partnerships in close coop-
eration with the Presidency and interested Member States. The Commission is in-
vited to report back to the Council on the outcome of these consultations in order to 
enable the Council to decide by the end of 2007 whether to invite the Commission 
to launch pilot partnerships (ibid.). 
 These conclusions were endorsed by the European Council one week later (Coun-
cil, 2007f). In December 2007, the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
agreed conclusions mandating “the Commission, in close liaison with Member States 
and/or the Presidency, in order to ensure a close involvement of the Council, to open 
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dialogue with Cape Verde and Moldova, with a view to launching pilot mobility part-
nerships” (Council, 2007g, p.25). These conclusions are based on “preliminary discus-
sions held between the Commission and Member States on the added value, possible 
content and structures of mobility partnerships” (ibid.). A few days later, the European 
Council endorsed these conclusions and welcomed the decision to open negotiations 
with Cape Verde and Moldova (Council, 2008e, p.4). In June 2008, the Council author-
ised the Commission “in close liaison with Member States and the Presidency, to take 
forward exploratory talks with Georgia and Senegal and to open dialogue with these 
countries, with a view to launching additional pilot Mobility Partnerships” (Council, 
2008f, p.7).50 It also requested the Commission to carry out an evaluation of the pilot 
Mobility Partnerships and to report on the results by June 2009 (p.6). The European 
Council endorsed the conclusions later in June (Council, 2008g). It is clear, therefore, 
that steps taken by the Commission to negotiate new Mobility Partnerships have always 
been mandated by the member states in the Council and European Council. The member 
states (in the Council and European Council) have also been active in promoting the use 
of Mobility Partnerships. The Stockholm programme, for instance, states that these 
partnerships should be the “main strategic, comprehensive and long-term cooperation 
framework for migration management with third countries” (Council, 2009b, p.61). 
 Sub-section 4.4.2 showed that member states’ concerns determined that Mobility 
Partnerships would be voluntary, rather than obligatory. Member states also determined 
another important aspect of the form of the Mobility Partnerships, namely their non-
legally binding nature. In general, member states are concerned with ensuring that 
Commission “proposals (and even impending proposals or ‘gleams in the Commission’s 
eye’) do not establish precedents leading to an increase in the Commission’s power or 
the spill-over of responsibility from an exclusively national arena to the sphere of 
Community competence” (Usher, 2006, p.105). This was certainly the case with the 
Mobility Partnerships. 
 The original Commission communication on Mobility Partnerships does not clearly 
specify the legal nature that the partnerships will take. It only states that  
mobility partnerships will necessarily have a complex legal nature, as they will in-
volve a series of components, some of which fall in the Community’s remit and 
others in the Member States’. The EU needs to ensure that a coherent partnership 
can be put together in the most expeditious manner, while respecting the division of 
powers between the EC and Member States (Commission, 2007a, p.3).  
The legal nature of the Mobility Partnerships was first stated explicitly in Council con-
clusions adopted in December 2007: the partnerships should “represent an overall po-
litical framework . . . [and] will need to strictly respect the division of competences 
between the EU and the Member States” (Council, 2007g, p.25; emphasis added). The 
Commission’s 2009 evaluation of the Mobility Partnerships is positive about the non-
binding nature of the political declarations which are the basis of the partnerships: 
                                                          
50 Similarly, the member states invited the Commission to launch negotiations with Armenia on a Mobility 
Partnership in May 2009 (Commission, 2010a, p.17). 
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“While guaranteeing the expeditious establishment of the current mobility partnerships, 
these arrangements also ensure that mobility partnerships are flexible tools, which can 
be adapted according to current needs” (Commission, 2009d, p.4). Officials in DG JLS 
maintain that a formal agreement would have been too static and unable to adapt to 
changing circumstances – a ‘living document’ is therefore preferable (Interview 17). A 
political statement allows implementation of the Mobility Partnerships to begin as soon 
as possible, in contrast to a formal international agreement under article 218 TFEU, 
which would require a full ratification process involving the European Parliament (In-
terview 2). Nevertheless, Commission officials would have preferred to have a legally 
binding basis for the Mobility Partnerships (Interview 1). A non-legally binding basis 
means that there are no guarantees that member states will carry out the initiatives they 
propose – the Commission can only encourage them to do so but has no sanctioning 
mechanism (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2011, p.106; Lavenex and Stucky, 2011, 
p.133). However, when the notion of legally-binding Mobility Partnerships was dis-
cussed in meetings with member states, member states were very opposed (Interview 
13). Commission officials therefore adopted a conciliatory, pragmatic approach and 
yielded to member states’ preferences on the legal form of the partnerships. It was more 
important to be able to launch this new policy tool than to insist on legally-binding 
Mobility Partnerships in the face of opposition from member states. Indeed, Commis-
sion officials acknowledge that “a legally binding agreement is not necessarily a pana-
cea” as there may be problems with ratification or implementation (Interview 20). 
 In addition to determining the form of the Mobility Partnerships, member states 
determine the content of the partnerships through the projects that they propose. This 
control over the content of Mobility Partnerships is apparent in four ways: the frag-
mented nature of the package of proposals in each partnership; the tendency by member 
states to rephrase existing initiatives rather than propose new projects; the dominance of 
bilateral initiatives despite the Commission’s preference for multilateral initiatives; and 
the absence of projects offering opportunities for legal migration to the EU. These dif-
ferent elements of the member states’ control over the content of the Mobility Partner-
ships are explained below. 
 Member state control of the content of the Mobility Partnerships makes it difficult 
for the Commission to ensure that each partnership is an “effective and coordinated 
offer bringing added value to existing cooperation” (Commission, 2009d, p.5). Rather 
than such a coherent package, Mobility Partnerships are a “package of fragmented co-
operation measures including a shopping list of different proposals” (Carrera and Her-
nández i Sagrera, 2011, p.106). Indeed, in some of the Mobility Partnerships two sepa-
rate proposals appear to overlap although they are not linked. Both Spain and Portugal, 
for instance, separately propose to provide support to the Cape Verdean national health 
system (Council, 2008b). Officials in DG JLS acknowledge that Mobility Partnerships 
are more a collection of projects than a coherent framework, and that there is not much 
the Commission can do to force a change in this situation (Interview 21). 
 Member states have tended to rephrase existing initiatives as part of the Mobility 
Partnership, rather than proposing new initiatives (Interview 7; 30). In the Mobility 
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Partnership with Cape Verde, for instance, the government of Luxembourg simply 
transferred all their planned or ongoing bilateral projects to the ‘umbrella’ of the Mobil-
ity Partnership (Interview 53). Member states also in some cases repeated initiatives 
from the Mobility Partnership with Moldova in the Mobility Partnership with Georgia 
(Interview 21). In both these Mobility Partnerships, Germany proposed to allow mi-
grants from Moldova/Georgia extended stays away from Germany without losing their 
German residence rights; Bulgaria proposed to sign a bilateral agreement on social 
security with both countries; and several member states proposed to provide information 
on the possibilities for legal migration to the EU (Council, 2008a; 2009a). Officials in 
DG JLS acknowledge that ideally the Mobility Partnerships should be based on new 
projects (Interview 30), and the 2009 evaluation emphasises that the partnerships should 
bring “added value to existing cooperation” (Commission, 2009d, p.5). However, given 
the non-legally binding nature of the partnerships, the Commission cannot force mem-
ber states to propose new projects. It finds itself in a weak bargaining position, with 
little choice of strategy as it is simply not in a position to demand change. 
 The Commission can, however, encourage the proposal of a certain type of projects 
by the member states through its control of funding. For the Mobility Partnerships, 
officials in DG JLS had envisaged cooperation between the member states, with pro-
jects being proposed jointly by three or four member states (Interview 13). The 2009 
call for proposals for funding under the thematic programme for cooperation with third 
countries in the areas of migration and asylum contains a lot dedicated to the develop-
ment of the Mobility Partnership instrument. The funding available for 2009 and 2010 
together was €4 million (Commission, 2009g). The call for proposals gives priority to 
projects undertaken by “a partnership among a number of organisations” (p.10), under-
lining that “the lack of a partner will have to be justified” (ibid.). However, this leverage 
has failed at bringing about a significant number of multilateral initiatives. Table 4.4 
gives an overview of the project proposals in the Mobility Partnerships to date, accord-
ing to the actors that proposed them (Council, 2008a; 2008b; 2009a). Bilateral initia-
tives clearly dominate each Mobility Partnership.51 
 
                                                          
51 In the Mobility Partnership with Armenia, this tendency has been repeated: 11 of 21 proposed projects are 
proposed by only one member state (Council, 2011b). 
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Table 4.4: Project proposals in the Mobility Partnerships to date. 
Actors proposing MP with Moldova MP with Cape Verde MP with Georgia 
One member state 40 20 11 
Two or more member states 12 1 5 
The Commission/EU agency 5 2 0 
Partner country 3 0 0 
Member state(s) and the Commis-
sion/EU agency 
2 1 2 
Member state(s) and partner country 0 2 0 
Partner country and the Commis-
sion/EU agency 
1 2 0 
Member state(s), partner country and
the Commission/EU agency 
1 3 0 
Total no. of projects 64 31 18 
 
One final way in which member states’ control over the content of the Mobility Partner-
ships is apparent is the absence of projects offering new opportunities for legal migra-
tion to the EU (Reslow, 2010, pp.15-16). An examination of the projects proposed in 
each Mobility Partnership shows that the projects proposed under the heading of ‘legal 
migration’ tend to relate to informing potential migrants about the possibilities for legal 
migration to the EU (not creating new opportunities); information campaigns to high-
light the danger of illegal migration; projects to inform migrants about voluntary return; 
pre-departure training for migrants planning to migrate to the EU; and bilateral agree-
ments on social security provisions (ibid.). Very few projects seek to create new oppor-
tunities for legal migration. The exceptions are a proposal by Romania and the Veneto 
region to support labour migration and development for Moldova; a proposal by the 
Czech Republic and Cyprus to offer circular migration opportunities for Moldovans; a 
proposal by Poland to offer Moldovans admission to the Polish labour market for tem-
porary work without a work permit; a proposal by Portugal to sign a protocol with Cape 
Verde to promote temporary and circular migration; a proposal by France to open up 
certain professions for Cape Verdean migrants; a proposal by Luxembourg to consider a 
circular migration scheme for Cape Verdeans; a proposal by France and Poland to fa-
cilitate access for Georgians to their national labour markets; and a proposal by France 
to encourage circular mobility of young Georgian professionals. This means that a total 
of 8 of the 113 projects proposed across the three Mobility Partnerships seek to create 
new opportunities for legal migration to the EU.52 
 The absence of projects on legal migration contradicts the central notion behind the 
Mobility Partnerships, namely to offer increased legal migration opportunities to the EU 
in return for third countries’ cooperation on preventing illegal migration (Commission, 
2007a). The reason for this contradiction is member states’ concern to maintain national 
                                                          
52 If the Mobility Partnership with Armenia is included, the number of projects creating new legal migration 
opportunities to the EU is 9 of 134 in total. In the Mobility Partnership with Armenia, France proposed to 
encourage circular mobility of young Armenian professionals (Council, 2011b). 
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control over the admission of migrants to their territories, and particularly to their labour 
markets (Interview 21; 30). Several member state officials indicate their government’s 
opposition to including legal migration in the Mobility Partnerships. An official of the 
Dutch ministry of social affairs and employment stated that the Netherlands will not be 
offering legal migration opportunities in the Mobility Partnerships (Interview 6). The 
UK government was concerned that the Mobility Partnerships were too focused on legal 
migration, whereas this is only one aspect of the GAM (Interview 18). A French gov-
ernment official emphasised that legal migration is a matter of national competence 
(Interview 16). The inclusion of legal migration was the main reason for Austrian oppo-
sition to the Mobility Partnerships (see chapter 5).  
 The member states as a group have thus adopted a negotiating strategy of contend-
ing as regards the issue of legal migration: they have stood firm in their assertions that 
they will not include legal migration in the Mobility Partnerships. In an expert meeting 
of member state representatives and the Commission in 2008, the Commission noted 
that the concept of ‘mobility’ was falling by the wayside in the partnership with Moldo-
va, and that more should be done to emphasise mobility in future Mobility Partnerships. 
This was, however, merely met with confirmation from several member states (the 
Netherlands, Germany and the Czech Republic) that no legal migration opportunities 
will be offered (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008a). 
 The issue of national competence over labour migration was already emphasised in 
the Franco-German proposal for a ‘new European migration policy’: “Die Steuerung der 
Arbeitsmigration muss jedoch weiterhin in nationaler Verantwortung der Mitgliedsstaa-
ten verbleiben” (Schäuble and Sarkozy, 2006, p.3). The Council’s June 2007 conclu-
sions highlighted that any legal migration opportunities in the Mobility Partnerships 
should be adapted “to the specific Member States’ labour market needs, while fully 
respecting the competences of the Member States” (Council, 2007e, p.5). The Commis-
sion has previously acknowledged the sensitivity of immigration policy for the member 
states, noting in 2005 that there is not enough support among member states for “a hori-
zontal framework covering conditions of admission for all third-country nationals seek-
ing entry into the labour markets of the Member States” (Commission, 2005d, p.5). The 
2011 report on policy coherence for development acknowledges that it has been difficult 
for member states to offer legal migration opportunities in the Mobility Partnerships due 
to the financial and economic crisis in Europe (Commission, 2011k, p.81). Neverthe-
less, officials in DG JLS were keen to see the inclusion of legal migration opportunities 
in the Mobility Partnerships: “anything on legal migration, even one action, that is real-
ly a moment when we can say the EU has placed its foot in the member states’ strong-
hold” (Interview 21). Already in his speech on ‘mobility packages’, Franco Frattini 
recognised the sensitivity of the issue of division of competences between the EU and 
the member states, stating that “quotas will continue to be set at national level in Mem-
ber States of the European Union. But I hope it will be possible for the EU Commission 
to know exactly the working needs on a State by State basis, to use them as an instru-
ment to get political packages and agreements with African countries” (Frattini, 2006). 
Member states’ control over legal migration opportunities weakened the Commission’s 
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position in negotiations with third countries on Mobility Partnerships: it limited the 
room for manoeuvre that Commission officials had and closed off certain negotiation 
strategies. Commission officials were, for instance, unable to guarantee that the project 
proposals would include access to member states’ labour markets, as that would depend 
on what member states were willing to offer (Interview 1). Given that legal migration 
opportunities are to be offered in return for third countries’ cooperation on illegal mi-
gration, this is problematic: “third states need to get something to be interested [but . . . ] 
most of the things they are interested in are still in the hands of our member states” 
(Interview 13). It is therefore highly significant for the EU-third country interaction that 
member states determine the content of Mobility Partnerships (see chapter 6). 
 Finally, member states have controlled the choice of partner countries for Mobility 
Partnerships. Based on the proposals made by the Commission, member states in the 
HLWG have selected the countries with which partnerships should be signed (Interview 
30). However, the Commission was not entirely free in its proposals of third countries: 
member states insisted on an east-south balance; other political considerations affected 
member states’ preferences; and member states’ control of the content of Mobility Part-
nerships limited the type of partner countries that the Commission felt it could propose. 
Officials in DG JLS favoured the selection of countries for Mobility Partnerships for 
which migration flows to the EU were significant (Interview 21). As the Mobility Part-
nerships are a tool of the GAM, the countries selected should also be one of the priority 
countries under the approach. When the European Council first adopted the Global 
Approach in 2005, the focus was on ‘Africa and the Mediterranean’ in very broad terms. 
The conclusions mention several different cooperation frameworks, such as the African 
Union, ECOWAS, the Euromed countries, the Cotonou Agreement countries, and indi-
vidual countries such as Tanzania, Morocco, Algeria and Libya (Council, 2005a). The 
implication seems to be that the whole of Africa will be the focus of the Global Ap-
proach. In 2007, the GAM was extended to the countries to the east and south-east of 
the EU: Turkey, the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Ma-
cedonia, Montenegro and Serbia), ENP countries in Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova 
and Belarus) and the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), and Rus-
sia (Commission, 2007e, p.3). Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the top 10 countries of the 
GAM contributing legal and illegal migration flows to the EU, plus the Mobility Part-
nership countries up to 2009 (Moldova, Cape Verde, Georgia and Senegal).53 
                                                          
53 The data for legal migration is the number of immigrants from the third country (based on citizenship) 
entering the EU 27 in 2007, based on Eurostat data (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
population/data/database, retrieved 17 February 2012). Notes: data for Ireland is for 2008; data for France is 
for 1999; data for the UK is for 2005; no data is available for Portugal or Romania; data from Belgium is not 
available for Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia or Zimbabwe; data for France is not available for Montenegro 
or Serbia; 2008 data from Austria is used for Montenegro; 2008 data from Denmark is used for Botswana, 
Central African Republic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mauritania, Namibia, São 
Tomé and Prìncipe and Swaziland; 2001 data from UK is used for Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, 
and São Tomé and Prìncipe; 2008 data from the Netherlands is used for Chad and Mauritania; 2006 data from 
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Figure 4.3: Legal immigration flows to the EU 27 in 2007 (source: Eurostat). 
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Figure 4.4: Illegal immigration flows to the EU 27 in 2008 (source: Eurostat). 
                                                                                                                                              
the Netherlands is used for Swaziland; 2005 data from France is used for Namibia. The data for illegal migra-
tion is the number of migrants with the citizenship of the third country found to be illegally present in the EU 
27 in 2008, based on Eurostat data (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/ 
database, retrieved 17 February 2012). Data for Luxembourg is for 2009. For full data tables see Annex III. A 
total of 68 countries are covered by the Global Approach to Migration. 
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The figures show that the five most significant countries contributing to legal immigra-
tion flows to the EU are Morocco, Albania, Ukraine, Turkey and Russia. The five most 
significant countries contributing to illegal immigration flows to the EU are Albania, 
Morocco, Eritrea, Nigeria and Algeria. Apart from Morocco, the Mobility Partnership 
countries only barely make it to the top 10, and Cape Verde in particular is a country of 
low migration pressure for the EU. However, countries were not chosen for Mobility 
Partnerships in the first instance according to their contribution to migration flows. 
Although the presence of some level of migration from the third country to the EU was 
a criterion for selecting the first countries for Mobility Partnerships (Interview 13), 
other factors played a more important role. In particular, member states insisted on an 
‘east-south’ balance (Interview 11; 13; 20). This east-south axis divides member states 
and determines their preferences for the geographical focus of the EU’s external policies 
(Interview 21). The Spanish government, for instance, opposed a visa facilitation 
agreement with Georgia on the grounds that something similar should then be offered to 
a country to the south of the EU (Interview 21). In one expert meeting of member state 
representatives and the Commission, the east-south tension was clear in the remarks of 
the Spanish and Polish representatives: Spain opposed a possible Mobility Partnership 
with Ukraine on the grounds that a PCA already exists with Ukraine and EU funding is 
therefore available for migration-related projects; Poland countered that African coun-
tries have received enough attention in migration-related matters (Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2008a). Parkes (2009a, p.343) has also observed this tendency with 
regards to the ENP: “The EU Member States wrangle with one another to ensure that 
third countries are favoured with which they enjoy a special relationship. In general, one 
can talk of an ‘East-South’ divide in ENP. If an eastern neighbour is favoured, a bloc of 
EU Member States will demand a ‘compensatory’ focus on a southern state, and vice 
versa”. This preference by the member states explains the initial pair-wise selection of 
third countries for Mobility Partnerships: Moldova-Cape Verde, Georgia-Senegal, and 
later Armenia-Ghana. Broader political considerations also played into the selection of 
partner countries, particularly in the case of Georgia. There was general sympathy 
among the member states with Georgia in the aftermath of the war with Russia in 2008 
(Interview 1). On 1 September 2008, an extraordinary meeting of the European Council 
committed the EU to “step[ping] up its relations with Georgia” including in the area of 
visas (Council, 2008h, p.4). Member states’ control of the issue of legal migration also 
constricted the Commission in its suggestions for third countries: DG JLS officials were 
aware that third countries with significant migration flows to the EU would be likely to 
demand greater access to the EU labour market as the price for their cooperation on 
illegal migration. As access to the labour market remains under member state control, 
selecting such third countries would have resulted in negotiations on a Mobility Partner-
ship dragging on (Interview 1). 
 Ultimately, without adequate member state support there would be no Mobility 
Partnership, because member states propose the projects that form the content of the 
partnerships. The level of interest of member states was therefore the most important 
consideration in the selection of third countries for Mobility Partnerships (Interview 
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13). The example of Ghana demonstrates this: the Commission proposed Ghana for the 
first African Mobility Partnership, but member states did not display significant interest 
(Interview 20). Later, however, member states’ preferences had changed, and Ghana 
was selected for negotiations. The “interest of a critical mass of EU member states” is 
also recognised as the first criterion for the selection of third countries for a migration 
mission (Council, 2012a, p.4). 
 This sub-section has outlined the ‘tug-of-war’ between the Commission and mem-
ber states in the decision-making process leading to the signature of Mobility Partner-
ships. On the surface, the Commission appears to have played a central, coordinating 
role: it proposed third countries for Mobility Partnerships; coordinated between inter-
ested member states; conducted negotiations with the third countries selected; and has 
been active in promoting the Mobility Partnership tool. However, the member states in 
the Council mandated the Commission’s actions at each step; determined the legal form 
of the Mobility Partnership tool; determined the content of each specific Mobility Part-
nership; and controlled the choice of third countries for Mobility Partnerships. This has 
limited the Commission to yielding and flexibility, negotiation strategies associated 
with ‘soft bargaining’. The control by member states has also put the Commission in a 
weak bargaining position when negotiating Mobility Partnerships with third countries 
because it is not able to offer unilateral concessions that member states have not ap-
proved. 
4.5.3 The European Parliament and other EU institutions 
This sub-section shows that the Commission and the Council have been the only EU 
institutions to play a role in the decision-making process on the Mobility Partnerships. 
Indeed, the European Parliament has been noticeably silent on the partnerships. Carrera 
and Hernández i Sagrera (2009, p.30) label this a “clear democratic deficit”: “It is strik-
ing to see that the European Parliament was completely absent in the process leading to 
the conclusion of the mobility partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde”. This ab-
sence is due to the legal form of the Mobility Partnerships: because the partnerships are 
signed as political declarations, rather than international agreements based on article 
218 TFEU, there is no formal role for the European Parliament as there is no legislative 
procedure. Although the member states insisted on this legal form in order to maintain 
control over the policy instrument, the process-tracing uncovered no evidence that keep-
ing the European Parliament completely outside the policy-making process was a spe-
cific aim of the member states. 
 Following the adoption by the Commission of the communication on Mobility 
Partnerships on 16 May 2007, the communication was officially transmitted to both the 
Council and the European Parliament on 21 May 2007. However, at no point have the 
partnerships been the specific subject of debate in the Parliament, and mentions of them 
are few and far between. Indeed, the policy rhetoric of Parliament resolutions is some-
what different to the notion underlying the Mobility Partnerships. The Parliament has on 
several occasions noted that legal and illegal migration are linked, because the availabil-
ity of channels for legal migration will reduce the extent of illegal migration (European 
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Parliament, 2007; 2005). However, legal migration is not conceived of as a bargaining 
tool for obtaining third countries’ cooperation on illegal migration. The Parliament even 
warns against making technical and financial assistance to third countries dependent on 
their performance on readmission (European Parliament, 2006a, p.11). 
 The 2007 resolution by the European Parliament on illegal immigration lists as one 
of the reference documents the Commission’s communication on Mobility Partnerships. 
However, the resolution does not specifically refer to a European Parliament position on 
the partnerships. Rather the resolution notes in general terms that “the cooperation of 
the EU and its Member States with the third countries of origin and transit is vital, and 
an effective and practical policy of co-development must be put in place with a view to 
addressing at an early stage in third countries the root causes of immigration” (European 
Parliament, 2007). The Parliament further calls on the member states and the Commis-
sion to ensure that adequate resources are in place for the implementation of the GAM. 
 In a resolution adopted in January 2008 on EU policy towards the South Caucasus, 
the European Parliament calls for the signature of a Mobility Partnership with Georgia 
(European Parliament, 2008a). In the resolution, the Parliament “stresses the importance 
of cooperation in the area of freedom of movement across the borders of the EU and its 
neighbours; calls on the Commission and the Council . . . to take the necessary steps for 
the launch of negotiations on readmission and visa facilitation agreements between the 
EU and Georgia and for the signature of a mobility partnership agreement with the EU”. 
This is earlier than the Council conclusions which mandated the Commission to begin 
negotiations with Georgia (June 2008). However subsequent Commission and Council 
documents do not refer to this resolution, therefore it is not possible to conclude a caus-
al impact of the opinion of the Parliament on the choice of Georgia as a partner country 
for a Mobility Partnership. In September 2008, the Belgian MEP Frank Vanhecke ad-
dressed a written question to the Commission, enquiring about the “reports” that “the 
European Union set up a pilot project with the African island state of Cape Verde to 
allow migrants from that state to travel easily back and forth between Cape Verde and 
the EU” and the meaning of such a project in practice (European Parliament, 2008b). 
The answer provided by the Commission outlines the idea of Mobility Partnerships 
(based on the 2007 Commission communication) and confirms that Spain, France, Lux-
embourg, Portugal and the Commission have signed such a partnership with Cape 
Verde. The answer also points out that projects within the Mobility Partnership address 
legal migration, illegal migration, and migration and development (European Parlia-
ment, 2008c). 
 In February 2009, the Parliament’s Policy Department commissioned a briefing 
paper on circular migration and Mobility Partnerships for the Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs Committee, in response to the 2007 Commission communication (Inter-
view 29). However, the briefing paper deals solely with the concept of temporary labour 
migration, covering aspects such as incentives for migrants to return and integration 
requirements in European countries (Wiesbrock and Schneider, 2009). The paper con-
cludes that “from a development perspective, rather than focusing on temporariness, 
migrant workers should be encouraged to stay in the host country for a longer time in 
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order to enable them to accumulate sufficient resources to make return worthwhile” 
(p.12). While it is true that schemes for circular migration might be incorporated into a 
Mobility Partnership, this has so far not been the case in practice (see sub-section 4.5.2). 
The briefing paper, once completed, was sent to all MEPs but it was not followed up 
with a specific debate in a plenary session on either Mobility Partnerships or circular 
migration (Interview 29). 
 A 2010 report commissioned by the European Parliament on the EU’s readmission 
policy also refers to the Mobility Partnerships (Cassarino, 2010). The report concerns 
the legal basis for readmission agreements and the balance between costs and benefits 
for third countries to sign such agreements. The link to Mobility Partnerships is made 
because readmission is one of the commitments required from third countries wishing to 
sign a partnership: “mobility partnerships stem from the consolidation of a new com-
promise encompassing a large array of issues ranging from development aid, to tempo-
rary entry visa facilitation, circular migration schemes and the fight against illegal mi-
gration including readmission” (p.34). However, the section of the report dealing with 
Mobility Partnerships does not mention the European Parliament or its position on the 
partnerships, and the policy recommendations of the report which address actions to be 
taken by the Parliament on readmission do not mention the Mobility Partnerships. No 
plenary debate was held in Parliament specifically on the basis of this report, although 
at the same time as the report was finalised MEPs were debating the ratification of the 
readmission agreement between the EU and Pakistan (European Parliament, 2010). This 
was the first readmission agreement to require ratification by the Parliament, due to the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. MEPs were divided: the EPP group generally 
emphasised the importance of a repatriation policy if EU migration policy is to be cred-
ible, whilst the S&D group raised concerns over human rights, given that Pakistan has 
not signed the Geneva Convention. Ultimately, however, Parliament ratified the agree-
ment. 
 In an opinion on EU labour immigration policy and relations with third countries 
adopted in June 2008, the Committee of the Regions refers to the Mobility Partnerships 
(Committee of the Regions, 2008). The opinion deals not only with the Commission 
communication on Mobility Partnerships, but also a communication on sanctions 
against employers of illegal migrants and two Commission proposals for Council direc-
tives: one on the conditions of entry to the EU for migrants for the purposes of highly 
qualified employment, and one on a single permit for third country nationals to reside 
and work in the EU. The overarching conclusion of the Committee of the Regions is 
that the EU “must equip itself as soon as possible with a genuine European immigration 
policy, respecting the powers of the different levels of government” (p.2). In this con-
text, the Committee “applauds the mobility partnerships with third countries . . . [and] 
notes the importance of concluding readmission agreements with third countries as part 
of their commitments” (p.5). However, the opinion “regrets that the role of the Commit-
tee of the Regions is not mentioned in any of the reference documents, and voices its 
concerns at the lack of attention to the territorial dimension” (p.3). The opinion is 
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adopted under article 307 TFEU,54 however it is an ‘optional referral’ meaning that 
there is no legal requirement for the Commission to refer the documents concerned to 
the Committee of the Regions. Indeed, no later documents by either the Council or the 
Commission refer to this opinion by the Committee of the Regions. The opinion calls 
for a stronger role for “towns and regions of origin and destination of migration flows in 
the mobility partnerships, since they can facilitate mobility for immigrants and exert a 
positive influence on the social integration of immigrants” (p.6). 
 The European Economic and Social Committee dealt with the Mobility Partner-
ships in an own-initiative opinion on EU immigration and cooperation policy with 
countries of origin (European Economic and Social Committee, 2007). The opinion 
concerns particularly the contribution that cooperation with third countries can make to 
their development, and discusses the benefits of remittances, the role of diaspora net-
works in development, and return migration as a way of recovering human capital. In 
this context, “the Committee supports the proposal to establish mobility partnerships” 
(p.19) but it makes several suggestions: Mobility Partnerships should be flexibly 
adapted to suit the situation of third countries; the Mobility Partnerships should contain 
an EU offer of quotas to match European job markets; funding available for Mobility 
Partnerships under the thematic programme should be increased; the Commission dele-
gations and member states’ embassies should cooperate more intensively; and immigra-
tion legislation should be more flexible to facilitate circular migration. However, as with 
the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions, there is no evidence that 
this opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee was taken into considera-
tion in further Council or Commission documents relating to the Mobility Partnerships. 
 This chapter does not deal with the role of the ECJ because the court is not in-
volved in decision-making processes, but rather judges the application of EU legisla-
tion. However, commentators have noted that the non-legally binding form of the Mo-
bility Partnerships makes it doubtful that “these partnerships can be subject to any judi-
cial control exercised by the ECJ” (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2009, p.30). 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped the governance at the EU level of the Mobility Partnerships. It 
set out to answer the first two sub-questions of the research project: what was the role of 
the EU institutions and the member states in the negotiation of the Mobility Partner-
ships? And what implications does this have for the form of the partnerships? Chapter 2 
took as a theoretical starting point the governance approach to understanding EU policy-
making. Scholars adopting a governance approach are not concerned with the process of 
European integration as such; rather, they share an interest in the day-to-day functioning 
of EU institutions and EU decision-making – in other words, in the EU as a political 
system. These scholars do not aim to develop an explanation of decision-making that 
will hold across all policy areas; rather they acknowledge that patterns of governance 
                                                          
54 As renumbered by the Treaty of Lisbon; ex article 265. 
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vary between policy areas. This chapter has followed such an approach by aiming to 
depict the pattern of governance of the Mobility Partnerships, and explain why this 
pattern of governance has emerged. 
 The pattern of governance that we see for the Mobility Partnerships is a classic 
example of ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ (see chapter 2, and Lavenex, 2009b). 
Many aspects of EU migration policy are now governed by the Community method: the 
Commission has the exclusive right to initiate policy, legislation is passed by the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament together, and this legislation is subject to adjudication 
by the ECJ. In contrast, the European Parliament and ECJ have been excluded from the 
policy process on the Mobility Partnerships. Decision-making at the EU level has in-
stead been characterised by a ‘tug-of-war’ between the Commission and the member 
states. On the surface, the Commission appeared to have played the central role: in the 
policy formulation stage, the Commission published the communication on the Mobility 
Partnerships. In the decision-making stage, DG JLS suggested potential partner coun-
tries, gauged the interest of the member states in taking part, conducted discussions with 
officials of the third countries, and continually promoted the Mobility Partnerships as a 
policy tool in the EU’s relations with third countries. However, behind the scenes mem-
ber states were maintaining control over the content, direction and form of the Mobility 
Partnerships. The member states influenced the policy formulation stage through their 
own policy initiatives, such as the French and Spanish bilateral migration agreements. 
In the decision-making stage, the member states have mandated every step taken by the 
Commission through Council conclusions, and controlled the selection of third coun-
tries for Mobility Partnerships. The influence of the member states on the decision-
making process has manifested itself in the form of the partnerships: Mobility Partner-
ships are signed as political declarations (rather than legally binding international 
agreements); participation is voluntary for member states; and member states control the 
content of the partnerships through the projects they propose. This control by member 
states placed the Commission in a weak bargaining position, both in its interactions with 
the member states, but also crucially in its negotiations with third countries on Mobility 
Partnerships.  
 Why do we see contestation between the Commission and the member states in the 
decision-making process? Chapter 2 argued that EU institutions will seek to maximise 
their competences by expanding the role of the EU in existing and new policy areas. 
Quite simply, if there is no EU policy there is no role for the EU institutions. The 
Commission thus had a clear interest in the creation and control the Mobility Partner-
ship instrument. However, external migration policy is at the crossroads of migration 
policy and foreign policy. These are two policy areas that are sensitive for the member 
states. They will therefore likely resist the transfer of too many competences to the EU 
institutions, preferring to maintain control of the policy-making process.  
 The combination of a Commission that seeks to expand EU external migration 
policy with member states that are reluctant to hand over control of a policy area that 
intersects both foreign policy and migration policy sets the stage for a complex deci-
sion-making process, as demonstrated in the case of the Mobility Partnerships. The 
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chapter has not dealt with the interest of individual member states in participating in the 
Mobility Partnerships; this will be dealt with in the following chapter, where the case 
studies of France, Austria and the Netherlands will be set out. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the member-state level (level III of the three-level game), as 
well as the interaction between the EU and the member states. At the member-state 
level, a domestic preference on participation in EU external migration policy emerges. 
These domestic preferences then feed into the interaction with the EU institutions, lead-
ing to agreement on the shape of the EU policy instrument. Chapter 4 outlined the cen-
tral role played by the member states during the policy-making process on the Mobility 
Partnerships, both in terms of policy formulation and in terms of decision-making. The 
control exercised by member states had important implications for the legal form of the 
Mobility Partnership instrument in general and the content of the individual partnerships 
specifically. This chapter will now answer the third sub-question of the research project 
as presented in chapter 2: why do some member states chose to participate in the Mobil-
ity Partnerships while others do not? In order to address this question, the focus in this 
chapter will be on three case studies: France, Austria and the Netherlands (see chapter 
3). These three member states reached very different decisions on participation in the 
Mobility Partnerships. France and Austria represent complete opposites in this respect: 
the French government decided early on in the discussions on this policy instrument to 
participate in all future Mobility Partnerships. The Austrian government decided that it 
was completely opposed to this policy instrument, regardless of the partner country 
concerned in any specific instance. The Dutch government took an intermediate posi-
tion: having been rather ambivalent at the outset and not joining either of the first two 
Mobility Partnerships (with Moldova and Cape Verde), it later reversed its position and 
joined first the partnership with Cape Verde and then the partnership with Georgia. This 
chapter accounts for these different domestic preferences. It therefore specifies the do-
mestic politics of external migration policy for the member states and offers explana-
tions for governments’ preferences on the issue. 
 The chapter starts by setting out the external migration policies of each of the 
member states. All three cases have some policies or measures in place that either re-
semble Mobility Partnerships or would be compatible with participation in a Mobility 
Partnership. The existence of such a policy in itself therefore cannot account for their 
different preferences on this EU policy instrument. Section 5.3 outlines how decisions 
relating both to the EU and to migration policy are taken in each member state. Section 
5.4 shows that the national identity explanation accounts for the decision by France to 
participate in all Mobility Partnerships, but that the same notion of ‘appropriateness’ is 
not the best explanation for Austrian and Dutch preferences on the partnerships. Instead, 
in these two cases a rationalist cost-benefit analysis led the two governments to formu-
late very different preferences (section 5.5). Section 5.6 outlines the size of the win-set 
for the EU and the member states. 
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5.2 External migration policy in France, Austria and the Netherlands 
All three member states have an external migration policy in place or are implementing 
projects related to migration in third countries. The bilateral agreements on the man-
agement of migratory flows that France signs with some third countries most closely 
resemble the concept of Mobility Partnerships. 
5.2.1 France 
The French government emphasises the importance of cooperation with third countries 
on migration issues: “migration is about third countries, people coming from third coun-
tries, so we cannot imagine having a national policy disconnected from what is happen-
ing outside” (Interview 32). The aim is to establish a “detailed dialogue with immigra-
tion countries of origin” (European Migration Network, 2009d, p.24). Such cooperation 
is seen as essential to achieve the government objective of preventing illegal migration 
(European Migration Network, 2010e, p.3; 2010f, p.3). Examples of French measures in 
cooperation with third countries include: provision for circulation visas in bilateral 
agreements; readmission clauses; police cooperation; placement of immigration liaison 
officers in third countries to exchange information and best practices; exchange of ex-
periences between the French border police and third countries’ services; contribution to 
training programmes organised by Frontex; and participation in the Conference of the 
Ministers of Interior of the Western Mediterranean (together with Malta, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania) (European Migration Net-
work, 2010f, pp.18-20). In addition to the EU readmission agreements, France has 
signed more than 40 bilateral readmission agreements (p.41). France implements pro-
grammes that could fall under the existing Mobility Partnerships, for instance a pro-
gramme on voluntary assisted return of migrants to Moldova (European Migration Net-
work, 2009d, p.20). The French Agency for Immigration and Integration (OFII) also 
provides assisted resettlement to migrants wanting to undertake business ventures in 
their country of origin (European Migration Network, 2010f, p.44), including in all the 
countries that have signed Mobility Partnerships. 
 The concept of ‘co-development’ has long been important in the French external 
migration policy (Magoni, 2004). The French Ministry of Interior defines the concept of 
co-development in the following way: “c’est toute action à laquelle participent des 
migrants pour aider au développement de leur pays d’origine” (French Ministry of Inte-
rior, n.d.; see also European Migration Network, 2009d, p.8). The overall objective is to 
reduce poverty in regions of emigration, and thereby contribute to a better management 
of migratory flows. Three main types of actions are envisaged: financial support for 
initiatives by migrant associations in their country of origin; support for migrants in 
setting up businesses in their country of origin; and measures to mobilise the expertise 
of highly-qualified migrants to contribute to the development of their country of origin. 
Until 2007, the policy of co-development focussed mainly on Senegal and Mali. In 
Senegal, primary and secondary schools and health centres have been constructed. In 
Mali, a project for the management of surface water was implemented in the region of 
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Djombougou. For the period 2009-2011, €100 million was earmarked for co-
development policy (ibid.). The concept of involving the diaspora in the development of 
their home country is also part of the general objectives of the Mobility Partnerships. 
The partnership with Moldova, for instance, states that the parties intend to “create the 
conditions for boosting the diaspora’s investment in their home country through twin-
ning projects, loan and transfer facilitation and targeted remittance schemes enhancing 
the development impact of migrant workers’ money transfers” (Council, 2008b, p.4). 
 The main framework for French cooperation with third countries on migration 
issues is a bilateral accord de gestion concertée des flux migratoires et de 
développement solidaire (agreement on the concerted management of migratory flows 
and cooperative development) (French Ministry of Interior, n.d.). This instrument is 
based on the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and the European Pact on Immigra-
tion and Asylum (ibid.). As of March 2012, accords had been signed with fourteen 
countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Congo, Gabon, Mauritius, Russia, Sene-
gal, Tunisia, Cameroon, Lebanon, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Of these, the 
first nine had been ratified (République Française, n.d.). The French government de-
scribes these accords as a “global partnership on migration” (European Migration Net-
work, 2010f, p.41), encompassing legal migration, visas, readmission, police coopera-
tion, reintegration, and development projects (p.45). These agreements set out certain 
sectors of the labour market for which nationals from the partner country can be em-
ployed without proof that there is no French or EU citizen to perform the task (Euro-
pean Migration Network, 2009d, p.18). They also aim to encourage the movement of 
highly qualified migrants, and they allow students to supplement their studies in France 
with a first professional experience before they return to their country of origin (Euro-
pean Migration Network, 2010f, pp.28-29).55 Circular migration is already envisaged in 
French migration policy: short-stay circulation visas, for instance, are issued to “foreign 
nationals who manifestly contribute to the development of the [French] economy or 
bilateral relations”. These visas are valid for multiple trips in several years (European 
Migration Network, 2009d, p.9). However, the Ministry of Interior also underlines that 
permanent labour immigration to France must respond to French business needs and 
must be consistent with French reception capacity (p.8). 
5.2.2 Austria  
Austria does not have a history of pursuing the type of agreements that the French gov-
ernment is signing with third countries. However, the Gastarbeiter agreements signed 
with third countries in the 1960s are an instance of external migration policy in that they 
drew third countries into cooperation with the Austrian government on migration issues. 
In the 1960s, the post-war economic boom coupled with a domestic labour force short-
                                                          
55 Like the EU Mobility Partnerships, the French accords are differentiated according to the third country 
concerned, so different conditions apply in the different agreements (European Migration Network, 2009h, 
p.39), for instance regarding the duration of the residence permit issued to students after their studies in 
France. Students from Benin, Burkina Faso, Mauritius and Tunisia receive a 6-month residence permit, whilst 
students from Cape Verde, Congo, Cameroon and Gabon receive a 9-month residence permit (European 
Migration Network, 2010f, p.29). 
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age led the government to follow the lead of Germany and Switzerland and sign bilat-
eral agreements with southern and south-eastern European countries on the recruitment 
of temporary labour migrants (Jandl and Kraler, 2003; European Migration Network, 
2010c). Agreements with Spain and Italy were not successful – Austrian employers had 
difficulty attracting workers from these countries in the face of competition from 
France, Germany, Switzerland and the Benelux countries (Gächter, 2008, p.4). Agree-
ments were signed with Turkey in 1964 and Yugoslavia in 1966, and these were more 
successful: by 1973 there were 178,000 Yugoslavians and 27,000 Turks in Austria 
(Jandl and Kraler, 2003). Migration under these agreements was conceptualised as tem-
porary in nature: migrants would come to Austria, work according to Austrian economic 
need, and then return to their countries of origin (European Migration Network, 2010c, 
p.29). With the onset of the oil crisis and recession in the early 1970s, these pro-
grammes were terminated and the access of foreigners to the Austrian labour market 
was restricted in the 1975 Aliens Employment Act (Jandl and Kraler, 2003). Neverthe-
less, immigration to Austria continued in the form of family reunification so that the 
experience with the Gastarbeiter programmes has had a lasting effect on the make-up of 
Austrian society: in 2008, 53% of all non-EU nationals living in Austria came from the 
two main recruitments regions of the Gastarbeiter programmes – the former Yugoslavia 
and Turkey (European Migration Network, 2010c, p.38). 
 Although the Gastarbeiter programmes have long since ended, the Austrian gov-
ernment actively pursues different kinds of measures on migration in or with non-EU 
countries (European Migration Network, 2010d, p.34). The 2007-2010 coalition pro-
gramme emphasised the importance of international cooperation to prevent illegal mi-
gration, and suggested measures such as cross-border cooperation between national 
labour market services (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, 2007, p.51). The most important 
countries for cooperation are those to the east and south-east of the EU; the Austrian 
government has, for instance, signed social security agreements with several countries 
to the south-east of the EU, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Turkey (Ös-
terreichische Sozialversicherung, 2012). The Austrian Ministry of Interior, in coopera-
tion with IOM and NGOs, operates assisted voluntary return programmes and reintegra-
tion support to migrants from certain regions including Moldova (European Migration 
Network, 2010c, p.72; European Migration Network, 2011a). The Ministry of Interior 
also operates information campaigns in third countries on the consequences of illegal 
migration to Austria (European Migration Network, 2010c, p.78). In 1998, the Austrian 
presidency of the Council drafted a strategy paper on EU migration policy. In it, agree-
ments with countries of origin of migrants on prevention of illegal migration and repa-
triation are identified as one of the pillars of an EU migration policy. The strategy paper 
also suggests linking facilitated border crossings with guarantees by third countries on 
readmission (Council, 1998a). 
5.2.3 The Netherlands 
Like Austria, the Netherlands also has a history of guestworker agreements with third 
countries. In the 1960s, agreements were signed with Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, 
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Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia (Geddes, 2003, p.105). As in Austria, the need 
for such guestworker agreements resulted from strong economic growth in the post-war 
years and a domestic shortage of low-skilled workers. The concept behind these agree-
ments was that migrants could work for a while in the Netherlands, and then return with 
their earnings to their home country to make a living there; migration was thus seen as 
temporary (European Migration Network, 2012a, p.26). With the onset of economic 
recession in 1973, guestworker agreements were terminated, although immigration to 
the Netherlands continued in the form of family reunification, just as in the Austrian 
case. 
 To this day, the Dutch government pursues an external migration policy. Since the 
1990s, the government has acknowledged the importance of cooperation with third 
countries on migration issues, for instance in securing the repatriation of illegal mi-
grants (Bonjour, 2005; European Migration Network, 2005a, p.26). A number of pro-
jects have been implemented in or with the cooperation of third countries. The Dutch 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), for instance, has posted immigration 
liaison officers to a number of third countries, including Syria, China, South Africa and 
Kenya. The aim of such postings is to improve the border control capacities of these 
third countries (European Migration Network, 2010h, p.19). Dutch external migration 
policy includes projects targeting more than one third country at a time: in 2009 the 
government signed an agreement according to which Liberian border guards would be 
trained in Ghana (p.20). IOM in the Netherlands has been an important implementing 
partner for Dutch external migration policy (Interview 15). The two most important 
projects implemented by IOM for the Dutch government in third countries have been 
MIDA Ghana (Migration for Development in Africa) and Temporary Return of Quali-
fied Nationals (TRQN). MIDA Ghana has been running since 2005, and aims to con-
tribute to the development of the Ghanaian healthcare sector. Ghanaians living in the 
Netherlands may return to Ghana for assignments lasting between two weeks and three 
months, during which they provide training to local healthcare professionals. Alterna-
tively, healthcare professionals in Ghana may travel to Europe to receive training. 
Travel costs are covered by funding from the Dutch government (IOM, 2010a). In 2009, 
there were 35 assignments (IOM, 2009b). TRQN has been implemented since 2006. 
The project aims to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Georgia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Highly-educated 
migrants from these countries carry out assignments lasting from a couple of weeks to a 
maximum of three months in their country of origin, much like MIDA Ghana. The as-
signments are based on the needs formulated by the institutions in the country of origin. 
In the first two years of the project (2006-2008), 160 assignments were completed 
(IOM, 2010b). Already in the policy memorandum on Dutch development cooperation 
2007-2011, the government emphasised the link between migration policy and devel-
opment cooperation (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007), and in 2008 a policy 
memorandum setting out Dutch migration and development policy was published (see 
section 5.5). 
 155 
5.3 The coordination of EU and migration-policy making in France, Austria and 
the Netherlands 
This section identifies the main governmental actors in each member state that could be 
involved in making the national decision on participation in the Mobility Partnerships. 
As external migration policy sits at the crossroads between migration policy and foreign 
policy, it is not only the ministry (or ministries) responsible for migration issues that are 
likely to be responsible for decision-making on the Mobility Partnership instrument, but 
also the ministry of foreign affairs. Coordination of national EU policy in general is also 
an inherently complex task (see Kassim et al., 2000). The EU “blurs the traditional 
distinction between foreign and domestic policy, and covers a range of different policy 
types” (p.7). Governments must decide whether to establish a central ministry for Euro-
pean affairs, responsible for taking national policy to Brussels, or whether to leave re-
sponsibility for EU policy in each policy area to the ministry responsible for that policy, 
or whether to establish some coordinating structure along with an EU unit in each min-
istry. The role of the Permanent Representations also varies between member states and 
between policy areas (van Keulen, 2006). This section shows that the three cases organ-
ise their EU and migration-policy making in rather different ways.  
5.3.1 France 
French coordination of EU policy is marked by a strong role for the Secretariat General 
for European Affairs (SGAE)56 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a weak role for 
the French parliament. The SGAE has always had a central role in the coordination of 
French positions within the EU. It is a service under the authority of the prime minister 
and is responsible for coordinating all aspects of French European policy-making (Szu-
kala, 2003, p.228). The SGAE hosts interministerial coordination meetings to arrive at 
the French position on matters of EU policy, and communicates instructions for discus-
sions in the Council to the Permanent Representation in Brussels (Menon, 2000). The 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has retained an important role in French EU policy 
through its control of the French Permanent Representation to the EU. The permanent 
representative and the deputy permanent representative of France to the EU always 
come from this ministry (Menon, 2001, p.76), and officials in the Permanent Represen-
tation play a significant role in the formulation of the instructions by the SGAE which 
constitute the French position on EU policies (p.83). 
In 1973, the Senate created a Delegation for European Affairs, and in 1979 the National 
Assembly followed suit. These committees have traditionally been considered ineffec-
tual and have been overlooked by French governments (Szukala, 2003, p.223; Ambler 
and Reichert, 2001, p.35; Menon, 2000, p.90). However, their position was significantly 
strengthened following a 1992 ruling of the Constitutional Council on the conformity of 
                                                          
56 In French: Secrétariat Général des Affaires Européennes. The SGAE replaced the Secretariat General of the 
Interministerial Committee for Questions of European Economic Cooperation (in French: Secrétariat Général 
du Comité Interministériel pour les question de coopération économique européenne; SGCI) in 2005. The 
SGCI was created already in 1948 (SGAE, n.d.). 
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the Maastricht Treaty with the French constitution. The Constitutional Council called 
into question certain treaty provisions, including those on a common EU visa policy, 
because they affected “the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty” 
(Szukala, 2003, p.223).57 As a result of this ruling, a new article 88(4) was included in 
the French constitution, which gives parliament the constitutional right to be informed 
about EU legislative proposals (p.224). However, it is not always clear which EU policy 
proposals constitute “matters for statute” – this has been a particularly contentious issue 
in the area of JHA (p.225). As Szukala (ibid., p.225) points out, “important EC deci-
sions may not touch the legislative domain at all while being incendiary in political 
terms”. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Decision-making on French EU policy. 
 
On migration policy, the most important governmental actors in France are the Ministry 
for Immigration and the comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration (CICI). In 
2007, the Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development 
was created and charged with managing policies on immigration, integration, and co-
development with countries of origin of migrants (European Migration Network, 2009d, 
p.3).58 The creation of this ministry had been an important manifesto pledge by the 
incoming president Nicolas Sarkozy, and should be understood in the context of a gen-
eral politicisation of the issue of immigration in French politics, particularly since 2002 
(Marthaler, 2008). In 2002, the far-right Front National won 18% of the vote in the first 
round of the presidential election, before being defeated by Jacques Chirac in the second 
round. The success of the far-right had an important impact on Chirac’s second term in 
                                                          
57 The Constitutional Council reached the same conclusion regarding the Amsterdam Treaty, partly due to the 
extension of qualified majority voting to the issue of asylum (Szukala, 2003, p.239). 
58 In 2010, the competence for migration policy was transferred to the Ministry of Interior. Within this minis-
try, a General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration was created (European Migration Network, 2011b, 
pp.5-6). This chapter refers to the Ministry of Immigration as this was still in existence during the time-frame 
concerned (up to 2009). 
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office: “The outcome of the 2002 presidential election indicated that the immigration 
policy of both the centre-left and centre-right was perceived by key sections of the elec-
torate as being too lax, and addressing this issue became a major focus of Chirac’s sec-
ond presidency” (p.387). In this context, Sarkozy was appointed minister of interior, 
and he presided over a rightward shift in policy and discourse on immigration by the 
French government (ibid.). 
 Other ministries also play a role in migration policy. The Ministry of Interior re-
tained competence over border control and the enforcement of removal measures for 
illegal migrants (European Migration Network, 2010f, p.5). The Ministry of Labour 
must approve the issuance of residence permits (European Migration Network, 2011c). 
Until 2007, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons was 
under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (European Migration Network, 
2009h, p.8). However, the Ministry of Immigration has played the leading role in the 
area of migration and development, often at the expense of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Assemblée Nationale, 2009, p.33). The two ministries share the responsibility 
for representing France in the EU’s HLWG (Interview 32; 33), but on the issue of Mo-
bility Partnerships the Ministry of Immigration took the lead and represented the French 
position (Interview 32). 
 These other ministries are represented in the CICI, which was created in 2005. The 
CICI is responsible for setting the overall direction of government policy on migration 
and asylum (European Migration Network, 2011b, p.5). The CICI is chaired by the 
prime minister, and includes (representatives of) the ministers of immigration, interior, 
social affairs, defence, justice, foreign affairs, education, economics and finance, and 
overseas France.59 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Decision-making on French migration policy. 
                                                          
59 Décret n°2005-544 du 26 mai 2005 instituant un comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration. 
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5.3.2 Austria 
Austria is traditionally thought of as a corporatist state, with the main interest groups 
having an important influence on policy-making (European Migration Network, 2010c). 
The Austrian model is based on “a pact between parties, chambers, employers and trade 
unions called the ‘social partnership’” (Höll et al., 2003, p.337). This social partnership 
consists of the Federal Chamber of Labour, the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, 
the Presidential Conference of Chambers of Agriculture, the Austrian Chamber of Busi-
ness, and interest groups (Falkner, 2001; Gächter, 2008; Höll et al., 2003).60 The social 
partners and the state together shape public policies; indeed, draft legislation is often 
negotiated between the social partners and the relevant ministry, and merely rubber-
stamped by the Austrian Parliament (Falkner, 2001). The social partners have also tradi-
tionally been influential in the formulation and implementation of Austrian migration 
policy specifically (Gächter, 2008, p.3). 
 EU membership has, however, caused some significant changes in the Austrian 
political landscape (Falkner et al., 1999; Müller, 2000). Leading ministries have gained 
influence in the policy-making process, at the expense of interest groups, the Parlia-
ment, and the Länder. EU membership has therefore made a great difference in terms of 
“who formally decides what Austria wants” (Falkner et al., 1999, p.499). Proposals for 
domestic legislation must be approved by all cabinet ministers unanimously, must gain 
majority support in Parliament, and must be presented to the interest groups that have 
chamber status. In contrast, “position-taking in EU bodies is left to individual cabinet 
members or civil servants accountable to them” (ibid.). The responsible ministry on an 
issue usually coordinates with officials of other affected ministries before taking a deci-
sion on the Austrian position in the Council, but the powers of ministers and ministries 
in policy-making have nevertheless been greatly increased by EU membership (Luif, 
1998). One reason for this shift has been the time pressure involved when taking a posi-
tion on EU matters: the “traditional, sometimes sluggish consultations among the ‘social 
partnership’ institutions” are not conducive to allowing efficient Austrian participation 
in EU policy-making (Höll et al., 2003, p.340). The time pressure also makes it difficult 
for the individual groups in the policy-making process, for instance the Länder, “to 
articulate a joint position [on EU matters] in time” (Falkner et al., 1999, p.502). The 
Austrian constitution gives the Parliament, in theory, an important role in EU policy-
making (Falkner, 2001; Müller, 2000). Positions of the Main Committee, for instance, 
are binding on the government. However, in practice the Parliament is not able to deal 
with the inordinate amount of information coming from Brussels, and does not have the 
resources to verify this second-hand information (Höll et al., 2003, p.343). 
 
                                                          
60 In German: Bundesarbeitskammer; Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund; Präsidentenkonferenz der Land-
wirtschaftskammern; and Wirtschaftskammer Österreich. 
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Figure 5.3: Decision-making on Austrian EU policy. 
 
In terms of migration policy, responsibility is shared between the Austrian ministries of 
Interior; Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection; and Foreign Affairs (Euro-
pean Migration Network, 2010g). The Ministry of Interior has overall competence on 
migration policy, including on border control, visas and illegal migration. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs61 is involved in external migration policy due to its competence on 
development policy and relations with third countries. These two ministries share re-
sponsibility for representing Austria in the EU’s HLWG (Interview 24; 25). The Minis-
try of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection regulates access to the labour 
market.62 The Ministry of Interior therefore normally liaises with the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection on 
migration issues (Interview 25; 27). 
 
                                                          
61 The Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. 
62 Previously, access to the labour market was regulated by the Ministry for Economics and Labour. This 
competence was passed to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Consumer Protection in 2009, after which the 
ministry became known as the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection (European Migra-
tion Network, 2009f, p.14). 
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Figure 5.4: Decision-making on Austrian migration policy. 
5.3.3 The Netherlands 
Dutch EU policy is coordinated in the Hague; officials at the Permanent Representation 
in Brussels “act on instructions that are formulated domestically”, although they are not 
“passive recipients of these instructions” (Soetendorp and Andeweg, 2001, p.219). The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overall responsibility for ensuring a coherent Dutch 
national position on EU issues, although the sectoral ministries most concerned with an 
issue at hand are responsible for preparing the Dutch negotiating position (Soetendorp 
and Hanf, 1998, p.37). A central role is played by the working group Beoordeling 
Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen (BNC), an interministerial group established in 1989 and 
chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which examines legislative proposals put 
forward by the Commission (Soetendorp and Andeweg, 2001, p.220; Hoetjes, 2003, 
p.320). The BNC also decides which should be the lead ministry on any particular EU 
issue. In the case of migration policy, this is mostly the Ministry of Justice, except in 
cases where visa policy is concerned, as this falls under the competence of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (Interview 8). The official Dutch negotiating position is approved by 
the cabinet, based on discussions in the Coordination Committee for European Integra-
tion and Association Issues (Co-Co) (Soetendorp and Andeweg, 2001, p.222; Hoetjes, 
2003, p.322). The Dutch Parliament has traditionally had a rather limited role in Dutch 
EU policy. A standing committee for EC affairs was created in 1986, however the Par-
liament cannot determine the Dutch negotiating position in the EU, which is fixed by 
the cabinet (Soetendorp and Hanf, 1998, pp.42-43). 
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Figure 5.5: Decision-making on Dutch EU policy. 
 
In the Netherlands, responsibility for migration policy was, at the time of the decision-
making on the Mobility Partnerships, shared between the Ministry of Justice, the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.63 Until 
2011, the Ministry of Justice had overall responsibility for migration and asylum policy, 
including citizenship and border control. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for visa policy and migration and development policy, and the ministry’s migration 
department represents the Netherlands in the EU’s HLWG (Interview 8). The Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment regulates the access of foreign nationals to the Dutch 
labour market (European Migration Network, 2009i, p.14). The IND and the Repatria-
tion and Departure Service (DT&V) fall under the Ministry of Justice (p.17), also after 
2011 when responsibility for migration policy was transferred to the Ministry of Inte-
rior. Occasionally, other ministries may also play a role in migration policy: the Minis-
try of Economic Affairs, for instance, determines whether an essential Dutch economic 
interest is served by the admission of migrants taking up self-employment in the Nether-
lands (European Migration Network, 2009j, p.33). The Royal Constabulary, which 
carries out border controls, falls under the Ministry of Defence. Since 2007, the Minis-
try of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment has been responsible for integra-
tion policy (European Migration Network, 2009k, p.10). The Aliens Police, which en-
sures compliance with residence procedures and decides on applications for residence 
permits, belongs to the Ministry of the Interior (p.13). 
                                                          
63 In 2011 the responsibilities for migration policy previously held by the Ministry of Justice were transferred 
to the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations (European Migration Network, 2012b). 
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Figure 5.6: Decision-making on Dutch migration policy. 
 
 
 
This section has demonstrated that the three cases organise both their EU and migration-
policy making structures rather differently. France is the only of the cases that had (at 
the time that the decisions on the Mobility Partnerships were made) an independent 
ministry responsible solely for immigration; in both Austria and the Netherlands, re-
sponsibility for migration is shared between the ministries of interior/justice, foreign 
affairs, and social affairs. In both France and the Netherlands, the ministry of foreign 
affairs and a coordinating structure play an important role in EU policy; in France, the 
coordinating structure is the SGAE, whereas in the Netherlands the BNC working group 
and Co-Co discuss EU policy. In Austria, by contrast, EU policy is largely left to the 
sectoral ministry or ministries mainly responsible for the policy under discussion. In the 
area of EU external migration policy, the smoothest decision-making process can be 
expected in Austria: the ministry of interior has overall responsibility for migration 
policy, and is therefore the sectoral ministry responsible for the Austrian position on EU 
migration policy. In France and the Netherlands, some tension could be expected be-
tween the ministry of foreign affairs (which have competence on EU policy) and the 
ministries involved in setting national migration policy (particularly ministries of inte-
rior). 
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5.4 The member state level: Mobility Partnerships matching with national 
identity? 
Chapter 2 outlined two possible explanations for member states’ decisions to participate 
in EU external migration policy. The first was a constructivist explanation: member 
states will participate in EU external migration policy if this matches with a notion of 
‘national identity’ and the conception of the role that the member state ought to play in 
the world. In other words, participation is considered ‘appropriate’, but is not related to 
a rational calculation of means and ends. This section argues that such a national iden-
tity explanation best accounts for the decision by the French government to participate 
in all Mobility Partnerships. The Austrian and Dutch governments share similar beliefs 
about an appropriate division of competences between the EU and its member states on 
migration, and yet reached different decisions on the Mobility Partnerships. The ration-
alist cost-benefit explanation is therefore better able to account for the domestic prefer-
ences in these two cases. 
 
Historically, France has had a national role conception of itself as a ‘leader’ in the EU 
(van Keulen, 2006). Along with the Commission (as the institution initiating EU poli-
cies), the ‘Franco-German tandem’ has often been ascribed a pivotal role in EU policy-
making (e.g. Metcalfe, 1998, p.414; Ambler and Reichert, 2001, p.54). During the 
1990s, defending this status as a significant player in the EU was one of the central 
preferences of the French government (Szukala, 2003). Suzkala argues that there is a 
European rhetoric being espoused by the French political elite that “emphasises the 
growing importance of a genuine French contribution to the European project” (p.220). 
The issue of the EU is a “major part of the national political game” (p.221) and there is 
agreement amongst the political elite that France should aim to preserve its “rank and 
influence among its European partners” (ibid.). 
 In the area of external migration policy, the French government sees a role for 
France as a pioneer in new policy solutions (Interview 16). The government states that 
“France has without a doubt been one of the host countries that has most ‘systematised’ 
the concrete application of the global approach [to migration] within the framework of 
bilateral agreements concluded with countries of origin” (European Migration Network, 
2010f, p.48). The French National Contact Point for the European Migration Network 
describes the French bilateral agreements on the concerted management of migratory 
flows as not only an instrument of French migration policy, but “an international 
benchmark” (European Migration Network, 2009d, p.8). The French Parliament has in 
the past pointed out that France has pioneered certain policy tools for migrants’ remit-
tances, at a time when countries such as Germany, the UK and Spain were still only 
exploring how to reduce the cost of sending remittances (Assemblée Nationale, 2009, 
p.20). French bilateral migration agreements can be seen as paving the way for the EU 
Mobility Partnerships (Interview 34; see also section 5.5). 
 In the context of the Mobility Partnerships, the fact that France was to hold the 
rotating presidency of the Council in the second half of 2008 was significant. The rotat-
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ing Council presidency is “without doubt an important arrangement in the governance 
of the European Union . . . [The presidency] performs several noteworthy functions” 
such as administrative tasks in preparation for Council meetings, setting political priori-
ties, mediating between other member states, and representing the Council externally 
(Thomson, 2008, pp.593-594). Despite the fact that academic contributions have been 
generally pessimistic about the influence wielded by the president of the Council, Tall-
berg finds that the role “provides each occupant with certain agenda-setting instruments, 
beyond what is available to ‘normal’ member states” (2003, p.6). Metcalfe (1998, 
p.414) concurs: “on a day-to-day basis, [the presidency] plays a major leadership role in 
EU policy making and holds a position of special prominence in the context of Council 
negotiations”. The presidency has important political responsibility for the smooth run-
ning of the policy-making process in the Council (p.416). Member states clearly per-
ceive the role of the president as being important, as evidenced by the debate surround-
ing the reform of this institutional arrangement during the constitutional convention 
(Thomson, 2008, p.595). It is also considered important that a member state has “some-
thing to show” for their time holding the presidency (Interview 22), for instance Council 
conclusions on a favoured national initiative or policy area. 
 Migration was certainly a focal point of the French presidency in 2008. In particu-
lar, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was concluded during this period 
and the JAIEX Council working group was created. The European Pact on Immigration 
and Asylum builds on the GAM and aims to “give a new impetus to the definition of a 
common immigration and asylum policy that will take account of both the collective 
interest of the European Union and the specific needs of each Member State” (Council, 
2008l, p.4). The pact is based on five main commitments: to organise legal immigration 
according to the priorities and needs of the member states and encourage integration; to 
control illegal immigration through return measures; to improve the effectiveness of 
border controls; to construct a Europe of asylum; and to encourage the synergy between 
migration policy and development policy through a partnership with countries of origin 
and transit (ibid.). The French Ministry of Interior makes clear that the pact was a 
French initiative (French Ministry of Interior, n.d.) and the French government sees the 
conclusion of the Pact as an “undeniable success” of the French presidency of the EU 
(European Migration Network, 2009h, p.40). The French presidency also presided over 
the creation of the JAIEX Council working group. In September 2008, the French gov-
ernment proposed the creation of a ‘Friends of the Presidency Group’ to discuss the 
linkages between external relations and JHA issues (Council, 2008i). Three meetings 
were held during the time of the French Presidency, which were attended by all member 
states, as well as the Commission, Frontex, Eurojust and Europol (Council, 2008j). One 
of the results of the group’s deliberations was the proposal to create an Ad Hoc Support 
Group concerning the external dimension of JHA questions, which would “facilitate the 
exchange of information and contribute towards more strategic and horizontal reflec-
tions in that area” (Council, 2008k, p.2). Although the term of office of JAIEX (as the 
ad hoc group came to be known) was originally intended to end in 2009, this working 
party was made permanent by a decision of Coreper (Council, 2009c). 
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At the time that the decision was to be made on the Mobility Partnerships, therefore, 
three notions of French leadership came together: the general idea that it is appropriate 
for France to play an important role within the EU, a role conception for France as a 
pioneer in the area of external migration policy, and the specific instance of the upcom-
ing French leadership through holding the presidency of the Council. As one inter-
viewee put it, in the case of the Mobility Partnerships there was simply “no question of 
participating or not” (Interview 32). Supporting this new policy instrument was an 
automatic decision because of the upcoming presidency (Interview 16; 32; 33), not a 
result of a decision about the means required to reach pre-defined ends. 
 Participation in the Mobility Partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde, which 
were being negotiated during the run-up to the presidency, was therefore unrelated to 
achieving certain objectives, and simply an appropriate action for the French govern-
ment. The choice of whether or not to participate was so constrained by ideas about the 
French role in the EU and in external migration policy that is was scarcely a choice at 
all (cf. Fearon and Wendt, 2002, p.60). Indeed, Moldova and Cape Verde are not prior-
ity countries for French foreign or migration policy. In terms of migration cooperation, 
the French government aims to establish migration agreements with countries in Africa, 
the Caribbean, South America and Asia (République Française, 2007); in other words, 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are not priority regions. There was no strategic inter-
est in participating in the Mobility Partnership with Moldova (Interview 35); the French 
government, at a loss of projects to propose for the text of the agreement, decided at the 
last minute to simply support the work of a French NGO which assists victims of traf-
ficking with reintegration in their country of origin (Interview 32). In terms of foreign 
policy more generally, Cape Verde is not the focal point for France in West Africa: 
Senegal and Mali are more important partners. Whereas Senegal receives around €100 
million in French development aid each year, Cape Verde receives only €8 million 
(Interview 31). Table 5.1 shows the number of migrants present in France in 2005 from 
the top 5 countries of origin and, for comparison, the numbers of Moldovan, Cape Ver-
dean and Georgian migrants present in the same year. These first three Mobility Part-
nership countries are clearly not major sources of immigration in France. 
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Table 5.1: Number of migrants present in France in 2005 (source: Eurostat).64 
Country of origin Number of migrants 
Algeria 477,495 
Morocco 461,465 
Turkey 220,750 
Tunisia 146,514 
China 64,211 
Cape Verde 13,246 
Georgia 4,607 
Moldova 3,139 
 
 
In contrast to the case of France, the ‘appropriateness’ or ‘inappropriateness’ of the 
Mobility Partnership instrument is not the most suitable explanation of the Austrian or 
Dutch governments’ decisions on participation. Certainly both governments see it as 
inappropriate for the EU to control the admission of migrants to their territories. Both 
were satisfied that the Mobility Partnerships would not overstep the bounds of an ap-
propriate division of competences between the EU and its member states: the Austrian 
government allowed the Mobility Partnership instrument to be established and used 
because participation by member states would be voluntary. The Dutch government 
judged that the Mobility Partnerships would not adversely affect the ability of member 
states to determine their labour market policy. These two governments therefore shared 
some perceptions about the appropriateness of the Mobility Partnerships, but neverthe-
less made different decisions on participation. These different decisions are better ex-
plained by a cost-benefit analysis. The Austrian government believes that it is generally 
inappropriate for the EU to act on immigration and labour market policy, and saw spe-
cific costs associated with the Mobility Partnership instrument. The Dutch government 
eventually decided that the benefits of joining the Mobility Partnerships outweighed the 
costs. The remainder of this section outlines briefly the hesitations of these two coun-
tries concerning the issue of EU competence; section 5.5 then explores the cost-benefit 
analysis made by the two governments. 
 
The Austrian government has frequently emphasised that immigration should remain a 
matter of national competence – it is not seen as appropriate for the EU to act in this 
policy area. The Austrian public is less supportive than the EU-27 average of a common 
EU immigration policy: only 68% of Austrian respondents favour a common policy, 
compared with an EU-27 average of 74% (Eurobarometer, 2008b, p.132).65 In 2000, the 
Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel voiced his opposition to the use of qualified majority 
voting at the EU level for matters of migration and asylum, stating that these were is-
                                                          
64 Eurostat data for 2005 (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database, re-
trieved 2 May 2012). Data for 2005 is the most recent available. 
65 The same Eurobaromter poll shows that 74% of French respondents and 83% of Dutch respondents favour a 
common EU immigration policy. 
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sues to be determined by member states (Pollak and Puntscher-Riekmann, 2002, p.77). 
In the negotiations on EU directives on intra-corporate transferees and seasonal work-
ers, for instance, the Austrian government has voiced general reservations related to the 
principle of subsidiarity (Council, 2011d; 2011e). There is a suspicion amongst some 
Austrian government officials that the European Commission is continuously attempt-
ing to expand its powers in the area of migration at the expense of member states’ com-
petences (Interview 26). Indeed, the Austrian government sent a letter to DG JLS accus-
ing the Commission of wanting to use the Mobility Partnerships to undermine member 
state competence over labour migration policy (Interview 21). This position has also 
been expressed by the standing subcommittee of the Austrian Parliament on EU matters, 
for instance in terms of the Commission’s proposals to approximate rights of third coun-
try nationals in the EU to those of EU citizens: “Einen Eingriff in national Kompetenzen 
sehen die Abgeordneten auch in den Überlegungen der Kommission, einen einheitlichen 
Rechtsstatus für illegale Einwanderer zu schaffen, der vergleichbar mit jenem der EU-
BürgerInnen ist” (Austrian Parliament, 2009, p.3). The Austrian strategy paper on EU 
migration policy drafted in 1998 therefore emphasised that participation in EU measures 
on migration should remain voluntary for member states (Council, 1998a). In the inter-
nal EU discussions on the concept of Mobility Partnerships, Austria emphasised that 
participation by member states in these partnerships should be on a voluntary basis 
(Interview 25). In its 2007 report on security, the Austrian Ministry of Interior ex-
pressed satisfaction with the internal EU negotiations on Mobility Partnerships because 
the voluntary basis had been guaranteed: “Im Laufe der Verhandlungen konnte Öster-
reich seine Vorstellungen erfolgreich einbringen, dass eine Teilnahme an Mobilitäts-
partnerschaften auf freiwilliger Teilnahme beruht, nationale Kompetenzen und die Be-
achtung der Gemeinschaftspräferenz gewährt bleiben sowie die Bekämpfung illegaler 
Migration als Verpflichtung der Partnerländer festgeschrieben wird” (Austrian Ministry 
of Interior, 2007, p.395). This voluntary basis explains the acceptance by the Austrian 
government to allow the Mobility Partnership instrument to be established and used. 
However, Austrian officials have since complained about the proposal of visa facilita-
tion and readmission agreements within the framework of Mobility Partnerships, be-
cause these EU-wide agreements are binding also on Austria despite its non-
participation in the partnerships (Interview 22; 25; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2008e). 
 
The Dutch government also argues that member states should remain responsible for 
deciding which migrants are admitted to their territory (Interview 3), but is more nu-
anced in its view than the Austrian government: the fiche prepared by the BNC working 
group on the Mobility Partnerships acknowledges that the EU has competences in im-
migration policy, but emphasises that labour market policy, and thus labour migration, 
is a member state competence (BNC, 2007). Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
determined that the name ‘Mobility Partnerships’ is actually misleading because mem-
ber states are free to decide whether or not to offer legal migration opportunities to 
partnership countries (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008d). Indeed, the Commis-
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sion communication on Mobility Partnerships clearly states that “mechanisms to facili-
tate economic migration should be based on the labour needs of interested Member 
States, as assessed by them” (Commission, 2007a, p.5). In December 2007, the secre-
tary of state for justice defended to the parliamentary committees for justice and interior 
the view of the government that Mobility Partnerships will not affect member states’ 
ability to determine their labour market policy (Tweede Kamer, 2008a, p.7).  
 
Table 5.2 summarises this section and shows which elements of the Mobility Partner-
ships were considered appropriate or inappropriate by each of the member states. This 
does not, however, tell the whole story of domestic preference formation on the partner-
ships, particularly for the Austrian and Dutch preferences: both had concerns about EU 
competence, and both ultimately judged that the Mobility Partnerships did not overstep 
the boundaries of an appropriate division of competences between the EU and its mem-
ber states. Nevertheless, they reached different domestic preferences. The following 
section explains these different preferences in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Table 5.2: Application of the national identity explanation to the case studies. 
Member state Appropriate Inappropriate 
France Opportunity for France to play leadership 
role (holding Presidency) 
Mobility Partnerships modelled on French
bilateral migration agreements 
 
Austria Voluntary basis EU competence on immigration 
The Netherlands Member states maintain competence on 
labour market 
EU competence on labour migration 
 
5.5 The member state level: costs and benefits of participation in the Mobility 
Partnerships 
The second explanation for member states’ decisions to participate in EU external mi-
gration policy is a rationalist one: member states assess participation in terms of the 
expected costs and benefits. If the benefits outweigh the costs, the member state will 
choose participation. This explanation is therefore very much of a ‘means-end’ type. 
Whilst such an explanation could plausibly account for the French decision-making on 
the Mobility Partnerships, this section argues that the national identity explanation is the 
‘prior’ one for the French case. However, the cost-benefit explanation can better ac-
count for the preferences of the Austrian and Dutch governments than the national iden-
tity explanation. 
 
The French decision to participate in the Mobility Partnerships could be accounted for 
by a desire to reproduce at the EU level policy solutions that the government imple-
ments at the national level, and therefore achieve a ‘politics of scale’ in terms of na-
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tional migration policy objectives. French policy emphasises the importance of coopera-
tion with third countries on migration issues (Interview 32; 35). The French bilateral 
migration agreements “aspire to compatibility with EU migration policy” (Panizzon, 
2012, p.107). The Mobility Partnerships are similar to these bilateral agreements (Inter-
view 35). The French government “would like to share this vision with other countries 
and organisations active in the ‘development and migration’ field” (European Migration 
Network, 2010f, p.48). Indeed, in 2007 the government stated the aim of generalising 
these types of agreements (République Française, 2007). Participation in EU Mobility 
Partnerships contributed to this aim, by providing “on a platter” new bilateral migration 
agreements (Interview 32). The partnerships offer the opportunity for France to 
strengthen existing cooperation with traditional partner countries or establish new coop-
eration with countries that are not traditional partners for France.66 In the case of Geor-
gia, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy was playing an important role during the 
2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia, which occurred during the French presi-
dency. It could therefore be beneficial for France to show political support for the Geor-
gian government in any way possible, including by participating in a Mobility Partner-
ship. There is an important Armenian diaspora in France, and a desire to involve this 
group in development efforts in their country of origin could explain French participa-
tion in that Mobility Partnership. Ambler and Reichert (2001) argue that French gov-
ernments have consistently proven themselves willing to “use the European project to 
achieve goals in the domestic arena” (p.54). In the area of foreign policy, for example, 
the French government has viewed EU action as “a necessary extension of French pol-
icy, not a constraint upon its sovereign decisions” (Balme and Woll, 2005, p.105). 
 The French government sees the Mobility Partnerships as being inspired by French 
bilateral migration agreements (Interview 16; 35).67 Indeed, the French agreements 
cover the same elements – legal migration, illegal migration, and development – as the 
EU’s GAM. The first of these agreements was signed with Senegal in 2006 (European 
Migration Network, 2009d, p.8) – in other words, during the same time that the Com-
mission was formulating its proposal for EU Mobility Partnerships (Interview 35). 
Chapter 4 also outlined the significance of the Franco-German proposal for a ‘new Eu-
ropean migration policy’ as a source of inspiration for the concept of Mobility Partner-
ships (Angenendt, 2007; Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2009). This proposal set out 
the idea of using circular migration schemes to reduce illegal immigration to the EU and 
the importance of signing cooperation agreements with third countries on migration 
issues (Schäuble and Sarkozy, 2006). In advance of the French presidency of the EU in 
2008, the government announced its intention to consult with the Commission and other 
member states on migration and development issues, so that the French approach would 
not ‘remain isolated in Europe’ (République Française, 2007). Participating in EU Mo-
bility Partnerships would therefore allow the French government to achieve a ‘politics 
                                                          
66 Personal communication, official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, 15 February 2011 
67 There is, however, an important difference between Mobility Partnerships and the French bilateral migra-
tion agreements, namely that the French agreements are legal agreements, whereas the Mobility Partnerships 
are political declarations (Interview 35). 
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of scale’ in terms of its own migration policy objectives because it could take part in 
agreements at the EU level that mirrored its own bilateral migration agreements. 
 In reality, however, a political decision was made early in the discussions on Mo-
bility Partnerships that France would participate in every partnership in the future, re-
gardless of the partner country (Interview 32). Participation in a Mobility Partnership is 
therefore not considered by the French government in terms of the costs or benefits 
involved in the specific case; rather, participation is a foregone conclusion, based on a 
decision made in the context of the French Council presidency in 2008. Indeed, the 
French government was not convinced that a Mobility Partnership should be offered to 
Senegal, knowing that negotiations would likely be difficult. Nevertheless, had the 
partnership been successfully concluded, France would have taken part (Interview 32; 
33). 
 
In contrast to the French government, the Austrian and Dutch governments based their 
decisions on the Mobility Partnerships on an assessment of the consequences of partici-
pation – in other words, on means-end logic. The Austrian decision not to participate in 
the Mobility Partnerships is in several respects quite surprising. On the surface, it does 
not appear that there would be significant costs to the Austrian government of participa-
tion. The Mobility Partnerships are quite compatible with national migration policy 
objectives and practice. Section 5.2 outlined the Austrian external migration policy, 
which includes projects that could very well be integrated into a Mobility Partnership. 
The Austrian government has, for instance, implemented assisted voluntary return pro-
grammes in Moldova. Such voluntary return and reintegration schemes have also been 
included in the Mobility Partnership with Moldova (Council, 2008b, p.12). The infor-
mation campaigns on the dangers of illegal migration to Austria operated by the Minis-
try of Interior could easily be included in a Mobility Partnership (Commission, 2007a, 
p.4). The strategy paper drawn up by the Austrian government in 1998 on EU migration 
policy links facilitated border crossings with guarantees by third countries on readmis-
sion, in much the same way as the Mobility Partnerships link legal migration opportuni-
ties to cooperation by third countries on illegal migration. 
 Despite its conviction that migration policy is a member state competence, con-
ducting some aspects of migration policy at the EU level has been emphasised by the 
Austrian government as a key national objective. The 2008 report on internal security 
by the Ministry of Interior points out that Austria is one of the most engaged member 
states in operational cooperation within the framework of Frontex (Austrian Ministry of 
Interior, 2008, p.230). The 2008-2013 coalition agreement expresses support for the 
negotiation of further EU readmission agreements (Republik Österreich, 2008, p.111; 
European Migration Network, 2009f, p.13). In some cases, the Austrian government 
believes that an EU-wide readmission agreement can “exercise pressure more efficiently 
than bilateral agreements” (Council, 1999b, p.5). The 1998 strategy paper by the Aus-
trian presidency emphasised the importance of developing a common EU migration 
policy (Council, 1998a). 
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Finally, potential partner countries for Mobility Partnerships would come from regions 
that are also important to Austria in terms of migration. In 2007, the Austrian Ministry 
of Interior expressed satisfaction that the EU’s GAM had been extended to incorporate 
regions to the east and south-east of the EU: “Damit wurde dem Umstand Rechnung 
getragen, dass illegale Migration nach Europa in erheblichem Maß über östliche und 
südöstliche Schleusungsrouten stattfindet” (Austrian Ministry of Interior, 2007, p.395). 
The Austrian Ministry of Interior emphasises the value for Austrian internal security of 
cooperation at the EU level on JHA when this cooperation is aimed at third countries 
that are also important for Austria (Austrian Ministry of Interior, n.d.). In 2007, Moldo-
van citizens were one of the main groups of migrants apprehended for being illegally 
present in Austria (European Migration Network, 2009g, p.20). Given that cooperation 
on illegal migration is a central component of a Mobility Partnership (Commission, 
2007a), Austria would seem to have an interest in participating in a Mobility Partner-
ship with Moldova. 
 Despite the Mobility Partnerships seemingly being an opportunity for Austria to 
pursue and strengthen its national policy solutions at the EU level, the Austrian gov-
ernment decided not to participate in the partnerships, regardless of the partner country 
concerned. The central reason for this decision was a contradiction between the Mobil-
ity Partnerships and national policy. In particular, the Mobility Partnerships were seen 
as a repeat of the Austrian experience with Gastarbeiter programmes, which led to sig-
nificant and permanent immigration to Austria. The potential costs, in terms of in-
creased immigration to Austria, associated with participation in the Mobility Partner-
ships were therefore considered too high by the government. 
 Austria has a long history of immigration: already in 1934, as a result of migration 
from east to west that had taken place within the Habsburg Empire, 12% of the popula-
tion of Austria was born in another country (Gächter, 2008, p.1). However, it is particu-
larly the experience with the Gastarbeiter programmes that are fresh in the minds of 
Austrian policy-makers. The migration which was supposed, in the 1960s, to be tempo-
rary, turned out to be very much of a permanent nature due to continued family reunifi-
cation. 
 In the Mobility Partnerships, the Austrian government saw a potential repeat of the 
Gastarbeiter programmes: increased mobility, intended to be circular, would lead to 
permanent immigration (Interview 22; 25; 26). The Commission communication on 
Mobility Partnerships clearly states as an objective that “Mobility partnerships will 
facilitate the migration of nationals of the third country to interested EU Member 
States” (Commission, 2007a, p.5). Schemes for circular migration could be included in 
a Mobility Partnership in order to “help mitigate brain drain” (p.7). It was particularly 
the connection to circular migration which was problematic (Interview 22; 25) because 
this is in direct opposition to the stated migration policy of the Austrian government, 
namely that it does not operate programmes for circular migration (European Migration 
Network, 2010d, p.23).68 The government feared that permanent immigration would 
                                                          
68 Jandl and Kraler (2003) argue that the refusal of Austrian policy-makers to acknowledge that Austria is a 
country of immigration has led to conflicting policies on migration: labour migration and family reunification 
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result from such circular migration schemes: in 2009, the interior minister Maria Fekter 
likened the Mobility Partnerships to an “Einbahnstraße für die Zuwanderung nach Eu-
ropa” (Austrian Parliament, 2009, p.3). There is a direct contradiction between this view 
of the Mobility Partnerships and Austrian migration policy which essentially aims to 
limit the numbers of migrants moving permanently to Austria. The Austrian priorities 
on EU migration policy are preventing illegal migration, promoting integration of exist-
ing immigrants rather than encouraging new immigration, and allowing legal migration 
only in so far as it is necessary and acceptable from a labour market and internal secu-
rity perspective (Austrian Ministry of Interior, 2007, p.396). Officials felt that there was 
not enough emphasis in the concept of Mobility Partnerships on preventing illegal mi-
gration (Interview 25). 
 In 1991, Austria became the first European country to base its immigration policy 
on a quota system, according to which foreign workers could constitute a maximum of 
8% of the workforce. This quota for work permits is still in place. In addition, work 
permits for migrants are subject to a labour market test: a work permit will only be 
issued if there is no suitable unemployed Austrian citizen to fill the vacancy (European 
Migration Network, 2010c, p.63). The 1993 Residence Act also established a cap on the 
number of residence permits which could be issued in any one year (p.31; Currle et al., 
2004, p.239). By 2007, the quota for first residence permits was set by the Ministry of 
Interior at 6,500 persons (European Migration Network, 2010c, p.50). Instead of en-
couraging new immigration, the Austrian priority has, since the passing of the Aliens 
Act in 1997, been the integration of those migrants already present in Austria; in other 
words, ‘integration before immigration’ (Jandl and Kraler, 2003; European Migration 
Network, 2007). The 2007-2010 coalition programme stated this objective clearly: 
“Primär gilt Integration der in Österreich lebenden Fremden; ungeregelte Zuwanderung 
ist zu stoppen . . . Integration steht ganz klar vor Neuzuzug” (Bundeskanzleramt, 2007, 
pp.138-139). Interior minister Maria Fekter reiterated this policy again to the Austrian 
Parliament in 2009: “Integration hat Vorrang vor Neuzuzug” (Austrian Parliament, 
2009, p.3). The aim of Mobility Partnerships to increase mobility of third country na-
tionals to participating EU member states did not fit with these national policy objec-
tives. The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, for instance, 
was concerned that a Mobility Partnership would force Austria to abandon its system of 
labour market testing for work permits (Interview 26). 
 Immigration has also become a highly politicised issue in Austria and is one of the 
most debated topics in Austrian media (European Migration Network, 2010d, p.8; In-
terview 24; 26). This is exemplified by the electoral success of the far-right Freedom 
Party (FPÖ), which, at the height of its success, became the second biggest political 
                                                                                                                                              
programmes have been limited, whilst at the same large numbers of temporary seasonal workers have been 
admitted. Indeed, in 1993 a new programme similar to the Gastarbeiter programmes of the 1960s was intro-
duced. It set a quota for the number of seasonal workers permitted entry to Austria during the summer and 
winter seasons, which, since 2003, has resulted in approximately 8,000 seasonal permits being issued each 
year (Gächter, 2008, p.12). In 2002 amendments were made to this law which further facilitated temporary 
migration by allowing allowed seasonal employment in sectors other than agriculture and tourism (European 
Migration Network, 2010c, p.33; Currle et al., 2004, p.269). 
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party in the 1999 elections. This electoral success has resulted in more restrictive immi-
gration policies being adopted in Austria (Zaslove, 2004). Immigration is one of the 
three issues that concerns Austrians the most, with 26% citing it as the most important 
issue facing Austria (Eurobarometer, 2008b, p.25).69 This is much higher than the aver-
age for respondents across the EU27, which was 15%. Only 14% of French respondents 
and 15% of Dutch respondents rated immigration as one of the most important issues 
facing their country in 2007. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, both the SPÖ and the 
ÖVP lost vote share to the right-wing parties, the FPÖ and the BZÖ (European Migra-
tion Network, 2009f, p.10). The public discourse surrounding migration is primarily 
concerned with illegal immigration to Austria and unjustified asylum claims being sub-
mitted (European Migration Network, 2005b, p.49). Increased immigration resulting 
from a Mobility Partnership would therefore be ‘difficult to sell’ to the public, particu-
larly given the increased immigration likely to result from opening the borders to the 
new EU member states (Interview 27). Indeed, even before the end of the transition 
periods for free movement for nationals from the new member states, the number of 
migrants from these countries present in Austria has increased significantly (see figure 
5.7). 
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Figure 5.7: Immigrants from the new member states in Austria (source: Eurostat).70 
                                                          
69 Data is from autumn 2007. This Eurobarometer report has been selected because member states were mak-
ing their decisions on whether or not to participate in Mobility Partnerships at this time.  
70 Eurostat data (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database, retrieved 27 
April 2012) for immigrants from Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
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The case of the Netherlands is an interesting one, entailing as it does a specific change 
in preferences. The Dutch government was rather ambivalent about the Mobility Part-
nerships at the outset because it was not certain about the costs or benefits that could be 
expected from this instrument. The fiche on the Mobility Partnerships prepared by the 
BNC working group in September 2007 emphasised that the form and content of these 
partnerships is not yet clear. These issues must first be defined before it would be possi-
ble to determine if the partnerships will bring any added value (BNC, 2007, p.3) – in 
other words, before the potential benefits of participation could be determined. Signifi-
cantly, despite this ambivalence, the fiche does not propose any opposition to the Mo-
bility Partnership instrument. The government later decided that the benefits of partici-
pation did indeed outweigh the costs, and joined the Mobility Partnerships with Cape 
Verde and Georgia. 
 At the time that Mobility Partnerships were being discussed at the EU level, a dis-
cussion on linking migration policy and development policy was still ongoing at the 
Dutch national level. The Dutch government did not want to commit to participating in 
the Mobility Partnership instrument before the national policy on migration and devel-
opment had been clarified (Interview 3). Only once the national policy had been clari-
fied would it be clear what the costs and benefits of participating in the Mobility Part-
nership instrument would be. However, despite the fact that the national policy on mi-
gration and development was still being developed, the Dutch government (like the 
Austrian) was implementing measures which would be perfectly compatible with the 
EU-level approach of cooperating with third countries on migration issues. These meas-
ures include capacity-building projects to train third countries’ border guards, and tem-
porary return programmes (see section 5.2.3).  
 Despite the uncertainty over the national migration and development policy, the 
Dutch government already saw potential costs associated with the Mobility Partnership 
instrument. In particular, the government was concerned about the emphasis on legal 
migration in the Mobility Partnerships. Dutch government policy aims at preventing 
large-scale immigration of low-skilled migrants (European Migration Network, 2010i, 
p.6). In general, foreign nationals are only granted a work permit in the Netherlands “if 
there is insufficient supply from workers from the Netherlands and the EEA countries” 
(p.29). Since the publication of a policy memorandum in 2006 entitled ‘Towards a 
Modern Migration Policy’, the focus of Dutch labour migration policy has been to en-
sure that migrants that are needed in the Netherlands are admitted quickly (Dutch Min-
istry of Justice, 2006). In particular, this implies an emphasis on attracting highly-
skilled migrants to the Netherlands. The new government, elected during 2007, under-
took measures in support of this aim, such as increasing the length of time that foreign 
students may remain in the Netherlands after finishing their studies to look for work 
(European Migration Network, 2009i, p.32). In 2008, the government established a new 
scheme for highly-educated migrants, which would allow for 500 permits a year to be 
issued to give these migrants the opportunity to find highly-qualified employment or 
start a business in the Netherlands (European Migration Network, 2009j, p.32). 
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Nevertheless, migration remains an ‘explosive’ political subject (Interview 19). Since 
the 1990s, immigration, asylum and integration have been highly politicised issues in 
the public and media discourses in the Netherlands (Wal, 2007). In 2007 (the time that 
the initial decision on participation in the Mobility Partnerships was made), there was 
particular media attention for the views of the right-wing populist party, the Partij voor 
de Vrijheid (Freedom Party; PVV). The PVV seeks to limit immigration to the Nether-
lands of non-Western foreigners, and emphasises cultural assimilation of those foreign-
ers already present in the Netherlands (European Migration Network, 2009i, p.21). Due 
to this political climate, the government needs to ‘show results’ in the area of migration 
control (Interview 5). Dutch immigration policy therefore remains rather restrictive. 
Although the immigration of highly-skilled migrants should be facilitated, employers 
will still have to prove a labour shortage before recruiting middle- or low-skilled mi-
grants from outside of the EU (Dutch Ministry of Justice, 2006, p.7). The government 
emphasises migration control (Interview 6; 11), and “attaches great importance to main-
taining a selective and restrictive admissions policy, based on an effective control and 
return policy” (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice, 2008, p.4). 
Indeed, only countries that cooperate on return issues should be considered for migra-
tion and development measures (p.44). An effective return policy was emphasised in the 
2007 coalition agreement (Rijksoverheid, 2007). For these reasons, the government was 
very clear that legal migration opportunities could not be offered as part of the Mobility 
Partnerships. The fiche by the BNC emphasised that the Netherlands should continue to 
follow its policy on admitting qualified migrants, as laid down in the 2006 policy mem-
orandum ‘Towards a Modern Migration Policy’ (BNC, 2007, p.3). The Mobility Part-
nerships clearly do not aim to facilitate the mobility only of highly-skilled migrants; 
rather, the focus is on matching job-seekers in the third countries concerned to vacan-
cies in the EU, and preventing brain drain by excluding from the partnerships sectors of 
the labour market that are under pressure in the third country (Commission, 2007a). 
Given the focus of the Dutch government on highly-skilled immigration, there was a 
potential contradiction between national and EU policy objectives in this case. 
 However, in late 2008 there was a change of policy. The Dutch government issued 
a note verbale on 12 November, indicating its desire to join the Mobility Partnership 
with Cape Verde that had been agreed in May 2008 (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2008b). When the Mobility Partnership with Georgia was agreed in 2009, the Nether-
lands was one of the signatories. This change in policy preference can be explained by a 
shifting perception of the costs and benefits associated with the Mobility Partnership 
instrument. Due to the clarification of the national policy on migration and develop-
ment, the establishment of a national circular migration pilot scheme, and a desire to 
play a role in defining this new EU policy instrument, the government decided that the 
benefits of participation outweighed the costs. There were specific benefits in terms of 
national migration and foreign policy objectives of joining the partnerships with Cape 
Verde and Georgia (see below), while the partnership with Moldova was not seen as 
being relevant to Dutch national policy objectives. 
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The Dutch policy on migration and development was established in July 2008 when the 
policy memorandum entitled ‘International Migration and Development’ was presented 
to Parliament (European Migration Network, 2010h, p.45). The policy on migration and 
development is based on six pillars: attention for the linkages between migration policy 
and development policy; capacity-building of third countries in the area of migration 
management; encouraging circular migration and brain gain; increased involvement of 
migrant organisations; strengthening the developmental effect of remittances; and sup-
port for sustainable return and reintegration (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Justice, 2008). A budget of €5 million per year would be made available 
from the development cooperation budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the 
newly defined migration and development priorities (p.12). Cooperation with third 
countries is seen as being crucial for a policy on migration and development (p.14) and 
the policy will focus on the 40 priority countries for Dutch development cooperation,71 
plus three countries selected specifically due to their migration situation.72 The three 
latter countries were added at the request of the Ministry of Justice (Interview 9). This 
list of 43 countries contains all the countries that had, by the end of 2009, signed Mobil-
ity Partnerships (Moldova, Cape Verde and Georgia), as well as the countries that 
signed Mobility Partnerships in 2011 and 2013 (Armenia and Morocco). Dutch gov-
ernment officials recognise that the national policy on migration and development is, to 
a large extent, complementary to the EU’s GAM (Interview 5). 
 One aspect of the new policy on migration and development was the introduction 
of a circular migration pilot scheme, in order to promote brain gain (Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice, 2008). Just as Austria, the Netherlands has a 
history of immigration of guest workers which was intended to be temporary in nature 
but turned out to be permanent (European Migration Network, 2010i, p.6; Interview 3). 
However, whereas a fear of renewed permanent immigration has led the Austrian gov-
ernment to reject circular migration schemes, the Dutch government decided to intro-
duce a pilot project on circular migration in order to test the ability of the concept to 
contribute to brain gain in practice. Under the scheme, 80 migrants per year could come 
from Indonesia and South Africa to work and learn in the Netherlands for a maximum 
period of two years. In this way these migrants would develop new competences, and in 
the long term the circular migration scheme would therefore contribute to building ca-
pacity of third countries and preventing brain drain (European Migration Network, 
2010h, p.46). Indonesia and South Africa were selected as the pilot countries because of 
the possibility to contribute to development goals, the good labour supply of these coun-
tries, the English language skills of their populations, and their good records on return 
and reintegration initiatives. Historical reasons naturally also played a role: Indonesia 
                                                          
71 Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Bu-
rundi, Cape Verde, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Macedonia, Ghana, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Paki-
stan, Palestinian Territories, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia. 
72 Angola, Morocco, Sierra Leone. 
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and South Africa were selected also because Dutch enterprises are active in these coun-
tries and the Dutch NGO carrying out the project had networks and experience in these 
countries (Siegel and van der Vorst, 2012, p.30). The government saw a possibility for 
the pilot circular migration scheme to be incorporated into a Mobility Partnership (In-
terview 3). 
 Another benefit from participating would be the ability to influence the develop-
ment of the Mobility Partnership instrument (Interview 6; 7). The decision to participate 
in the Mobility Partnerships was made in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the 
head of the migration unit in particular did not want to be confronted at a later point 
with a well-developed EU policy instrument that could no longer be changed (Interview 
7). The Netherlands has often been a central actor in EU migration initiatives (Geddes, 
2003, p.123). Indeed, the creation of the HLWG followed a Dutch proposal for a ‘cross-
pillar’ approach to migration (van Selm, 2002). The Dutch government in 1998 pro-
posed that the EU should create a ‘Task Force’ on asylum and migration. The task force 
should be responsible for preparing a country-specific approach to the main countries of 
origin of migrants arriving in the EU. Such a country-specific approach should contrib-
ute to the overall aim of curbing the inflow to the EU of “persons abusing asylum pro-
cedures and of illegal migrants” (Council, 1998b, p.5). This task force later became 
established as the HLWG. 
 The Netherlands is the only of the three cases studied in this thesis which has not 
made a blanket decision to participate/not to participate in the Mobility Partnership 
instrument as a whole; rather, the Dutch government evaluates participation in each 
specific Mobility Partnership based on the expected costs and benefits in terms of Dutch 
national policy objectives. Moldova, for instance, was not considered relevant for Dutch 
policy preferences, and there were therefore no benefits expected from participation in 
this Mobility Partnership (Interview 11; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008d). 
There were no perceived benefits from participating in the Mobility Partnership with 
Cape Verde in terms of migration policy objectives (Interview 5; 14):73 the Cape Ver-
dean diaspora in the Netherlands, although sizeable from a Cape Verdean point of view, 
does not belong to one of the largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands (see chapter 
3). There is also no significant immigration from Cape Verde to the Netherlands: in 
2007, only 110 Cape Verdeans immigrated to the Netherlands.74 However, there were 
foreign policy reasons to favour participation in a Mobility Partnership with Cape 
Verde: officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw the partnership as a way to reas-
sure the Cape Verdean government that the Netherlands remains committed to the bilat-
                                                          
73 Despite there not being a substantial migration interest for the Dutch government in Cape Verde, the Neth-
erlands participated in a project entitled ‘DIAS de Cabo Verde’, funded by the EU and implemented by IOM. 
The project began already in 2007, before the Dutch decision on participation in the Mobility Partnership. The 
project aimed at facilitating the engagement of the Cape Verdean diaspora in the development of their country 
of origin. Cape Verdeans living in Portugal, Italy or the Netherlands could carry out a temporary project in 
Cape Verde, such as a training programme for a Cape Verdean organisation (European Migration Network, 
2010g, p.26; Interview 57). 
74 Eurostat data for 2007 (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database, re-
trieved 4 April 2012) 
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eral relationship between the two countries (Interview 7). In 2007 the Dutch govern-
ment decided to dismantle the development cooperation relationship with Cape Verde, 
based on the results achieved by the country (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a; 
2007).75 There was therefore a need to find new topics of cooperation with Cape Verde 
in order to broaden the scope of the bilateral relationship (Interview 11). The Mobility 
Partnership could be used as a new framework for cooperation with Cape Verde. In the 
case of the Mobility Partnership with Georgia, the situation was reversed: there was no 
substantial interest by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in participating, despite Georgia 
being on the list of development partner countries. However, the Ministry of Justice was 
interested in cooperating with Georgia on issues of return and reintegration (Interview 
14). Although actual migration flows from Georgia to the Netherlands are limited, 
Georgia is a transit country for migrants heading to the EU, and the Ministry of Justice 
therefore saw benefits from participating in the Mobility Partnership (Interview 9). 
 
Table 5.3 summarises the cost-benefit analyses for each of the three cases. This section 
has argued that the national identity explanation is the ‘prior’ one for the case of France: 
decision-making within the French government was not means-end in nature, but rather 
concerned the appropriateness of French leadership and the notion of France as a pio-
neer in external migration policy. The French government viewed particularly the 
choice of Senegal for a Mobility Partnership as wrong, knowing that the negotiations 
would be difficult, but would nevertheless have participated in such a partnership be-
cause of its a priori commitment to participate in all partnerships. The Austrian gov-
ernment implements an external migration policy in countries with which Mobility 
Partnerships could be foreseen, implying potential benefits to participation in such part-
nerships. However, the Austrian government did not perceive such benefits, and focused 
instead on the significant potential costs of participation in the Mobility Partnerships. 
These costs explain the decision not to participate. The Dutch government was ambiva-
lent in the beginning, and concerned about the emphasis on legal migration in the Mo-
bility Partnerships. However, once the national policy on migration and development 
had been determined, it was clear that this was compatible with participation in the 
partnerships. The choice of Cape Verde and Georgia as partner countries was relevant 
for national foreign policy and migration policy objectives. 
 
                                                          
75 In order to ease the transition for the Cape Verdean government, Dutch development aid was phased out 
gradually during the period 2007-2011 (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008c). 
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Table 5.3: Application of the cost-benefit explanation to the case studies. 
Member state Costs Benefits 
France Choice of partner countries Achieve ‘politics’ of scale 
Austria Potential for permanent immigration 
(repeat of Gastarbeiter experience) 
Difficult to ‘sell’ Mobility Partnerships 
to the public 
 
The Netherlands Over-emphasis on legal migration in the 
Mobility Partnerships 
Possibility to incorporate national circular 
migration scheme into Mobility Partnership 
Ability to influence development of Mobil-
ity Partnership instrument 
Cape Verde: foreign policy objectives 
Georgia: return and reintegration 
5.6 EU-member state interaction: size of the win-sets 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 accounted for the French, Austrian and Dutch preferences on the 
Mobility Partnership. This section explains the dynamics of the game between the 
Commission and the member states by examining the size of the win-set for each actor. 
It shows that the Commission had to be willing to compromise in order to secure 
agreement on the Mobility Partnership instrument as such. The cost of no agreement for 
all the member states was low, but was relatively lower for Austria which was opposed 
to the concept of the partnerships. The Commission was therefore in a weaker position 
in the decision-making process than the member states, because the member states 
would not have been negatively affected if no agreement had been reached. This weaker 
position is reflected in the flexible, ‘soft’ bargaining strategies adopted by Commission 
officials. 
5.6.1 Cost of no agreement for the EU 
Chapter 2 argued that the cost of no agreement for the EU is high, because if there is no 
agreement on EU external migration policy then there is by default no role for the EU. 
In this case, ‘the EU’ is the Commission because chapter 4 showed that other EU insti-
tutions were side-lined in the policy-making process on the Mobility Partnerships. For 
the Commission, it was more important to get some kind of policy in place than to en-
sure a specific format of the Mobility Partnerships. Without member state involvement, 
there would be no Mobility Partnerships. Commission officials therefore adopted a 
flexible negotiating strategy and yielded to member states on issues such as the legal 
nature of the partnerships, in order to secure agreement on the policy instrument as 
such. The lengths that Commission officials were willing to go to clearly demonstrate 
the high cost of no agreement in this case. Officials in DG JLS would, for instance, have 
preferred to have legally binding Mobility Partnership (Interview 1), but adopted a 
pragmatic approach when it became clear that member states were opposed to this sug-
gestion (Interview 13).  
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The Commission had a great deal invested in the Mobility Partnership instrument, 
which also makes the cost of no agreement high. These partnerships are seen by Com-
mission officials as necessary because immigration to the EU will continue, and there-
fore needs to be managed (Interview 17). In addition, there are specific advantages to 
the partnerships, such as the chance to discuss sensitive issues, particularly labour mi-
gration, with the member states (Interview 21). The partnerships can also form an im-
portant source of ‘leverage’ in the Commission’s often difficult negotiations on read-
mission with third countries (Interview 2; 13). Later Commission documents have con-
tinued to emphasise the importance of the Mobility Partnership instrument for the EU. 
The 2009 evaluation, for instance, describes the partnerships as 
promising, innovative and comprehensive tools [that] may represent a valuable 
framework for increasing transparency, enhancing synergies, triggering cooperation 
and ensuring more cost-efficient operations between partners, between the Com-
mission and Member States, and inside them, between various ministries and de-
partments involved (Commission, 2009d, p.8).  
The 2011 communication on the GAMM argues that Mobility Partnerships should be 
“the principal framework for cooperation in the area of migration and mobility between 
the EU and its partners” (Commission, 2011b, p.10). 
5.6.2 Cost of no agreement for the member states 
Despite their different preferences on participation in the Mobility Partnerships, the cost 
of no agreement for all the member states studied can be considered low. However, the 
cost of no agreement is lower for Austria than for France and the Netherlands. The 
Austrian government, whilst willing to allow the Mobility Partnerships to go ahead on a 
strictly voluntary basis, was very opposed to the instrument and would have been 
pleased if the whole idea had been shelved. The French and Dutch governments do 
participate in the Mobility Partnerships but would not have been really disadvantaged if 
no agreement had been possible at the EU level: the French government has its bilateral 
migration agreements available to it as an alternative, and the Dutch government created 
a policy and budget for migration and development and could therefore carry out ac-
tions independently. Indeed, all the governments, no matter whether they favoured or 
opposed participation in the Mobility Partnerships, emphasised that legal migration 
remains a national competence. It is therefore not costly if the EU fails to agree a policy 
instrument that potentially incorporates elements of legal migration. 
 Section 5.4 showed that the French government did not consider participation in the 
Mobility Partnerships in a ‘means-end’ way; rather, participating in this new instrument 
was simply considered appropriate because it matched a national role conception of 
France as a leader both in the EU and also in the area of external migration policy. 
However, in case there would have been no agreement at the EU level on the Mobility 
Partnerships, the French government would be able to resort to its own bilateral migra-
tion agreements (the accord de gestion concertée des flux migratoires et de 
développement solidaire). Indeed, the French government prioritises these bilateral 
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agreements: it was reluctant when the Commission suggested Senegal as a partner coun-
try for a Mobility Partnership because it already has a bilateral agreement with Senegal 
and this is “enough” (Interview 16). In cases where a bilateral agreement is being nego-
tiated, intervention by the EU is even seen as “interference” which can obstruct the 
conclusion of the more important bilateral agreement (ibid). The French government 
also asserts national competence over which migrants to admit to French territory 
(French Ministry of Interior, n.d.), and government officials were concerned that a Mo-
bility Partnership would lead partner countries to make unrealistic requests of participat-
ing member states, such as a quota for their citizens to migrate to the EU (Interview 16). 
Therefore, even though the Mobility Partnerships matched a French national role con-
ception, the cost of no agreement was still low. 
 Given the contradiction between Austrian national policy objectives and the Mobil-
ity Partnerships, the cost of no agreement for Austria was low; indeed, the cost of the 
wrong kind of agreement (legally-binding Mobility Partnerships with circular migration 
schemes in which Austria would be forced to participate) would have been very high. 
The Ministry of Interior made very clear in negotiations at the EU level that Austria was 
opposed to the concept of Mobility Partnerships, and Austrian officials in EU settings 
(such as the HLWG) emphasised that participation in the Mobility Partnerships should 
be voluntary (Interview 22; 25). The Austrian government was willing to let the Mobil-
ity Partnership instrument go ahead provided that participation by member states would 
be voluntary, but if no agreement would have been possible at the EU level then this 
would actually have been a positive outcome: it would have removed any possibility 
that Austria might find itself forced to accept measures that it opposed. Indeed, having 
emphasised the voluntary nature of the Mobility Partnerships, Austrian government 
officials were furious when the Commission requested mandates for readmission and 
visa facilitation agreements for the Mobility Partnership countries, because these 
agreements are binding on all member states – including Austria (Interview 22; 25). 
Ultimately, however, the government was outvoted in the Council and therefore forced 
to accept the conclusion of such agreements. 
 Section 5.5 showed the change in preferences of the Dutch government: having 
been unsure of the costs and benefits of the Mobility Partnership instrument at the out-
set, the government later decided that the benefits would outweigh the costs and there-
fore decided to join. However, the cost of no agreement on the Mobility Partnerships 
was still low. The Dutch government had developed its own policy and budget on mi-
gration and development, and could therefore implement measures independently. 
There would be no major disadvantage if the Mobility Partnership instrument did not 
exist, because it is possible to “have a good migration discussion with a country without 
having a Mobility Partnership” (Interview 11). The Dutch government also emphasises 
that it will not offer legal migration opportunities as part of a Mobility Partnership (In-
terview 4; 6). Failure to reach agreement on the Mobility Partnership instrument would 
not be costly because it would remove any possibility of the Dutch government being 
forced to accept legal migration measures as part of such a partnership. 
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5.6.3 Ratification procedure within the EU 
Ratification concerns the autonomy of the central decision-maker(s) to take a decision. 
In terms of the number of institutional players involved within the EU in decision-
making on Mobility Partnerships, the ratification procedure could be described as easy: 
only the Commission and the member states (in the Council structures) were involved in 
the policy-making process. Chapter 4 showed that other EU institutions, and particularly 
the European Parliament, were side-lined and did not play any role at all. Between the 
member states and the Commission there was something of a struggle for control over 
the policy instrument. Ultimately, member states retained control over several features 
of the Mobility Partnerships: the legal form (a political declaration rather than a legally 
binding international agreement); the voluntary nature of participation; the selection of 
partner countries; and the specific content of each Mobility Partnership. This is a type of 
‘ongoing’ or ‘continuous’ ratification: member states have ensured that they must ap-
prove each step in the process towards Mobility Partnerships being signed. The Com-
mission adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach, allowing member states this degree 
of control because it made the ratification procedure easy: it prevented member states 
from vetoing this new policy instrument altogether. The Austrian government, for in-
stance, was very opposed to the notion of increasing legal migration opportunities, but 
allowed the Mobility Partnership instrument to proceed on the basis that participation 
by member states would be voluntary. The Dutch government was ambivalent about the 
Mobility Partnerships at the outset; however the BNC fiche makes no mention of oppos-
ing this policy instrument (BNC, 2007). It notes that labour market policy is a member 
state competence where the EU must not act, but it acknowledges that the EU has com-
petence on immigration. Allowing such a degree of member state control over the pol-
icy has come at a cost: the Commission is not free to make proposals or concessions to 
third countries, because ultimately member states shape the Mobility Partnerships 
through their participation and the projects they propose. 
5.6.4 Ratification procedure within the member states 
For all three of the member states studied in this chapter, the domestic ratification pro-
cedure on the Mobility Partnerships was easy in the sense that the central decision-
maker(s) could act relatively autonomously: in each case, the decision was taken in one 
or two ministries, without involvement of other ministries, the national parliaments, or 
societal actors. This may be explained by the lack of politicisation of the Mobility Part-
nerships: this is not a policy instrument that has been brought to public attention. When 
EU issues do not attract much attention, they are generally dealt with at the administra-
tive level of each member state (van Keulen, 2006). In France, the Ministry of Immigra-
tion was the decision-maker; in Austria it was the Ministry of Interior; and in the Neth-
erlands the decision on the Mobility Partnerships was made jointly by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. 
 As outlined in section 5.3, several French ministries have a stake in immigration 
policy and are therefore represented in the CICI. However, in the case of the Mobility 
Partnerships, these ministries were largely by-passed. The decision that France would 
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participate in Mobility Partnerships was taken by the then secretary-general of the Min-
istry of Immigration, on the basis of advice from officials in the European Affairs sec-
tion (Interview 32). The Ministry of Immigration was the main one concerned with the 
substance of the Mobility Partnerships, and was therefore the site of the French decision 
to participate. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was naturally also concerned by the 
Mobility Partnerships because of its competence over diplomatic relations (Interview 
32), and representation of France in the HLWG is shared between the Ministry of Im-
migration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, in this instance the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was rather ‘being informed’ about the French position than determining 
it (Interview 33). The decision was taken by the Ministry of Immigration (Interview 35). 
Given the interministerial rivalries within the French administration and between ‘Paris’ 
and the Permanent Representation in Brussels (Menon, 2000), the ratification procedure 
on the Mobility Partnerships can be characterised as easy – the decision was made at the 
bureaucratic level within the Ministry of Immigration, in coordination with the SGAE in 
Paris. 
 Despite the Austrian corporatist tradition and the involvement of three ministries in 
setting migration policy, the decision not to participate was taken by the Ministry of 
Interior as the main government institution responsible for migration policy (European 
Migration Network, 2010c; Interview 25). The Ministry of Interior thus acted autono-
mously: other ministries and the social partners were bypassed. It is important to note 
that a different ratification procedure within Austria involving these other groups might 
have led to a different outcome, as they have taken a rather different view of Mobility 
Partnerships. The Federation of Austrian Industry, for instance, has criticised the restric-
tive and security-oriented approach of the government to immigration, and argued that 
Austria needs to be more open to immigrants entering the country (Der Standard, 2009; 
European Migration Network, 2007; Interview 24). In the Austrian Permanent Repre-
sentation, there was a feeling that participation, especially in the Mobility Partnership 
with Moldova, would be perfectly compatible with Austrian policy objectives, particu-
larly given the Moldovan concern with promoting return migration of its own citizens 
(Interview 22). The Austrian visa application office in Chisinau has brochures about the 
opportunities and risks of migration, and this information is also made available to dias-
pora communities in Austria (European Migration Network, 2010d, p.25). Such a pro-
ject could fall under a Mobility Partnership. However, within the Austrian system for 
EU coordination, the chain of command runs from the ministry in Vienna to the de-
partments of the Permanent Representation (Müller, 2001, p.235). In other words, the 
ministries in Vienna determine the Austrian position, to be defended by the Austrian 
Permanent Representation. Officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also believed 
that, given that Mobility Partnerships are largely made up of technical cooperation pro-
grammes, participation would be perfectly compatible with Austrian national policy: 
“we always had and we always will have technical cooperation programmes” (Interview 
24). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore favours rethinking the Austrian position 
on Mobility Partnerships (Interview 22). However, on the issue of Mobility Partnerships 
the Ministry of Interior is the lead ministry, and in case Austrian government depart-
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ments disagree on an EU matter it is the lead ministry that makes the decision (Müller, 
2000, p.206). 
 The Ministry of Interior was not, however, alone in its negative assessment of the 
concept of Mobility Partnerships. A parliamentary subcommittee on EU affairs echoed 
the government’s concern over the concept of circular migration being proposed at the 
EU level, because this would increase possibilities for immigration to the EU: “Das 
Konzept der Kommission zur zirkulären Migration, das heißt zu einer befristeten Zulas-
sung für einige Jahre mit obligatorischer Rückkehr und ohne Integration, wird strikt 
abgelehnt. Jedenfalls dürfe es zu keiner Erweiterung der Zulassungsmöglichkeiten von 
Drittstaatsangehörigen zum Arbeitsmarkt durch die EU geben” (Austrian Parliament, 
2009, p.3). The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection is also 
extremely cautious about admitting new ‘waves’ of immigration to Austria, arguing that 
the integration of those migrants already in Austria should take priority (Austrian Inte-
gration Fund, 2008). In a position paper published in August 2007, the Federal Chamber 
of Labour declared itself to be officially opposed to Austrian participation in the Mobil-
ity Partnerships and the introduction of a circular migration model at the EU level, ques-
tioning whether the EU has the competence to introduce such policies (Austrian Federal 
Chamber of Labour, 2007). It is therefore not certain that including other groups in the 
ratification procedure would have resulted in a different Austrian position on the Mobil-
ity Partnerships, but it would likely have made the ratification procedure difficult. 
 Dutch decision-making on the Mobility Partnerships officially fell to the Ministry 
of Justice, in close coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment (BNC, 2007). However, informally decision-making 
was shared between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice (Inter-
view 4; 5), and both ministries were involved in drawing up an overview document 
about the Mobility Partnerships for the BNC working group (Interview 3; 8). The Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs focuses on migration and development broadly, whilst the Min-
istry of Justice focuses on return (Interview 4; 9; 11). Siegel and van der Vorst (2012, 
p.23) found that these differing interests and aims were also present in the Dutch circu-
lar migration project: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned with securing a 
‘triple win’ scenario for migrants, sending and receiving countries, whereas the Ministry 
of Justice was concerned with ensuring return migration. So whereas the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs might evaluate a project on voluntary return of migrants according to 
whether the migrants find work once they return, the Ministry of Justice will focus on 
whether all migrants participating in the project actually returned (Interview 6; 15). 
These different priorities are reflected in the budgets available: the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs provides the budget for migration and development measures, whilst the Minis-
try of Justice only has (limited) financing available for return actions (Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice, 2008, p.16). On the issue of Mobility Partner-
ships, the Ministry of Justice was hesitant to make commitments that it might not be 
possible to keep. Officials were aware that projects involving exchange of knowledge 
on migration management with third countries would rely on the expertise and experi-
ence of staff in the Ministry of Justice or its services (Interview 5; 9). The Ministry of 
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Social Affairs and Employment was opposed to the concept of a Mobility Partnership; 
in principle, it does not support the conclusion of labour migration agreements with 
third countries (Interview 6). The Ministry was particularly unhappy with the Dutch 
circular migration pilot project, which it vigorously opposed on the basis that there is no 
need for labour migration from outside the EEA region (Siegel and van der Vorst, 2012, 
p.23). However, ultimately the ministry’s view was outvoted in the cabinet and it had to 
accept the pilot project (Interview 3; 6), which is officially a joint project of the Minis-
tries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Social Affairs and Employment (European Migra-
tion Network, 2010i, p.16). All three ministries have seats in the steering committee 
(Siegel and van der Vorst, 2012, p.11). 
 Mobility Partnerships have not been the specific subject of parliamentary debate in 
the Netherlands, but they have been considered during discussion of events at the EU 
level more generally. These discussions have, however, consisted of minis-
ters/secretaries of state outlining the Dutch position on Mobility Partnerships; Parlia-
ment was not involved in taking the decision, but was informed ex post facto of the 
Dutch position. Parliament was informed of the Dutch position on Mobility Partnerships 
in a letter from the minister for development and the state secretary for justice in Sep-
tember 2007: Mobility Partnerships are one of the developments at the EU level, and the 
Netherlands is reported to be cautiously positive about such partnerships, providing that 
member state competence over the labour market is retained (Tweede Kamer, 2007, 
p.4). During a meeting with the parliamentary committees for justice, interior, and Eu-
ropean affairs in June 2008, the secretary of state for justice assured members of par-
liament that decisions on Mobility Partnerships will be made based on the Dutch inter-
est to cooperate with the country concerned. The Dutch interest is return and readmis-
sion, border control, and the prevention of human trafficking. As negotiations were 
ongoing for a Benelux readmission agreement with Georgia, and as Georgia is an im-
portant transit country of migration for the Netherlands, the decision was made to join 
this Mobility Partnership (Tweede Kamer, 2008b, p.9). 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has accounted for the different preferences of the French, Austrian and 
Dutch governments on the Mobility Partnerships and, together with chapter 4, for the 
outcome of their interaction with the Commission. The chapter gives a somewhat mixed 
view of the explanatory powers of the rationalist and constructivist theories. Overall, a 
rationalist cost-benefit calculation is the more powerful theoretical explanation for 
member states’ preference formation. Certainly both the Austrian and Dutch govern-
ments clearly considered the opportunities and constrictions offered by cooperating at 
the EU level on the Mobility Partnerships. The Austrian government decided that, due 
to the significant contradiction between national and EU policy objectives, the cost of 
participating would be too high. The Dutch government hesitated: initially, it was reluc-
tant to decide to participate because the national policy on migration and development 
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had not yet been established. The potential costs and benefits of EU level cooperation 
were therefore not yet clear. However, once the national policy was formulated, it was 
determined that the benefits of participation in the Mobility Partnerships outweighed the 
costs. Tracing the process in these two cases showed that the decision on participation 
was made in a means-end way, by weighing potential costs against potential benefits. 
However, the constructivist explanation cannot be entirely discarded. The Austrian 
government, for instance, sees EU competence in immigration policy as inappropriate; 
this is something that is and should be the domain of the member states. The Dutch 
government had similar concerns in terms of labour market policy, which in combina-
tion with the cost-benefit calculation accounts for the initial Dutch ambivalence: the 
Dutch government was concerned that legal migration was over-emphasised in the Mo-
bility Partnerships, which is inappropriate because this is not an EU competence. Sec-
tion 5.4 nevertheless argued that the national identity explanation could not fully 
enough explain the outcome in these two cases: despite similar concepts of what an 
appropriate division of competences between the EU and its member states should be, 
the two governments made different decisions on the Mobility Partnerships. The cost-
benefit explanation is thus the more convincing one. 
 The case of France might also be explained according to rationalist logic: section 
5.4 showed how the French preference for participation in the Mobility Partnerships 
could be justified in terms of the benefits expected from participation. However, the 
process-tracing conducted showed that the ‘prior’ explanation is the one relating to the 
French national role conception. Participation in the Mobility Partnerships was consid-
ered ‘appropriate’ because it matched with a concept of France as a leader, both within 
the EU and in the domain of external migration policy more broadly. This has locked 
the French government into a path of participation in every Mobility Partnership de-
cided to date and also those that will be decided in the future.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: EU-member state interaction (including the change in Dutch preference). 
 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the size of the win-sets in the interaction between the member 
states and the EU. It shows that the win-set for the Commission was large: the cost of 
no agreement was high, and the ratification procedure within the EU was easy. This 
limited the Commission to a ‘soft bargaining’ negotiating style in its interaction with the 
member states: Commission officials were forced to compromise on the details of the 
Mobility Partnership instrument in order to get member states’ agreement to move 
ahead (see chapter 4). At the same time, being flexible and willing to compromise in 
this way made the ratification procedure easy because it prevented member states from 
vetoing the Mobility Partnership instrument altogether. In contrast, the win-sets for the 
member states were small. In all cases, the ratification procedure was easy but the cost 
of no agreement was low. Not even France and the Netherlands, which do both partici-
pate in Mobility Partnerships, would have been seriously disadvantaged if no agreement 
EU ---------------------------------------------------[--------]-------[---------------- Member states 
                                                                         F1       EU1     A1 
                                                                        NL1                NL0 
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had been possible. However, the cost of no agreement was relatively lower for Austria 
because the government was opposed to the concept of Mobility Partnerships. 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the international level (level I of the three-level game), as well 
as the interaction between the EU and the third countries. It answers the final sub-
question of the research as presented in chapter 2: why do third countries choose to join 
a Mobility Partnership? This chapter thus specifies both the nature of the international 
negotiating environment between the EU and these third countries, and also the domes-
tic politics of international cooperation on migration for the third countries. The cases 
selected were Senegal and Cape Verde. Section 6.2 outlines briefly the existing external 
migration policy of the EU towards Senegal and Cape Verde. Section 6.3 concerns the 
process of negotiations between the EU and Cape Verde and Senegal on the Mobility 
Partnerships. When Mobility Partnerships are negotiated, the substance of the negotia-
tions is the preamble and the political declaration which form the main part of each 
Mobility Partnership text. The annex of proposed projects is not specifically negotiated; 
rather it is created on the basis of the actions that the member states, EU institutions, 
and/or third countries propose to carry out in the framework of the Mobility Partnership. 
Thus, the negotiations between the EU and Cape Verde concerned the content of the 
preamble and political declaration. In the case of Senegal, the Commission sent a pro-
posed draft Mobility Partnership text to the Senegalese government, as a basis for nego-
tiations.  
 Chapter 2 argued that the domestic preferences of third countries explain their 
decisions on whether to cooperate with the EU on migration issues. This process of 
domestic preference formation can be accounted for by two possible explanations: a 
social learning approach, and a policy conditionality approach. Section 6.4 shows that 
two of the conditions of the social learning model were the same across the Senegalese 
and Cape Verdean cases: neither case study uncovered evidence of a process of persua-
sion or dialogue being applied by the EU; and both governments consider EU readmis-
sion requirements to be inappropriate. The social learning model is therefore not con-
vincing as an explanation for the success or failure of these Mobility Partnerships, be-
cause, despite these similarities, Cape Verde chose to sign the partnership while Senegal 
decided not to. Section 6.5 argues that the policy conditionality approach is best able to 
account for how these two countries developed different domestic preferences. Section 
6.6 outlines the size of the win-sets in the EU-third country interaction.76 
6.2 EU external migration policy in Senegal and Cape Verde 
Senegal and Cape Verde are part of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP 
countries (see chapter 3). Independently of the Mobility Partnership instrument, the EU 
was therefore already implementing projects related to migration in both Senegal and 
Cape Verde, financed by the Thematic Programme on Cooperation with Third Countries 
                                                          
76 For an analysis of the motivations of the Moldovan and Georgian governments to join Mobility Partnerships 
see Lavenex and Stucky (2011) and Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera (2011). 
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in the Areas of Migration and Asylum. In the period 2007-2008, immediately before the 
negotiations on Mobility Partnerships, seven projects were financed in Senegal and 
three in Cape Verde (see table 6.1). The majority of projects implemented related to the 
prevention of illegal migration or the promotion of the link between migration and de-
velopment. Member states were the lead implementers in most cases, although on aver-
age across all the projects represented in table 6.1, 79.7% of funding came from the 
EU’s Thematic Programme. 
6.3 Negotiations on the Mobility Partnerships 
The Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde was one of the first two pilot partnerships to 
be agreed in May 2008.77 Following the publication of the Commission communication 
on Mobility Partnerships in May 2007, the concept of Mobility Partnerships was dis-
cussed in the Council in June 2007 (see chapter 4). The Council invited the Commission 
to hold consultations with both member states and third countries during the course of 
2007, so that the Council could decide by the end of 2007 whether to authorise the 
launch of Mobility Partnerships (Council, 2007e). At this time, the Cape Verdean gov-
ernment became aware, through the ambassador in Brussels, that the EU was looking to 
test the concept of Mobility Partnerships with a country from the ACP grouping. The 
Cape Verdean ambassador in Lisbon approached the Portuguese authorities to discuss 
the issue, as Portugal held the rotating presidency of the EU at the time. As Luxem-
bourg is another traditional European partner country for Cape Verde, the Cape Verdean 
ambassador in Brussels discussed a potential Mobility Partnership with the Permanent 
Representation of Luxembourg (Interview 56; 65). However, the Cape Verdean gov-
ernment did not submit a formal written expression of interest in the Mobility Partner-
ship to the Commission or Council (Commission, 2009d, p.3). In contrast, the Moldo-
van government submitted three non-papers indicating its interest in, and ideas about, a 
Mobility Partnership (ibid.; Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2011). In December 2007, 
the Council authorised the Commission, “in close liaison with Member States and/or the 
Presidency . . . to open dialogue with Cape Verde and Moldova, with a view to launch-
ing pilot mobility partnerships” (Council, 2007b, p.5). Following this, the Commission 
approached the Cape Verdean government with the formal proposal for a Mobility Part-
nership (Interview 13). The Cape Verdean government “quickly confirmed [its] interest 
and engaged in the process” (Commission, 2009d, p.3). Meetings were held both in 
Brussels and Praia, and the text of the Mobility Partnership agreed by May 2008. The 
Mobility Partnership was formally signed in September 2008 (Council, 2008c). 
                                                          
77 The Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde was agreed at the same time as the Mobility Partnership with 
Moldova. 
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Already at the same time as the signature of the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde, 
in May 2008, the HLWG reached agreement on inviting the Commission, “in close 
liaison with Member States and the Presidency, to take forward exploratory talks with 
Georgia and Senegal and to open dialogue with these countries, with a view to launch-
ing additional pilot mobility partnerships” (Council, 2008m, p.7). The Senegalese au-
thorities had, at this point, not been consulted (Interview 17); rather the eligibility of 
Senegal for a Mobility Partnership had been discussed within the EU and decided by the 
Council (Commission, 2009d, p.3). Following the formal decision at EU level, a first 
meeting was held in Dakar in July 2008, in which the Senegalese government indicated 
that it was very interested in the idea (Interview 13). The Mobility Partnership was to be 
based largely on existing projects carried out by the French, Spanish and Italian gov-
ernments – these member states had signalled that they would participate in the Mobil-
ity Partnership (Chou and Gibert, 2012, p.418). The Commission sent the draft declara-
tion of the Mobility Partnership to the Senegalese government, but never received any 
reply. Despite bringing the issue up in bilateral meetings (for instance in the follow-up 
meetings of the Rabat process), and assurances by the Senegalese government that it 
was very interested, still the Commission received no reply (Interview 13). A European 
Parliament delegation visiting Senegal later in 2008 once again forwarded the request 
regarding the Mobility Partnership, and the Commissioner for development cooperation 
(Louis Michel) sent a letter to Senegalese President Wade (Interview 23). By September 
2009, it was clear that negotiations were not progressing and the Commission had aban-
doned the idea for a Mobility Partnership with Senegal (Commission, 2009d, p.3). The 
Commission’s 2009 report on policy coherence for development, which contains a sec-
tion on Mobility Partnerships, makes no mention of negotiations with Senegal (Com-
mission, 2009f, p.121). In contrast, the Mobility Partnership with Georgia, which had 
been initiated at the same time as the proposal was made to Senegal, was signed in No-
vember 2009 (Council, 2009a). 
6.4 The international level: a process of persuasion and dialogue? 
One explanation for third countries’ decisions to cooperate with the EU on migration 
issues is social learning: third countries will cooperate with the EU if they are persuaded 
that the EU policy is appropriate. The most important condition according to this expla-
nation is an attempt by the EU to engage the third country in a dialogue to persuade the 
government of the value of cooperation. However, negotiations on a Mobility Partner-
ship with both Senegal and Cape Verde display a complete absence of such an approach 
by the EU. Instead, the negotiations were very much of a ‘take it or leave it’ character, 
leaving little room for either country to be persuaded of the appropriateness of the pol-
icy instrument. Mobility Partnerships require a commitment from the third country 
concerned to cooperate with the EU on readmission, including by signing an EU-wide 
readmission agreement (see chapter 4). Both the Senegalese and Cape Verdean govern-
ment see these readmission requirements as inappropriate because they should not have 
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to be responsible for failed EU border controls. For Cape Verde, however, the legiti-
macy of EU policies is enhanced due to its identification with the EU community. This 
section applies the social learning model first to the negotiations with Cape Verde and 
then to the negotiations with Senegal. 
 
The Commission’s 2009 evaluation of the Mobility Partnerships states that the Cape 
Verdean government had clear views on the main aspects it wanted to be reflected in its 
partnership, namely security and mobility (Commission, 2009d, p.3). However, tracing 
the actual process of negotiations shows that there was little room in the negotiations 
with the EU for the Cape Verdean government to influence the content of the Mobility 
Partnership. Interviewees in the Cape Verdean government point out that that this part-
nership “started as an experimental project of the EU . . . That’s why the beginning of 
the project was mostly a project from the EU than a project of bilateral genesis” (Inter-
view 51), indicating the inability of Cape Verde to influence the content of the partner-
ship. The text of the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde is very similar to the text of 
the Mobility Partnership with Moldova (Interview 56), implying no attempt by the EU 
to persuade the Cape Verdean government that this instrument is appropriate specifi-
cally for the Cape Verdean case.78 There was a clear feeling within the Cape Verdean 
government that it had had a limited impact on the negotiations of the Mobility Partner-
ship: “you can say that the partners are equal, that things have been discussed, this is 
politically correct, but the reality is not that” (Interview 56). From the text of the Mobil-
ity Partnership (Council, 2008c) it seems that the Cape Verdean desire for mobility to 
be incorporated has not been met (see Annex II). Many of the projects proposed under 
the heading of facilitating legal migration concern only informing potential migrants 
about possibilities for migration or establishing cooperation between European and 
Cape Verdean institutions. The projects are not aimed at increasing overall mobility 
from Cape Verde to the EU (see also chapter 4). 
 The requirements that the EU places on third countries in the area of readmission 
are seen by the Cape Verdean government as being inappropriate. Cape Verdean offi-
cials state that the government has no problem with readmitting its own citizens; indeed, 
it has agreements on readmission with some European countries, for instance France, 
Spain and Portugal. However, it has hesitated over the EU readmission agreement due 
to the inclusion of the clause on third country nationals. As one interviewee put it, if a 
migrant is found to be illegally present in the EU then it means that EU border controls 
have failed, so why should Cape Verde then have to take this person back? (Interview 
66) The government does not, as such, object to readmitting third country nationals who 
are legally and long-term resident in Cape Verde. Interviewees indicate that the real 
objection is to the readmission of third country nationals who have only transited 
through Cape Verde: “we won’t accept anybody, just because he has a piece of paper 
proving that he bought gas here in Praia, that he should therefore be sent back to Cape 
Verde” (Interview 65; cf. Coleman, 2009 on Ukraine, Turkey and Morocco). 
                                                          
78 This tendency by the EU to use a ‘template’ agreement for different negotiation processes has also been 
noted by Cassarino (2012, p.193). 
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On the other hand, the legitimacy of the EU’s policies and approaches is enhanced by 
the identification within Cape Verdean society with Europe and the European Union. 
Both the government of Cape Verde and the European Commission see Cape Verde as a 
bridge between Europe and Africa (Interview 12; 49; Commission, 2007b). Interview-
ees point to several affinities between Europe and Cape Verde in terms of culture, relig-
ion, norms and values, the legal system, the organisation of the state, and respect for 
human rights (Interview 49; 56; 65). In its communication on the future of relations 
between the EU and Cape Verde, the Commission also indicates that the EU and Cape 
Verde share “close human and cultural links, the common experience of major events 
and strong, shared socio-political values” (Commission, 2007b, p.2). As one inter-
viewee pointed out, “the references [in Cape Verde] are in the north, not in the west 
coast of Africa” (Interview 56; cf. Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). This can be 
attributed to the interaction between Cape Verdeans and the diaspora, which is mainly 
found in the United States and Europe (ibid.). 
 
The process of negotiation on the Mobility Partnership with Senegal was much the same 
as with Cape Verde. Following the formal decision at EU level to select Senegal as a 
partner for a Mobility Partnership, the Commission sent the completed draft text of the 
declaration of a Mobility Partnership to the Senegalese government for signature (Inter-
view 41). This proposed text was largely identical to the Mobility Partnership with Cape 
Verde, with only minor changes made due to differences in Senegalese population and 
migratory flows (Chou and Gibert, 2012). Just as with Cape Verde, therefore, there is 
no evidence of an attempt by the EU to persuade Senegal of the appropriateness of this 
policy instrument for the Senegalese case in particular. The Senegalese government sees 
the unilateral actions of the EU and lack of deliberation with third countries as inappro-
priate, unacceptable and ineffective. Interviewees point out that EU projects on migra-
tion cannot be implemented without the cooperation of third countries, and yet the EU 
takes decisions unilaterally and then afterwards approaches third countries concerning 
the implementation. The Senegalese government believes that third countries should 
instead be invited to discuss and debate the contents of the policies which they are ex-
pected to help to implement (Interview 41). The government insists that it will not ac-
cept decisions on migration cooperation being imposed on it (Interview 47). There was 
particular anger among interviewees that such a unilateral approach was also employed 
by the EU in signing the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (Council, 2008l). 
The pact relies on third countries for implementation, but third countries were not con-
sulted in the process leading up to the signature of the document (Interview 48). This 
finding confirms previous research by Chou and Gibert, who also noted the “tendency 
by European officials to present a ‘joint cooperation’ document in the state of near final-
ity to non-EU partners”, as in the case of the Mobility Partnership with Senegal (2010, 
p.8). Such a unilateral approach is in stark contrast to the stated principle by the EU to 
base its cooperation with Senegal on partnership, a dialogue between the two parties and 
support for the sectoral strategies identified by the Senegalese government (Senegal-
European Community, 2008, p.31). Partnership has also been identified as a cornerstone 
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of EU migration missions (Council, 2007a, p.8), although the fact that the terms of 
references for such missions are “shared” with third countries (p.4) leaves open to de-
bate how much influence these countries actually have on the content. 
 Just as for the Cape Verdean government, EU readmission requirements are seen 
by the Senegalese government to be illegitimate. In fact, the position of the Senegalese 
government on readmission is more uncompromising than that of the Cape Verdean 
government. Senegalese interviewees insist that Senegal will not accept the return of 
non-Senegalese migrants (Interview 46), but readmission of its own nationals has also 
been a stumbling block in bilateral relations with EU member states (see sub-section 
6.5.3). Senegalese government officials complain that the EU is overly focussed on the 
issue of return, without adequate attention for other migration issues, such as the inte-
gration of migrants in the country of destination (Interview 41). This implies that an 
appropriate migration policy would be more balanced and nuanced than the approach 
currently adopted by the EU. 
 
Overall, it is clear that a social learning approach is unable to account for the different 
outcomes of the Mobility Partnership negotiations with Cape Verde and Senegal. Both 
countries’ governments view EU readmission requirements as inappropriate, particu-
larly as regards the clause on third-country nationals. In neither case was there evidence 
of a process of dialogue or persuasion: the EU approach was rather to present the Sene-
galese and Cape Verdean governments with a draft Mobility Partnership document, 
apparently assuming that the benefits of the cooperation would be obvious to both part-
ners. The following section shows that this was not the case: the Senegalese and Cape 
Verdean governments saw very different costs and benefits to a Mobility Partnership 
(although they were being presented with essentially the same text), and therefore de-
veloped very different domestic preferences. 
6.5 The international level: policy conditionality and domestic preference 
formation 
The policy conditionality approach predicts that third countries will cooperate with the 
EU when the expected benefits of cooperation outweigh the expected costs. Chapter 2 
argued that the cost-benefit calculation made by third countries will depend on three 
factors: (i) the resonance of the EU policy with national policy objectives; (ii) the ad-
ministrative capacity of the target state; and (iii) the domestic costs of adopting the EU 
policy. This section looks at the process of domestic preference formation regarding the 
Mobility Partnership in Cape Verde and Senegal. It shows that, for Cape Verde, the 
expected benefits of the Mobility Partnership outweighed the expected costs, which led 
the government to agree to the partnership. Senegal refused to sign a Mobility Partner-
ship because the benefits on offer could not outweigh the anticipated costs. 
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6.5.1 Resonance of EU policy with national policy objectives 
A central difference between the case of Cape Verde and the case of Senegal is the 
resonance of the Mobility Partnership with national policy objectives. Whereas the 
proposed partnership resonated well with Cape Verdean national migration policy ob-
jectives, there was a complete contradiction between the Mobility Partnership and the 
Senegalese government’s approach to migration policy. 
 
The Cape Verdean government perceived a resonance of the Mobility Partnership with 
national migration policy. In particular, the government believed the Mobility Partner-
ship would strengthen its efforts to deal with illegal migration, whilst encouraging en-
hanced relations with the Cape Verdean diaspora. Migration is an important aspect of 
Cape Verdean history, culture and society, and shapes Cape Verdeans’ views of them-
selves (Carling and Åkesson, 2009; Carling and Batalha, 2008; IOM, 2009c). Cape 
Verde has a rich and diverse history of emigration (Cape Verde-European Community, 
2008). In the early twentieth century, the main destinations were the United States, 
Senegal, and Argentina. Cape Verdean emigrants to the United States mainly departed 
on board American whalers, and took up residence in New England. The capital of 
Senegal, Dakar, was a place of refuge for many Cape Verdean emigrants hoping to 
avoid forced migration to other Portuguese colonies. Cape Verdeans also joined the 
many Europeans migrating to Argentina. In the middle of the twentieth century, emigra-
tion to Europe picked up. The most important destination was Portugal, where there was 
a demand for labour due to the emigration of Portuguese workers. The successful ship-
ping industry in the Netherlands attracted many Cape Verdean men to emigrate and 
settle, mainly in Rotterdam. At the same time, Cape Verdean women were moving to 
Italy to find domestic work. Many of the Cape Verdeans who had migrated to Dakar 
moved to France when Senegal gained its independence (Carling and Åkesson, 2009). 
Figure 6.1 shows the spread of the Cape Verdean emigration tradition in dark grey. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Countries of emigration for Cape Verdeans. 
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As a result of this emigration tradition, there is a significant Cape Verdean emigrant 
population, particularly considering that the population of the islands themselves is only 
516,000 (in 2011; CIA World Factbook 2011a). However, there are no exact figures on 
the size of this emigrant community. It is often stated that there are twice as many Cape 
Verdeans abroad as in Cape Verde itself (Interview 60), but there is no evidence for this 
claim (Carling, 2008). The World Bank puts the figure at 192,500 (World Bank, 2011). 
IOM estimates the emigrant community to be 700,000 (IOM, 2011). Carling (2008) 
agrees with IOM that the emigrant community is probably larger than the population of 
Cape Verde. A significant proportion of the Cape Verdean emigrant community lives in 
the EU. Eurostat data shows that there were around 75,000 Cape Verdeans (legally 
registered) in the 27 EU member states in 2010. Table 6.2 shows the most important 
emigrant communities in EU member states. 
 
Table 6.2: Cape Verdeans legally resident in selected EU member states in 2010 (source: Eurostat).79 
EU member state No. of Cape Verdean migrants 
Portugal 49,434 
France 13,246 
Italy 4,624 
Spain 3,345 
Luxembourg 1,660 
Netherlands 1,492 
 
Encouraging the Cape Verdean diaspora to participate in the economic, social, political 
and cultural development of Cape Verde is one of the key pillars of Cape Verdean mi-
gration policy (IOM, 2009c; Interview 55). There is a Cape Verdean saying that “the 
11th island of Cape Verde is abroad” (Interview 58), and the government is keen to 
incentivise the integration of the emigrant community in Cape Verdean life. Indeed, 
emigrants have electoral rights and can therefore contribute decisively to the outcome of 
elections (Interview 49). The Mobility Partnership has as one aim to “foster cooperation 
with Cape Verdean communities abroad”, including by facilitating investment by the 
diaspora in Cape Verde, facilitating remittances, and supporting the voluntary return 
and reintegration of migrants in Cape Verde (Council, 2008c, p.4). Participation in this 
                                                          
79 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database (retrieved 21 November 2011). 
Data for France is from 2005; data for Luxembourg is from 2001 (most recent available). Data based on 
citizenship is used because the dataset is more complete. However, a different picture emerges if data based 
on country of birth is selected. The number of Cape Verdeans in the Netherlands dramatically increases, from 
1,492 to 11,708 in 2010. This perhaps implies that many Cape Verdeans in the Netherlands naturalise. The 
number for France increases from 13,246 to 18,294. For Spain and Portugal, the increase in numbers of Cape 
Verdeans by measuring according to country of birth is not so dramatic. 
partnership was therefore seen by the Cape Verdean government as a chance to develop 
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projects in cooperation with the diaspora. 
 Despite its history as a country of emigration, Cape Verde is increasingly becoming 
a country of immigration and transit migration (Interview 12; 38; 56; Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2009b). In 2010, Cape Verde had a net migration rate of -0.66 per 
thousand, but this is much lower than for other countries in the region – Mali, for in-
stance, had an emigration rate of -5.23 per thousand (CIA World Factbook, 2011c). The 
World Bank estimates that there were 12,100 immigrants in Cape Verde in 2010, mak-
ing up 2% of the population. The main countries of origin of these migrants were São 
Tomé and Principe, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Portugal, Senegal, Italy, the United States, 
France, Nigeria, and Brazil (World Bank, 2011). Cape Verde is a particularly attractive 
destination for migrants from other West African countries, either as a transit country 
for onward migration to Europe, or as a country of destination. The economic growth, 
political stability, and higher salaries in Cape Verde make it attractive for migrants 
(Cape Verde-European Community, 2008). Table 6.3 compares Cape Verde to the other 
ECOWAS countries to show why it is that Cape Verde is increasingly a country of 
immigration. It is clear that Cape Verde is the richest, most well-developed country in 
ECOWAS, and also the country where civil liberties are best protected. 
 
Table 6.3: Cape Verde compared to other ECOWAS countries (sources: CIA World Factbook, 2011a; UNDP, 
2011; Freedom House, 2011). 
Country GDP per  
capita 
Human  
development index 
% of population below  
poverty line 
Civil liberties 
score 
Benin $1,500 167 37% 2 
Burkina Faso $1,200 181 46% 3 
Cape Verde $3,800 133 30% 1 
Côte d’Ivoire $1,800 170 42% 6 
Gambia $1,900 168 Not available 5 
Ghana $2,500 135 28% 2 
Guinea $1,000 178 47% 5 
Guinea-Bissau $1,100 176 Not available 4 
Liberia $500 182 80% 4 
Mali $1,200 175 36% 3 
Niger $700 186 63% 4 
Nigeria $2,500 156 70% 4 
Senegal $1,900 155 54% 3 
Sierra Leone $900 180 70% 3 
Togo $900 162 32% 4 
 
As a result of these regional differences, there has been a wave of immigration to Cape 
Verde from other ECOWAS countries. ECOWAS citizens have the right of free move-
ment to Cape Verde for a stay of 90 days, but there are two problems with such immi-
gration: firstly, the government is concerned that the Cape Verdean labour market is not 
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big enough to absorb all those arriving (Interview 58); and secondly, ECOWAS citizens 
(mainly from Ghana, Mali and Senegal) use Cape Verde merely as a transit destination 
in their attempts to reach Europe. There have been several incidents of boats with mi-
grants bound for the Canary Islands departing from Cape Verde, but the vast majority of 
migrants leaving aboard these boats are not Cape Verdeans (Carling, 2008, p.10; Car-
ling, 2002, p.28). The Cape Verdean government is trying to deal with the new issues 
related to illegal immigration. Each year, Cape Verde returns approximately 800 citi-
zens of ECOWAS countries who are illegally resident in Cape Verde. Returning these 
citizens is expensive, but the government is keen to convey an image of Cape Verde as 
a “serious country”, where migrants who are illegally present will be returned (Inter-
view 49). The increase in immigration also led to the creation of an inter-ministerial 
committee on migration, whose objective was to elaborate a national migration policy 
(Interview 50). This policy was presented to parliament in February 2011. The govern-
ment emphasises that Cape Verde has no interest in being a country of transit for mi-
grants heading to Europe. Instead, it favours well-organised legal migration (Interview 
49; 60). For instance, one objective of the national institute for employment and voca-
tional training (IEFP) is to prepare Cape Verdeans to migrate, by providing training 
courses or by matching skills of Cape Verdeans with skills needed in the European 
labour market (Interview 62). The Mobility Partnership instrument is designed to com-
bine cooperation on legal and illegal migration. A stated objective of the partnership 
with Cape Verde is to “promote a better framework for legal mobility”, for instance 
through visa facilitation (Council, 2008c, p.3). At the same time, one pillar of the part-
nership deals with border management, identity and travel documents, combating illegal 
migration and trafficking in human beings (p.5). This combination of cooperation on 
legal and illegal migration resonated with the Cape Verdean government’s central con-
cerns in migration policy. It should be noted that it was this overall concept behind the 
Mobility Partnerships that resonated well with Cape Verdean national policy objectives; 
the Cape Verdean government did not make its decision to sign the partnership based on 
the specific projects proposed by the member states (see Annex II for an overview of the 
projects in the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde). 
 
In contrast to the Cape Verdean government, the Senegalese government reached the 
conclusion that there was a contradiction between national migration policy objectives 
and the proposed Mobility Partnership. Senegal has traditionally been a country of des-
tination in West Africa (IOM, 2009a) and there is therefore a significant immigrant 
community. The World Bank estimates that in 2010 there were 210,100 immigrants 
living in Senegal, mainly from Guinea, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, France, Cape 
Verde, Gambia, Morocco, Syria, and the United States (World Bank, 2011).80  
 Having long been a country of destination, Senegal is increasingly becoming a 
country of emigration. Since the mid-2000s emigration from Senegal has become head-
line news, as many of the migrants on boats bound for Europe have turned out to be 
                                                          
80 Dia (2009; cf. Wagbou, 2008, p.151) warns that the scale of immigration to and emigration from Senegal is 
probably underestimated due to the lack of reliable statistics. 
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Senegalese (Poeze, 2010, p.33). In 2011, Senegal had a net migration rate of -1.9 per 
thousand (CIA World Factbook, 2011b) and an emigrant community estimated at 
636,200 (World Bank, 2011). The main countries of destination for Senegalese emi-
grants are Gambia, France, Italy, Germany, Mauritania, Spain, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Ghana, the United States, Mali and Guinea-Bissau (IOM, 2009a; World Bank, 2011). 
Eurostat data shows that there were around 200,000 Senegalese (legally registered) in 
the 27 EU member states in 2010. Figure 6.2 shows the spread of Senegalese emigra-
tion, and table 6.4 shows the most important emigrant communities in EU member 
states.  
 
Figure 6.2: Countries of emigration for Senegalese. 
 
 
Table 6.4: Senegalese legally resident in selected EU member states in 2010 (source: Eurostat).81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Senegalese government views both immigration and emigration generally posi-
tively. In fact, in a 2003 study of 22 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers by African 
countries, the paper by Senegal was one of only six to draw positive conclusions about 
                                                          
81 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database (retrieved 11 January 2012). 
Data for France is from 2005 (most recent available). Data based on citizenship is used. 
EU member state No. of Senegalese migrants 
Italy 72,618 
Spain 60,895 
France 48,178 
Germany 2,383 
Portugal 1,782 
Belgium 1,414 
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the impact of migration on poverty reduction (Bakewell, 2008, p.1348). The govern-
ment is concerned about the departure of young Senegalese (Chou and Gibert, 2012, 
p.416), but simultaneously supports legal emigration as an important factor for devel-
opment (Ndione and Broekhuis, 2006, p.9). Senegalese immigration policy is not par-
ticularly restrictive regarding residence permits for immigrants (Gerdes, 2007, p.3; 
Ndione and Broekhuis, 2006, p.9). Illegal immigrants, if discovered in Senegal, are not 
automatically deported (Interview 46). In September 2010, a meeting was held between 
the various ministries involved in migration matters, in order to establish an integrated 
national migration policy. The resulting document shows that illegal migration is not a 
priority; rather, the focus is on improving data on migration flows, promoting the con-
tribution of the diaspora to the development of the country, protecting the rights of the 
diaspora, and reinforcing the capacities of the actors involved in migration (Interview 
44). Remittances from emigrants are an important part of Senegal’s economy (Agence 
Française de Développement, n.d.). IOM estimates that remittances made up 12% of 
Senegalese GDP in 2007 (IOM, 2009a), whilst the World Bank puts the figure at 9% of 
GNI for 2010 (World Bank, 2011). Senegalese living abroad have been active, for in-
stance, in financing infrastructure development in Senegal and establishing joint ven-
tures with Senegalese associations (Panizzon, 2008, p.5). International migration, how-
ever, has only relatively recently become a topic of importance for the government: the 
government’s 2002 policy on population focussed largely on internal migration (Sene-
galese Ministry of Economics and Finance, 2002). Senegal has played an active role in 
the Euro-African Partnership for Migration and Development (the Rabat process), for 
instance by organising preparatory meetings in Dakar in advance of the meeting in Ra-
bat in 200682 and hosting the 2011 meeting of the process in Dakar. 
 Interviewees in the Senegalese government indicate a significant contradiction 
between Senegalese and European migration policies. Senegalese government officials 
are critical of the EU’s policies on both legal and illegal migration. Selective immigra-
tion policies of EU countries (which officials see reflected in the Mobility Partnership) 
cause developing countries like Senegal to lose talented and qualified citizens, whilst 
not making adequate provision for return or circular migration (Interview 45; 46; Dia, 
2009, p.24). The EU common approach to migration is seen as nothing more than a 
cynical approach to extend border control further away from the EU by giving compe-
tences to third countries (Interview 46). This common approach is seen as ineffective: 
interviewees expressed the opinion that, if the EU wishes to prevent migration, a more 
effective strategy would be to create more wealth in African countries. If the aim is to 
prevent illegal migration in particular, the EU should create more channels for legal 
migration (Interview 48). However, Senegal is open to cooperation with the EU on 
migration issues, as long as this reflects Senegalese policy objectives such as legal mi-
gration opportunities for its citizens (Interview 46; van Criekinge, 2010, p.9). 
                                                          
82 Text of the Rabat declaration retrieved 12 January 2012 from http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/ 
materiales/docs/RabatDeclaration_ActionPlan.pdf 
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6.5.2 Administrative capacity of the target state 
Low administrative capacity, in terms of staffing levels and the absence of internal 
coordination structures, will increase the costs to a third country of cooperating with the 
EU (see chapter 2). Both Senegal and Cape Verde have limited administrative capacity 
on migration matters, but this section argues that this administrative capacity did not 
affect the domestic preference formation on the Mobility Partnerships. Low staffing 
levels within the Cape Verdean administration, and the lack of experience of staff, was 
noted during the negotiation of the Mobility Partnership. The Cape Verdean govern-
ment also lacks a coordination structure to deal with migration issues. However, this 
limited administrative capacity was not a factor in the government’s preference forma-
tion on the partnership. The Senegalese government also lacks a coordination structure 
to deal with migration issues, but this alone cannot account for the Senegalese govern-
ment’s preferences on the Mobility Partnership: despite such limited administrative 
capacity, the government has succeeded in negotiating bilateral migration agreements 
with European countries. 
 
Within the Cape Verdean administration, responsibility for migration is fragmented 
between several ministries, and there is a lack of reliable statistical data on migration 
and remittance flows (Carling, 2008). Figure 6.3 shows how responsibility for migration 
policy is allocated (IOM, 2009c). For the Mobility Partnership with the EU, the Cape 
Verdean ambassador in Brussels was responsible for the negotiations (Interview 56), 
while talks were conducted on behalf of the Commission by DG JLS, with the involve-
ment of others, such as Development, Relex, and Aidco (Interview 13). The Cape Ver-
dean ambassador faced two main problems during the negotiations: firstly, the Cape 
Verdean delegation had more limited resources, both in terms of experience and size of 
the team, than the delegation of the Commission (Interview 66). For instance, the am-
bassador had not realised that the negotiations on the Mobility Partnership would over-
lap with matters relating to mode four of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS),83 as the Cape Verdean government does not have an expert on WTO matters 
(Interview 56). This lack of expertise affected the role that Cape Verde was able to play 
in the negotiations: “When you [negotiate an agreement] you might be pleased that 
you’ve done something good for your country, but you have the frustration of knowing 
that if you had specialists in other sectors you might have done better” (Interview 56). 
Kruse (2006, p.125) notes that the Albanian government had a similar problem when 
negotiating a readmission agreement with the EU: “Representatives of the Albanian 
government described their EU counterparts in negotiations as very skilful and special-
ised because they have a lot of negotiation experience. At the same time, they reported 
about their own weaknesses due to a lack of familiarity with issues concerning illegal 
migration”. 
                                                          
83 Mode four of the General Agreement on Trade in Services concerns the temporary movement of natural 
persons. This mode refers to “the supply of a service . . . by a service supplier of one Member, through pres-
ence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of another Member” (Ward, 2011). 
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The second problem was one of coordination between the various Cape Verdean minis-
tries. For the purposes of the negotiations of the Mobility Partnership, the Cape Verdean 
foreign minister at the time created a working group incorporating also representatives 
from the ministries of labour and interior (Interview 54). However, the ambassador in 
Brussels was getting only limited input from the ministry of interior and no input from 
the ministry of labour. These limitations of administrative capacity did not, however, 
affect the domestic preference formation, which was in favour of signing the Mobility 
Partnership. 
 
Some EU officials speculate that the lack of response by the Senegalese authorities to 
the offer of a Mobility Partnership might signal a problem with coordination between 
the Senegalese ministries involved in migration matters (Interview 13; 23). Certainly 
the Commission struggled to identify the appropriate interlocutor for the Mobility Part-
nership negotiations (Chou and Gibert, 2012, p.416). Senegalese interviewees acknowl-
edge that competence for migration is “sprinkled” across several ministries and that 
these ministries very much work separately as no independent coordination structure 
exists (Interview 36; 41). Figure 6.4 shows how competence for the various aspects of 
migration policy is allocated within the Senegalese government (Interview 40; 45; 47; 
Ministry of Senegalese Abroad, n.d. a; Senegalese Ministry of Economics and Finance, 
2002; IOM, 2009a; CIGEM, 2009). There are, however, occasional deviations from this 
structure. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for bilateral migration agree-
ments, but some agreements may be dealt with by technical ministries if there is a need 
for the dossier to move quickly. The Ministry of Senegalese Abroad is responsible for 
assisting the diaspora with their investment projects in Senegal, but PLASEPRI (a joint 
Italian-Senegalese project to encourage the Senegalese diaspora in Italy to invest in 
Senegal), is managed for Senegal by the Ministry of Microfinance. To compound mat-
ters, the office of the President sometimes takes control of migration issues, for instance 
of the projects developed under the accord de gestion concertée des flux migratoires 
with France (Interview 40). Ministries frequently change name, and therefore remit: the 
Ministry of Senegalese Abroad started as an independent ministry, was then incorpo-
rated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before being made independent again in 
2003; and the Ministry of Microfinance used to be part of the Ministry of Family (Diatta 
and Mbow, 1999, p.249; Interview 42). Interviewees particularly stress that there is 
rivalry between the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior (Interview 16; 20; 44). 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs guards its competence in external relations jealously; 
however the Ministry of Interior was tasked with conducting the negotiations with 
France on the accord de gestion concertée des flux migratoires (Interview 48). The 
accord was therefore signed by the Ministry of Interior, although the steering committee 
overseeing the implementation of the accord has been chaired by the secretary-general 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interview 37).  
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On the Mobility Partnership, interviewees in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs imply that 
coordination problems may have played a role in the domestic preference formation: the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarded the offer of a Mobility Partnership to other min-
istries with a request for proposals for projects. No reply was received (Interview 42). 
Despite this lack of coordination among the Senegalese ministries concerning migra-
tion, interviewees in the Commission acknowledge that the stalled negotiations on the 
Mobility Partnership cannot be explained only by this limited administrative capacity 
(Interview 17; 20). There may be no overall vision of or strategy on migration policy 
within the Senegalese government (Dia, 2009, p.14), but action on migration issues is 
still possible. Senegal has signed migration agreements with France, Spain and Italy, 
has implemented five programmes to promote the employment of women and young 
people, and has implemented three programmes to utilise the skills of Senegalese emi-
grants for the country’s development (IOM, 2009a, pp.28-29; cf. Panizzon, 2008). In 
2007, the Senegalese government and the EU signed a joint declaration stating their 
intention to cooperate on the management of migratory flows (Agence de Presse 
Sénégalaise, 2007). The limited administrative capacity of the Senegalese government 
has not stood in the way of any of these agreements and therefore cannot on its own 
explain the failure of the Mobility Partnership. Chou and Gibert (2012, p.417) reach the 
same conclusion: they argue that President Wade’s decision not to appoint one of his 
special advisors to deal with the Mobility Partnership “can be read as a covert strategy 
to stall the negotiations indefinitely”. 
6.5.3 Domestic costs of adopting the EU policy 
For both Senegal and Cape Verde, the main cost involved with signing a Mobility Part-
nership was the prospect of a readmission agreement with the EU. The Cape Verdean 
government hesitated for a long time regarding this agreement, but ultimately decided 
that the costs would be outweighed by the benefits of the visa facilitation agreement on 
offer. The Senegalese government perceived further problems with the structure of the 
Mobility Partnership which meant that the benefits being offered could not outweigh the 
substantial cost associated with a readmission agreement. 
 
The preamble of the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde is the only Mobility Partner-
ship not to include a commitment of the signatories to conclude and implement visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements (see chapter 4). However, the annex of pro-
posed projects includes a proposal by the Commission to request a negotiating mandate 
from the Council for a readmission agreement (Council, 2008c, p.13). Indeed, it has 
been clear ever since the Commission proposed the concept of Mobility Partnerships 
that this instrument would only be offered to countries willing to cooperate on illegal 
migration, including by signing a readmission agreement covering third country nation-
als (Commission, 2007a, p.4). A readmission agreement has therefore been a prospect in 
the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde since the beginning, and in February 2009 the 
Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations with Cape Verde (Council, 
2009d). However, this comes with significant costs for the Cape Verdean government, 
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and the more the Commission and member states insisted on this point, the more the 
government became concerned that “the readmission issue is at the heart of the Mobility 
Partnership; everything else is just window dressing” (Interview 66). Cape Verde is still 
a relatively poor country and is starting to have its own problems with immigration; the 
government therefore does not want to accept responsibility for the return of third-
country nationals (Interview 54), which is a requirement of an EU readmission agree-
ment. 
 Such a readmission agreement is therefore clearly costly for the Cape Verdean 
government. At the outset, the government accepted this cost because it perceived the 
Mobility Partnership to be about more than only the readmission agreement. Indeed, the 
government sees many advantages of the partnership: access to resources to improve 
border management; the opportunity to work with the Cape Verdean diaspora; and a 
permanent dialogue with the EU on migration issues (Interview 49; 59). Significantly, 
the government sees the Mobility Partnership as providing opportunities for mobility, 
which is important given that European immigration policies have become increasingly 
restrictive over the past years (Interview 58; Åkesson, 2008). There is strong mobility 
from Cape Verde to the EU, with the government estimating that 45% of the Cape Ver-
dean diaspora live in the EU (Interview 49). 
 The idea of the Mobility Partnership instrument is that countries that cooperate 
with the EU on illegal migration will be offered “better access to EU territory for their 
citizens” in return (Commission, 2007a, p.3). This might include facilitated access to 
the EU labour market and improvement of the procedures for issuing short-stay visas, 
including the possibility of a visa facilitation agreement (p.8). In Cape Verde, the EU 
visa procedure is seen as overly complicated (Interview 54; cf. Trauner and Kruse, 
2008b, p.6). Achieving visa-free travel for all its citizens to the EU is therefore a stated 
goal of the Cape Verdean government (Interview 7; 51). The government believes that a 
visa liberalisation agreement would therefore be a fair deal in return for signing the 
readmission agreement (Interview 66). In the first draft of the text of the Mobility Part-
nership, visa liberalisation was mentioned. However, by the time of the second draft, the 
EU had replaced this offer of visa liberalisation with one of visa facilitation (Interview 
49), which is in line with the Commission proposal on the Mobility Partnership instru-
ment. The Cape Verdean government accepts that this indicates that visa liberalisation 
is simply not possible at this time, and this is confirmed by an official of the EU delega-
tion (Interview 52). 
 In February 2009, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations 
with Cape Verde on a visa facilitation agreement (Council, 2009e). The Cape Verdean 
government is happy to accept a visa facilitation agreement as a step-by-step approach 
towards visa liberalisation, because, as one interviewee put it, if the government cannot 
solve the EU visa problem for all Cape Verdean citizens, it can at least solve it for some 
citizens (Interview 65). The Cape Verdean government displays understanding of how 
the EU functions. Officials understand that, on issues such as visa liberalisation, it is not 
only ‘Brussels’ taking the decision, but rather the member states (Interview 56). They 
are also aware that immigration policy remains a member state competence (Interview 
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59), but equally that EU governance is in flux and the situation may change as a result 
of the Lisbon treaty (Interview 51).  
 There has been considerable anger within the government, and particularly within 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about the pressure from the EU to sign the readmission 
agreement. In order to secure the conclusion of the readmission agreement, the Com-
mission and member states have from the beginning made it clear that this is a pre-
condition for a visa facilitation agreement to be signed. This bundling of the agree-
ments, combined with the Cape Verdean government’s desire to ease the visa process 
for its citizens travelling to the EU, led to the agreements being signed together on 24 
April 2012 (Commission, 2012d; 2012e). The Cape Verdean government was not able 
to prevent the inclusion of third country nationals and stateless persons in the readmis-
sion agreement. However, a joint declaration is attached to the agreement stating that 
“the parties will endeavour to return any third-country national . . . to his or her country 
of origin” (Commission, 2012d, p.33). Such a declaration is not found in the readmis-
sion agreements signed with the other Mobility Partnership countries.84 
 The 2011 Commission communication on the Global Approach indicates that, 
where a readmission agreement and visa facilitation agreement are in place and are 
properly implemented, the EU could consider taking steps towards visa liberalisation 
for individual partner countries, “taking into account the overall relationship with the 
partner country concerned” (Commission, 2011b, p.11). Given the existence of both a 
Mobility Partnership and a Special Partnership, Cape Verde might be a test case of this 
commitment. 
 
The Senegalese government is wary of making international agreements on readmis-
sion. Emigration can be a ‘safety valve’ for the many unemployed Senegalese (Fall et 
al., 2010, p.10): the unemployment rate was estimated to be 48% in 2007 (CIA World 
Factbook, 2011b). Government officials view the return of illegal migrants who have 
‘failed’ in their migration attempts as a security risk (Dia, 2009, p.35). A readmission 
agreement would therefore have a “negative impact on the relationship between the 
state and society” (Cassarino, 2010, p.23). Given also the financial contribution made 
by the diaspora through remittances, it is clear that there would be significant costs 
associated with the acceptance of a readmission agreement. 
 Readmission has already proven to be an obstacle in bilateral agreements and al-
most caused the failure of the negotiations on the accord de gestion concertée des flux 
migratoires between Senegal and France (Assemblée Nationale, 2009, p.29). The 
agreement is one of the only bilateral agreements signed between France and a third 
country that does not contain a clause on the readmission of third country nationals, 
presumably due to Senegalese opposition and leverage as an important country of origin 
of immigrants to the EU (Panizzon, 2012, p.122). The final text of the agreement con-
tains a readmission clause, which states: “La France et le Sénégal s’engagent à accepter 
                                                          
84 The declaration is not included in the readmission agreements signed with Moldova and Georgia. As of July 
20213, the readmission agreement with Armenia has been initialled but the text is not yet publicly available. 
The readmission agreement with Morocco has not yet been concluded. 
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. . . le retour sur leur territoire de leurs ressortissants se trouvant en situation irrégulière 
sur le territoire de l’autre Partie”.85 The article goes on to establish which documents are 
acceptable as proof of nationality in readmission cases. This is the key to readmission 
agreements, because “states do not usually outright reject readmitting their nationals, 
but they can obstruct or delay the process by refusing to issue documents or identifying 
their nationals” (Klavert and van Seters, 2012, p.2). French officials complain that, 
since the signature of the agreement, the Senegalese embassy in Paris has actually be-
come less willing to provide illegal Senegalese migrants with the travel documents 
needed for their repatriation, despite the inclusion of the readmission clause (Interview 
37). Senegalese officials respond that the government does not see the clause as an 
obligation to readmit, but rather a commitment to discuss the issue of readmission at a 
later stage (Interview 41).86 Senegal also refused to sign a bilateral readmission agree-
ment covering third country nationals proposed by Spain: “The agreement would be 
accompanied by a substantial offer of cooperation aid (15m euros over five years) and 
moreover greater open legal migration channels for Senegalese . . . Yet in the estimation 
of the Senegalese, the migration benefits for nationals would not offset the significant 
return costs for non-nationals” (Roig and Huddleston, 2007, p.378). 
 In the case of the Mobility Partnerships, the Senegalese government considered it 
unlikely that the nature of the partnership would provide the benefits necessary to com-
pensate for the costs of the readmission agreement (Interview 42; 48). The financial 
benefits for Senegal of signing a Mobility Partnership were unclear – Commission and 
member state officials had not discussed this issue in depth, and no firm conclusions 
had been reached in this regard (Chou and Gibert, 2012, p.418). Participation in the 
Mobility Partnership would be voluntary for the EU member states. This would mean 
that not all member states would have to contribute to or finance the Mobility Partner-
ship, but any member state could still hold Senegal to a readmission agreement signed 
in the framework of the partnership because such agreements are EU-wide (Interview 
46).87 The Senegalese government was also aware that signing a Mobility Partnership 
would not automatically result in measures for increased mobility, such as a visa facili-
tation agreement (Interview 1). Of the 18 readmission agreements in force, signed, or 
                                                          
85 Décret no. 2009-1073 du 26 août 2009 portant publication de l’accord entre le Gouvernement de la 
République française et le Gouvernement de la République du Sénégal relatif à la gestion concertée des flux 
migratoires (ensemble trois annexes et une déclaration), signé à Dakar le 23 septembre 2006, et avenant à cet 
accord (ensemble deux annexes), signé à Dakar le 25 février 2008. Retrieved 16 January 2012 from 
http://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr/  
86 This is similar to article 13(5) of the Cotonou Agreement, which states that “at the request of a Party, nego-
tiations shall be initiated with ACP States aiming at concluding . . . bilateral agreements governing specific 
obligations for the readmission and return of their nationals. These agreements shall also cover, if deemed 
necessary by any of the Parties arrangements for the readmission of third country nationals and stateless 
persons”. However, the Commission views this as a legal obligation to conclude readmission agreements, and 
therefore considers it unnecessary to offer further financial incentives to ACP countries (Commission, 2003, 
p.14). 
87 EU readmission agreements do not apply to Denmark due to its opt-out from the area of freedom, security 
and justice. Readmission agreements only apply to the UK and Ireland if they decide to opt in to them (Cole-
man, 2009). 
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being negotiated as of February 2011, only 10 were coupled with a visa facilitation 
agreement (Commission, 2011i). Visa facilitation agreements are an important incentive 
for the negotiation of readmission agreements (Council, 2011f), but “the existence of a 
readmission agreement, or the willingness of a third-country to negotiate one, does not 
automatically nor routinely lead to the opening of negotiations on a visa facilitation 
agreement” (Council, 2005b, p.3). Cape Verde is the only African country to date to be 
offered a visa facilitation agreement; agreements have instead been negotiated with 
countries in eastern and south-eastern Europe, although the Commission suggested in 
2011 to offer agreements to southern Mediterranean countries (Commission, 2011e).  
6.6 EU-third country interaction: size of the win-sets 
Section 6.5 accounted for the domestic preference formation on the Mobility Partner-
ship in Cape Verde and Senegal. The Cape Verdean government judged that the ex-
pected benefits of the partnership would outweigh the expected costs, whereas the Sen-
egalese government reached the opposite conclusion. Ultimately a partnership was 
signed with Cape Verde whilst negotiations with Senegal stalled and were then aban-
doned. This section explains the dynamics of the game between the EU and Cape 
Verde/Senegal by examining the size of the win-set for each actor. This can account for 
the outcome of the negotiations. The section shows that the EU’s member states are 
very much present in this game, through the influence of their bilateral migration 
agreements, and through their control of the Commission’s power to negotiate an 
agreement. 
6.6.1 Cost of no agreement for the EU 
Chapter 2 outlined that the cost of no agreement for the EU is assumed to be high. This 
is because both the Commission and Council have repeatedly outlined the importance of 
cooperation with third countries on migration issues. Senegal and Cape Verde were 
selected for Mobility Partnerships for very different reasons, but the cost of no agree-
ment for the EU was still high in both cases: Cape Verde was one of the first two coun-
tries to be offered a Mobility Partnership, so failure of the negotiations would have been 
embarrassing for the EU; and Senegal was seen as the first real test for the Mobility 
Partnership concept. 
 Cape Verde was selected for a Mobility Partnership not so much because of its 
importance in terms of migration flows to the EU, but rather due to its image as an 
“easy” country with which to cooperate. Failure of one of the first two Mobility Partner-
ships to be negotiated would have been embarrassing, and so a ‘safe’ choice of partner 
country was made. There is an informal understanding between the Commission and the 
member states that there will be a “balance between east and south” in the GAM (Inter-
view 5; 13; 20; 21; 22; 28; 32), and there was therefore a need to find an African coun-
try with which the concept of Mobility Partnerships could be tested. Cape Verde was 
considered an ideal candidate because it has been willing to cooperate on security is-
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sues, which are normally seen as being sensitive and therefore a difficult area for coop-
eration between the EU and third countries (Interview 12). The ‘migration pressure’ 
from a country with only 500,000 inhabitants can also be considered limited (Interview 
56).  
 In contrast, Commission officials were aware that Senegal would be the first real 
test for the concept of Mobility Partnerships because there is and has been significant 
migration from Senegal to the EU (Interview 1; Chou and Gibert, 2010; van Criekinge, 
2010, p.7). This implies that the cost of no agreement was high because this was seen as 
a true test of the policy instrument. Indeed, the failure of the partnership with Senegal 
led the Commission to conclude in its evaluation that “the pre-selection process should . 
. . benefit from a more strategic reflection and approach . . . and more clarity in relation 
to the objectives that the EU interested Member States and the Commission want to 
achieve” (Commission, 2009d, p.3).  
 The two countries were also selected in very different ways: Cape Verde played an 
active role in becoming a candidate country for a pilot Mobility Partnership, by request-
ing member states to propose Cape Verde to the Commission (Interview 65).88 Among 
the member states, Spain and Portugal in particular supported the idea, and were active 
in suggesting Cape Verde as a partner country for a Mobility Partnership in informal 
discussions between the Commission and member states (Interview 52). The process of 
selecting Cape Verde was therefore a reciprocal one between the Cape Verdean gov-
ernment on the one hand, and the member states and the Commission on the other. Sen-
egal, in contrast, was approached by the EU (Interview 11) and therefore selected in a 
more one-sided way. Interviewees were divided over how Senegal was selected as a 
partner country. Some indicated that the Commission initiated the process, seeing ad-
vantages to a Mobility Partnership with Senegal (Interview 17). Others assign impor-
tance to member states’ preferences (Interview 13), with Spain particularly favouring a 
Mobility Partnership with Senegal (Interview 16; 20). Regardless of whether the mem-
ber states or the Commission initiated the process leading to Senegal being selected, 
Council conclusions were adopted in June 2008 authorising the Commission to open 
negotiations with Senegal before the Senegalese authorities were consulted (Interview 
17). The risk of ‘no agreement’ being the outcome of the negotiations was therefore 
much more present than for the ‘easier’ case of Cape Verde. 
6.6.2 Cost of no agreement for the third countries 
The Senegalese and Cape Verdean governments perceived the cost of no agreement on 
the Mobility Partnerships very differently. For the Cape Verdean government, achieving 
closer relations with the EU is a cornerstone of its foreign policy (Interview 7). Mem-
bership of ECOWAS is not seen as satisfactory for the country’s political ambitions due 
to the corruption and unbalanced development in West Africa, and the fact that Cape 
Verde’s main trading partners are in Europe (Interview 56). In 2011, the three most 
important countries for Cape Verdean exports were Spain, Portugal and Morocco, and 
                                                          
88 Although Cape Verde did not submit a formal written proposal to the Commission until after the Commis-
sion and member states had agreed to select Cape Verde for a Mobility Partnership (Commission, 2009, p.3). 
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the three most important countries for imports to Cape Verde were Portugal, the Nether-
lands and Spain (CIA World Factbook, 2011a). The 2008-2013 country strategy paper 
also notes Cape Verde’s lack of involvement in ECOWAS – for instance, Cape Verde is 
not much involved in the decision-making process of ECOWAS and does not contribute 
to its financial mechanisms (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008). Cape Verde is 
one of the most stable democracies in Africa (CIA World Factbook, 2011a), and the 
government therefore believes that cooperation with Cape Verde can be interesting for 
the EU as an example that democracy in Africa can be successful (Interview 56; Cape 
Verde-European Community, 2008, p.6). The EU delegation in Praia agrees, noting that 
Cape Verde lacks many of the problems (such as corruption) that other ACP countries 
grapple with (Interview 52). 
 The Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde should also be understood within the 
framework of the Special Partnership between the EU and Cape Verde (Interview 20). 
The Special Partnership has important symbolic value for the Cape Verdean govern-
ment because it provides for a permanent, structured dialogue with the EU, despite the 
fact that it does not incorporate a financial envelope (Interview 51; 56). The Cape Ver-
dean government saw the Mobility Partnership as a chance to further develop the Spe-
cial Partnership (Interview 56). Indeed, since its signature the Mobility Partnership has 
frequently been referred to as “the most dynamic aspect of the Special Partnership” 
(Interview 13; 38; 61). A starting point for the Special Partnership was the pillar on 
security. The Commission communication states that this pillar covers cooperation on  
transnational organized crime (cooperation on counter-terrorism, human trafficking 
and the smuggling of immigrants, illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, money-
laundering), whilst promoting respect for human rights; effective management of 
migration, including improving the contribution of the Cape Verdean diaspora to 
the development of the country (remittances) and action to tackle illegal migration; 
maritime safety (Commission, 2007b, p.5).  
These issues are also highlighted in the national indicative programme for Cape Verde, 
where the “improved management of migratory flows” is one objective to be achieved 
in support of national security (Cape Verde-European Community, 2008, p.39). It is 
particularly the issue of drugs that concerns the Cape Verdean government. In 2005, 
Cape Verde requested the assistance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
and the CAVE INTECRIN programme (Cape Verde Integrated Crime and Narcotic 
Programme on strengthening the rule of law) was launched, with funds contributed by 
the Commission, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (UNODC, 2005). The Cape 
Verdean government sees that the EU has an interest in cooperating with Cape Verde on 
drug trafficking, as the drugs that pass through Cape Verde are headed for the European 
market (Interview 49; 51; 56). For the government, the issue of drugs is also related to 
migration – those in the diaspora who have criminal records have generally been in-
volved with drugs in some way (Interview 56). Sometimes these people are then de-
ported back to Cape Verde, creating further problems with reintegration (Interview 55). 
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Given the immense symbolic value for the Cape Verdean government of the relation-
ship with the EU, the cost of no agreement on the Mobility Partnership was very high. 
For the Senegalese government, on the other hand, the cost of no agreement was low 
due to the existence of bilateral alternatives. The existence of bilateral alternatives is not 
specific to Senegal: Cape Verde also had bilateral cooperation programmes on migra-
tion with some EU countries. However, the two countries evaluated these bilateral 
agreements differently: the Cape Verdean government saw benefits to the Mobility 
Partnership, and these benefits were not negatively affected by the existence of bilateral 
cooperation. The Senegalese government, on the other hand, is aware of the fact that EU 
migration policy is limited by the structure of decision-making – member states must 
collectively agree on measures to be taken (Interview 48). Given such “negative percep-
tions of the EU’s capabilities in migration management”, the government prefers to deal 
bilaterally with the member states whose agendas are often much more appropriate for 
Senegal’s own preferences (van Criekinge, 2010, p.12; Chou and Gibert, 2012). The 
availability of such bilateral alternatives makes the cost of no agreement on EU propos-
als low. Indeed, due to their competence over labour migration policy, member states 
can make offers to third countries which the EU is not capable of competing with. In its 
bilateral migration agreements, for instance, France offers students of the third countries 
concerned a 6- or 9-month permit to remain in France for a first professional experience 
after they complete their studies (European Migration Network, 2010f, p.29). Such 
bilateral initiatives are weakening the Commission’s bargaining position with third 
countries. The competition between member states to offer the most attractive agree-
ment has built the confidence of the Senegalese government to make demands of bilat-
eral partners and say ‘no’ to the EU when it feels the agreement being offered is not 
satisfactory, such as with the Mobility Partnership (Panizzon, 2008; Interview 1; 28). 
The most important bilateral partners in terms of migration are France, Spain and Italy. 
These are also the member states implementing migration projects in Senegal using 
funding from the EU’s Thematic Programme (see table 6.1). 
 France and Senegal have a long history of cooperating on migration, and France 
has also implemented several programmes in Senegal with EU co-financing. One exam-
ple is the partenariat pour la gestion des migrations professionnelles (in cooperation 
with the Belgian and Italian authorities and IOM) which aims to promote circular labour 
migration and capacity-building in Benin, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal (Commission, 
2010e). At the bilateral level, an agreement entered into force already in 1980 offering 
professional training to Senegalese living in France, in preparation for their return to 
Senegal. A co-development convention was signed between France and Senegal in 
2000, with the aim of directing the diaspora’s resources towards the development of 
Senegal (Panizzon, 2008). In 2006, Senegal signed the first agreement on the joint man-
agement of migratory flows with France (accord de gestion concertée des flux 
migratoires). The agreement covers cooperation on visas, residence permits, border 
control, return of illegal migrants, and migration and development. The central pro-
gramme being implemented under the agreement is PAISD (Programme d’Appui aux 
Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement), which aims to help Senegalese living 
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in France to contribute to the development of Senegal through investments, projects, or 
expertise (Interview 37; Ministry of Senegalese Abroad, n.d. b). Significantly, the 
agreement with France was signed in two rounds, the first being concluded in 2006 and 
the second in 2008. The reason for the renegotiation was dissatisfaction on the Senegal-
ese side with the first agreement, which did not offer more in terms of migration oppor-
tunities than the existing French immigration law. French visas target highly-skilled 
migrants, and the Senegalese government was therefore concerned about a possible 
brain drain (Panizzon, 2008, p.2). The second agreement signed in 2008 extends the 
clause on return of illegal migrants, but in return lists over 100 professions which are 
opened up to Senegalese. This means that a French employer in one of these professions 
may hire a Senegalese without having to prove that no other suitable candidate can be 
found in the French or European labour market (Interview 37; 43). Professions covered 
by the agreement include tourism, security, agriculture, transport, ICT, and health.89 
Such legal migration opportunities are precisely what the Senegalese government seeks 
in agreements with Europe (Gerdes, 2007, p.4; Interview 35) and the government is 
therefore satisfied with the agreement, describing it as a “good deal” (Interview 41; 48). 
 Spain has seen an enormous increase in the number of West African migrants arriv-
ing on its territory since 2004-2005, and has therefore launched a major policy towards 
the region, including the opening of new embassies (Interview 39). In its 2009-2012 
Africa Plan, the Spanish government lists as one of the six main objectives the consoli-
dation of the partnership with Africa on migration (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2009). In Senegal, Spain has “signed a Basic Development Cooperation Agreement . . . 
cancelled €65.5 million from Senegal’s external debt, and started preparations for estab-
lishing a Fund for Concession of Microcredit” (Fall et al., 2010, p.15). In 2006, in re-
sponse to the rising number of West African migrants making the journey to Europe, 
Spain and Senegal signed a memorandum of understanding. The agreement is a trans-
parent trade-off between labour migration and illegal migration: Senegal received work 
permits for 4,000 Senegalese to work temporarily in Spain and funding for job training 
in Senegal, and in return had to accept Frontex patrols in its territorial waters and the 
return of 4,000 illegal Senegalese migrants by Spain (Panizzon, 2008). In 2007, Spain 
and Senegal signed a more comprehensive agreement on migration matters which in-
cluded provision for 2700 Senegalese workers (in agriculture and fisheries) to go to 
Spain (ibid.). Like France, Spain has implemented projects with EU financing, such as 
the Seahorse project on border controls and interregional cooperation between Cape 
Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal (Commission, 
2010e). 
 Panizzon (2008, p.34) argues that a central difference between the French and 
Spanish approaches to bilateral cooperation on migration with Senegal is that Spain has 
                                                          
89 Décret no. 2009-1073 du 26 août 2009 portant publication de l’accord entre le Gouvernement de la 
République française et le Gouvernement de la République du Sénégal relatif à la gestion concertée des flux 
migratoires (ensemble trois annexes et une déclaration), signé à Dakar le 23 septembre 2006, et avenant à cet 
accord (ensemble deux annexes), signé à Dakar le 25 février 2008. Retrieved 16 January 2012 from 
http://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr/ 
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been “quicker than France in opening its labour market on a quota-basis to Senegalese 
migrant workers and more pragmatic in the sense that it will offer pre-departure orienta-
tion, linguistic and pre-employment training to the low-skilled or even unemployed 
workers in Senegal”. This willingness to open channels for labour migration explains 
why the cooperation is positively viewed by the Senegalese government – interviewees 
feel that this is an effective way to respond to the problem of illegal migration, as op-
posed to the French immigration policy which is selective and favours the highly-skilled 
(Interview 45). The 2008 renegotiation of the French agreement with Senegal (which 
facilitated access to the French labour market for around 100 professions) was a re-
sponse by France to the Spanish cooperation with Senegal (Panizzon, 2008, p.2). This 
demonstrates that the competition between EU member states strengthens the Senegal-
ese negotiating position on migration matters: the possibility for cooperation with sev-
eral different bilateral partners reduces the cost of no agreement of any single instance 
of cooperation. Senegal can also benefit from different types of funding because the 
partners may be duplicating their efforts (Interview 23). This seems to be the case with 
the general observatory on migratory flows created under the French-Senegalese migra-
tion agreement, and the observatory on emigration envisaged under Spain’s framework 
agreement with West African countries (Panizzon, 2008, p.13). 
 After France introduced a visa requirement for Senegalese citizens in 1985, Italy 
became the most important country of destination for Senegalese migrants (Gerdes, 
2007, p.3). Senegal is the main recipient of Italian development aid in West Africa, and 
Italy has also carried out projects with co-financing from the EU. One example is the 
COOPI project which ran in the period 2004-2006 and aimed to support development-
related initiatives by the Senegalese diaspora (Fall et al., 2010, p.16). The project MIDA 
(Migration for Development in Africa) is the result of cooperation between the Italian 
government and IOM. MIDA aims to improve knowledge transfer from the diaspora in 
order to stimulate development (Ndione and Broekhuis, 2006, p.22). Senegal has also 
benefited from an annual quota of work permits for Italy. In 2008, this was fixed at 
1,000, although the decision is taken unilaterally by Italy (Dia, 2009, p.29). 
 It is important to note that Cape Verde, like Senegal, also cooperates bilaterally 
with EU member states on migration issues, mainly with Portugal, Spain and France. 
However, the symbolic importance of the relationship with the EU meant that the cost 
of no agreement for the Cape Verdean government on the Mobility Partnership was not 
reduced by the existence of these bilateral alternatives for cooperation. Spain has helped 
to patrol Cape Verdean waters (Carling, 2008, p.11). Labour migration agreements have 
been concluded with both Spain and France. However, despite the fact that both agree-
ments are signed and ratified by both parties, no Cape Verdeans have yet migrated un-
der these schemes due to the economic crisis in Europe (Interview 49; 62). A bilateral 
labour migration agreement with Portugal has been in place since 1997, allowing Cape 
Verdeans to work in Portugal for up to three years, subject to having an employment 
contract. However, this scheme has not been much used, partly due to the difficulty of 
finding employment contracts and partly due to a lack of information about the scheme 
(Carling, 2002, p.28). The labour migration scheme with France falls under the agree-
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ment on the joint management of migratory flows (accord de gestion concertée des flux 
migratoires) signed between France and Cape Verde. This agreement incorporates fa-
cilitated access to the French labour market for 40 selected professions; readmission and 
police cooperation; reinsertion of migrants returning to Cape Verde; and co-
development with the diaspora in France (Interview 35).  
6.6.3 Ratification procedure within the EU 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the number of institutional veto-players within the EU on 
the issue of Mobility Partnerships is small. Due to the fact that the partnerships are non-
legally binding political declarations, neither the European Parliament nor the other EU 
institutions play any role in the negotiations. The decision-making process is therefore 
the domain of the Commission and the member states (in the Council).  
 In terms of the EU-third country interaction, the control exercised by the member 
states over the Mobility Partnerships made the ratification procedure difficult: the 
Commission does not have the autonomy to make proposals or concessions to third 
countries, because ultimately member states shape the content of the Mobility Partner-
ships through the projects they propose. On the surface, the Commission appears to play 
the central role in the negotiations with third countries on Mobility Partnerships: after a 
partner country has been selected, in agreement with the member states, the Commis-
sion negotiates the partnership on behalf of the EU. However, member states are very 
much present in the interaction between the EU and third countries, because of their 
control of the content of the proposed partnership. The Commission is therefore con-
strained in the negotiation strategies it can adopt with third countries, in that it can only 
offer that which member states are prepared to give (Interview 1). It cannot yield to 
third countries’ preferences for certain types of projects because it does not have the 
power to elicit offers from member states for specific projects. In the case of the part-
nership with Cape Verde, for instance, the government of Luxembourg simply trans-
ferred all their planned or ongoing bilateral projects to the ‘umbrella’ of the Mobility 
Partnership (Interview 53), despite the fact that Commission officials hoped for propos-
als for new projects that would not otherwise have been implemented (Interview 30). 
The Commission is also not in a position to use ‘hard bargaining’ strategies such as 
threats against the member states, because it relies on their support – it is the member 
states which must propose the projects that form the substance of the Mobility Partner-
ships, and they must agree (on a voluntary basis) to take part in a partnership. Without 
member state participation, there can be no Mobility Partnership. The concerns of the 
Cape Verdean government about the readmission agreement might easily have been 
assuaged by removing the clause relating to third country nationals; this is a move that 
the Commission advocates in general in relation to readmission agreements (Commis-
sion, 2011c, p.9), however the member states in the Council continue to insist that the 
third country national clause must stay (Council, 2011a, p.6). The Commission is there-
fore not in a position to make such a concession during the negotiation of a Mobility 
Partnership. However, it is also in no position to use ‘hard bargaining’ strategies against 
the third countries: as outlined in chapter 2, there are no sanctions for third countries 
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choosing not to sign a Mobility Partnership. Making threats or criticising third countries 
would thus not contribute to the goal of agreeing a Mobility Partnership. In its interac-
tion with third countries, then, the Commission finds itself in a Catch-22: it is not able 
to adopt a ‘soft bargaining’ strategy because member states control the Mobility Part-
nership instrument, but neither is it able to adopt a ‘hard bargaining’ strategy because 
there are no sanctions imposed on third countries for not signing a Mobility Partnership.  
6.6.4 Ratification procedure within the third countries 
For Cape Verde, the ratification procedure on the Mobility Partnerships was easy as the 
process was controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This ministry could thus act 
autonomously. The ambassador in Brussels led the negotiations with the EU, and the 
minister of foreign affairs in Cape Verde created a working group which included repre-
sentatives of the ministries of Labour and Interior. A secretariat within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was set up to oversee the implementation of the partnership and coordi-
nate the necessary input from other institutions such as the Institute of Communities or 
the Institute of Professional Training and Employment (Interview 51). The process in 
Cape Verde was therefore rather bureaucratic and apolitical, particularly given the con-
sensus within the government on the desirability of closer relations with the EU (see 
sub-section 6.6.2). Cape Verdean citizens are very concerned with achieving the possi-
bility to travel easily to Europe (especially to Portugal) to visit friends and relatives 
(Interview 51), but the repatriation of migrants from Europe to Cape Verde, as is possi-
ble under the readmission agreement, does not play a significant role in the public de-
bate. 
 For Senegal, the story is rather different, and the government faced a potentially 
difficult ratification procedure for the Mobility Partnership to be agreed. The difficulties 
could stem from three sources: the Senegalese parliament, civil society, and public 
opinion. The Senegalese parliament has, in the past, demonstrated its opposition to 
readmission agreements. In 2003, Senegal and Switzerland signed a readmission agree-
ment which was the first of its kind to include the return of third-country nationals. 
However, the Senegalese parliament refused to ratify the agreement (Ellermann, 2008, 
p.168; Panizzon, 2008, p.29; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010, p.4). It is therefore unlikely 
that the Parliament would ratify an EU-wide readmission agreement, including provi-
sions for returning third-country nationals, which would ultimately be a requirement for 
a Mobility Partnership. The Senegalese government also faces pressure from civil soci-
ety groups. In 2008, CONGAD, a Senegalese grouping of NGOs, issued a statement in 
response to the adoption of the EU returns directive, condemning the human rights 
implications and underscoring the right of people to move freely in search of a better 
existence (CONGAD, 2008). Unions and NGOs in Senegal are also critical of the legal 
migration policies of European countries, which they see as a route to brain drain be-
cause these policies focus on elite and highly-skilled migration (Dia, 2009, p.24). While 
it is true that many Senegalese dream of migrating to Europe (e.g. Poeze, 2010), the 
public debate is also informed by the repatriation of migrants from Europe back to Sen-
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egal.90 Public opinion would therefore not look favourably on the government signing 
an agreement with the EU (Interview 1). 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has accounted for the different preferences of the Cape Verdean and Sene-
galese governments on the Mobility Partnerships, and the outcome of their interaction 
with the EU. Neither Cape Verde nor Senegal were engaged in a process of dialogue 
and persuasion by the EU; instead, the offer of a Mobility Partnership was of a ‘take it 
or leave it’ character. Faced with this offer, the two governments reached very different 
conclusions about the value of a Mobility Partnership. The partnership resonated well 
with Cape Verdean migration policy goals, and the cost of a readmission agreement was 
ultimately deemed to be outweighed by the benefits being offered. In contrast, the pro-
posed Mobility Partnership did not resonate with the Senegalese approach to migration 
policy, and a readmission agreement was considered too high a cost for the meagre 
benefits being offered. For Cape Verde, the cost of no agreement was high because 
closer relations with the EU are a cornerstone of Cape Verdean foreign policy. For Sen-
egal, the cost of no agreement was low due to the availability of bilateral alternatives for 
migration cooperation. The ratification procedure in Cape Verde was easy, but the Sen-
egalese government would have faced a potentially difficult ratification procedure due 
to public and parliamentary opposition to readmission agreements. The cost of no 
agreement for the EU was high in both cases. The ratification procedure in the EU was 
difficult due to the constraints placed on the Commission in terms of content of the 
Mobility Partnerships. Figure 6.5 illustrates why agreement was possible on the Mobil-
ity Partnership with Cape Verde, but not on the Mobility Partnership with Senegal. The 
win-sets of the EU and Cape Verde overlap, while the win-sets of the EU and Senegal 
do not overlap.  
 
EU ------------------------------------[-------]---------------------------[------------- Third country 
                                                   CV1    EU1                                S1 
Figure 6.5: EU-third country interaction. 
 
Tracing the process of the decision-making procedure on these Mobility Partnerships 
has shown that the policy conditionality model can account for the Cape Verdean and 
Senegalese governments’ decisions on whether to cooperate with the EU. This approach 
highlights the difference in the cost-benefit calculations of the Cape Verdean and Sene-
galese governments as the reasons for their preferences on the Mobility Partnerships. In 
                                                          
90 Coleman (2009, p.153) makes a similar argument in relation to Morocco’s reluctance to sign a readmission 
agreement: “a repeated argument of the Moroccan authorities is that conclusion of a readmission agreement 
with the Community would be difficult to sell to the public”. In return for signing a readmission agreement, 
Morocco has demanded compensation that would be clearly visible to Moroccan citizens, such as increased 
opportunities for labour migration to the EU. 
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neither case was there evidence of the EU engaging these governments in a process of 
dialogue or persuasion. Both the Senegalese and Cape Verdean governments view EU 
readmission requirements as inappropriate, and yet they made different decisions on the 
Mobility Partnership. The social learning model cannot account for the different out-
comes in the two cases. This chapter has also highlighted that the existence of bilateral 
relations may alter the cost of no agreement to a third country of a Mobility Partnership, 
as in the case of Senegal. This places the Commission in a tricky, and weak, bargaining 
position when negotiating Mobility Partnerships. Member states are, in effect, under-
mining the ability of the Commission to negotiate with third countries by maintaining 
more favourable bilateral relations than that which is being offered by the EU. This is 
demonstrated particularly well by the case of France: the French government, as all 
other member states’ governments, did not believe that legal migration opportunities 
should be included in EU Mobility Partnerships (see chapter 5). However, its own bilat-
eral migration agreement with Senegal opens up certain professions to allow Senegalese 
easier access to the French labour market. The Senegalese government knew that the 
EU Mobility Partnership would be unlikely to offer such favourable terms, due to the 
shared competence between the EU and the member states. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
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7.1 Introduction 
Immigration to the EU is not a new phenomenon, but migrants trying to reach EU terri-
tory take increasingly more dangerous routes, putting their lives at risk. The EU is 
popularly referred to as ‘Fortress Europe’, to reflect the restrictive immigration policies 
adopted both at EU level and by the member states. And yet there is a gap between the 
objectives and achievements of such restrictive migration policies: the official rhetoric 
may be something close to ‘zero immigration’, at least for low-skilled migrants, but the 
long sea borders in southern Europe, with the African coast not far away, tempt many 
migrants to make the clandestine journey to the EU. In the early 2000s, a policy context 
emerged at the EU level which sought to link migration policy with foreign policy: 
foreign policy should be employed to achieve migration control objectives. This raises 
many questions, both in terms of internal and external governance. Third countries do 
not necessarily share the interest of the EU in preventing illegal migration, so why 
would they choose to cooperate? And within the EU, both migration policy and foreign 
policy are sensitive topics for member states’ sovereignty, so why would they choose to 
participate in such EU measures? 
 Against this background, the Commission introduced the Mobility Partnerships in 
2007. The Mobility Partnerships are one of the tools of the EU’s Global Approach to 
Migration. They are political agreements, signed between the Commission, interested 
member states, and third countries. The rationale is to offer these third countries in-
creased legal migration opportunities for their citizens to travel to the EU, in return for 
their cooperation on preventing illegal migration. Mobility Partnerships are differenti-
ated according to the third country with which they are signed, but always consist of a 
joint declaration followed by a list of proposed projects to be implemented. Projects are 
proposed by the Commission, member states, and/or the third country. A Mobility Part-
nership is thus an umbrella for these various projects. An example of a project from the 
Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde is a proposal by Portugal to establish a common 
visa centre for the issuance of short-stay visas in Praia (Council, 2008c, p.10). 
 The focus of this research was on the decision-making process on EU external 
migration policy. The central research question was: How does the interaction between 
EU institutions, member states and third countries shape the governance of the EU’s 
external migration policy? Chapter 2 argued that the decision-making process on the 
Mobility Partnerships can only be fully understood by applying a three-level game 
model. Three-level game models have been applied to EU external policies by other 
scholars (e.g. Larsén, 2007; Patterson, 1997; Collinson, 1999; Young, 2003), but this 
thesis makes two innovative contributions to the existing literature: it is the first piece to 
accurately conceptualise the model in terms of the preferences of the actors involved, 
how the levels are linked, and what the conditions are for agreements to be reached; and 
it is the first application of a three-level model to a field other than external trade policy, 
namely external migration policy. This chapter outlines the findings of the research and 
sets out avenues for future research. 
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7.2 The three-level game model 
This is not the first piece of research to posit that EU external policies can be thought of 
as an interaction between the EU institutions, the member states, and the third countries. 
However, previous applications of such a three-level model have been under-specified 
(see chapter 2). Even the important contribution by Patterson (1997) contains three 
important omissions: it fails to account systematically and theoretically for member 
states’ and third countries’ preference formation; it does not clearly enough indicate the 
link between the two interactions in the model; and it does not systematically outline the 
cost of no agreement and ratification procedure, which are different for the different 
actors in the game. 
 This research therefore marks a significant contribution to this fledgling literature 
and indicates a way forward for three-level games. It has presented a complete concep-
tualisation of the three-level game model, including the links between the three levels, 
the theoretical explanations for member states’ and third countries’ preferences, and the 
determinants of the size of the win-set for each actor (see figure 7.1). At the interna-
tional level (level I), the EU and third countries negotiate on migration issues. Third 
countries’ preferences can be accounted for either by the policy conditionality or social 
learning model. The policy conditionality model is a rationalist explanation which pos-
its that third countries will cooperate with the EU if the expected benefits of doing so 
outweigh the expected costs. This cost-benefit calculation by third countries will depend 
on three factors: (i) the resonance of the EU policy with national policy objectives; (ii) 
the administrative capacity of the target state; and (iii) the domestic costs of adopting 
the EU policy. The social learning model is a constructivist explanation according to 
which the third country is persuaded of the legitimacy and appropriateness of EU migra-
tion initiatives in a process of dialogue with the EU. 
 The EU level (level II) is the decision-making process within the EU, between the 
EU institutions and the member states in the Council, on external migration policy. 
There is a tension between the Commission and the member states. The Commission 
seeks to expand the role of the EU in external migration policy, in order to maximise its 
own competences – by default, if there is no EU external migration policy, there is no 
role for the Commission. The member states, on the other hand, seek to maintain control 
over a policy area which is central to their sovereignty, straddling as it does both migra-
tion policy and foreign policy. These are both matters of ‘high’ politics, and the member 
states are reluctant to allow too much interference from the EU institutions on such 
matters. 
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The member state level (level III) refers to the domestic preference formation of the 
member states on EU external migration policy. Member states’ preferences can be 
accounted for either by a rationalist or constructivist explanation (although see section 
7.4). According to a rationalist cost-benefit explanation, member states will participate 
in EU external migration policy when the expected benefits of doing so outweigh the 
expected costs. A potential benefit of participation would be the opportunity to achieve 
policy objectives that cannot be realised at the national level. Participation will be costly 
if it encroaches on a special bilateral relationship or if there is incongruence between 
EU external migration policy and national policy objectives. A constructivist national 
identity explanation of member states’ preferences holds that a ‘logic of appropriate-
ness’ is at play: rather than considering participation in EU external migration policy in 
means-end terms, member states’ governments will participate if such policy measures 
match a national identity or role conception. 
 The size of the win-set for each actor is determined by the cost of no agreement and 
the ratification procedure. In general, a win-set is large if the cost of no agreement is 
high and the ratification procedure is easy. If an actor will be seriously disadvantaged 
by a failure to reach agreement, there will be an incentive to be flexible and open to 
compromises so that agreement can be reached. Ratification concerns the autonomy of 
the central decision-maker(s) to take a decision: if a large number of domestic political 
actors must approve the decision, ratification is difficult. Where the win-sets of the 
actors involved in an interaction overlap, agreement is possible. 
 The three levels of the game are linked in two ways. Firstly, they are linked through 
the two interactions: one interaction is between the EU and its member states, and one 
interaction is between the EU and the third countries. The outcome of the first interac-
tion (agreement on an EU external migration policy) becomes the subject of negotiation 
in the second interaction. Secondly, the dashed line in figure 7.1 represents bilateral 
relations between member states and the third countries that are the targets of EU exter-
nal migration policy. Such bilateral relations can alter the cost of no agreement for third 
countries of cooperation with the EU: if alternative, more attractive options for coopera-
tion are offered on a bilateral basis by the member states, the cost of no agreement with 
the EU as a whole is low. For member states, the existence of bilateral relations might 
make participation in EU external migration policy unattractive because the bilateral 
relationship is favoured. On the other hand, if participation in an instrument of EU ex-
ternal migration policy would allow member states to achieve objectives that cannot be 
realised at the bilateral level, participation can be expected to be high. 
7.3 The governance of EU external migration policy 
The central argument of chapter 2 was that the different levels of decision-making – 
between EU institutions and the member states, and between the EU and third countries 
– must be brought together and analysed as one whole, in order to explain policy out-
comes. However, for practical reasons of conducting the research, it was necessary to 
 226 
divide the main research question into four sub-questions. These sub-questions related 
to the actors involved in the three-level game and were addressed separately in the em-
pirical chapters. This section outlines an answer to each of the sub-questions, treating 
the first two together. Three main conclusions can be drawn: the Commission found 
itself in the weakest bargaining position, because its cost of no agreement was highest; 
wider, perhaps universal, participation by the member states in the Mobility Partner-
ships could have been ensured if only Commission officials had placed less emphasis on 
the aspect of legal migration – this would have raised the cost of no agreement for 
member states; and finally, member states’ bilateral relations with third countries can 
undermine the Commission’s ability to negotiate Mobility Partnerships, because these 
bilateral relations alter the cost of no agreement for third countries. These conclusions 
all relate to the cost of no agreement, confirming the assumption made in chapter 2 that 
this is a more important determinant of the size of the win-set than the ratification pro-
cedure. 
7.3.1 What was the role of the EU institutions and the member states in the negotiation 
of the Mobility Partnerships? What implications does this have for the form of the part-
nerships? 
According to two-level game theory, the actor for whom the cost of no agreement is 
highest is in the weakest bargaining position (Putnam, 1988). This is clearly true of the 
Commission in the case of external migration policy. The reason for this is the nature of 
this policy area. The Commission is assumed to be competence-maximising: it seeks to 
expand its own role in policy-making. It therefore has a vested interest in agreement 
being reached, because if there is no policy agreed then its role is by default reduced to 
zero. On the other hand, external migration policy is a sensitive issue for the member 
states, sitting as it does at the crossroads of migration policy and foreign policy. These 
policy areas are important to member states’ sovereignty, and they will therefore seek to 
maintain control over decision-making. 
 This ‘tug-of-war’ between the Commission and the member states was clear in the 
decision-making on the Mobility Partnerships, and it had a profound effect on the form 
that the partnerships took. The Commission for its part has been the driver of this policy 
instrument: from the first mentions of the notion of ‘Mobility Packages’ by Commis-
sioner Frattini in 2006, through the publication of the communication on Mobility Part-
nerships in May 2007, to the continued promotion of Mobility Partnerships as the main 
framework for migration relations between the EU and third countries. However, behind 
the scenes the Commission and member states have had different preferences on several 
aspects concerning the form these partnerships should take: their legal form; their con-
tent; and the choice of partner countries. Each of these disagreements has been resolved 
in the member states’ favour, due to the Commission’s weak bargaining position.  
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7.3.2 Why do some member states choose to participate in the Mobility Partnerships 
while others do not? 
Chapter 5 showed that the governments of all three countries studied, no matter whether 
they favoured participation in the Mobility Partnerships or not, were concerned at the 
outset to maintain national competence over legal, and particularly labour, migration. 
Agreeing to a Mobility Partnership instrument including obligatory legal migration 
schemes would have been too high a cost for any of the member states studied. The 
French government nevertheless chose to participate in the Mobility Partnerships due to 
a fit with the national role conception of France as a leader both in the EU and in the 
area of external migration policy. The Austrian government decided the costs of partici-
pation outweighed the benefits, and although it was initially ambivalent the Dutch gov-
ernment ultimately decided that the benefits of participation outweighed the costs.  
 Despite the different preferences of these governments on the Mobility Partner-
ships, the Commission could have secured wider, perhaps even universal, participation 
by the member states in the partnerships. For this, Commission officials simply had to 
place more emphasis on the possibility for member states to propose projects relating to 
illegal migration under a Mobility Partnership, and less emphasis on the aspect of legal 
migration. This would have increased the cost of no agreement for member states. The 
Commission communication on Mobility Partnerships indicated that the member states’ 
legal frameworks on the admission of third country nationals would be respected in the 
Mobility Partnerships (Commission, 2007a, p.4). It stated that “mechanisms to facilitate 
economic migration should be based on the labour needs of interested Member States, 
as assessed by them” (p.5). A close reading of the communication thus already implies 
that member states will determine whether or not they will offer legal migration oppor-
tunities to Mobility Partnership countries. This fact could have been made explicit in 
early meetings in the HLWG, to circumvent opposition from member states. Indeed, 
once officials in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs had studied the Mobility Partner-
ship instrument more closely, they determined that the name ‘Mobility Partnerships’ is 
actually misleading because member states will not be obliged to offer legal migration 
schemes (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008d). 
 The three-level model (figure 7.1) posits a link between member states and third 
countries because of the existence of bilateral relations in the area of migration. How-
ever, chapter 5 found no evidence that bilateral relations with the third country con-
cerned alter member states’ preferences on a Mobility Partnership. The French govern-
ment agreed (although reluctantly) to participate in the proposed Mobility Partnership 
with Senegal, a country with which it also has a bilateral migration agreement. The 
Austrian government, on the other hand, refused to join the Mobility Partnership with 
Moldova despite carrying out bilateral migration initiatives in that country. For these 
two countries a ‘blanket’ decision to participate/not participate in the Mobility Partner-
ships was taken, regardless of the third country. The case of the Netherlands is different 
because the Dutch government determined on a case-by-case basis whether or not to 
participate in Mobility Partnerships: the partnerships with Cape Verde and Georgia 
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were judged relevant in terms of national policy objectives, whilst the partnership with 
Moldova was not considered worthwhile to join. 
7.3.3 Why do third countries choose to join a Mobility Partnership? 
Chapter 6 showed that the existence of bilateral relations between member states and 
third countries can undermine the Commission’s ability to negotiate a Mobility Partner-
ship: if alternative, more attractive options for migration cooperation are offered on a 
bilateral basis by the member states, the cost of no agreement on a Mobility Partnership 
is low. This was shown for the case of Senegal, where the migration cooperation with 
Spain and France in particular incorporates more legal migration opportunities than a 
Mobility Partnership would. In such instances, member states are essentially mandating 
the Commission to approach the third country with an EU offer which is less attractive 
than their existing bilateral cooperation. 
 For both the Senegalese and Cape Verdean governments, an EU-wide readmission 
agreement covering also third-country nationals and stateless people is an onerous con-
dition. The Senegalese government outright rejects such an agreement, and did not 
perceive enough benefits in the Mobility Partnership to compensate for a readmission 
agreement. The Cape Verdean government hesitated for a long time; the decision to 
ultimately sign the readmission agreement was a ‘close call’. Readmission agreements 
have long been one of the central tools in EU external migration policy (see chapter 1), 
but both the Council and the Commission now seem to be acknowledging that it may 
not be feasible to expect all third countries to sign such an agreement in the framework 
of a Mobility Partnership. In 2011, the Commission proposed the introduction of a new 
policy instrument, the Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) (Com-
mission, 2011b). CAMMs are in a sense ‘everything but readmission and visa facilita-
tion’: they will contain many of the same elements as Mobility Partnerships, but will be 
concluded with “countries outside the EU neighbourhood or countries where there is no 
mutual interest in entering in to negotiations on readmission and/or visa facilitation 
agreements” (Council, 2012b, p.37).  
 This thesis did not aim to reach conclusions that could be generalised to Eastern 
European countries; indeed, chapter 1 speculated that countries with no EU membership 
perspective may have different considerations when choosing to cooperate with the EU 
than countries with some EU membership perspective (no matter how distant). The 
Council and Commission now seem to be drawing this same conclusion: ENP countries, 
which are closely linked to the EU in this and other regional/bilateral frameworks, may 
be persuaded to sign readmission agreements; member states may also be persuaded that 
it is ‘safe’ to offer these countries a visa facilitation agreement. This is the case for the 
eastern Mobility Partnership countries: Moldova, Georgia and Armenia have all agreed 
both readmission and visa facilitation agreements with the EU. However, sub-Saharan 
African countries are more loosely connected to the EU, have no real interest in signing 
readmission agreements, and are not candidates for visa facilitation. It seems that the 
experience of attempting to negotiate Mobility Partnerships with Senegal and Ghana, 
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neither of which was concluded yet, may have highlighted this fact for the member 
states and Commission. 
7.4 Three-level games and negotiators’ strategies 
In the two-level game approach (Putnam, 1988), the role of the ‘chief negotiator’ and 
the strategies that this actor adopts are assumed to play a decisive role in shaping the 
final agreement that is reached. Chapter 2 argued, however, that Putnam is imprecise in 
his conceptualisation of negotiators’ strategies: his central claim seems to be that strate-
gies determine the size of an actor’s win-set, but he also makes statements that imply 
that strategies are the outcome of the size of an actor’s win-set. In this thesis, strategies 
were not hypothesised to be a determinant of actors’ win-sets; rather, it seems logical 
and plausible that they are determined by win-sets. The bargaining position that you 
find yourself in determines the strategy that you adopt. 
 This assumption has been confirmed in the case studies. The central finding in this 
respect is that the Commission, which has the biggest win-set and therefore the weakest 
bargaining position, is forced to adopt tactics reminiscent of ‘soft bargaining’: showing 
flexibility, being pragmatic, and conceding its own interests. In its interaction with the 
member states, the Commission was in no position to adopt a tough negotiation strategy 
due to the control exercised by the member states over the Mobility Partnership instru-
ment. The win-sets of the member states were all smaller than the win-sets of the Com-
mission; they were thus in a stronger bargaining position and dictated the shape and 
content of the Mobility Partnerships, whilst the Commission yielded to their prefer-
ences. In its interaction with the third countries, the Commission was severely limited in 
its choice of bargaining strategy, with neither ‘hard’ nor ‘soft’ tactics being available to 
it. There are no sanctions imposed on third countries for not signing a Mobility Partner-
ship, making ‘hard bargaining’ tactics inappropriate and unproductive. However, ‘soft 
bargaining’ tactics require the negotiator to show flexibility and make concessions, and 
the Commission does not have such room for manoeuvre in negotiations with third 
countries due to the control exercised by member states over the Mobility Partnership 
instrument. These findings are rather exploratory, and the effect of the size of win-sets 
on the strategies available to/employed by negotiators deserves further, systematic re-
search.  
7.5 Rationalism vs. constructivism 
The empirical chapters compared the suitability of rationalist and constructivist explana-
tions in accounting for the preferences of both member states and third countries on 
participation in the Mobility Partnerships. For member states, the decision to participate 
could be explained either by a cost-benefit analysis (rationalist) or by a match with 
national identity/role conception (constructivist). For third countries, the decision to 
sign a Mobility Partnership could be explained either by the policy conditionality (ra-
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tionalist) or social learning (constructivist) models. Rather than choosing upfront for 
one or the other of these approaches, these two different types of explanations were 
juxtaposed in order to determine which provided the most convincing account of the 
domestic process of preference formation. The empirical chapters highlighted the diffi-
culty of neatly applying either a rationalist or a constructivist explanation. Despite the 
intensive process-tracing carried out in the framework of a case study and the high con-
textual validity of such a study, it is still possible that the case study researcher will not 
be able to determine whether one theoretical explanation is more convincing than an-
other:  
 Sometimes competing explanations can be equally consistent with the available 
historical evidence; this makes it difficult to decide which is the correct explanation 
or, alternatively, whether both interpretations may be part of the overall explana-
tions – i.e., whether the outcome may be overdetermined . . . If the data and gener-
alisations available to the investigator do not permit him or her to choose from 
competing explanations, then both explanations for the case should be retained as 
equally plausible (George and Bennett, 2005, p.92). 
 This was particularly evident in chapter 5. Overall, the rationalist cost-benefit ex-
planation was the most convincing account of member states’ preference formation. 
Indeed, a logic of appropriateness cannot account for the difference between Austrian 
and Dutch preferences: both governments considered the potential for EU competence 
on labour migration to be inappropriate, but ultimately they made different decisions on 
participation in the Mobility Partnerships. These two different decisions are better ex-
plained in terms of the costs and benefits expected to accrue from participation. How-
ever, although the French case could be explained according to a rationalist logic, 
French government officials did not view participation in the Mobility Partnerships in a 
means-end framework. Rather, participation fitted well with conceptions of France as a 
pioneer, both within the EU in general and on external migration policy in particular.  
 Chapter 6 found the social learning model to be a weak explanation for third coun-
tries’ preferences on the Mobility Partnerships. Dialogue, persuasion and deliberation 
are central to the social learning model, but there was no attempt by the EU to persuade 
Senegal and Cape Verde of the appropriateness of signing a Mobility Partnership. The 
EU approach was rather of a ‘take it or leave it’ nature. In addition, both the Senegalese 
and Cape Verdean governments viewed the EU’s readmission requirements as inappro-
priate, and yet they made different decisions on the Mobility Partnership. Given that 
these decisions were reached by weighing the costs involved with a readmission agree-
ment against the potential benefits of a Mobility Partnership, the policy conditionality 
approach was deemed better able to explain third countries’ preferences. However, a 
sense of identification with Europe and the EU weighed into the Cape Verdean govern-
ment’s considerations, implying that the social learning model is not entirely without 
explanatory power, but rather that it is the least convincing explanation for these cases. 
 The main conclusion in this regard is that there is a need to build bridges between 
rationalist and constructivist thinking. Sil and Katzenstein (2010) argue that scholars 
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who insist on the superiority of a particular theoretical approach for solving any and all 
research problems are at risk of simplifying complex social phenomena and overlooking 
empirical facts in order to apply their favoured theoretical approach. It is much more 
productive for scholars to focus on finding connections between different theoretical 
approaches “with an eye to generating novel insights that bear on policy debates and 
practical dilemmas” (p.2). There is a need to tone down the rhetoric about a great para-
digmatic debate or the existence of fundamentally different world view: ultimately, 
rationalism and constructivism are simply two approaches to answering questions about 
international politics (Fearon and Wendt, 2002, p.67). As Jachtenfuchs (2002, p.654) 
points out: “That both material interests and ideas or identities matter for political out-
comes is a truism for those not familiar with the rationalism-constructivism contro-
versy”. What is more interesting, he argues, is determining under which conditions 
interests, ideas and identities matter (cf. Fearon and Wendt, 2002, p.61).  
 Since the 1990s, scholars of international relations have begun to move beyond 
traditional paradigm wars and ‘dialogues of the deaf’; instead, some are now arguing 
that rationalist and constructivist logics can and should be combined (see Checkel, 
2010, for an overview). Certainly there are fundamental epistemological and empirical 
differences between rationalist and constructivist theory (Tallberg, 2010, p.637). Never-
theless, there is still much that connects these approaches; indeed, rationalism and ‘con-
ventional’ constructivism share positivist assumptions (Jupille et al., 2003, p.15) and 
both are concerned with actors’ preferences, although they of course differ in their ex-
planations of how those preferences are formed. Fearon and Wendt (2002, p.62) point 
out that the logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness may interact over time: 
action that originally stems from a cost-benefit calculation may, if repeated, eventually 
become an internalised norm. 
 Sil and Katzenstein (2010) call for analytic eclecticism; in other words, scholars 
should “explore how diverse mechanisms posited in competing paradigm-bound theo-
ries might interact with each other, and how, under certain circumstances, they can 
combine to affect outcomes that interest both scholars and practitioners” (p.10). How 
can this call be translated into practical research design? Particularly in light of this 
research, how can bridges be built between rationalism and constructivism? Checkel 
(2001, p.558) argues that policy decisions may be the result of “a game of cost/benefit 
analysis, with the diffusion of new social norms changing such calculations”. Norms, 
legitimacy, appropriateness, and national identity can be part of a cost-benefit analysis 
of participating in EU external migration policy. If a proposed EU policy is considered 
appropriate, this might be another benefit to participating in this policy. Such an ap-
proach might be a more fruitful avenue for researchers: to assume that policy-makers 
want to achieve an objective, so that their decisions are means-end in nature, but that 
these objectives can also be related to norms and identity. However, it would seem to 
subsume constructivism to rationalism, making constructivist understandings of norms 
and identity only part of a rational cost-benefit analysis. In a later contribution, Checkel 
(2010) argues against subsumption, outlining two alternative methods for combining 
rationalist and constructivist theories: firstly, a ‘domain of application’ approach would 
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limit each theory to its explanatory ‘home turf’, and then bring these home turfs to-
gether in some larger picture. Jachtenfuchs (2002, p.655) hypothesises along these lines 
that ideas might play a decisive role in those cases where actors do not know which 
effects to expect from the proposed policy. In terms of this research, a ‘domain of appli-
cation’ approach could mean applying the social learning model in cases where there is 
evidence of the EU engaging a third country in persuasion and dialogue, and applying 
the policy conditionality model in cases where the EU instead adopts a ‘take it or leave 
it’ approach. Secondly, in a ‘temporal sequencing’ approach, each theory depends on 
the other to explain a temporally prior outcome, so that the theories work together over 
time. In terms of this research, an in-depth analysis of member states’ domestic prefer-
ence formation might uncover that a particular ministry first developed its position on 
an EU initiative based on a logic of appropriateness, but that the ensuing discussion 
between ministries on the national position was based on a cost-benefit analysis. 
 These suggestions for combining rationalist and constructivist theorising are likely 
to incur methodological difficulties, as Checkel acknowledges (2010, p.24). In particu-
lar, different independent variables may become difficult to distinguish from one an-
other, despite the fact that this is an essential precondition for empirical research (Ger-
ring, 2003, p.9). However, social science research must reflect the reality of the world in 
which we live, and that reality is complex: decision-makers do not base their decisions 
on only one factor, but rather take into account many considerations. It is a widely-held 
and compelling premise in case study research that different causes can produce the 
same outcome – in other words, that equifinality is a reality in the social world (Rohlf-
ing, 2012, p.7). It is unrealistic and unhelpful to assume monocausality because ‘over-
determined’ outcomes, where different interpretations are equally consistent with the 
process-tracing evidence, are simply empirical reality. Confirming evidence for one 
hypothesis is not necessarily contradictory evidence for competing hypotheses (p.185). 
Employing a rationalist/constructivist framework is still a useful exercise because it 
provides a framework for understanding and interpreting policy-makers’ decisions and 
therefore for comparing cases according to shared logics; it may just not be possible to 
firmly conclude that one explanation is superior to the other. Scholars therefore need to 
adopt a “let’s just get on with it” approach in order to develop better explanations of 
political behaviour and policy outcomes (Checkel, 2010; cf. Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). 
7.6 Suggestions for further research 
This thesis represents the first attempt at a full conceptualisation of the three-level game 
model, including explanations for the preferences of member states and third countries, 
and the conditions for agreement to be reached. It is also the first systematic analysis of 
the EU Mobility Partnerships (see chapter 1). There are therefore many avenues of 
research still to be explored. 
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7.6.1 The three-level game model 
It is generally accepted in academic research that a theory should not be developed 
based on a set of evidence, and then tested against that same evidence (e.g. George and 
Bennett, 2005, p.111). This research aimed to provide the first full conceptualisation of 
the links between the three levels, theoretical explanations for the preferences of mem-
ber states and third countries, and the conditions for agreement to be reached. The three-
level game model should now be tested on a different policy instrument or a different 
policy area in order to assess its explanatory value. 
 The model could be applied to another instrument of external migration policy. 
Mobility Partnerships are often preceded by a migration mission by the EU to the third 
country concerned (see chapter 1). Chapter 2 gave an overview of member states’ par-
ticipation in some of these migration missions. Future research might address questions 
such as: why do member states decide to participate? Why does the third country accept 
the suggestion by the EU to conduct a migration mission? What is the role of the Com-
mission, for example in selecting the third countries? These questions could be ad-
dressed in the three-level framework.  
 The three-level game model could also be applied to a legally binding instrument of 
external migration policy, if focussing on certain member states: Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK have opted out of the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice. Ireland and the 
UK retain the possibility of opting in to measures on a case-by-case basis, although they 
do not participate in visa facilitation agreements due to their non-membership of the 
Schengen area. Table 7.1 shows the decisions taken by Ireland and the UK on the EU 
readmission agreements as of February 2011. With the exception of the agreements with 
Hong Kong and Macao, Ireland has decided not to participate in any readmission 
agreements. The UK participates in all the agreements. Why do these two member 
states display different preferences? Such a research question could be addressed by 
applying the three-level model, and thus also examining the interest of the third coun-
tries concerned in signing a readmission agreement. 
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Table 7.1: Participation by Ireland and the UK in EU readmission agreements. 
Third country Ireland participating? UK participating? 
Hong Kong91 Yes Yes 
Macao92 Yes Yes 
Sri Lanka93 No Yes 
Albania94 No Yes 
Russia95 No Yes 
Ukraine96 No Yes 
Macedonia97 No Yes 
Bosnia and Herzegovina98 No Yes 
Montenegro99 No Yes 
Serbia100 No Yes 
Moldova101 No Yes 
Pakistan102 No Yes 
Georgia103 No Yes 
 
Previous applications of the three-level game model have focused on external trade 
policy (Larsén, 2007; Patterson, 1997; Collinson, 1999; Young, 2003). The three-level 
game models applied in these studies were not fully conceptualised (see chapter 2), and 
this policy area could thus usefully be revisited based on the comprehensive three-level 
game model developed in this thesis. External trade policy is a very different type of 
policy to external migration policy because the EU has long had significant compe-
tences in trade policy by extension of the internal market. The conceptualisation of the 
three-level game model presented in this research is predicated on voluntary participa-
tion in the policy instrument by both member states and third countries. There is little 
sense in determining how member states make their decision to participate in an EU 
external policy instrument when that policy by default applies to all member states. 
However, the member states must still issue negotiating instructions to the Commission 
for trade agreements with third countries:  
 How much room for manoeuvre the Commission has when conducting negotiations 
varies according to the circumstances. Usually, differences of both principle and 
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special interest between the member states result in negotiating directives being 
fairly tightly drawn – often reflecting a compromise between those countries tend-
ing towards protectionism and those favouring a more free trade approach . . . The 
Commission’s flexibility in negotiations can be constrained by the necessity of not 
disturbing compromises that have been agreed only with difficulty in the Council 
(Nugent, 2010, p.374). 
The three-level game model could be used to arrive at a better understanding of how the 
member states, the Commission, and third countries interact in trade negotiations. 
 It would of course also be empirically worthwhile to apply the three-level game 
model to an entirely different external policy area. Many EU internal policies have 
external dimensions. One example is the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The EU 
concludes fisheries partnership agreements with third countries; these agreements allo-
cate financial and technical support for sustainable fisheries in the third countries in 
return for fishing rights for the EU fishing fleet (Commission, 2012f). This quid pro quo 
approach closely resembles that seen in Mobility Partnerships, where the promise of 
increased legal migration opportunities is traded for third countries’ cooperation on 
illegal migration. Fisheries agreements are in place between the EU and many countries 
in the global south (ibid.). If applying a three-level game model to explain decision-
making in the CFP, the question at level I would be why third countries’ governments 
decide to sign such agreements – are they persuaded by the EU that this instrument is 
appropriate? Or do they believe that the benefits offered outweigh the cost of allowing 
EU trawlers to fish their waters? In the CFP there is exclusive EU competence and so 
negotiations with third countries are conducted by the Commission on behalf of the 
member states (Nugent, 2010, p.351). The Council mandates the Commission to con-
duct these negotiations, but within the Council the member states benefit differently 
from, and therefore presumably have different preferences on, such fishing agreements: 
“Some 80% of the economic benefits of the EU’s external fishing agreements go to the 
Spanish fleet, with Portugal, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, Poland and Lithua-
nia also benefiting” (Hudson, 2006, p.124). How do member states arrive at their do-
mestic preference, and how are the various domestic preferences translated (through 
negotiation) into a Council mandate for the Commission? 
7.6.2 The Mobility Partnerships 
In terms of the Mobility Partnerships, this sub-section recommends three avenues for 
future research: focussing on different third countries; analysing a larger number of 
member states; or conducting research on the implementation of the partnerships. 
 In order to compare a ‘positive’ and a ‘negative’ case, this thesis focused on the 
first two Mobility Partnerships to be negotiated with African countries: Senegal and 
Cape Verde. The thesis does not claim that the conclusions reached here will hold for all 
third countries, because different groups of third countries have different considerations 
when they decide whether or not to cooperate with the EU on migration issues (see 
chapter 1). Indeed, there are important differences between African and Eastern Euro-
pean countries in this respect. Eastern European countries can justify their cooperation 
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with the EU in terms of “their planned accession to the EU . . . or to expected benefits 
from a rapprochement with the EU” (Cassarino, 2010, p.27). With particular reference 
to the Mobility Partnerships, Lavenex and Stucky (2011, p.131) argue that “at least for 
Georgia and Moldova, the motivation to participate is linked to the countries’ more 
general efforts to perform well under the ENP”. Four ‘circles’ of third countries can be 
identified in the EU’s external migration policy: Western European non-EU countries; 
candidate countries for EU membership; the Mediterranean and Balkan countries; and 
all other countries that have concluded agreements with the EU that incorporate migra-
tion (Uçarer and Lavenex, 2002). The third-country case studies examined here are 
‘fourth circle’ countries. There are now four Mobility Partnerships in place with ‘third 
circle’ countries: Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Morocco. Further Mobility Partner-
ships are planned with other ‘third circle’ countries in North Africa. Future research on 
the Mobility Partnerships as a policy instrument could compare the motivations of these 
different types of countries to cooperate with the EU in such a forum. Are Mobility 
Partnerships more likely to be successfully concluded with ‘third circle’ countries than 
‘fourth circle’ countries? 
 In terms of member states’ participation in the Mobility Partnerships, future re-
search could analyse different member states or a larger number of member states. 
There are certain inherent strengths of case studies, as outlined in chapter 3. Neverthe-
less, there is ultimately a trade-off between depth and breadth in empirical research: 
given the depth and detail of case studies, a single research project can only deal with a 
limited number of cases. For this research, three cases were selected at the member-state 
level: France, Austria and the Netherlands. There is, however, an analytical technique 
which aims to combine the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative research: Qual-
itative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (see Ragin, 2008; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). Un-
like quantitative research, QCA is not concerned with measuring the individual impact 
of a variable on an outcome. Rather, variables act in combination to produce an out-
come. It is this set-relational view which links QCA more closely with case studies, as 
opposed to the correlational approach of quantitative research. However, QCA can deal 
with a larger number of cases than case studies: it is an appropriate method for analys-
ing between 10 and 50 cases. Given that it has 27 member states, the EU is the ideal 
testing ground for applying a QCA analysis. Future research on the Mobility Partner-
ships could thus apply such an approach to studying member states’ motivations for 
participating.  
 This thesis covers the period of time from the publication of the Commission com-
munication on Mobility Partnerships to the end of 2009, when three partnerships had 
been signed and negotiations with Senegal had stalled. The interest in this research has 
been to uncover and model the process of decision-making on this still relatively recent 
policy instrument. Now that five years have passed since the first Mobility Partnerships 
were signed, future research should examine the process of implementation of these 
agreements. Two avenues of research are possible. A first option is to focus on the effect 
of the Mobility Partnerships. Lavenex (2012, p.131) describes the Mobility Partnership 
with Moldova as “hardly consequential”. Does this observation hold true for the other 
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Mobility Partnerships? What have been the practical consequences (if any) of imple-
menting Mobility Partnerships? A second option concerns the process of implementa-
tion. Given that the vast majority of projects were proposed and are being implemented 
by member states (see chapter 4), but that the Commission has a general coordinating 
role, the question arises whether the same institutional dynamics are seen between the 
Commission and the member states in the implementation phase as during decision-
making. Implementation dynamics have not been the topic of this research, but inter-
viewees nevertheless on occasion offered some insights in this direction. These insights 
relate to the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde, because this is the only case studied 
where a partnership was actually concluded. 
 The tension amongst member states and between member states and the Commis-
sion in the decision-making process is duplicated in the tug-of-war over the EU com-
mon visa centre, established in Praia. The visa centre is run by the Portuguese govern-
ment, and issues visas also for Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Luxem-
bourg and Slovenia. Commission officials would have preferred all member states to be 
represented at the centre in order for it to have real added value as the single place for 
Cape Verdeans to apply for EU visas (Interview 52). However, France and Spain, the 
only two EU member states besides Portugal to have full embassies in Praia, decided 
not to participate in the centre. Rather than transferring their visa operation to the com-
mon visa centre, these member states “prefer to decide for themselves” (Interview 63). 
The symbolism of having an own embassy issuing visas is too important to sacrifice for 
the greater efficiency of having a single EU common visa centre.  
 There have been problems of communication between member states and the 
Commission, resulting in the duplication of some projects. In Cape Verde, two projects, 
CAMPO (Centro de Apoio ao Migrante no País de Origem) and Diaspora Contributo, 
both created opportunities for Cape Verdean migrants living in Europe to return to Cape 
Verde and provide training to Cape Verdean institutions (Interview 64). Originally, the 
Dutch government planned to create a migration profile for Cape Verde as its contribu-
tion to the Mobility Partnership, but only late in the process did it become clear that 
such a migration profile had already been created by IOM. The Dutch government 
therefore decided instead to fund a consultant to assist the interministerial commission 
on migration created by the Cape Verdean government (Reslow, 2012, p.7). Such over-
laps are not surprising given that member states are not timely with providing input for 
the scoreboards for each Mobility Partnership maintained by the Commission. For this 
reason, the partnerships end up as a collection of projects, rather than a coherent pack-
age (Interview 21).  
 Finally, the commitment by some member states seems to be lacking, or maybe 
waning. The Spanish government, for instance, was supposed to be a partner in the 
CAMPO project, but did not provide training for the mediators who should give infor-
mation on possibilities for migration to Spain (Interview 64). The governments of Lux-
embourg and Belgium are officially partners with Portugal in the common visa centre in 
Praia, but neither government has sent officials to work in the centre, despite the fact 
that office space has been reserved for them (Interview 63). Future research could inves-
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tigate whether questionable commitment to the implementation of the Mobility Partner-
ships can be traced back to hesitation in joining the partnerships. The Netherlands, 
which specifically changed its policy and joined the partnership with Cape Verde after it 
was already signed, could be a test case: how can Dutch involvement in the implemen-
tation of the Mobility Partnership be characterised? 
7.7 The human impact of EU external migration policy 
The title of this thesis is ‘Partnering for mobility’. The use of the term mobility in the 
name of the Mobility Partnerships implies migration opportunities; however, chapter 4 
showed that so far very few projects have been proposed that actually create new oppor-
tunities for migration. Visa facilitation agreements may be signed as part of a Mobility 
Partnership, but such an agreement does not remove the visa requirement or change the 
criteria for a visa to be issued – it simply makes the application procedure faster and/or 
cheaper. There is general acknowledgement both amongst academics and policy-makers 
that African countries need substantial incentives if they are to agree to cooperate with 
the EU on preventing illegal migration (see chapter 1). So the lack of real migration 
opportunities would seem to undermine the effectiveness of the Mobility Partnerships. 
The EU is, as it were, ‘shooting itself in the foot’ by seeking cooperation with third 
countries whilst simultaneously jeopardising it by not offering these countries attractive 
terms.104 
 The question is whether this is problematic, from a normative point of view. Is it 
actually desirable for instruments like the Mobility Partnerships to be effective in terms 
of the cooperation between the EU and third countries? This research has concerned the 
process of decision-making on EU external migration policy, but it is important not to 
lose sight of the fact that migration is about people moving across borders. External 
migration policy therefore has a human impact. When the EU cooperates with third 
countries on migration issues in order to control and prevent immigration to the EU, it 
makes these third countries responsible for dealing with migrants. Not all third countries 
are equipped for such responsibilities. The starting point for this thesis was the story of 
migrants dying in their attempts to cross from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of 
Ceuta (see chapter 1). Morocco has increasingly become a country of transit for sub-
Saharan African migrants attempting to enter Europe. Since 2004, Morocco has cooper-
ated with Spain in conducting joint naval patrols, in return for increased development 
aid (de Haas, 2005). Migrants who, as a result of this cooperation, fail to reach Europe, 
sometimes end up settling in Morocco instead. However, here they face “substantial 
xenophobia and aggressive . . . border authorities. Since most of them have no legal 
status, they are vulnerable to social and economic marginalisation” (ibid.). Unauthorised 
migrants are regularly deported by the Moroccan authorities to the Algerian border and 
                                                          
104 This is, of course, a simplification of the decision-making procedure within the EU. Chapter 4 showed that 
it is the member states which want to maintain control over legal migration and therefore exclude this as a 
topic in the Mobility Partnerships. 
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just left there to their fate (de Haas, 2009, p.5). Even asylum-seekers are rejected at the 
border, despite Morocco being a signatory to the Geneva Convention. Spain has signed 
a bilateral agreement with Morocco on the readmission of unaccompanied children, 
despite the fact that “the Moroccan child protection system is not ready to provide ade-
quate care for children repatriated from Spain” (Human Rights Watch, 2008, p.5). 
 Particular concern has been expressed by NGOs over the fate of migrants returned 
to Libya as a result of the cooperation between Italy and Libya. A treaty was signed 
between the two countries in 2008, obliging Libya to cooperate in preventing illegal 
migration in return for funding from the Italian government for this purpose (Aghazarm 
et al., 2012, p.10). Human Rights Watch accuses the Italian government of committing 
refoulement because “Libya has no asylum law or procedures. There is no formal mech-
anism for individuals seeking protection in Libya. The authorities make no distinction 
between refugees, asylum seekers, and other migrants” (Human Rights Watch, 2009, 
p.10). The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) conducted an investiga-
tion in 2012 which found that migrants in Libya are ‘hounded’: those considered to be 
illegal migrants are held in detention centres where “living conditions are deplorable. 
The mission heard numerous accounts of degrading treatment, physical violence and 
humiliation . . . Migrants and refugees live in fear without any prospect of legal redress 
and no access to national or international bodies” (FIDH, 2012). In 2012, the European 
Court of Human Rights ruled that the Italian government had violated migrants’ human 
rights by returning them to Libya (Vogt, 2012). 
 Given that EU external migration policy potentially exposes migrants to inhuman 
treatment in third countries, it may not be problematic from a normative point of view if 
it proves to be ineffective in ensuring third countries’ cooperation on migration issues. 
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Annex I: List of interviews 
Interview 1 European Commission (DG JLS), Brussels, 6 February 2009 
Interview 2 European Commission (DG JLS), Brussels, 6 February 2009 
Interview 3 Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment of the 
Netherlands, The Hague, 14 September 2009 
Interview 4 Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands, The Hague, 15 September 
2009 
Interview 5 Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands, The Hague, 15 September 
2009 
Interview 6 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands, The 
Hague, 17 September 2009 
Interview 7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague, 17 Sep-
tember 2009 
Interview 8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague, 29 Sep-
tember 2009 
Interview 9 Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands, The Hague, 29 September 
2009 
Interview 10 Permanent Representation of Portugal to the EU, Brussels, 6 October 
2009 
Interview 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague, 8 October 
2009 
Interview 12 European Commission (DG Development), Brussels, 12 October 
2009 
Interview 13 European Commission (DG JLS), Brussels, 13 October 2009 
Interview 14 Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU, Brussels, 16 
October 2009 
Interview 15 IOM The Hague, 19 October 2009 
Interview 16 Permanent Representation of France to the EU, Brussels, 20 October 
2009 
Interview 17 European Commission (DG JLS), Brussels, 21 October 2009 
Interview 18 Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the EU (by tele-
phone), 22 October 2009 
Interview 19 Dutch embassy Dakar (by telephone), 27 October 2009 
Interview 20 European Commission (DG Development), Brussels, 29 October 
2009 
Interview 21 European Commission (DG JLS), Brussels, 6 November 2009 
Interview 22 Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU, Brussels, 3 December 
2009 
Interview 23 EU delegation Senegal (by telephone), 4 March 2010 
Interview 24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria, Vienna, 7 June 2010 
Interview 25 Ministry of Interior of Austria, Vienna, 8 June 2010 
 241 
Interview 26 Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection of Aus-
tria, 8 June 2010 
Interview 27 Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection of Aus-
tria (by telephone), 7 July 2010 
Interview 28 IOM Brussels, 26 July 2010 
Interview 29 European Parliament (DG Internal Policies), Brussels, 15 September 
2010 
Interview 30 European Commission (DG Home Affairs), Brussels, 15 September 
2010 
Interview 31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Paris, 5 January 2011 
Interview 32 Ministry of Interior of France, Paris, 10 January 2011 
Interview 33 Secretariat General for European Affairs of France, Paris, 10 January 
2011 
Interview 34 IOM Paris, 10 January 2011 
Interview 35 Ministry of Interior of France, Paris, 12 January 2011 
Interview 36 Ministry of Interior of Senegal, Dakar, 25 January 2011 
Interview 37 French embassy Dakar, 26 January 2011 
Interview 38 Dutch embassy Dakar, 26 January 2011  
Interview 39 Spanish embassy Dakar, 27 January 2011 
Interview 40 Ministry of Senegalese Abroad, 31 January 2011 
Interview 41 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, Dakar, 14 February 2011 
Interview 42 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, Dakar, 14 February 2011  
Interview 43 French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII), Dakar, 21 Feb-
ruary 2011 
Interview 44 Ministry of Finance of Senegal, Dakar, 23 February 2011 
Interview 45 Ministry of Public Service and Employment of Senegal, Dakar, 24 
February 2011 
Interview 46 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, Dakar, 24 February 2011  
Interview 47 Ministry of Interior of Senegal, Dakar, 25 February 2011 
Interview 48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Senegal/Senegalese embassy The 
Hague, 25 March 2011 
Interview 49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cape Verde, Praia, 3 May 2011 
Interview 50 Office of the Prime Minister of Cape Verde, Praia, 4 May 2011 
Interview 51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cape Verde, Praia, 4 May 2011  
Interview 52 EU delegation Cape Verde, Praia, 5 May 2011  
Interview 53 Luxembourg embassy Praia, 5 May 2011 
Interview 54 Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cape Verde, Praia, 6 May 2011  
Interview 55 Institute of Communities, Praia, 9 May 2011 
Interview 56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cape Verde, Praia, 11 May 2011 
Interview 57 IOM Praia, 13 May 2011 
Interview 58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cape Verde, Praia, 16 May 2011  
Interview 59 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cape Verde, Praia, 17 May 2011 
Interview 60 Ministry of Communities of Cape Verde, Praia, 30 May 2011 
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Interview 61 Portuguese embassy Praia, 30 May 2011 
Interview 62 National Institute for Employment and Vocational training (IEFP), 
Praia, 31 May 2011 
Interview 63 EU common visa centre, Praia, 3 June 2011 
Interview 64 CAMPO, Praia, 6 June 2011 
Interview 65 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cape Verde, Praia, 7 June 2011  
Interview 66 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cape Verde, Praia, 7 June 2011 
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Annex II: Projects proposed in the Mobility Partnerships 
1. The Mobility Partnership with Moldova (Council, 2008b) 
Monitoring of migration flows: 
- Proposal to elaborate a monitoring mechanism on migratory flows and stocks 
Consolidation of the national migration management system: 
- Proposal by Sweden to expand and extend the Söderköping process 
- Proposal by Germany and Romania to build capacity in the area of migration 
- Proposal by Greece to organise a training workshop on residence/work permits 
- Proposal by Hungary to build capacity in the area of residence of foreigners 
- Proposal by Poland to organise seminars on illegal migration 
- Proposal by Czech Republic to organise training in border management 
- Proposal by Slovakia to train police officers on illegal migration 
- Proposal by Hungary and Slovakia to offer training and support on asylum policy 
- Proposal by Slovenia to exchange knowledge and best practices on asylum 
- Proposal by Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden to organise study visits 
and exchange of best practices 
- Proposal by Italy to train public officials 
- Proposal by Slovenia to exchange knowledge and experiences 
- Proposal by Germany to evaluate the Moldovan border authority 
- Proposal by Hungary to share best practices on border management 
- Proposal by Portugal to provide assistance and training on document security 
- Proposal by Poland and Hungary to strengthen capacities in identifying forged travel documents 
Information on legal migration and assistance for returning migrants: 
- Proposal by Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania, Italy, Germany, Greece, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Sweden to provide information on legal migration to the EU 
- Proposal by Greece and Italy to offer pre-departure training to Moldovan migrants 
- Proposal by Italy to provide a handbook on entry and integration policies 
- Proposal by Greece, Poland, Germany and Lithuania to create a website on legal migration 
Labour migration schemes: 
- Proposal by Romania and the Veneto region to support labour migration and development 
- Proposal by Czech Republic and Cyprus to offer circular migration projects 
- Proposal by Bulgaria to sign an agreement on labour migration with Moldova 
- Proposal by Romania to sign a convention on local border traffic with Moldova 
- Proposal by Italy to support potential Moldovan labour immigrants 
- Proposal by Sweden to inform about changes to Sweden labour migration law 
- Proposal by Poland to offer admission for temporary work without a work permit 
Voluntary return and reintegration schemes: 
- Proposal by Germany to support voluntary return projects 
- Proposal by Romania to support reintegration of migrants in Moldova 
Diaspora consolidation and co-development: 
- Proposal by the Commission to strengthen the development aspect of migration 
- Proposal by Moldova to strengthen the Information Centres for Moldovan migrants in Moldovan embas-
sies 
- Proposal by Germany to allow Moldovans in Germany extended absence without loss of residence rights 
- Proposal by Romania and Veneto region to design an instrument to encourage migrants to invest remit-
tances and return to Moldova 
- Proposal by Germany to extend a remittances website 
- Proposal by Sweden to facilitate exchange of experiences on remittances 
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- Proposal by Hungary to strengthen capacity of Moldovan consular personnel 
Social protection of migrants and their families: 
- Proposal by Romania to strengthen capacity on social security benefits 
- Proposal by Bulgaria to sign a treaty on social insurance with Moldova 
- Proposal by Romania to sign an agreement on social security with Moldova 
- Proposal by Italy to address the social dimension of migration 
Development of the Moldovan labour market: 
- Proposal by Czech Republic to develop to Moldovan labour market 
- Proposal by Sweden to reform vocational training 
- Proposal by Sweden, Romania and Lithuania to strengthen Moldovan public employment service 
- Proposal by the Commission to strengthen the development aspect of migration 
- Proposal by Moldova to promote the quality of its higher education 
- Proposal by the Commission to promote participation of Moldova in the Erasmus Mundus programme 
- Proposal by Romania offer scholarships to Moldovan students 
- Proposal by Moldova and Sweden to provide incentives on local job opportunities 
- Proposal by Czech Republic to support private and small enterprises 
- Proposal by Romania to promote job creation in tourism and rural development 
- Proposal by all signatories to promote bilateral recognition of skills and qualifications 
Visa and readmission: 
- Proposal to enlarge the Common Visa Application Centre in Moldova 
Cooperation in border management, identity and travel documents, fight against illegal/irregular migration
and trafficking in human beings: 
- Proposal by Portugal for authorities to cooperate in area of document security, fraud, border control, and
trafficking in human beings 
- Proposal by France to continue a programme on trafficking in human beings 
- Proposal that Moldova take measures to improve border management 
- Proposal by Hungary to cooperate on local level on border management 
- Proposal by Germany to offer an audit of the Moldovan border control structure 
- Proposal by Czech Republic to support border management structures 
- Proposal by Frontex and Moldova to train the Moldovan border guard service 
- Proposal by Moldova to improve travel and identity document security 
- Proposal by Germany and Portugal to provide technical assistance to Moldova 
- Proposal by the Commission to provide advice on biometric passports 
- Proposal that Moldova implement the Palermo Convention 
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2. The Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde (Council, 2008c) 
Monitoring and awareness of migration flows: 
- Proposal for a migration profile for Cape Verde 
Employment, management and facilitation of legal migration and integration: 
- Proposal by Portugal to develop CAMPO (an information centre for prospective Cape Verdean migrants) 
- Proposal by Portugal to sign a new protocol with Cape Verde to promote temporary and circular migra-
tion 
- Proposal by Portugal for cooperation between the Portuguese and Cape Verdean employment and voca-
tional training institutes 
- Proposal by Spain to launch a schools/workshops programme 
- Proposal by Spain to strengthen the development of business initiatives by women 
- Proposal by France to open up certain professions to Cape Verdean migrants (part of the accord de ges-
tion concertée des flux migratoires) 
- Proposal by the member states to foster cooperation between higher education institutions 
- Proposal by Cape Verde and the member states to develop a dialogue on reintegration of migrants 
- Proposal by Luxembourg to consider a circular migration scheme 
- Proposal by Luxembourg to strengthen the programme ‘Migrer les yeux ouverts’ (information for mi-
grants about life in Luxembourg) 
- Proposal by Luxembourg to offer twinning between universities 
Mobility and short-stay visas: 
- Proposal by the Commission to negotiate a visa facilitation agreement 
- Proposal by Portugal to set up a common visa application centre in Praia for short-term visas 
Links between migration and development, diasporas, money transfers: 
- Proposal by Portugal to develop DIAS de Cabo Verde (foster circulation of highly qualified Cape Ver-
dean migrants) 
- Proposal by Cape Verde and the member states to foster cooperation between hospitals and research 
institutions 
- Proposal by Spain to strengthen capacities of Cape Verdean national health system 
- Proposal by Portugal to support the Cape Verdean national health system 
- Proposal by France for a co-development programme 
Asylum and immigration: 
- Proposal that Cape Verde ratifies the Geneva convention 
- Proposal by Portugal to help Cape Verde develop its asylum system 
Cooperation on border management, identity and travel documents, and the fight against illegal migration and 
trafficking in human beings: 
- Proposal that Cape Verde implements the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
- Proposal that work agreement between Frontex and Cape Verdean national police should include infor-
mation exchange and joint operational measures 
- Proposal by Frontex and Cape Verde that the Cape Verdean national police should implement training
programmes for border guards and on the falsification of documents 
- Proposal by the European Community and the member states to facilitate police cooperation 
- Proposal by the Commission to negotiate a readmission agreement 
- Proposal by Portugal to build capacity of Cape Verdean authorities in areas such as biometrics 
- Proposal by Spain to build capacity of Cape Verdean authorities in maritime security 
- Proposal by Spain to strengthen the Cape Verdean national Red Cross 
- Proposal by Spain to build capacity of Ministry of Defence 
- Proposal by France to cooperate with Cape Verde on security and document control 
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3. The Mobility Partnership with Georgia (Council, 2009a) 
Mobility, legal migration, integration and migration and development: 
- Proposal by Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Lithuania, Poland,
Sweden and the ETF to provide information on legal migration routes to the EU 
- Proposal by France and Poland to facilitate access to national labour markets 
- Proposal by France to encourage circular mobility of young professionals 
- Proposal by Poland to provide information on voluntary return 
- Proposal by Belgium and Czech Republic to support assisted voluntary return 
- Proposal by Netherlands to provide legal advice and psycho-social support 
- Proposal by Germany to support highly-skilled migrants returning to Georgia 
- Proposal by Germany to provide support to Georgian office for diaspora issues 
- Proposal by Czech Republic to enlarge advisory centre in Tbilisi 
- Proposal by Netherlands to support Georgia to implement a national return and reintegration programme 
- Proposal by Belgium to support reintegration of vulnerable groups 
- Proposal by Germany to allow Georgians in Germany extended absence without loss of residence rights 
- Proposal by Netherlands to support temporary return of qualified nationals 
- Proposal by Bulgaria to sign a bilateral agreement on social security 
- Proposal by Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden to support the Georgian Civil Registry Agency 
Asylum policy and protection of refugees: 
- Proposal by Germany and Poland to share best practices on asylum 
Border management, identity and travel documents, fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human 
beings: 
- Proposal by Frontex, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and UK to 
create a steering committee to develop activities (e.g. information exchange, training, research and devel-
opment) in the area of border management 
Readmission policy: 
- Proposal by Belgium, Estonia, Netherlands and Poland to organise study visits on readmission and return 
policy 
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4. The Mobility Partnership with Armenia (Council, 2011b) 
Mobility, legal migration and integration: 
- Proposal by the EU provide capacity building on migration management and a migration profile 
- Proposal by Bulgaria, France, Netherlands, Romania and Sweden to share experience on legal migration 
and train Armenian officials 
- Proposal by France to promote circular migration of young professionals 
- Proposal by Italy, Poland and Sweden to inform on possibilities for legal migration 
- Proposal by Romania to inform on possibilities for legal migration and risks of irregular migration 
- Proposal by Romania to offer pre-departure training and joint study programmes 
- Proposal by Italy to provide a handbook on entry and integration policies 
- Proposal by Germany to facilitate mobility of Armenians in Germany 
- Proposal to collect labour market information on Armenia 
- Proposal by Bulgaria to negotiate a bilateral agreement on social security and management of labour
migration 
Migration and development: 
- Proposal by France to support use of migrants’ skills acquired abroad for the development of Armenia 
- Proposal by Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, the EU, the ETF to
support reintegration of migrants in Armenia 
- Proposal by Germany to promote cost-effective channels for remittances 
- Proposal to share experience in employment and education policies 
- Proposal by Romania to foster cooperation between NGOs 
Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, identity and travel docu-
ments’ security, border management: 
- Proposal by Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania and the EU to exchange best 
practices on readmission processes 
- Proposal by Belgium and Poland to share knowledge on combating trafficking in human beings 
- Proposal by Bulgaria, Netherlands, Poland and the EU to reinforce Armenia’s border management capaci-
ties 
Asylum and international protection: 
- Proposal by the EU to support capacity of Armenia to implement an asylum policy 
- Proposal by Sweden to organise a workshop on the European Asylum Curriculum 
- Proposal by Poland to share knowledge on countries of origin information systems 
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Annex III: Legal and illegal immigration to the EU from 
Global Approach to Migration countries 
Legal immigration flows to the EU 27 in 2007 (source: Eurostat) 
Country Number of immigrants entering EU 27 in 2007 
Morocco 131203 
Albania 125746 
Ukraine 88143 
Turkey 49463 
Russia 46730 
Serbia 30826 
South Africa 26903 
Bosnia 25722 
Nigeria 22681 
Moldova 22280 
Algeria 20953 
Senegal 15602 
Croatia 14449 
Macedonia 12341 
Tunisia 11617 
Egypt 11320 
Somalia 7998 
Ghana 7973 
Georgia 7646 
Belarus 5886 
Cameroon 5500 
Ethiopia 4998 
Armenia 4957 
Zimbabwe 4854 
Kenya 4540 
Mali 4372 
Eritrea 4236 
Gambia 3729 
Côte d’Ivoire 3193 
Guinea 3080 
Equatorial Guinea 2840 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2281 
Mauritius 2222 
Republic of Congo 1833 
Mauritania 1720 
Sudan 1646 
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Country Number of immigrants entering EU 27 in 2007 
Azerbaijan 1639 
Uganda 1443 
Libya 1422 
Togo 1401 
Guinea-Bissau 1311 
Cape Verde 1279 
Tanzania 1263 
Angola 1228 
Seychelles 1210 
Zambia 1205 
Malawi 1134 
Montenegro 935 
Burkina Faso 849 
Rwanda 845 
Madagascar 804 
Namibia 785 
Burundi 761 
Sierra Leone 689 
Liberia 635 
Benin 624 
Niger 316 
Comoros 275 
Mozambique 261 
Gabon 210 
Central African Republic 126 
Chad 108 
Botswana 67 
Djibouti 65 
São Tomé and Príncipe 47 
Lesotho 29 
Swaziland 14 
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Illegal migration flows to the EU 27 in 2008 (source: Eurostat) 
Country Number of persons illegally present in EU 27 in 2008 
Albania 72670 
Morocco 39775 
Eritrea 21055 
Nigeria 16575 
Algeria 15775 
Tunisia 14085 
Ukraine 13985 
Turkey 13925 
Serbia 13315 
Somalia 10945 
Senegal 10700 
Russia 10210 
Moldova 7100 
Egypt 6800 
Georgia 5130 
Ghana 4910 
Zimbabwe 4215 
Mali 3050 
FYROM 2780 
Bosnia 2535 
Guinea 2435 
Sudan 2425 
Gambia 2360 
Cameroon 2190 
Croatia 1965 
Armenia 1940 
Angola 1915 
Côte d’Ivoire 1870 
Cape Verde 1855 
Guinea-Bissau 1705 
Belarus 1355 
Mauritania 1280 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1270 
South Africa 1175 
Republic of Congo 1125 
Sierra Leone 1105 
Ethiopia 1015 
Kenya 850 
Libya 830 
Liberia 740 
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Country Number of persons illegally present in EU 27 in 2008 
Mauritius 695 
Uganda 665 
Azerbaijan 660 
Gabon 565 
Togo 565 
Equatorial Guinea 555 
Malawi 515 
Burkina Faso 440 
Montenegro 350 
Niger 295 
Benin 290 
Comoros 250 
São Tomé and Príncipe 240 
Tanzania 240 
Burundi 210 
Rwanda 205 
Zambia 200 
Chad 160 
Mozambique 145 
Madagascar 140 
Namibia 120 
Botswana 105 
Central African Republic 95 
Swaziland 30 
Djibouti 20 
Lesotho 20 
Seychelles 20 
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Samenvatting 
Dit onderzoek bestudeert het proces van het nemen van beleidsbeslissingen tussen de 
EU, de EU-lidstaten en derde landen op het gebied van migratie. De vraag wordt gesteld 
waarom overeenkomsten op het gebied van migratie worden gesloten, gezien het feit dat 
zowel EU-lidstaten als derde landen mogelijk terughoudend zijn wanneer het draait om 
samenwerking met de EU op het gebied van migratie. Het belangrijkste argument, om 
volledig inzicht te krijgen in dit beleidsproces, is dat het noodzakelijk is om naast de 
Europese instituties zowel de voorkeuren van EU-lidstaten als derde landen in overwe-
ging te nemen. Deze actoren zijn aan elkaar gerelateerd in een ‘three-level-game’. De 
bevindingen tonen aan dat de Europese Commissie zich in een lastige onderhandelings-
positie bevindt: zij is gebonden aan de voorkeuren van de lidstaten wat betreft migratie 
overeenkomsten en ontbeert autonomie om concessies te doen aan derde landen tijdens 
onderhandelingen. Tegelijkertijd ondermijnen lidstaten de onderhandelingspositie van 
de Commissie door derde landen een meer aantrekkelijke samenwerking te bieden op 
bilateraal niveau. 
 Migratie is zonder enige twijfel het grootste sociale fenomeen van onze tijd – tot 
2000 werd het aantal migranten wereldwijd geschat op 150 miljoen. Door de grote in-
komensongelijkheden tussen ontwikkelings- en ontwikkelde landen, zijn migranten 
bereid een toenemend risico te nemen om door middel van onrechtmatigheden ontwik-
kelde landen te bereiken. Ontwikkelde landen zijn niet in staat om deze migratiestroom 
door unilaterale beleidsmaatregelen tegen te houden. Daarom zoeken zij samenwerking 
met derde landen op het gebied van migratie om te komen tot het stoppen van de migra-
tiestroom bij de bron. De behoefte om samen te werken met derde landen om effectief 
migratiebeleid te voeren, is duidelijk uitgesproken binnen Europese beleidsdocumenten. 
Het is echter niet vanzelfsprekend dat op Europees extern migratiebeleid overeenstem-
ming kan worden gevonden. Lidstaten kunnen terughoudend zijn om de bevoegdheid op 
dit beleidsveld over te dragen aan de Europese instituties. Dit is een beleidsveld wat ligt 
op het snijvlak van twee beleidsvelden welke cruciaal zijn voor de nationale soevereini-
teit: migratiebeleid en buitenlandbeleid. Derde landen kunnen afwijzend staan tegenover 
samenwerking met een EU die gericht is op het voorkomen van illegale migratie en het 
terugsturen van illegale migranten vanuit de EU.  
 Toch worden er overeenkomsten gesloten op het gebied van migratie tussen de EU, 
de lidstaten en derde landen. Dit onderzoek stelt de vraag hoe dit kan, door te kijken 
naar één bepaald aspect van Europees extern migratiebeleid: Mobiliteitspartnerschap-
pen. Dit beleidsinstrument is geïntroduceerd in 2007 en biedt derde landen toenemende 
kansen op legale migratie voor haar burgers naar de EU in ruil voor samenwerking om 
illegale migratie te voorkomen. Er geldt een vrijwillige deelname voor lidstaten aan de 
Mobiliteitspartnerschappen: geïnteresseerde lidstaten nemen hieraan deel door aan te 
geven welke projecten zij willen implementeren. Elk partnerschap heeft de vorm van 
een politieke verklaring; getekend door zowel de Commissie, de participerende lidstaten 
en het derde land. Deze politieke verklaring, welke niet wettelijk bindend is, geeft de 
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intentie tot samenwerking van de partners weer. Toegevoegd aan de verklaring is een 
lijst van voorgestelde projecten – de implementatie van deze projecten geeft de inhoud 
van het Mobiliteitspartnerschap weer. Aan het eind van 2009 (het einde van de periode 
waarin de casusselectie voor dit onderzoek heeft plaatsgevonden) zijn er Mobiliteits-
partnerschappen ondertekend met Moldavië, Kaapverdië en Georgië. De onderhande-
lingen met Senegal zijn opgeschort. De EU-lidstaten hebben verschillende voorkeuren 
aangegeven betreffende de Mobiliteitspartnerschappen. Frankrijk participeert in alle 
drie mobiliteitspartnerschappen, de meeste lidstaten participeren in één of twee partner-
schappen, en vier lidstaten (Oostenrijk, Finland, Ierland en Malta) nemen aan geen 
enkel Mobiliteitspartnerschap deel. 
 Dit onderzoek heeft als doel een toevoeging te zijn op de bestaande literatuur over 
Mobiliteitspartnerschappen, door als eerste op basis van uitgebreide interviews, een 
systematische analyse van de voorkeuren van lidstaten en derde landen te maken. Het 
samenbrengen van drie niveaus van analyse is tevens een doelstelling: het niveau van de 
lidstaat, de EU en het internationale (derde land) niveau. Hoofdstuk 2 van dit onderzoek 
beargumenteert dat het proces van het nemen van beleidsbeslissingen op het gebied van 
Europees extern migratiebeleid, een ‘three-level-game’ is.  
 Op het eerste niveau onderhandelen de EU en derde landen over migratieproblema-
tiek. Om de uitkomsten van deze internationale onderhandelingen te begrijpen, is het 
van essentieel belang om de binnenlandse voorkeuren van deze derde landen op het 
gebeid van onderhandelen met de EU te begrijpen. Dit onderzoek past twee concurre-
rende verklaringen voor de voorkeuren van derde landen toe: de  ‘policy conditionality’ 
verklaring (een rationele kosten-baten verklaring)  en ‘social learning’ (een constructi-
vistisch verslag gebaseerd op de logica van het gepaste handelen. Het EU niveau (ni-
veau 2) is het proces van het nemen van beleidsbeslissingen op het gebied van Europees 
extern migratiebeleid binnen de EU, tussen de Europese instituties en de lidstaten in de 
(Europese) Raad. Dit onderzoek past een beleidsmatige aanpak toe, door het patroon 
van beleid op Europees niveau in kaart te brengen en vervolgens dit patroon te verklaren 
in termen van de rol die Europese instituties en de lidstaten spelen. Hoewel lidstaten een 
centrale rol hebben in dit beleidsveld, proberen Europese instituties zoveel mogelijk 
competenties naar zich toe te trekken. Het niveau van de lidstaat (niveau 3) in de ‘three 
level game’ refereert naar de formatie van binnenlandse voorkeuren van de lidstaat op 
het gebeid van Europees extern migratiebeleid. Het is van belang de binnenlandse voor-
keuren van lidstaten te begrijpen om inzicht te krijgen in de uitkomsten van beslissingen 
binnen de EU. Dit onderzoek past twee concurrerende verklaringen voor de voorkeuren 
op het gebied van Mobiliteitspartnerschappen van lidstaten toe: een rationele kosten-
baten verklaring en een constructivistische verklaring van nationale identiteit. 
 De drie niveaus in deze ‘three level game’ zijn aan elkaar gerelateerd door een 
tweetal interacties: de eerste tussen de lidstaten en de Europese instituties, de tweede 
tussen de EU en derde landen. De twee interacties zijn gerelateerd omdat het beleid dat 
wordt bepaald in de eerste interactie (tussen lidstaten en de Europese instituties), het 
onderwerp wordt van onderhandeling in de tweede interactie (tussen de EU en het derde 
land). Niveaus 1 en 3 zijn ook direct gerelateerd, onafhankelijk van de EU, door bilate-
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rale overeenkomsten op het gebied van migratie. Tenslotte zijn lidstaten ‘aanwezig’ in 
de interactie tussen de EU en het derde land, door de centrale rol die zij innemen in het 
bepalen van de inhoud van het beleid dat ter onderhandeling ligt. 
 Om de onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden, zijn case studies voor vijf landen uitge-
voerd. Ten eerste zijn op het niveau van de lidstaten, case studies uitgevoerd voor 
Frankrijk, Oostenrijk en Nederland. Frankrijk is geselecteerd als een ‘positieve’ casus, 
omdat het deelneemt in alle Mobiliteitspartnerschappen die overeen zijn gekomen tot 
aan het eind van 2009. Oostenrijk is geselecteerd als een ‘negatieve’ casus, omdat zij 
aan geen enkele mobiliteitspartnerschap deelnam; de Oostenrijkse overheid heeft de 
Europese Commissie zelfs beschuldigd van het ondermijnen van de bevoegdheden van 
lidstaten met dit beleidsinstrument. Nederland is een ‘ambivalente’ casus – de Neder-
landse overheid was initieel tegenstander van de Mobiliteitspartnerschappen, maar heeft 
naderhand haar positie gewijzigd en deelgenomen aan het partnerschap met Georgië en 
Kaapverdië. Op het niveau van het derde land, is Senegal geselecteerd als een ‘negatie-
ve’ casus omdat het land de gestarte onderhandelingen hierover heeft gestaakt. Kaap-
verdië is geselecteerd als een ‘positieve’ casus, omdat zij toestemden met een mobili-
teitspartnerschap. Om data te verzamelen, zijn er 66 interviews uitgevoerd met beleids-
makers in de Europese Commissie, de overheden van Frankrijk, Oostenrijk, Nederland, 
Senegal en Kaapverdië. Daarnaast zijn er interviews gehouden met delegaties van de 
EU in derde landen en lokale delegaties van de Internationale Organisatie voor Migratie 
(IOM).  
 Hoofdstuk 4 van dit onderzoek brengt het beleidspatroon onderliggend aan Mobili-
teitspartnerschappen op Europees niveau in kaart. Het toont aan dat de lidstaten en de 
Europese Commissie met elkaar worstelen over de controle van dit beleidsinstrument. 
Voor de schermen leek de Commissie een centrale rol te hebben gespeeld: de Commis-
sie was verantwoordelijk voor de communicatie over Mobiliteitspartnerschappen, heeft 
potentiële partnerlanden voorgesteld, heeft de interesse in deelname van lidstaten ge-
peild, discussies gevoerd met vertegenwoordigers van derde landen en continue de 
Mobiliteitspartnerschappen als beleidsinstrument van de Europese relatie met derde 
landen gepromoot. Desondanks bleven de lidstaten achter de schermen controle houden 
over de inhoud, richting en vorm van de Mobiliteitspartnerschappen. De lidstaten heb-
ben de periode van beleidsformulering beïnvloed door hun eigen beleidsinitiatieven. 
Gedurende de periode van het nemen van beslissingen, hebben de lidstaten de Commis-
sie gemandateerd en controleerden zij het selectieproces van derde landen. De invloed 
van de lidstaten op het proces van het nemen van beslissingen, heeft zichzelf gemanifes-
teerd in de vorm van de partnerschappen: Mobiliteitspartnerschappen worden getekend 
als politieke verklaringen (in plaats van wettelijk bindende internationale overeenkom-
sten); deelname is vrijwillig voor de lidstaten; en de lidstaten controleren de inhoud van 
de partnerschappen door de projecten die zij voorstellen. 
 Nu de dominante rol van de lidstaten op Europees niveau is vastgesteld, is hoofd-
stuk 5 een verhandeling over de voorkeuren van lidstaten wat betreft de Mobiliteitspart-
nerschappen. De Oostenrijkse overheid had besloten niet deel te nemen omdat de Mobi-
liteitspartnerschappen met hun gelijkenis van de ‘gastarbeiter’ opzet, niet pasten binnen 
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de nationaal gestelde beleidsdoelen voor migratie. De Nederlandse overheid was in het 
begin terughoudend omdat de kosten en baten van dit nieuwe beleidsinstrument nog niet 
inzichtelijk waren. Desalniettemin, toen het nationale beleid was geformuleerd, is er 
vastgesteld dat de baten van deelname aan de partnerschappen de kosten overstegen. 
Door de Franse overheid werd deelname aan de partnerschappen als ‘gepast’ gezien 
omdat het goed paste in het beeld van Frankrijk als leider, zowel binnen de EU als bre-
der in het domein van extern migratiebeleid. Voorts heeft dit hoofdstuk niet bewezen 
dat het bestaan van bilaterale relaties met het voorgestelde partnerschapsland de voor-
keuren van de overheden van lidstaten heeft beïnvloed. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert de voorkeuren van derde landen. Noch Kaapverdië, noch 
Senegal waren betrokken in een proces van dialoog en overtuiging door de EU: in plaats 
daarvan had het voorstel voor een Mobiliteitspartnerschap een hoog ‘slikken of stikken’ 
gehalte. Het partnerschap paste goed binnen de Kaapverdische beleidsdoelen op het 
gebied van migratie, en de kosten die betaald moesten worden  in de vorm van een 
overnameovereenkomst van onderdanen werden uiteindelijk lager geacht dan de voor-
gestelde voordelen. Dit in tegenstelling tot Senegal, waar het partnerschap niet goed 
paste binnen de gestelde migratiedoelen en de kosten voor overname van onderdanen te 
hoog werden geacht voor de voorgestelde, magere voordelen. Bilaterale alternatieven 
die de voorkeur hadden, sterkten de voorkeur van de Senegalese overheid om ‘nee’ te 
zeggen tegen de EU.  
 De conclusie pleit voor het slaan van bruggen tussen rationeel en constructivistisch 
denken, zodat academisch onderzoek de empirische waarheid kan weergeven. Verder 
onderzoek kan het ‘three level game’ model nuttig toepassen op andere beleidsinstru-
menten van Europees extern migratiebeleid, of op compleet andere externe beleidsvel-
den als bijvoorbeeld het gemeenschappelijk visserijbeleid. Toekomstig onderzoek naar 
Mobiliteitspartnerschappen zou een nuttige vergelijking kunnen maken tussen Afrikaan-
se en Oost-Europese partnerlanden, of een analyse kunnen uitvoeren op meer lidstaten. 
Tenslotte is het belangrijk niet uit het oog te verliezen dat extern migratiebeleid van 
invloed is op mensen, namelijk migranten die proberen de Europese Unie te bereiken. 
Gezien de dubieuze situatie wat betreft mensenrechten van sommige van de derde lan-
den waarmee de EU samenwerkt (Libië in het bijzonder), is het de vraag of het wense-
lijk is voor het Europees extern migratiebeleid om effectief geïmplementeerd te worden. 
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